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Introduction 
1. WHY STUDY THE ACADEMY OF 
TURKU? 
The question of the role of universities in the 17th-century Scientific 
Revolution has increasingly attracted renewed attention in the history 
of science since the 1980's. According to the old standard view es-
tablished by Martha Ornstein in the 1920's, the universities played 
hardly any role at all in scientific change (except perhaps by retarding 
it), whereas the scientific societies fought for new science.' This view 
has been revised and nowadays it is generally conceded that univer-
sities played an important role in disseminating the ideas of the Scien-
tific Revolution. New scientific ideas were gradually incorporated into 
the curriculum, albeit with varying speed and to a varying extent. The 
significance of this is clear, bearing in mind that most of the prominent 
figures in 17th-century new science were actually educated in univer-
sities.2 It is an important notion that the Aristotelian philosophical 
system was not necessarily inflexible, although the universities ob-
viously were reluctant to change as institutions. 
The way of incorporating new modes of thought in the traditional 
curriculum was usually a gradual and a critical process. Therefore I 
am less willing to employ the term "Scientific Revolution", the mea-
ning of which has become so familiar as to suffer from depletion to 
a considerable extent? I regard the phrase "diffusion of knowledge" 
instead as more suitable to describe the developments in most 17th- 
Ornstein 1928, esp. p. 213-263. 
2 Brockliss 1981, 1987, 1990, p. 190-191. Gascoigne 1985, 1990. Heyd 1982. Rues-
tow 1973. Feingold 1991 however stresses the conservative attitude of the uni-
versity institutions. 
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On the different meanings attached to the phrase "scientific revolution" see Porter 
1987. For an analysis of difficulties in using this concept see Cunningham & 
Williams 1993. 
13 
century European universities. Indeed, for some of them the "Scientific 
Revolution" seems to consist of the abandonment of Aristotelian phy-
sical concepts and the acceptance of new, mainly Cartesian ones ins-
tead.4 
Diffusion and transformation of knowledge is an integral part of 
scientific change. Every scientific innovation, be it a methodology, 
theory, hypothesis or an instrument, needs to be accepted by a wider 
audience in order to be able to claim the status of a scientific truth.' 
Hence, the diffusion of ideas or "-isms" such as experimentalism, Car-
tesianism and heliocentrism into universities has been extensively stu-
died in large and famous universities like Paris and Cambridge, or 
even Uppsala.' These studies have often been motivated by the aspi-
ration to redefine the role of the universities in this process of change. 
However, we generally know relatively little about how the diffusion 
and transformation of knowledge took place at the less well-known 
14 
	
	 and smaller universities. Neither is it pointless to study what an early 
modern university was like for its own sake. This study will focus on 
both of these purposes. It will explore what natural philosophical lear-
ning was like in a provincial 17th-century university, and how the 
mechanisms involved in the process of diffusion of knowledge func-
tioned there. 
In 17th-century Sweden the universities played an irreplaceable role 
in all learning. It has been said that some of the gymnasiums almost 
equalled universities,' but excluding these exceptions the universities 
were the only institutions where any kind of higher education could 
be obtained. There were no academies or societies promoting the ad-
vancement of new science in Sweden. It was not until Sylvester in 
1710 when the first short-lived academy, Collegium curiosorum, was 
founded in Sweden by the mechanical engineer Christopher Polhem 
4 Widmalm 1992. 
5 	 The matter is naturally not as simple as this, but further essential questions and 
reservations can be raised such as to what extent a theory must be understood in 
order to be accepted? What if only some aspects of the theory are being accepted? 
What does it then mean 'to be accepted'? A theory may be shared by different 
kinds of groups: laymen, authorities, scientists in one or several disciplines, in 
one or several countries or laboratories, etc. 
6 Brockliss 1981, 1987. Gascoigne 1985. Widmalm 1992. 
7 	 Several new gymnasiums were founded in Sweden at the beginning of the 17th 
century: Västerås 1623, Strägnäs 1626, Linköping 1627, Turku and Tartu 1630, 
Skara and Vyborg 1641, Växjö 1643. The two first gymnasiums especially worked 
like a sort of provincial university. Klinge 1987, p. 48. 
and the chemist Urban Hiärne. But it was only in 1739 that the Aca-
demy of Sweden was founded on the model of the French and English 
scientific academies. Chemistry and mechanics were to some extent 
studied outside the university by the copper-mining company at Stora 
Kopparberget.8 This study was clearly practice-orientated, but it did 
not immediately influence the theoretical teaching at the universities. 
Moreover, even in the 18th century the chemists and academics re-
ceived their basic education at the University of Uppsala. Therefore 
universities are our major starting-points in studying natural philosop-
hical thinking. 
The University of Turku was one of the five universities in the 
Kingdom of Sweden during the 17th century, the other ones being 
located at Uppsala, Tartu, Lund and Greifswald. The University of 
Turku was slower to open its gates to new or practical knowledge 
than the country's main university in Uppsala. It was small compared 
with the leading European universities of that age,9 and no particularly 	 15 
exciting and original ideas in the field of physics emanated from there 
during the period concerned. The natural philosophical learning at Tur-
ku is nevertheless worth studying, not only because the University 
satisfied the educational needs of an almost half of the country, but 
also because the research provides us with a model of an early modern 
university. This is not to say that the processes involved in the dif-
fusion of knowledge in other universities would necessarily be similar 
to those operating at Turku. Nevertheless the focus on peripheral ins-
titutions may contribute to our understanding of 17th-century learning 
on a larger scale. 
The aim of this study is to create a detailed view of the history of 
learning at the Academy of Turku. (Despite its official name, the Royal 
Academy of Turku, the institution in question was a normal early mo-
dern university.) Moreover, this study will focus on one discipline 
only, i.e. natural philosophy or physics. Before defining the subject 
of this study more closely, however, let us see what has already been 
written on the role of the Academy of Turku and of learning there. 
8 Lindroth 1975, p. 552-555. Lindroth 1978, p. 48 ff. 
9 There were 600-850 students during the period concerned. Strömberg 1987, p. 
308-309. 
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2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Life and learning at the Academy of Turku is a many-sided topic and 
many studies handling various aspects of it have been published. It is 
not, therefore, possible or even desirable to introduce all of them here. 
However, in order to relate this study to previous research I shall in 
the following discuss some of the most noteworthy studies of the his-
tory of the Academy of Turku and of its learning. 
There are two major histories of the University in general. In the 
1980's a great project was launched to write a new history of the 
Academy of Turku. This project, mainly motivated by the 350th an-
niversary of the University, has resulted in a thorough picture of its 
social, political and administrative developments. Most relevant for 
us is the first part of this three-volume series, History of The University 
of Helsinki, part I, The Royal Academy of Turku 1640-1808. 10 (The 
University was moved to Helsinki in 1828 after a devastating fire and 
has since then been known as the University of Helsinki.) Because of 
its general character, however, this book can offer only a sketchy view 
of the main area of this research, i.e. the history of natural philosophy. 
The same thing is more true of the another major history of the Uni-
versity, Ivar A. Heikel's University of Helsinki 1640-1940. 
Many of those studies which discuss aspects of learning at the Uni-
versity are more concerned with other subjects than natural philosop-
hy. Seppo J. Salminen and Pentti Laasonen have discussed the history 
of theology in their biographies of theology professor Enevaldus Sve-
nonius and Bishop Johan Gezelius." These studies give us valuable 
information about the intellectual milieu in the University. Logic and 
metaphysics are subjects which have great relevance for natural phi-
losophy too. The character of these branches of knowledge in the 
1660's were studied by Jaakko Lounela in his doctoral dissertation on 
the teaching of logic in 17th-century Finland.:2 A wider account of 
philosophy at Turku, which still is very useful, was written by pro-
fessor Thiodolf Rein at the beginning of this century.13 Rein discusses 
not only theoretical but also practical philosophy (ethics and politics), 
even making excursuses into other disciplines such as physics. 
10 Klinge, Knapas, Leikola, Strömberg 1987. 
11 Laasonen 1977b. Salminen 1978, 1985. 
12 Lounela 1978. 
13 Rein 1908. 
Rein's study was published in a series which still forms the most 
extensive studies dealing with the history of science at the Academy 
of Turku. This series, History of Learning at the University of Turku 
dates from the turn of the century when it was produced by the Society 
for Swedish Literature in Finland.14 It covers all disciplines from theo-
logy and philology to physics and medicine. Those parts which handle 
thinking in natural history, physics and mathematics only confine 
themselves to describing the contents of some dissertations which were 
considered important by the authors, O.E.A. Hjelt and K.F. Slotte. 
The lack of analytical spirit is, however, not the only defect in these 
books. Quite often they reflect the positivistic ideals of the end of the 
19th century and do not therefore always meet the demands which 
are set for historical studies in our days. 
The whiggish attitude towards bygone science, which can actually 
be in a way charming when found in texts dating from over ninety 
years ago, provokes nothing but irritation in articles written in the 	 17 
1950's or later. It is not unusual to find in these studies a tone which 
is profoundly ahistorical. If we judge 17th-century learning by our 
own criteria about what proper (physical) science should be, it is no 
wonder that we do not find much science there to be studied. But, by 
doing this we easily miss the point and fail to understand these dif-
ferent patterns of thinking. The most striking example of this failure 
is the section in the authoritative Cultural History of Finland 1, which 
also deals with the early phases of learning at the Academy of Turku.'5 
Whereas systematic studies on 17th-century natural philosophy are 
still lacking, several articles on the subject do nevertheless exist. Some 
of these succeed in avoiding the whiggish attitude fairly well. Anto 
Leikola has written many articles about biological ideas in the 17th 
and the 18th centuries. Seppo J. Salminen has dealt with natural phi-
losophy and Cartesianism from the theologians' point of view. One 
of the most distinguished works is Simo Knuuttila's and Ilkka Niini-
luoto's article on the arrival of Baconianism in Finland. This study 
shows that Baconian ideology - even if not Baconian science in prac-
tice - really arrived in Turku only in the 18th century.16 Tapio Mark-
kanen and Raimo Lehti have dealt with Copemicanism - and ast- 
14 	 The parts of the series essential in this context are Heikel 1894. Hjelt 1896. Rein 
1908. Slotte 1898. Fagerlund & Tigerstedt 1890. 
15 Lehtinen 1979. 
16 Knuuttila & Niiniluoto 1986. Leikola 1983a, 1983b. Salminen 1983, 1981. 
ronomy in general - in several articles and studies, so that the overall 
(although partially biased) picture of the fate of heliocentrism in Fin-
land is well covered." 
Finally, there are my own studies on natural philosophy at the Aca-
demy of Turku. In my Finnish candidate of philosophy and licentiate 
of philosophy theses I have analysed the contents of Contemplationes 
mundi, a textbook in natural philosophy written by a professor of 
eloquence, Daniel Achrelius, in 1678-82.18 Even though Achrelius' 
book offers a general view of the natural philosophy of its time, it 
still is an account of only one person's work, which in the light of 
the current study proves out to be more atypical than expected. 
In Sweden history of science has had a position among academic 
disciplines since the 1930's, and the study of 17th-century learning 
has been one of the fields most focussed on. In these studies natural 
philosophy has been placed in a more general, all-Swedish context. 
18 
	
	 Unfortunately, this has in practice meant a strong emphasis on Upp- 
sala. This has inevitably led to a situation in which the developments 
characteristic of Turku have attracted less attention than those at the 
main university.19 It is obvious from what has been said above that 
even if all existing studies were gathered together, an evident gap 
would still remain. A comprehensive study is still lacking - a study 
which would place natural philosophy at the second largest University 
of 17th-century Sweden in its proper disciplinary context. This work 
is meant to fill this gap. At the same time I shall try to approach the 
subject analytically and pose questions which hopefully turn out to 
be interesting in the history of science generally. 
Before specifying the tasks of this study more closely, it might be 
appropriate to have a brief look at our sources. This is because the 
nature of the sources available limits considerably the number of rea-
lizable modes of approach. 
17 Lehti 1979, 1984. Markkanen 1970. 
18 Kallinen 1991a. See also Kallinen 1991b. 
19 Lindroth 1943, 1975. Sandblad 1944, 1945. Nordenmark 1959. 
3. SOURCES OF THE STUDY 
A) Theses and monographs. The humanistic ideals upon which aca-
demic learning was founded emphasized promoting sublime moral and 
intellectual values and their polished expression. At the University, 
these ideals were to find their expression in orations composed by 
students, and in dissertations. As one of the earliest scholars at Turku 
put it, the purpose of preparing a dissertation was to "sharpen the 
reason and inquire into the truth, which are both intellectual nourish-
ment".20 A dissertation was extremely important as the culmination of 
academic learning. However, the process of writing and defending a 
thesis in the 17th century differs radically from that of our own times. 
Academic dissertations are unquestionably the most important sources 
for studying the history of natural philosophy at Turku, so that there 
is every reason to ask, what was a thesis? and to study them a little 
more closely. 
First of all, two kinds of dissertations were being published: the 
so-called inaugural theses for practising argumentation tactics, and 
master's theses. Doctoral dissertations were extremely rare at Turku 
in the 17th century, and they were ventilated only in the Faculty of 
Theology. Indeed, there was no such a thing as a Doctorate of Phi-
losophy before the 19th century. In the 17th century the reason for 
this was clear, the role of the Faculty of Arts being to provide pre-
paratory instruction only and thus a "Doctor of Philosophy" was some-
thing like a contradiction in terms.21 Theses were always printed22 and 
20 Alanus-Garsius 1645, Th. III "...ingenij acuendi, veritatisque inquirendae gratia, 
quae animi pabulum." Klinge 1987, p. 98, 103-104, 584-600, et passim, points 
out that the endeavour to establish Ciceronian and Erasmian-style humanistic 
values in Sweden was often expressed in speeches. In practice, however, this 
effort brought meagre results. Somewhat cynically it could be stated however 
that the unarticulated aims of humanistic education were nevertheless realized at 
least in one respect at the University of Turku. As Grafton & Jardine 1986, p. 
xiii-xiv, 17, 24, 136, et passim have shown, despite its high moral principles 
humanistic education tended to produce passive students. It was important to 
know the method, but not to express one's own ideas. Obviously, fluent and 
docile students made good officials and clergymen in this age of absolutism and 
religious orthodoxy. Otherwise the "humanism" Klinge is talking about seems to 
be more Ramistic in spirit when it emphasizes the importance of disputation and 
ratiocination. (Lipsius on the other hand stressed political skills as the main aim 
of humanistic studies.) Grafton & Jardine 1986, p. 197. 
21 
	
	 The whole concept of Doctor of Philosophy was accepted around 1800, but even 
dissertations for Doctor of Theology or Law were extremely rare at Turku. On 
19 
thus considered to be really public. In this context the public consisted 
chiefly of the readers inside the academy itself and it was perhaps 
only patrons and parents who otherwise had access to philosophical 
theses. 
In any case publicity presupposed some degree of censorship, usu-
ally in the form of an imprimatur conceded by the dean of the Faculty. 
Instead of ensuring the thesis's adequate scholarly standard, the pri-
mary function of the censorship was to prevent publishing any material 
which might offend religion or the king. For this reason we can expect 
that dissertations usually represent the orthodox and generally accep-
ted interpretations of theories. There were, of course, some occasions 
when the contents of a thesis aroused opposition. 
The question of the real author of a dissertation has often been 
considered to be an important one. According to the general practice 
professors usually wrote the inaugural theses (pro exercitio), while the 
20 
	
	 masters' theses (pro gradu) were more often written by the student 
himself.73 Usually, when the student was the author of a thesis, it was 
indicated by subscription "Auth. & Resp." or something similar at the 
end of the dedication." The task of the student, responders, was first 
of all to pay for the printing of the thesis and then to defend it against 
the opponens, also a student. I shall take up the question of the real 
author only if there is a special reason. This is done for the following 
reasons. 
First of all, most dissertations were probably written more or less 
in co-operation. It would be waste of time and effort to try to define 
which elements of a given thesis come from the professor's and which 
from the student's pen. Secondly, dissertations are usually standard 
works as far as their contents is concerned. They contain very few 
personal elements apart from the dedicatory and congratulatory poems 
attached to the beginning of the work. There is some point in discus-
sing the author's real identity only in those cases when it can help to 
explain some special characteristics of the thesis. Most importantly, 
however, the fundamental idea of the disputative method in philosophy 
the development of the title "Doctor of Philosophy" see Clark 1992. 
22 	 The privileges of the university press were established in 1641, but the press 
itself began functioning only in 1642. Heikel 1940, p. 52-53. 
23 	 Klinge 1987, p. 393. 
24 In these cases the student was also officially regarded as the author. E.g. Aboa 
Literata, one of the earliest bibliographies on literature produced at the Academy, 
names students as authors of these theses. Stiernman 1990 (1719). 
was that nobody was supposed to propose his own ideas, but any 
student should in principle be able to defend or oppose any thesis.75 
This principle certainly accounts for the manifest impersonality of the 
theses. 
Writing and defending dissertations had a mainly pedagogical func-
tion. Indeed, it has been claimed very convincingly that emphasizing 
the pedagogical utility of thesis-writing could occasionally go as far 
as to influence the acceptance of certain ideas in the universities of 
early modern Europe. The less suitable a philosophical construct was 
for pedagogical functions, the more reluctant university scholars were 
to accept it. On the other hand, a factor which greatly contributed to 
the final success of the Cartesian philosophical system was its peda-
gogical suitability.26 The main aim in defending a thesis was to teach 
students to master the art of arguing, i.e. the proper use of both rhetoric 
and dialectic. No independent thought was encouraged. For the aut- 
horities this kind of learning was perfect. Students who learned to 	 21 
follow the method without speculating too much themselves undoub-
tedly became competent and docile servants for both the church and 
the state. 
The ideal aim of philosophical scholarship was to educate good 
debaters who would find the (pre-established) 'truth' by critical dis-
cussion which followed certain fixed rules. This ideal does not, the-
refore, contradict the fact that the corpus of the True Philosophy was 
thought to exist there already.' In other words, even though disser-
tations were rhetorical practices, the theories expressed in them were 
nevertheless regarded as true. This is a simple but an important point 
to note, because a modern reader might easily view such theses as 
pieces of research and judge them as such. We cannot blame 17th-
century theses for not being good research (in the sense of finding 
out new knowledge), because that was not their objective. They were 
exercises in debating, which at the same time taught students the right 
kind of world-view, a function they obviously fulfilled. 
Natural philosophy was naturally mainly dealt with in physics. 
However, other professors also taught the subject and wrote theses on 
25 	 Klinge 1987, p. 391. 
26 	 van Berkel 1981, p. 110-112. Gascoigne 1990, p. 212-216. The point of the pe-
dagogical unsuitability of certain philosophies was sometimes expressly made. 
Gascoigne 1985, p. 396, 412. 
27 Klinge 1987, p. 384. van Berkel 1981, p. 112-116. Mikkeli 1992, p. 43-44, 91. 
it. Many theses discussing themes which clearly belong to the field 
of physics were published under the guidance of other professors of 
the Faculty of Arts, e.g. eloquence, poetry, logic and metaphysics, and 
mathematics. Which principles should we then use to judge the rele-
vance to this study of theses written in various fields? First of all it 
has to be noticed that even in physics some theses were written on 
political and metaphysical subjects.28 These have been ignored in this 
study. Secondly, there are dissertations in almost every discipline 
which include chapters or quaestiones dealing with several branches 
of knowledge, including physics. The main point is that these chapters 
were judged as natural philosophical even by the standards of the day. 
But I have also included some theses, which deal with the same sub-
ject matter as physics but belong to a different discipline. 
Medicine and mathematics were independent disciplines and thus 
not regarded as parts of physics. However, the handful of dissertations 
22 
	
	 in medicine and a rather larger number in mathematical astronomy 
will also be considered in this study. This is because in my opinion 
comparing the views presented in these disciplines with each other 
may contribute to our understanding of the 17th-century learning as 
a whole. Because of the aim of comparison, purely mathematical the-
ses like those on geometry or arithmetic, or "applied mathematics" 
such as calendar-making and geodesy have been left aside. Theologi-
cal and metaphysical texts (about purely theological and metaphysical 
aspects) will also be examined only as far as it is necessary for un-
derstanding some of the more fundamental concepts in the system of 
knowledge. Because the relationships between physics and other aca-
demic disciplines play a central role in my argument, the subject will 
be dealt with more extensively in the chapter "The Academic Context 
of Natural Philsophy". 
It will probably never be possible to scrape together every single 
thesis in which issues relevant to natural philosophy and/or mathema-
tical astronomy were dealt with. Only theses which directly deal with 
these subjects will be considered in this study, since otherwise it is 
to be feared that the most genuine problems in the field would be 
drowned out by the multitude of dissertations dealing with matters of 
a less relevant sort. Obviously marking off this material is never 
entirely unproblematic. The following tables name the professors in 
28 E.g. Hahn-Schefer 1687. Hahn-Coreel 1704. Hahn-Wiising 1687. 
the disciplines most relevant in respect to natural philosophy at the 
Faculty of Arts and the Faculty of Medicine. It also summarizes the 
number of theses published under their tuition.29 These tables may 
also help the reader to orientate himself in this jungle of scholars' 
names later in the text. It should be noticed that some of the theses 
included under the column "On physics" also discuss other problems 
than physical ones for the reasons indicated above, so that these num-
bers should not be taken as an absolute guide but only as an appro-
ximation. 
The total number of theses and parts of theses dealing with natural 
philosophical topics and subjects related to it amount to 284. However, 
not all of them are necessarily referred to in this study. On a chrono-
logical scale, the most active years appear to be the two decades from 
1680 to 1700. While during the first ten years of the 18th century the 
activity of writing theses remained at a relatively high level, the num-
bers collapsed noticeably after 1710. Petrus Hahn for example super-
vised only seven theses after 1710. The cause for this is partly to be 
sought in the effects of the ongoing Great Northern War, refugees 
from Livonia bringing plague to Stockholm and Turku in September 
1710, and in May 1711 a devastating fire burning down about one 
fourth of the town of Turku.30 
It is striking that the number of physical dissertations written by 
other professors than physics reaches its height during the period when 
Andreas Petraeus held the chair in physics. As Petraeus himself pre-
sided over only for four theses during his seventeen years at office, 
the professors of Latin language Martinus Miltopaeus and Daniel Ach-
relius published on natural philosophy especially. The same applies 
to Petrus Laurbecchius also, although he continued to publish in the 
field even after the nomination of Hahn in 1683. Laurbecchius also 
worked as an extraordinary professor of mathematics for two years 
from 1667 on.31 The professor of logic and metaphysics Simon Tålpo 
published a remarkable number of theses in physics or topics closely 
related to it. Indeed, 20.6 % of all his theses can be classified as 
"physical". However, in his case his diligence seems not to correlate 
with the period of Petraeus' professorship, so we might consider per-
sonal interest in physics as his main motive. 
29 The numbers are based on Vallinkoski 1966. 
3° Engström 1994. Tengström 1833, p. 153, 155. 
31 Stiernman 1990, p. 63. 
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Table 1. The following tables show the number of theses per professor in each discipline 
considered in this study. The darker column shows the number of theses relevant to this 
study in each professor's oeuvre, whereas the lighter column represents the total number of 
theses. Alanus was professor of physics and botany during 1640-48, Thauvonius 1649-59, 
Thuronius 1660-65, Petraeus 1665-82 and Hahn 1683-1718. Alanus, Thauvonius and 
Petraeus became later professors of Theology. 
Professors of Logic and Metaphysics 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 
Table 2. The production of relevant theses for the study of natural philsophy was 
considerably less among the professors of logic and metaphysics, only Thuronius with his 
double professorship, and Simon Tålpo writing many theses on physics and on subjects of 
related interest. Nycopensis was in office 1640-50, Pratanus 1650-55, Thuronius 1656-65, 
Jakob Flachsenius 1665-79, Tålpo 1679-1700, Rungius 1700-01 and Juslenius 1702-17. 
Pryss Anders 
Rudeen Torsten 
Lund David 
Laurbecchius Petrus 
Justander Erik 
Table 3. In the Middle Ages and Renaissance poetics was usually taught either as a part of 
rhetoric or logic. At Turku it was first associated with logic, but in 1655 poetics became a 
chair of its own. The professors of poetics are as follows: Justander 1655-67, Laurbecchius 
1668-88, Lund 1688-91, Rudeen 1692-1706 and Pryss 1706-46. 
Table 4. Eloquence was one of the most important humanistic disciplines. It was regarded as 
useful both for would-be officials and clergymen - in the latter case because of its usefulness 
for the art of preaching. Terserus held the first professorship during 1640-49, and he was 
followed by Hartman 1649-53, Svenonius 1654-60, Miltopaeus 1660-79, Achrelius 1679-92, 
Alander 1692-1704, Pihlman 1704-07 and Nesselius 1707-16. 
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Table 5. The scope of mathematics included not only arithmetic and geometry, but also 
astronomy, geodesy, music, cartography and other subjects. At Turku mathematics is 
characterised by the long teaching periods of each professor, excluding Steen who spent only 
five years in office: Kexlerus stayed as professor 1640-69, Johan Flachsenius 1669-92, Steen 
1692-97 and Tammelin 1698-1717. 
Professors of Medicine 
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Table 6. The medics published remarkably little, which has mostly to do with the status of the 
medical profession. Anyone who took a degree in medicine preferred to do it abroad, e.g. in 
Leiden. The Faculty of Medicine had the following professors: Achrelius 1641-70, Til-landz 
1670-93, Braun 1693-98, Wallerius 1699-1704 and Hielm 1705-15. 
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Table 7. This table shows the distribution of the theses relevant for this study in various 
disciplines. As expected, the largest number of theses falls into physics and botany, which 
was the proper discipline for natural philosophy. The great number of natural philosophical 
theses in eloquence is explained by Achrelius' Contemplationes mundi, which was first 
published as a series of theses. Theses in mathematics and medicine were considered as 
mathematical or medical respectively, not as a part of physics. 
Table 8. The periodical distribution of all relevant theses shows a great increase in natural 
philosophical and mathematical activity in the 1680's and 1690's. The Great Northern War 
caused a decline in the number of theses. The fall starts from the beginning of the new 
century and accelerates during the last three years of the period, when only a few theses 
were printed: hence the last column exceptionally includes the thirteen years 1700-13. 
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Besides theses there was another literary genre typical of scholastic 
and early modern learning: the textbook. In theology, professor Ene-
vald Svenonius produced several volumes of programmatic and pug-
nacious religious books.32 In mathematics, Kexlerus published books 
on arithmetic, chronology, and cosmological geography.33 Andreas 
Thuronius published two books in logic and metaphysics, which were 
to become classic texts at Turku: Institutiones Logicae and Compen-
dium Metaphysicae.34 Several other books from other authors could 
be named in addition to these. Most of these textbooks contained only 
small personal contributions, as they were for the most part compila-
tions of certain foreign authors' works. 
There are, however, two books which are of more importance for 
this study than those mentioned above. In 1672 Bishop Johan Gezelius 
published his Encyclopaedia Synoptica, which was a wide-ranging 
scholastic representation of all branches of knowledge. The method 
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and aim of this work is revealed in its subtitles: "Collected from the 
best and most exact writings of Philosophers and distributed in Three 
parts. Published for the use of diligent students, who have no money 
to by the longer works of these Authors, and have not enough time 
to go through all of them."35 Gezelius' work combines the old ency-
clopaedic tradition with seventeenth-century developments. Whereas 
the encyclopaedias were traditionally occupied with the question of 
the classification of sciences, the 17th-century textbooks were partly 
different in character. There was a growing tendency among the se-
venteenth-century authors to write a cursus covering the entire course 
of philosophy, or even theology.36 Gezelius has a laconic style of ex- 
32 On Svenonius' oeuvre see Salminen 1978, 1985. 
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	 Arithmetica triplex 1655. Tractatus brevis de tempore 1661. Cosmographiae Com- 
pendiosa descriptio et geographiae introductio 1666. Vallinkoski 1966, p. 280-
283. Slotte 1898, p. 7-8. 
34 Institutro logicae 1660-61. Compendium metaphysicae 1664. Rein 1908, p. 75-84. 
35 Gezelius 1672. "Ex Optimis & accuratissimis Philosophorum Scriptis collecta, & 
in Tres partes distributa. In Usum Studiosae juventutis, cui neque pretium pro-
lixiores Authores redimendi, neque tempus eosdem perlustrandi suppetit, Evulga-
ta." 
36 According to Laasonen 1977b, p. 373-374 and Klinge 1987, p. 594 the foreign 
model for Gezelius' work might have been German Johann Henrich Alsteds' 
Scientiarium omnium encyclopaedia of 1630. This would be understandable be-
cause the Calvinists such as Keckermann, Timpler and Alsted were the most 
prominent compilers of encyclopaedias in early 17th century. However, the Cal-
vinists' view of the ontological status of metaphysics and theology differred ra-
dically from that held by the Lutherans. Lohr 1988, p. 632-638. Schmitt 1988, 
p. 801-803. 
pression and he concentrates on making divisions and definitions of 
the subject matters. In this respect his work differs from the normal 
natural philosophical works at Turku. 
Why did Gezelius choose to write in a genre atypical of the Aca-
demy of Turku? One explanation might be that he was a bishop, and 
as such not directly an academic. Unlike the normal textbooks Geze-
lius' Encyclopaedia was not first published as a series of dissertations 
and thus there were no practical demands preventing its presentation 
in this form. 
On the other hand another book of great significance in 17th-cen-
tury physical learning at Turku was first published as a series of dis-
sertations and only later gathered into book form. This textbook is 
Daniel Achrelius' Contemplationes mundi, which came to light as a 
book in 1682.37 Instead of being a comprehensive study of all disci-
plines, it aimed to cover all of natural philosophy. As this book will 
frequently be referred to in this study, it will speak for itself and 
therefore it hardly needs further introduction here. From the 1660's 
to the 1680's textbooks were published relatively frequently in respect 
to the size and resources of the University. The last great textbooks 
were published in the course of the 1680's, and it was not until the 
1730's that we see new attempts to write major works at the Academy 
of Turku. However, only two of the 17th-century textbooks have real 
relevance to this study. Academic theses remain the most important 
source materials. 
B) Manuscripts, letters, minutes. Almost all that we know about 
learning at the Academy of Turku in the 17th century is based on 
information obtained from printed academic dissertations. A series of 
fires has destroyed the major part of other possible sources, such as 
private letters, manuscripts and notes made from lectures. The most 
notable extant manuscript, which has remained unpublished, is a 68-
page treatise on astronomy.38 For a long time this book has been att-
ributed to the professor of physics and metaphysics, Andreas Thu-
ronius, who would have written it around 1664-1665, just before his 
death. However, Jaakko Lounela has quite recently produced convin-
cing evidence that this manuscript is more appropriately ascribed to 
the professor of mathematics Simon Kexlerus.39 Another manuscript 
37 Achrelius 1682. On this book see Kallinen 1991a. 
38 UUB manuscript A 301. 
79 Lounela 1987. 
29 
on comet observations is, however, undoubtedly from Thuronius' 
hand.40 
Other manuscripts concerning natural philosophy in 17th-century 
Turku are hardly traceable. Most part of the official papers of the 
Academy are still available, however, and can be some help in this 
research. Correspondence between the Chancellor and the Senate, as 
well as letters to and from the king of Sweden have been preserved 
up to our day. They are for the most part easily available in printed 
form, as are the official records of the Senate.41 These documents are 
invaluable for elucidating the background to controversies at the Uni-
versity. All in all, however, there is relatively little background ma-
terial available. Although the scope of the sources available does not 
allow us to look into the everyday teaching and learning at the Uni-
versity42 or to do a detailed study on boundary-work through contro-
versies, there are yet other aspects of the life in universities that can 
30 	 be satisfactorily studied. 
4. DEFINING THE SUBJECT OF 
RESEARCH 
This study deals with the thinking in natural philosophy at the Aca-
demy of Turku. It begins with the foundation of the University in 
1640 and extends over seventy-three years to 1713, when the Acade-
my of Turku was closed down, because Russian troops occupied the 
area. Professors fled to Stockholm and rescued the University archives 
and library with them. Although at some point the University tried to 
function even while evacuated, no regular teaching was ever achieved. 
Peace was made between Sweden and Russia in 1721 and the follo-
wing year the University could be reopened. 
It is a general assumption in the history of Finnish science that this 
40 HYK Ms/Mf 550. 
41 	 With the exception of the years 1695-99. 
42 	 For a study in which the regulations stated in the official curriculum are compared 
with the everyday life and teaching in universities see e.g. Brockliss 1987. Gas-
coigne 1985. Grafton & Jardine 1986. 
break caused for political reasons involved a change in learning tra-
ditions as well. It is true that when the University started functioning 
again in 1722, most professors were new to their office and of a 
younger generation with a less scholastic training than their predeces-
sors 4' 
 How deeply this break really influenced the learning of natural 
philosophy in Turku must remain outside the scope of this study. It 
seems that the change was not equally profound in all respects - and 
not even as immediate as has often been assumed. This study will 
provide a sound basis for analysing the question of continuity and 
discontinuity in this historical context, a task I wish to be able to take 
up in a later study. 
"Natural philosophy" is a relatively vague term. It not only refers 
to Medieval and Renaissance natural "science", but also has an estab-
lished reference to the German philosophical movement of the 18th 
and 19th centuries (Naturphilosophie). In this study, of course, we 
have the natural philosophy of the early modern science in mind, 	 31 
which in the 17th century was usually referred to by terms such as 
"scientia naturalis", "physiologia", "history of physical matters" and 
"cognition of nature"." Apart from historiographical correctness there 
is one more reason, why I prefer to use the term "natural philosophy" 
over "science". I would like to avoid any confusion with experimental 
science and thereby respect the unique characteristics of the both of 
these intellectual approaches. The 17th-century natural philosophy was 
characteristically knowledge of God and His attributes as revealed by 
the scrutiny of his creation, i.e. nature. In this "natural philosophy" 
differs markedly from later (19th-century) concepts of "natural scien-
ce"." 
Generally "natural philosophy" in this study equals with the scope 
of the 17th-century physics.46 The natural philosophy at Turku was 
not physics in the same sense as Aristotle and his commentators un-
derstood the subject matter of Physica. Discussions about the general 
and fundamental ideas such as the nature of motion and rest, change, 
time, place, necessity and contingency, and causation interested the 
43 	 Heikel 1940, p. 98-105. 
44 	 Scharfius 1646, p. 1. "Physica... alias vocatur naturalis scientia, physiologia, his-
toria de rebus physicis, naturae cognitio." 
45 	 On the distinctive character of natural philosophy see Cunningham 1991. Cun-
ningham & Williams 1993, p. 420ff. 
46 	 In this text the word "physics" will be used as a synonym for natural philosophy. 
scholars at Turku surprisinly little. Some of these themes were dealt 
with in metaphysical and logical works,47 but in physics the approved 
interpretations of these fundamental concepts remained preconceived 
ideas. Neither did the physics at Turku include study of kinematics, 
dynamics or things of that kind, since they were regarded as a part 
of mathematical sciences.48 What we encounter at Turku is "physics" 
in the wider sense of the antique and medieval tradition, which con-
centrated upon finding the causes of all "natural bodies" (corpus na-
turalis). It encompasses theories of generation and corruption, ast-
ronomy, meteorology, and studies living, animate nature. However, 
defining the limits of the study only according to the 17th-century 
disciplinary boundaries would leave a lot of interesting comparative 
material aside, so that I have occasionally widened the scope of my 
study from "physics" to cover all ideas and theories which describe 
and/or explain natural phenomena. 
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	 A word of warning might well be appropriate in talking about na- 
tural phenomena. The range of "natural" phenomena as opposite to 
supernatural or even non-existent ones will have to be historically 
defined. One source of confusion and misunderstanding between 17th-
century science and later-day historians describing it is that the boun-
daries between these two categories have changed since. For example, 
by equating supernatural and unknowable we would dismiss 17th-cen-
tury conceptions of sympathies and antipathies between things as 
something imaginary, mystical and occult. In the 17th century this 
was not necessarily the case, and indeed even the concepts mystical 
and occult had partially different meanings to nowadays.49 
It might be advisable to say a couple of words about metaphysics 
as well. Gary Hatfield has recently drawn attention to a distinction 
which in fact should go without saying for a historian.50 In the modern 
sense of the word "metaphysical" often refers to presuppositions con-
cerning the nature of reality which underlie all theoretical thinking. 
Certainly all philosophers made such presuppositions in the 17th cen-
tury, and they do in the 20th century as well. However, the me- 
47 For a discussion on the four causes see Flachsenius 1678. 
48 	 Gezelius 1672. Statics is placed among the scientias mathematicas. 
49 Whereas in the 17th century it was understood that occult practices involved 
calling on demonic spirits for help in mastering nature, modem forms of occultism 
usually prefer to seek for contact with spirits of the dead in order to get infor-
mation about the hereafter, to foresee the future, etc. 
50 Hatfield 1990. 
taphysics of the 17th century was still in many ways bound up with 
the Aristotelian and Platonic traditions. Metaphysics was a science of 
the first principles of being, studying being qua beings` In this sense 
it was prior in respect to nature, but not in the order of learning, 
because metaphysical concepts were ultimately abstracted from sen-
sory images. It was a traditional Aristotelian question whether this 
"first philosophy" could produce the principles of the more specialised 
sciences such as physics. All in all the concepts defining the nature 
of being had to be suitable to describe spiritual entities as well, and 
most metaphysical terminology was modified to match the needs of 
Lutheran theology. Bearing this in mind we might expect the two 
disciplines, metaphysics and physics, to have a special kind of a re-
lationship during the era concerned. 
Not only is the lack of understanding of the historicity of concepts 
dangerous, but exceedingly restrictive definitions can be harmful as 
well, if they limit our view of the subject as a historical entity too 
much. My purpose here is therefore more to define loose frameworks 
for these concepts in order to make it clearer what this study is all 
about. It is also essential for us to be aware of the kind of problems 
and ambiguities the use of these concepts might involve. There are 
two more concepts often used in this study which for these reasons 
need specification: Aristotelianism and scholasticism. These two are 
such well-known cover-all concepts that their exact meaning in each 
context is not so readily clear. Indeed, as Charles B. Schmitt and 
Edward Grant have shown in their articles, during its approximately 
five hundred years of dominance (1200-1700) "Aristotelianism" im-
plied such a variety of learned schools and sects that the confusion 
about the meaning of the term itself is more or less inevitable. Mo-
reover, in the 16th century it was by no means self-evident that a 
university scholar should be an Aristotelian: Aristotelianism was not 
without alternatives, Platonic, Neo-Platonic, and Stoic ideas together 
with the humanist movement competing with it successfully.52 For us 
the term "Aristotelianism" has a sufficiently concise meaning if we 
define it to include such thought as in one way or another is based 
51  For many Renaissance thinkers metaphysics had also been important as a science 
of God, the only immutable existing entity. Lohr 1988. 
52 Schmitt 1973. Grant 1987. Kessler 1990 has shown that the Platonic and hu-
manistic traditions were nevertheless in many ways bound to or connected with 
Aristotelianism. 
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on Aristotle's or his commentators' texts. This includes the idea of 
physics as demonstrated knowledge of the causes of things (scientia). 
There were some basic characteristics in natural philosophy which all 
"Aristotelianisms" tended to accept. Edward Grant has set them down 
as follows: 
From Aristotle's physical treatises scholastic authors derived and 
justified the geocentric system, the four elements, the four causes, 
the doctrine of potentiality and actuality, the doctrine of celestial 
intelligences, the sharp distinction between celestial and terrestrial 
bodies and between lightness and heaviness, and other fundamental 
concepts.'' 
As we will later see, Grant's list no longer perfectly covers the 
features of Aristotelian natural philosophy at Turku. Schmitt's notion 
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	 of the variety of Renaissance Aristotelianisms has generated a wide- 
spread research tradition since the beginning of the 1970's, in which 
the multiple features of Aristotelianism have been studied from dif-
ferent points of view.54 My study will also join this tradition in its 
own straightforward way, for it will be one of its central tasks to 
provide the term "Aristotelian natural philosophy" with a meaning 
which suits this particular historical context. 
In the quotation above Grant mentions "scholastic authors". But not 
all scholastics were Aristotelians and not all Aristotelians merely scho-
lastics in the Renaissance and 17th-century science.55 Scholasticism 
"is predominantly a method of study and of teaching developed and 
used within the framework of institutional instruction and pedagogy",56  
whereas Aristotelianism is a much broader concept, a system of phi-
losophical and scientific knowledge. In northern Europe scholasticism 
was revived in the 17th-century as a conscious reaction to Ramism 
and the humanistic movement. In this revival it was ready to take 
inspiration from Spanish philosophers, especially Francisco Suårez.57 
Scholastic thought was very much alive at Turku too, albeit not in a 
pure form but at least in the sense that the structure of sciences, met- 
53 	 Grant 1987, p. 342. 
54 	 See e.g. articles in Henry & Hutton 1990. 
55 	 Schmitt 1973, p. 161. Grant 1987, p. 343. 
56 Schmitt 1973, p. 161. 
57 Trentman 1982, p. 818-824. 
hods of disputation and textbook-writing had inherited various features 
from the scholastic tradition. 
As it may be clear from the chapter in which previous research on 
the subject was described, one of the main aims of this study is to 
create a thorough view of physics in the 17th century. First of all this 
naturally fulfils a function in the national historiography of science. 
But it also aims to achieve something of a wider interest from this 
parochial basis. How can this be done? This study deals with natural 
philosophy in a distant and provincial university. It was not an inno-
vative community, which would have played a crucial role in the rise 
and advancement of early modem science. No discoveries of any im-
portance were made there. However, concentrating on one rather small 
university makes it possible to write a detailed history of such a wide-
ranging discipline as physics was in the 17th century. The idea is to 
concentrate on seeing how a standard university such as this func- 
tioned, what kind of a role natural philosophy played in it and what 	 35 
kind of profile physics consequently got there. I shall therefore refrain 
from making systematic comparisons with other Swedish and Cent-
ral-European universities. This study does however provide a basis 
for future comparative research. 
Natural philosophy is best studied in its academic context. In order 
to build this context it is important to determine which characteristics 
in the life of the Academy seem to be most formative. It might be 
useful to start by considering the ideology behind the very existence 
of the Academy. The University was founded for certain purposes, 
and this ideology obviously also guided the tendencies in its educa-
tional politics. Thus I shall begin the first chapter of this work with 
the foundation of the University. The inner structure of the Academy 
will then be discussed. The disciplinary structure of the University 
not only specified the context of its everyday work, but also mirrored 
the epistemological boundaries between different branches of know-
ledge. I shall argue later in this study that much of the discussion in 
17th-century physics was about aspirations to break and attempts to 
maintain these boundaries. Moreover, the institutional setting binds 
the Academy of Turku to the more general European traditions of 
learning. 
In the 17th century theology was the uncontested regina scien-
tiarum, especially in a country where the church was pushing aggres-
sively for orthodoxy. Obviously then the relationship between physics 
and theology plays an extremely important part in the context in which 
natural philosophy is situated. The interplay between physics, theology 
and metaphysics is therefore another central theme in the first chapter. 
The relationships between theology and philosophy have been touched 
on in many studies of Swedish and Finnish history of science and 
ideas. There is still no study which thoroughly analyses the rela-
tionships between these two branches of knowledge. The question has 
been incidentally discussed in two kinds of studies. First of all, the 
historians of theology have dealt with the subject from their own point 
of view.58 Because many of these studies are biographies, it appears 
quite natural that the emphasis be laid on one particular person's ac-
tivity in the field. On the other hand historians of science have also 
dealt quite briefly with the influence of religious ideas and biblical 
argumentation on their respective subjects.59 
Both the historians of theology and of science have usually con-
tented themselves with stating simply that philosophy was an ancilla 
of theology. What this relationship really meant to natural philosophy 
on one hand and to theology on the other is hardly ever problematised 
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	 any further. Historians of theology have in general been more con- 
cerned about the question of what importance philosophy as a whole 
had for the development of religious thought. 
It can hardly be claimed that there was any deep-seated controversy 
between 17th-century theology and philosophy in Finland. Despite the 
distinct gulf between their epistemologies, subject matters and all in 
all between their statuses, theology and philosophy nevertheless for-
med an interdependent system of knowledge. Although the intention 
was not to create a physica Christiana in the Calvinistic style (a phy-
sics entirely based on theological argument), many fundamental ideas 
on which the system of natural philosophy was based were neverthe-
less derived from religious beliefs. Theological dogmas should in turn 
be expressable in metaphysical terminology as well. It is hardly surp-
rising therefore that theological beliefs strongly influenced the "right" 
interpretation of some of the key concepts in metaphysics. Physics 
was also in many ways dependent on metaphysical concepts, and con-
versely physical "observations" and "facts" could be used to demon-
strate the truth of some theological and metaphysical doctrines. 
On the other hand the 17th century was the period in Europe during 
which the Bible-critic, driven by upholders of philology, astronomy 
and other kinds of "mundane criticism", made a breakthrough for the 
58 Laasonen 1977b. Salminen 1978, 1981, 1983, 1985. 
59 Hjelt 1896. Leikola 1983. Lehti 1979. Slotte 1898. Sandblad 1944, 1945. 
first time.60 The threat this posed to the authority of the Bible was 
felt in the Kingdom of Sweden, too, although domestic critics of the 
Holy Book were still lacking. It seems possible that this threat gene-
rated a strain of cautiousness in the attitudes of both philosophers and 
theologians towards the mutual relationship between their particular 
domains of study. 
In the first chapter the relations between these three branches of 
knowledge will be scrutinized, although only as far as they help us 
understand the special context in which 17th-century physics found 
itself. A really thorough study of the subject would demand extensive 
study of original sources in theology, which would be an enormous 
task and has to be left outside the scope of this study. The approach 
to the problem I have adopted in this study follows the guidelines 
recently drafted by J. H. Brooke. It disengages itself from assumptions 
according to which science and religion are either in an inherent con- 
flict, or complementary to each other. Instead, more refined forms of 	 37 
interaction will be looked for. Finally it is recognised that the very 
concepts of "science" and "religion" must be historically redefined.61  
The second chapter of this study consists of an overall description 
of the physical theories and concepts which were used in 17th-century 
natural philosophy. I shall focus on those problems in natural phi-
losophy which 17th-century scholars themselves regarded as central. 
Although a need for a this kind of general national historiography, 
which would work as a reference for those authors who deal with 
other aspects of 17th-century cultural life or other branches of intel-
lectual history clearly exists, this piece of research is also intended to 
go beyond mere description. Aristotelian physics at Turku was a result 
of a long philosophical tradition, and I intend to relate physics there 
to this long inheritance thus rendering some ideas which might at the 
first instance seem odd to a modern reader more understandable. 
I have been claiming that "Aristotelianism" is far too vague a term 
without any further qualification, when talking about the 17th century. 
The fact is that in Turku also the corpus of accepted dogmas in natural 
philosophy was a collection of ideas absorbed from various philosop-
hical traditions. It has been a trend in some studies published during 
the 1970's and 80's on 17th-century history of science in Finland to 
6° Scholder 1966. 
61 	 Brooke 1991, p. 1-51. 
trace these various influences!' Because it has become common 
knowledge by now that the major part of learning was based on Ger-
man models, acquired either directly from Protestant Germany or via 
Sweden, my study intends to avoid re-inventing such wheels. Further-
more I greatly doubt whether a detailed quantitative study in which 
positive, negative and neutral reference to European authors are listed 
could be carried out satisfactorily. As I have shown in one of my 
previous articles, the citations vary in length and importance, they 
may be indirect (i.e. stem from a third author's text) or often leave 
the origin of the model text in doubt. Sometimes it even is difficult 
to judge whether a citation should be interpreted as positive or neutral, 
and so forth.6' It is evident that the quantitative method is not reliable 
without a thorough qualitative analysis, and analysing the entire corpus 
in this way would be an unreasonably time-consuming job. Something 
very general will however be said about the most used sources in the 
38 	 first chapter. 
In order to get an authentic picture of learning in some period, a 
historian of science should not only concentrate on looking for the 
geniuses or dissidents of the time, who are then said to have antici-
pated later invented theories, or on searching for the roots of certain 
modern conceptions. We should most of all pay attention to those 
questions which were really being discussed in the period concerned. 
This is not to say that studying the exceptional features of a period 
would not illuminate important aspects of the totality of the history 
of science. However, we cannot even say what is new or exceptional 
unless we readily recognize what was usual and traditional. Therefore 
it is my intention to focus my description on those matters which the 
scholars in 17th century Turku themselves found central and important 
in their respective fields of study. 
The third chapter of this study then goes deeper into the subject 
by weighing the impact of Cartesianism on natural philosophy at Tur-
ku. It was probably the most prominent and most disputed "new phi-
losophy" both on the Continent and in Scandinavia during the 17th 
century, which is exactly why I regard Cartesianism as worth closer 
study. Tracing Baconian ideas, if not futile, would be at least much 
62 Salminen 1978, 1985. Lounela 1978. Lehti 1979. Kallinen 1991a. 
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	 On the practical difficulties in this methodology see Kallinen 1993. For theoretical 
difficulties in studies on how influences are absorbed, given or passed on, see 
Skinner 1969. 
less fruitful than studying Cartesianism and reactions to it in greater 
depth, not least because the extent of Baconian influence at Turku 
has already been studied.' Cartesianism caused severe disputes at the 
University of Uppsala in the 1660's and 1680's, while the University 
of Turku remained a relatively peaceful place in this respect. Cartesian 
ideas were consciously and decidedly rebuffed, and this tactic was 
successful until the last two decades of the century. Although this 
philosophy was thereafter approved in principle, it did not become 
the new paradigm. 
Cartesianism not only threatened the dominant position of Aristo-
telian philosophy. More importantly, accepting Cartesian ideas would 
often have presupposed renegotiation of the disciplinary and episte-
mological boundaries. This claim is evidenced by seeing how the dif-
ferent degrees of sensitivity towards ideas on different levels of epis-
temological and metaphysical importance were formed. We can easily 
imagine that there were differences in reactions to Cartesian dualism 	 39 
and, let us say, to the Cartesian version of the circulation of blood. 
Thus the third chapter of this book will not only be a how-Descar-
tes-came-to-Finland-story, but also offers an analysis of different as-
pects of Cartesian theories in this particular doctrinal context. Alt-
hough I shall approach the subject mainly from the viewpoint of phy-
sics, we will also have to ask what kind of role metaphysical and 
religious ideas played in the formation of the various attitudes towards 
Cartesianism. On the other hand this chapter provides substantial ma-
terial for the analysis of how knowledge claims are transformed and 
treated in the process of diffusion of knowledge. 
Studying physics in its academic context and in its relation to theo-
logy in particular, and discussing the advent and partial acceptance 
of Cartesianism should provide a thorough picture of the whole body 
called natural philosophy. The main task of the conclusion, entitled 
"Stability and Change", will therefore be to weigh some further ques-
tions of the nature of 17th-century Aristotelian science in general. The 
problematics of change and stability will dominate this chapter: we 
shall see which elements in natural philosophy changed and which 
did not. What kind of causes can we assign to change on the one 
hand and stability on the other? First of all I shall pay attention to 
the role of eclecticism in this dynamic. We shall ponder what kind 
64 Knuuttila & Niiniluoto 1986. 
of pressures economic and political factors might have put upon na-
tural philosophy, or whether these kinds of "external" factors can be 
used as explanations at all. Having gathered up some remarks about 
the general attitudes towards new ideas, or "novelties", I shall proceed 
to try to explain the relatively strong conservative element in natural 
philosophy. 
The problematics of centre as against periphery falls quite naturally 
on a study like this. I shall begin by considering the role of the Aca-
demy of Turku in the educational system of the kingdom of Sweden. 
Is there something in this role which explains the character of learning 
at the University of Turku, or could it conversely be said that the state 
of learning at Turku partially assigned it a certain niche on the national 
level? The University of Turku was institutionally and doctrinally a 
bearer of old European traditions. Only as a part of a political and 
military superpower such as Sweden did the province of Finland and 
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	 its only University become an organic part of Europe. During the 17th 
century the field of learning was in a state of ferment in Europe and 
it is of course important to know in what relation the Academy of 
Turku stands to all this. Therefore I shall finish this study by making 
some comparative remarks about the state and status of the learning 
at Turku in an all-European context. 
The Academical Context 
of Natural Philosophy 
1. THE AIMS AND STRUCTURE OF 
THE UNIVERSITY 
The Foundation of the Academy of Turku 
The Reformation, which was introduced into Sweden from above as 
a part of political changes and the birth of national state in the 1520's, 
interrupted the educational traditions carried on by the Catholic 
church. When practically speaking all property of the church was con-
fiscated, the new Lutheran church hardly had even the means to edu-
cate the vicars it needed. Whereas in the Middle Ages Swedish names 
could regularly be met in the matricles of such universities as Paris 
and Prague, the number of students attending foreign universities drop-
ped drastically in the first part of the 16th century. However, the only 
way to obtain higher education was still to go abroad, and after the 
Reformation the universities of Lutheran Germany attracted some 
Swedish and Finnish students.' Although a new schooling system was 
gradually organized by the state, in accordance with Melanchthonian 
educational principles, learning on the whole was still at a very modest 
level. In the province of Finland there were lower schools in Turku 
and Vyborg (grammar and cathedral schools), but there was no func-
tioning university in the country before the rearrangement of the Uni- 
Eliasson 1992, p. 29-33. Klinge 1987, p. 13-17. Strömberg (forthcoming), Ch. 5. 
On peregrinations before the foundation of the University of Turku see also Hei-
ninen & Nuorteva 1981. Wittenberg, Rostock and Helmstedt were the most po-
pular universities in the 16th century, whereas in the following century Helm-
stedt's popularity decreased while Leiden, Leipzig and Greifswald became more 
fashionable. 
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versity of Uppsala in 1595.2 
The political and military expansion of Sweden in the 17th century 
made increasing demands on the country. It was realized very early 
that in order to keep the rapidly-growing state bureaucracy going, a 
reform would have to be carried out; a reform which would cover the 
educational system in its entirety from elementary schools to univer-
sities. Moreover, it was calculated that it would be cheaper to educate 
students in local universities than to send them abroad. As a part of 
this policy king Gustaf II Adolf gave the University of Uppsala a 
large sum of money and other property in 1624. These grants finally 
enabled the institution founded in 1477 to function properly. But new 
universities were also founded, for example in the newly occupied 
Tartu in 1632 and in Lund in 1666. This educational policy brought 
benefit to Finland as well. It had been a part of Sweden for hundreds 
of years, and now for the first time the province had acquired a gym- 
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nasium which was soon elevated to a real university. This happened 
in the year 1640.3 
Behind the great administrative and institutional reforms during the 
first part of the 17th century was the effort of the state to centralize 
and standardize the country. This policy was well summarised by the 
Dutch scholar, Justus Lipsius, who was one of the greatest authorities 
in political theory in 17th-century Sweden. As he put it: "one religion, 
one language, one law and similar manners are the best bonds to keep 
a country together with".4 The University of Turku was to bring this 
state ideology into the hearts of young students while educating them 
to be good officials. 
It was not, however, only the practical needs of the state which 
formed the ideological background for the teaching at the University. 
The main function of the Academy of Turku was to raise the educa-
tional level of the clergy. As the quotation from Lipsius shows, reli- 
2 	 Klinge 1987, p. 18-24, 32-39. According to the Melanchthonian educational ideals 
even intending priests had to study mundane subjects in order to be good debaters 
against infidels. Kusukawa 1990, p. 41-66, et passim. 
3 	 Klinge 1987, p. 20-32, 39-52, 60-71. The gymnasium had been founded only ten 
years earlier, in 1630. Lindroth 1975, p. 19, 47-56. On bureaucratization see 
Rystad 1983. 
4 	 Lehtinen 1979, p. 102-104, 111-114, quote from Lipsius p. 103 "una religio, una 
lingua, una lex, iidem mores vincula optima sunt societatis". Other reforms were 
e.g. the foundation of The Turku Court of Appeal in 1623 and the introduction 
of new divisions into provinces in 1634. See Halila 1987, p. 17-21. Klinge 1987, 
p. 71-75. 
gious purity was regarded as an important factor in standardizing the 
state. Of course, the Lutheran Church had a very strong position in 
cultural life in itself.5 Especially after the Peace of Westfalen in 1648, 
Lutheran orthodoxy of the most bigoted and aggressive kind played 
a dominant role in 17th-century Swedish culture in general.6 Although 
the aims of the state and the principally state-led church to raise the 
educational level of the Finnish-speaking clergy were thus similar in 
theory, they often diverged in practice. Whereas the church aimed to 
harness the potential of the universities to train clergy, the king and 
aristocracy preferred to further their respective interests by favouring 
a more mundane curriculum.' This tension between the state and the 
church was to play a role in the life of the University for decades. 
The aspirations of the state and the church were personified in the 
men who mostly promoted the actual foundation of the University, 
bishops Johannes Rudbeckius and Isak Rothovius, and governor-ge- 
neral Per Brahe. In the 1620's and 1630's Rudbeck had already vi- 	 43 
gorously opposed new laws planned by the king to exert more control 
over the clergy. Partly due to these controversies Rudbeck wanted to 
create a university which would be free from the influence of the 
prominent statesman Johan Skytte, one of Rudbeck's arch-rivals. This 
Rudbeckian university would steer clear of Ramism (a philosophy 
much favoured by Skytte) and teach Lutheran orthodoxy in a very 
anti-catholic form. Unlike the University of Uppsala, the alma mater 
at Turku would avoid any contacts with Central Europe, where young 
noblemen could be seduced by "calvinistic and jesuitic heresies". 
Bishop Rothovius at Turku was for his part eager to renew and reor-
ganize clerical matters in Finland, and a university in his episcopal 
town would naturally greatly further his interests. Rothovius was the-
refore an active proponent of the academy before the high officials 
in Stockholm. 
On the other hand Count Brahe also had his own feuds with the 
state chancellor Oxenstierna, who was the main proponent of the cent-
ralist policy. Decentralization and old-style aristocratism were closer 
to Brahe's heart, and he saw that a university at Turku would advance 
these ideals. According to Brahe an academy would also gradually 
spread the light of civilization and discipline to the uncultured people 
5 	 Halila 1987, p. 91-106. 
6 Hägglund 1971, p. 274. Salminen 1978. 
7 Klinge 1987, p. 46. Schybergson 1915, p. 48-61. 
The Academy of Turku was very 
much a creation of Count Per 
Brahe. He was also the first 
Chancellor of the University and 
directed its development with a 
strong paternal hand until his 
death in 1680. Brahe was not 
nominated as Chancellor 
immediately after the foundation of 
the Academy, although he acted 
as such unofficially. Only in 1646 
did the Academy get a Chancellor. 
In the 17th century it was a matter 
of prestige for a University to have 
a high-bom Chancellor, a 
patronus. 
living in the distant areas of Finland.8 This ideology behind the foun-
dation of the University largely explains the voluntary intellectual iso-
lation of the institution from developments elsewhere in Europe. 
The initiative to found a university at Turku had for the first time 
been announced at the Diet of 1637. By 1638 the plan had proceeded 
so far that negotiations over practical arrangements could be started 
between Brahe and the privy council. Despite Rothovius' and Brahe's 
disapproval of the "German orientation" of Uppsala, this University 
served as a model for the Royal Academy of Turku.9 The constitution 
of the University of Uppsala was to be in force at the Academy of 
s Klinge 1987, p. 51-71, 75. Lindroth 1975, p. 50-51, 83-84. Schybergson 1915, 
p. 1-22. Bearing in mind the ideologies of both Brahe and Rudbeck it is easy to 
see why they despised Ramist philosophy, which was still in vogue in Sweden 
during the 1630's. Ramism not only was favourable to secular learning, 'the 
humanities', but it also regarded schooling as a means to achieve higher social 
position - an idea not approved of by Brahe. Grafton & Jardine 1986, p. 168. 
On Ramism in Sweden see also Sellberg 1979, p. 9-15. Sjöstrand 1940, p. 200-
235. 
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	 The official name of the University of Turku was "The Royal Academy of Turku". 
Nevertheless it was not an academy in the sense of the new scientific academies, 
the term being used to refer to a normal university institution. This practice had 
already been adopted in the 1625 Constitution of the University of Uppsala. See 
Annerstedt 1877, p. 239, et passim. In this study the words university and academy 
are therefore synonymous whenever referring to the Academy of Turku. 
Bishop Isak Rothovius aimed at 
renewing religious life in the 
bishopric of Turku. The new 
Academy, in which clergymen 
could be trained, served this 
purpose well. The vice-chancellor 
was the highest authority present 
at the University, although it was 
much up to the bishop's own 
authority how effectively he could 
actually influence the teaching and 
nominations at the University. 
45 
Turku too, whenever applicable. Thus both Uppsala and Turku carried 
on the basic structure of the University of Paris, which was imitated 
in the foundation of many other North European universities as well. 
Four faculties were established at the new university, Theology, Law, 
Medicine and Arts, or Philosophy as it came to be called.1 ' Academic 
life with all its rules, traditions and ideologies was brought ready-made 
from Uppsala to Turku. This was confirmed by the fact that nine of 
the eleven professors appointed came from the mother country." 
The Order of Disciplines 
The most prestigious of the faculties at Turku was Theology. In North-
ern Europe this was normally the case, whereas in Italy e.g. law and 
medicine prospered.12 Theology got three chairs in Turku. The respect- 
10 
	
In the following I shall use the terms Faculty of Arts and Faculty of Philosophy 
as synonymous. 
Klinge 1987, p. 75-79. Lehtinen 1979, p. 114-115. As learning at Uppsala has 
been studied elsewhere, I shall not here systematically deal with the kinds of 
theses Turku professors had defended at Uppsala. See e.g. Lindroth 1975. 
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Schmitt 1984, XIV p. 36-39, XV p. 289. On the order of disciplines in Turku 
as seen through the eyes of a seventeenth-century theologian see Salminen 1978, 
p. 103-127. 
ability of the subject was made apparent above all in the salary and 
professorships in theology were thus the best paid of all. Many pro-
fessors from the Faculty of Arts thus endeavoured to get a promotion 
to the Faculty of Theology. Both the Faculties of Law and Medicine 
had only one professor each. Studies in law were rather practical, and 
the Turku Court of Appeal (founded in 1632) undoubtedly offered 
chances to build a career to the most gifted students, while the Faculty 
of Medicine did not attract many students at all. 
The Faculty of Arts was the largest of the four, but its status was 
the lowest and its function mainly propaedeutic. While in some uni-
versities the independence of the philosophy curriculum could nevert-
heless grow,13 at Turku the development followed a pattern more ty-
pical of Lutheran education, which saw arts studies serving the training 
of priests.14 Natural philosophy was therefore also taught at the Uni-
versity of Turku as preparatory studies for priests and laywers-to-be. 
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For many students the master's degree remained the only one they 
got. In the Faculty of Arts there were chairs of political science and 
history, holy languages (Hebrew and Greek), eloquence (Latin langu-
age and literature), logic and metaphysics, mathematics, and physics. 
The Faculty got one more chair when the chair of poetics was detached 
from logic and metaphysics in 1655.15 On the whole, the disciplinary 
structure of the Academy was based on long academic traditions which 
were informed by the Aristotelian order of sciences. These structures 
also reflected more thoroughgoing differences in the subject matter 
and method between the disciplines. 
There was a hierarchy not only between faculties, but between dif-
ferent disciplines inside the Faculty of Arts as well. During the se-
venteenth century sciences were usually divided into theoretical, prac-
tical and productive disciplines, sometimes also called arts. Theoretical 
or speculative sciences included contemplative disciplines such as me- 
13 Gascoigne 1985, p. 395. Gascoigne's example is from Cambridge, where "the 
philosophical curriculum had become increasingly divorced from the study of 
theology which helped reduce (though not eliminate) theologically-based objec-
tions to changes in the philosophy curriculum. Moreover, with the growth in the 
importance of undergraduate at the expense of postgraduate degrees in the period 
after the Statutes had been drawn up, philosophy (which had been traditionally 
associated with the bachelor's degree) came to loom larger in the university's 
overall course of studies." 
14 Kusukawa 1990, p. 41-66, 164-176. 
15 For more detail on these nominations see Klinge 1987, p. 75-79, on poetics p. 
588. 
taphysics, physics and mathematics. At Turku pneumatics or the study 
of the finite spirits (angels) was also regularly mentioned among theo-
retical disciplines.16 Ethics, politics and economy were called practical 
disciplines because they had the task of directing human activities, or 
as bishop Gezelius put it "they perfect man's will by wisdom, and 
guide human actions to reach what is good in civil life."17 Lowest in 
the grade were mechanical skills such as agriculture, navigation, mi-
ning and architecture, some of which were related or subordinated to 
mathematics. Arts such as grammar, rhetoric and logic were often also 
counted among productive disciplines, i.e. they were considered to be 
mere instruments working for the benefit of all other intellectual ac-
tivity. This view was supported by Gezelius at Turku.'8 In all-Euro-
pean discussion the actual order of disciplines, the grounds on which 
these rankings should be made, and relationships of mutual (in)de-
pendences were constantly in dispute, especially during the sixteenth 
century.' 9 
The order of the disciplines at Turku was partially sealed by the 
constitution of the University. The constitution of the University of 
Uppsala from the years 1625/6 and 1655 were also valid at the Uni-
versity of Turku as far as they could be applied to the local conditions. 
Although the University of Turku got its own statutes in 1661, they 
remained a mere formality since in 1675 the constitution of Uppsala 
was specially decreed as valid at Turku too!' In addition to the re-
gulation of the basic functions of the institute these statutes also gave 
instructions about teaching, starting from the orders as to which days 
and which hours each professor should lecture. At the same time the 
statutes defined which subjects belonged to each professor's teaching 
duties. For some disciplines in the Faculty of Arts a detailed curricu-
lum was defined, which sometimes included a list of books which 
teaching should follow.'' 
16 Thuronius-Aurelius 1661. Gezelius 1672, p. 3-5. Flachsenius 1664. Tammelin-
Brumerus 1695, p. 11. 
17 Gezelius 1672, p. 5, "voluntatem hominis prudentiä perficit, dirigendo actiones 
humanas ad bonum civile obtinendum". 
18 Gezelius 1672, p. 5. 
19 Wallace 1988, p. 210-211. Mikkeli 1992. Jardine (forthcoming). 
20 Heikel 1940, p. 20. Klinge 1987, p. 117-118. 
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	 In all three statutes, from 1626, 1655 and 1661, the most detailed lists of books 
were given for teaching in history, holy languages, the Latin language and mat-
hematics. Annerstedt 1877. Schybergson 1918 & 1920. 
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Theoretical philosophy (i.e. logic and metaphysics) together with 
political philosophy were the most prominent philosophical disciplines 
at Turku during the 17th century. This is so although the official guid-
lines given by the statutes were much more detailed for these disci-
plines than for natural philosophy. The statutes of 1626 stress that the 
teaching of logic should be based on its usefulness instead of spending 
time in making unnecessary distinctions. The influence of Ramism is 
thus evident, and he is even mentioned as an author to be favoured 
in teaching.22 The Ramist emphasis then disappeared from the 1655 
statutes, which say that the main function of logic should be to help 
in composing speeches or other texts.23 This did nevertheless not mean 
an immediate end to Ramist influence. In the so-called trivial schools 
especially a Ramist textbook could still be used. In the University of 
Turku Enevaldus Svenonius started a more visible polemic against the 
use of Ramist books in logic 24 
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	 The 1626 statutes ordain three professors of mathematics, whereas 
the 1655 statutes mention only two. At Turku there always was only 
one professor of mathematics. He was told to lecture on Euclides, 
Ptolemy, Ramus, Sacrobosco, Peurbach and Copernicus in 1626, whe-
reas the later statutes refrain from naming any authors.25 The medics 
are recommended the works of Galen and Hippocrates, with the ad-
dition that "chemical authors" should also be studied.26 However, not-
hing is said about the preferred orientation of the teaching in natural 
philosophy in either the 1626 or 1655 statutes.27 This is most probably 
because the ordinances were written primarily for Uppsala, where the 
teaching of physics was combined with the chair of medicine. The so 
22 Annerstedt 1877, p. 250-251, 280. "Logices professor perplexis scholasticorum 
disputationibus juventutem non fatiget de logicae genere, subjecto, fine, medii 
investigatione et aliis, quae plus habent difficultatis quam utilitatis." (p. 250) 
23 Schybergson 1918, p. 227. "Och då logikens bruk icke ligger ensamt i dispute-
rande, utan dess betydelse främst framträder, då man vill sammansätta eller up-
plösa ett tal eller en skrift, så bör logikern beflita sig om att söka giva reglerna 
praktisk tillämpning..." 
24 	 Svenonius 1662, p. 296. Lounela 1978, p. 88-121, et passim. 
25 Annerstedt 1877, p. 277-278. Schybergson 1918, p. 224-225. Schybergson 1920, 
p. 169. 
26 Annerstedt 1877, p. 249-250. Schybergson 1918, p. 224. Schybergson 1920, p. 
168. 
27 Annerstedt 1877, 1625 statutes p. 239-254, 1626 statutes 255-282. In Uppsala 
physics was integrated as a part of medicine: "Medicarum primus institutions 
medicinae enarrabit cum medendi methodo, alter physicen cum herbarum et par-
tium humanis corpore cognition..." Annerstedt 1877, p. 249. 
called Brahe regulations are thus the only place where an official 
statement is made about the preferred orientation of natural philosop-
hical learning. This brief section can be quoted in its entirety: 
The professor of physics shall deal with the principles of physics 
according to Aristotle or some other of the most well-known aut-
hors. He shall also lecture on botany to his audience from the books 
of Dioscurus and other acknowledged authors of this kind. He shall 
lecture in the greater auditorium at seven o'clock.28 
Some historians have tended to see it as odd and restrictive for the 
progress of science that the statutes of a University name the authors 
to be studied.79 However, it has been shown that the form of the sta-
tutes seldom hindered actual developments as the official curriculums 
were not slavishly followed in other European universities either.'' 
We have no reason to believe that this would not have been true for 
Sweden and Finland either: even though the statutes gave rather direct 
orders concerning the contents of teaching in some disciplines, eve-
ryday life turned out to be more flexible. We know, for example, that 
also many authors other than those mentioned in the statutes are quo-
ted and referred to in academic dissertations. Thus we should not 
imagine that the statutes themselves formed an absolute rule in this 
respect. On the other hand, it was an important function of the statutes 
to define the minimum contents of a degree. In this respect they could 
somewhat anachronistically be compared with the modern students' 
guidebooks on the curriculum, which are much more detailed and 
restrictive, at least in the Finnish educational system. In the 17th cen- 
28 Schybergson 1920, p. 169-170. "Physicesprofessom skall behandla institutiones 
physicae enligt Aristoteles eller andra de mest erkända författare. Han skall även 
föredraga botanik för sina åhörare ur Dioscurus och de andra mest framstående 
författatre av detta slag. Han skall läsa i auditorium maximum klockan 7." The 
"Dioscurus" naturally refers to Dioscorides. 
29 Lehti 1984, p. 222. 
See e.g. Brockliss 1987, passim. Gascoigne 1985, p. 396-397. "Like the teaching 
in natural philosophy which, to judge by the Statutes, should have been largely 
confined to the study of Aristotle, the curriculum of the seventeenth century me-
dical faculty had largely broken loose from the confines of the Statutes which 
had prescribed Hippocrates and Galen as the basic authorities." Gascoigne is tal-
king about Cambridge, but the same was largely true for the medicine at Uppsala 
too, where Paracelsus, Sennert and later the Cartesian authors became the actual 
authorities despite the statutes' stress on Hippocrates and Galen. Lindroth 1975, 
p. 387-394. 
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tury the statutes not only restricted learning, but were also intended 
to keep up with the general standards for degrees. 
But there was also another kind of versatility in the teaching. Na-
tural philosophy was to be taught by the professor of physics, but in 
fact theses on physics were published under other professors' guidance 
too, and conversely the professor of physics could publish theses on 
such subjects as politics or metaphysics.' This bears witness to a great 
flexibility or even to a kind of unestablishedness between various dis-
ciplines. One albeit marginal reason for this variety was, that in some 
cases a special need to produce certain kinds of dissertations in other 
disciplines could arise if the proper discipline was not working in a 
satisfactory way!' 
It seems that it was not totally unproblematic to publish theses on 
another professor's subject, though. Occasionally there were disputes 
in which a professor would accuse another of lecturing or disputing 
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	 over matters belonging to his discipline. For example, in 1684 the 
professor of political studies, Andreas Wanochius made a complaint 
to the Chancellor claiming that the professor of eloquence, Daniel 
Achrelius, was unjustly publishing theses on subjects which belonged 
to his discipline. The Chancellor Bengt Oxenstierna took Achrelius' 
side, and according to him, professors could supervise subjects belon-
ging to other disciplines as long as they did not thereby neglect their 
own duties.' The ideals of the day stated that politics and ethics 
should be combined with eloquence and poetry in the education of 
noblemen and even office clerks. Personal feuds were quite usual in 
17th-century academic life, and this example is not without this kind 
of cause either. Resentment and envy did not appear for the first time 
in the relationships between Achrelius and his collegues.34 Neverthe-
less, it is very indicative that the grudge was articulated as a question 
about crossing the boundaries of disciplines. 
In what sense did the boundaries of disciplines constitute the limits 
of flexibility then? It was typical of scholasticism to structure disci- 
31 	 It was not, in fact, unusual for university teachers to teach in various fields, even 
those not officially theirs. Westman 1980, p. 105. 
32 Perhaps the most striking example is Andreas Petreus' professorship in physics: 
during his 20 years in office he published only four dissertations in physics. Prof. 
Achrelius especially published a considerable number of dissertations on physics 
in this period (see Achrelius 1682). 
33 	 Chancellor Oxenstierna to the Senate 18.7.1684. In Jörgensen 1940. 
34 Hultin 1895. 
plines in a hierarchical order, but the question of the priority of one 
science over another had already been a much discussed theme in 
Antiquity. Different principles for ordering the sciences were presen-
ted by Plato and Aristotle among others. The order of sciences in 
17th-century scholasticism was basically inherited from Aristotle's 
conceptions about subordinate sciences. This order was based on me-
taphysical ideas about knowledge and the proper methods for ac-
quiring it.35 Nevertheless, the 17th-century understanding of the order 
of disciplines was not so much a question of the subordination of 
sciences as such, but of a complex pattern of established socio-pro-
fessional roles and academic values combined with epistemological 
preferences.36 
From our point of view it is important to note that both the subject 
matter and legitimate methodologies of each discipline were accurately 
and inflexibly defined. Aristotle had already forbidden the transference 
of proofs from one science to another in his Posterior Analytics. Ac- 	 51 
cording to Aristotle each science would also have its distinctive sub-
ject matter and first principles.37 It was central in this setting to know 
the criteria on which we could say two disciplines differed from each 
other. According to many late 16th-century authors, e.g. Jacopo Za-
barella, whose views were not without importance in Turku either, 
two theoretical sciences differed when they had separate subject mat-
ters (res considerata) and/or modes or methods of inquiry (modus 
considerandi).38 In addition to these the aim or finis of a discipline 
was also regarded as a distinguishing feature between disciplines at 
Turku.39 Because of the distinctiveness of each discipline, a professor 
of eloquence who published a physical thesis had to apply the proper 
methods of physics to the proper subject matter of this discipline in 
35 	 McKirahan 1978, p. 197-204. For an example of late 16th - early 17th century 
order of sciences which was based mostly on the subject-matter of sciences see 
Wallace 1988, p. 209-213. 
36 Jardine (forthcoming). Westman 1980. Biagioli 1993. 
37 McKirahan 1978, p. 201-202. Aristotle 1975, An. Po. I.7. Aristotle 1941, NE 
VI.3. 
38 Laird 1983, p. 226-228. Mikkeli 1992, p. 20, 32-33, 35-40. 
39 	 Thauvonius-Arctopolitanus 1656, Corollaria, "1. Omnis facultas suas habet metas 
quas transilire non licet. 2. Omnis facultas habet Subjectum proprium in quo 
scilicet explicando occupata est. 3. Omnis facultas habet finem proprium, possi-
bilem & praestantem, traditq; media ad ilium consequendum sufficientia atq; fa-
cilia. 4. Omnis facultas potest comprehendi certa methodo." Alanus-Wassenius 
1646, Th. X. Thuronius-Aurelius 1661. 
his work. As we will see later in this work, violation of this rule was 
often the primary matter of dispute in controversies. 
The question about the differences between disciplines was also a 
question of the degree of certainty of knowledge. This aspect was 
being increasingly emphasized in the course of the 17th century. What 
kind of knowledge and acquired by whom was most certain and most 
respectable? Thus disciplinary boundaries were at the same time epis-
temological and social ones. I have included in this study theses from 
two disciplines which partially shared the subject matter with physics. 
However, their ends and especially methodologies differred from those 
of physics. In the following I briefly survey these three disciplines: 
physics, mathematics and medicine, and their status in the hierarchy 
of knowledge. 
The most commonly offered definition of natural philosophy at Tur-
ku was that "Physics is the science of natural bodies, as far as they 
52 
	
	 are natural". (Physica est scientia corporis naturalis, quatenus natu- 
rale est.) As "natural" they were entities which consisted of an actual 
conjunction of form and matter (a composite whole). Therefore any 
study of such beings as spirits or angels was excluded from physics.4°  
What, then, constituted scientia and how it was to be acquired from 
the physical world? It was stated in Aristotelian style, that scientia 
was an intellectual habitus: "The Genus of the word scientia is used 
to express... accurately and more Philosophically a demonstrative ha-
bitus, by which we understand necessary conclusions [arrived at] 
through their causes which are real, primary, immediate, prior and 
better known than the conclusions themselves."41 This definition thus 
employs typical Aristotelian concepts of scientific knowledge. Accor-
ding to Aristotle, knowledge could be called scientific (episteme) if 
it had been acquired by (syllogistic) demonstration from the first prin-
ciples. In this sense we could only have knowledge of necessary 
things, or of things that could not be otherwise. However, we should 
40 	 Alanus-Wassenius 1646, Th. XI. Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, Sectio Prima, Mem- 
brum I. Thauvonius-Arctopolitanus 1656, Th. VII-XVI. Thuronius-Aurelius 1661, 
Theorema Physicum. Hahn-Govinius 1685, Qvaestio I. Gezelius 1679, p. 4, 203. 
41 Thauvonius-Arctopolitanus 1656, Th. IIX. "Genus voce Scientiae, exprimitur... 
strict&, & magis Philosophic& pro habitu demonstrativo, quo percipimus conclu-
siones necessarias per causas suas veras, primas, immediatas, priores & notiores 
ipsis conclusionibus". Cf. Thuronius-Aurelius 1661, Theorema Physicum, II. 
Alanus-Wassenius 1646, Th. X. "Est nempe physica certa rerum necessariarum 
per suas causas cognitio." Aristotle 1975, An.Po. I. 2, 4. 
be careful not to pose our readings of Aristotle too readily on the 
17th century texts. 
The fine definition in the spirit of Posterior Analytics quoted above 
is not very informative about the practice of physics at Turku. The 
real aim of physics was to give a definition of the causes and affections 
of natural bodies, either in general (physica generalis) or considering 
certain species of composite wholes (physica specialis).42 In other 
words the principles of natural bodies which were to be demonstrated 
were the four Aristotelian causes, material, formal, efficient and final. 
The study of the affections of each natural body on the other hand 
meant a survey of its accidents (quantity, quality, place, duration and 
movement or rest).43 Although physics aimed at knowledge of the 
universal characteristics of bodies, knowledge of the universals could 
be achieved only by abstracting from individuals. This would be done 
best by studying nature itself. The principally empirical nature of 17th- 
century natural philosophy should not be exaggerated, though. Exactly 	 53 
because physics had the noble status of a theoretical discipline, its 
aim was not to "operate, but to know and contemplate natural things" 44 
The structure of the physics theses directly reflects the method used 
in natural philosophical inquiry.45 All theses usually start with a de-
dication (to the relatives and patrons of the respondent) and a preface; 
the congratulatory poems written by fellow students could be placed 
either at the beginning or at the end.46 There were two basic formulas 
for writing a dissertation. The simpler form of these was based on 
questions or theorems.47 Each theorem or "thesis" formed a main chap- 
42 Alanus-Wassenius 1646, Th. XVI-XIX. Th. XI: "Nullus etiam alius est scopus 
scientiae naturalis, quam cognoscere principia corporum naturalium & eorundem 
accidentia per suas causas..." Thauvonius-Arctopolitanus 1656, Membrum III. 
Thuronius-Aurelius 1661, Theorema Physicum, III. Gezelius 1672, p. 203. Hahn-
Govinius 1685, Qvaestio III. Hahn-Höök 1690. 
43 	 On the affections of natural bodies see Gezelius 1972, p. 213-224. 
44 Alanus-Wassenius 1646, Th. X. "...non operani, sed scire & contemplari res na-
turales". See also Th. VII Porisma "Scientia naturae acquiritur, naturam ipsam 
scrutando". 
45 	 On method as an order of presentation see Mikkeli 1992, p. 80-85. 
46 Writing these poems was also an important form of exercise for good literary 
expression. 
47 In the theses the term 'theorem' is freely used. However, in this context it did 
not have the meaning of a sentence deduced from axioms or a formal system, 
but simply any kind of argument or statement which dealt with the subject matter. 
This kind of thesis can usually be recognized from its title, which was of the 
type "Theoremata nonnulla..." or "Quastiones quaedam...". 
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Both the so-called questio theses 
and others could include so-called 
corollaries or questions in the final 
part of the thesis. In this thesis by 
Miltopaeus and Kiellinus of 1672 
statements concerning all 
disciplines are included. The 
pneumatological corollary states, 
that 'A spirit as a spirit has no 
principles", the physical 'The 
prime matter is a mere figment.' 
and the astronomical one claims 
that "The natural spheres [of the 
planets] are not real [i.e. material] 
orbs." 
ter in the work. The theorem or question itself was presented first, 
after which erroneous explications of the subject were introduced, and 
finally the correct opinion was supported by several arguments. This 
kind of thesis could either deal with one subject matter, or more ty-
pically, present arguments discussing problems from many different 
disciplines. In any case they took up only special aspects or problems 
without intending a comprehensive definition of the subject. 
Obviously this method was a descendant of the quaestio method, 
which was originally a product of medieval scholasticism." It must 
be noticed, however, that we do not meet the medieval quaestio in a 
pure form in 17th-century dissertations. Whereas medieval 'ques-
tionaries' were born to explain obvious contradictions in authoritative 
texts, our theses concentrate more expressly on discussing a (physical) 
problem or a statement. It was also typical of the medieval quaestio 
to pile up arguments regardless of their relative strength. In the theses 
published in Turku instead we can see some humanist influence, which 
stressed more precise and plausible reasoning.49 Variations of the 
48 On quaestio method in the Middle Ages see Marenbon 1987, p. 10-14, 27-33. 
"quaestio method" were often incorporated in the course of argument 
in theses which were structured according to a more complicated kind 
of a method. 
The other basic formula of writing dissertations was much more 
common than the one described above. At its most typical the subject 
of inquiry was either a process (digestion, generation), phenomenon 
(eclipses, time) or a natural object (such as snow, earth, a dove or the 
senses). Only occasionally did the titles reveal a more closely defined 
approach to the subject, like "On the origin of wells". As the aim of 
physics was to give proper definitions of corpus naturales, this ap-
proach offered the most complete definition. A good definition con-
sisted of two parts: a nominal and practical definition. Nearly every 
thesis started with a nominal definition of the subject matter. This 
"onomatologia" consisted of definitions of etymologies, synonyms and 
homonyms of the main term describing the subject matter. 
The scholastic method in 17th-century theses has sometimes been 
criticised for losing itself in useless and endless nominal definitions. 
However, the 17th-century scholars themselves saw positive use in 
this activity. The purpose of the etymological definition was not clear-
ly expressed. However, the idea obviously was that studying the ori-
gins of a term would somehow reveal the essence of the thing to us. 
This idea stood behind at least one medieval best-seller, the Etymo-
logiae written by Isidorus of Seville. At Turku the idea is not as 
central and easily recongizable as in Isidorus' project, but it seems 
that the aim was most probably to trace something from the original 
language in which Adam had named all species. 
Thus, it says in Gen. 2.20, that Adam, acting as the most perfect 
Philosopher, gave proper names to all living creatures, to all birds 
in the sky and all beasts upon the earth. This naming did not happen 
at random, but it was made in accordance with certain under-
standing, which originated from perfect knowledge of the whole 
nature...50 
49 	 For medieval and humanist traditions of quaestio see also Kristeller 1988, p. 136. 
Murdoch 1990, p. 171. 
50 Alanus-Wassenius 1646, Th. II. "Habetur ergo Gen. 2,20, quod Adamus, abso-
lutissimi Philosophi fungens officio, animantia cuncta, universa volatilia coeli & 
omnes bestias terrae genuinis suis appellåvit nominibus. Quae nominum impo-
sitio cum non temere, sed certo consilio fuerit facta, & ex perfecta-totius naturae 
cognitione manaverit..." 
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Hence names were not given at random, but described something 
which belonged to the essence of the thing they referred to.51 If the 
main aim of scholastic science was definitio entis, and the intellectual 
control achieved by this definition, this kind of scrutiny was not wit-
hout importance either. 
On the other hand, the authors at Turku were much clearer about 
the aim of studying synonyms and homonyms of words. The intention 
was to specify the meaning of each term and thereby to prevent mi-
sunderstandings. Equivocation was a source of errors in philosophical 
reasoning which was most specifically fought against. One author ty-
pically remarks: "Having presented the Etymology we shall now join 
in Homonyms, so that we may proceed the more successfully, because 
equivocation usually generates errors. But this is done easily, because 
the word 'thunderstorm' allows very few significations in addition to 
the genuine and proper one."52 Whether equivocation could always be 
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	 avoided is another matter, for even the authors themselves occasional- 
ly fell into the very same trap they tried to eliminate. 
The major part of each thesis consisted of definitio realis, the real 
definition or "pragmatologia". The real definition was not concerned 
with the concept and its meanings but with the natural object it re-
ferred to. The somewhat complicated structure of the theses in this 
section was in many ways based on the ideas Aristotle presented in 
his Topics and Categories. The disposition of the theses followed the 
doctrine of predicables as presented in the "Porphyrian tree".53 The 
order outlined by predicables is then combined with the doctrines of 
51 In the seventeenth century there really was some discussion about a universal 
'natural language', in which the words would actually provide an accurate desc-
ription of the things signified. This idea was hardly accepted as such at Turku, 
since it was often emphasized that concepts were abstractions of singulars, and 
only as such did they refer to the things themselves. On the other hand the lan-
guage Adam spoke was the first universal language of the mankind, and some 
traces of it might have survived even Babel - thus the study of etymology. There 
was, however, disagreement about what was the language Adam spoke and whet-
her it was a natural or an artificial language. Knowlson 1975. Ashworth 1981. 
52 Hahn-Heurlin 1702, p. 2 "Proposita Etymologia, Homonymiam subiungimus, ut 
eo felicius procedamus, cum errorum genitrix Aequivocatio esse solet, & id eo 
facilius, cum paucissimas admittit significationes, vox Tonitru, praeter propriam 
& genuinam." 
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	 Henry 1982, p. 128-129. The list of predicables would usually contain things 
such as genus, species, differentia, proprium and accidens. On the other hand 
categories included: substance, quantity, quality, relationship, place, time, positi-
on, equipment (habitus), activity, passivity. 
categories and the four causes on different stages of the presentation. 
Following the doctrine of predicables the two main parts of a real 
definition were genus and differentia. Species seems to have dropped 
out from explicit conceptual apparatus in use, but the idea was that 
genus and differentia together formed a definition of a natural body 
of some species.54 Genus simply stated in which category of being 
the object under scrutiny belonged, i.e. whether it was substance, ac-
cidence or possibly a state of being such as motion or rest. The dis-
cussion of the genus hardly ever extended beyond a brief definition. 
As the name itself shows, the latter part of the real definition, diffe-
rentia, considered those characteristics of the species which distin-
guished it from other species within the same genus. This discussion 
was also divided into two parts, both including several subdivisions. 
The first part (causae) consisted of discussion of the four Aristo-
telian causes, material, formal, effective and final causes (usually in 
this order). However, the discussion of what these causes were was 
not subject of physics, but of logic and metaphysics. Generally, a 
cause was considered to be "a principle which influences the essence 
of the effect".S5 All causes could stand in different relations to the 
effect. There were more immediate and more remote causes, the latter 
of which could have effect only through the proximate causes. Usually 
these causes were subordinated to each other, for example so that the 
Sun was subordinated to God as an efficient cause of man's genera-
tion, and man himself as the immediate cause was subordinated to 
both God and the Sun. The general apparatus of causation was further 
strengthened by the notion that some causes were total, i.e. they could 
alone stand for a certain effect, whereas partial causes needed to be 
conjoined in order to bring forth an effect.56 
These divisions brought delicacy and subtlety to the Aristotelian 
understanding of causation and thus also to physical explanations. 
54 The word species was predicated only of individuals belonging to that species. 
Hence, man is a species. On the other hand, if we say that "man is a rational 
animal", then "animal" is the genus. It is predicated of its various species. Henry 
1982, p. 130. Risse 1964, p. 91-92. 
55 Thuronius 1660, Institutiones Logicae I, p. 143. Thuronius 1664, Pars Generalis, 
p. 215-217. Flachsenius 1678, Collegium Logicum I, p. 284. "Causa autem rea-
liter considerata, est principium influens in esse causati." 
56 Thuronius 1660, Institutiones Logicae I, p. 143-154. Thuronius 1664, Pars Ge-
neralis, p. 217-219. Flachsenius 1678, Collegium Logicum I, p. 289-290. The 
terminology and division of the causes varies a little between these authors. 
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Most theses published at the Academy of Turku followed this pre-established scheme. It was 
said that a proper definition of the subject matter consisted of nominal and real definitions. 
Both of these two classes were divided into two or more subsections. Greatest space was 
nearly always allowed to the differences of things. The material, formal, effective and final 
causes were discussed thoroughly. The treatment of other differences depended on whether 
the subject of the study was an animal or a non-living entity. 
Each of the four causes were in addition divided into several other 
types of causes. For example the efficient cause, one of the so-called 
external causes of things, could function per se, accidentally, volun-
tarily or involuntarily; solely or connected with other efficient causes, 
impulsively or instrumentally, etc.$7 It is not reasonable for us to go 
into all these details, but it is worth remembering that there were 
several different modes in which a cause could operate. Physically 
the efficient cause brought effect into being by real action, be it either 
by necessity of nature or by intention.58 Matter and form as causes 
were less problematic, for they could rather be directly associated with 
the form and matter of a substance.59 The role of the final cause is 
perhaps most difficult to understand for modern readers, because the 
functions of the final and efficient causes tend to be confused. Every 
efficient cause operates for a final cause, which defines for what pur-
pose (cujus gratia) something exists. Several modes of finality could 
be discerned, just as for efficient cause as well.6o 
In physics the greatest attention was usually paid to the effective 
causes of an entity, whereas material and formal causes were discussed 
less. If the final causes were treated in a "scholarly" tone, they were 
usually passed over with only a few words and the natural function 
of the research-object was clarified. Sometimes the literary style chan-
ged, however, and an eloquent praise of the blessings which this or 
that particular entity brought to man and nature followed. In addition 
to the four Aristotelian causes the scrutiny of differences included an 
analysis of the accidents of the corpus naturalis. These so-called af-
fectiones each belonged to a different category: place, movement, 
quantity, qualities (siccitas, firmitas, caliditas etc.), temporality, figure, 
etc., and they were discussed to a varying extent depending on the 
subject matter. 
Following the proper order of presentation was considered impor- 
57 Thuronius 1660, Institutiones Logicae I, p. 155-173. Thuronius 1664, Pars Ge-
neralis, p. 224-229. Flachsenius 1678, Collegium Logicum I, p. 301-310. 
58 Flachsenius 1678, Collegium Logicum I, p. 310. "Causa Physica est, quae vere 
& realiter agit, sive id fiat ex necessitate naturae, sive consilio, ut ignis urit, homo 
ambulat." The necessity of nature here refers to the thought that if all natural 
causes are present and there are no obstacles, the effect will follow necessarily. 
Flachsenius 1678, Collegium Logicum I, p. 321-322. 
59 Thuronius 1660, Institutiones Logicae I, p. 173-186. Thuronius 1664, Pars Ge-
neralis, p. 220-224. Flachsenius 1678, Collegium Logicum I, p. 325-347. 
60 Thuronius 1660, Institutiones Logicae I, p. 187-199. Thuronius 1664, Pars Ge-
neralis, p. 229-234. Flachsenius 1678, Collegium Logicum I, p. 347-355. 
59 
tant. A thesis which did not follow it risked being dismissed as not 
a scholarly work. One of the most conspicuous examples of this was 
Achrelius, who had to defend his omission of the normal routine in 
the preface of his Contemplationes mundi. Achrelius indirectly labels 
the canonized method as hair-splitting and exhorts his critics to write 
a better book themselves.61 Another sign of the importance of the 
order of presentation is that it was also preserved in many Cartesian-
influenced theses in the last two decades of the century.62 
Mathematics was a very many-sided discipline in 17th-century Tur-
ku. The various statutes required teaching of not only geometry, arith-
metic, etc., but also of subjects which were not mathematics in the 
strict sense, as scientia circa quantitatem. Such "applied mathematics" 
were computus ecclesiasticus, geodesy, geography, optics, gnomonics 
(construction of sundials), architecture, navigation and astronomy.6' 
There was only one professor of mathematics at Turku, and it is hardly 
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	 probable that one man could teach all these subjects. Teaching seems 
to have concentrated on the basic subjects of mathematics, and no 
theses were published on the more technical subjects.64 Especially in 
the field of astronomy, theses were written which are relevant to this 
study of the learning in natural philosophy. Mathematical and phi-
losophical astronomy had been methodologically and functionally se-
parated since Antiquity. In principle, the mathematician's task was to 
calculate the movements of the planets, but he was not supposed to 
say anything about the physical reality of the heavens. This job was 
reserved for the physicists. In a way this dichotomy was due to the 
endeavour to maintain both Aristotelian and Ptolemaic views on the 
heavens. These mutually contradictory theories could not both be pre-
served without making a category distinction between them.65 
It can, and should be questioned how far we can maintain this 
Duhemian dichotomy between physics and mathematics when appro-
aching the 16th and 17th centuries. Obviously mathematicians also 
had their views on the physical structure of the world, and on the 
61 	 Achrelius 1682, Cordate et Candide Lector b4. 
62 Kallinen 1993. 
63 Klinge 1987, p. 357-358. Annerstedt 1877, p. 249-250, 277-278. Schybergson 
1918, p. 224-225. Schybergson 1920, p. 169. On mathematics and its subdisci-
plines see Thuronius-Aurelius 1661, Theorema Mathematicum. Gezelius 1672, p. 
4. 
64 Vallinkoski 1966, p. 135-139, 280-283, 474, 501-503. 
65 	 For a classical representation of this view see Duhem 1969. 
compatibility of mathematical theories with them.` Nevertheless, the 
gulf between physics and astronomy/mathematics indisputably existed 
at the level of epistemologies. Natural philosophers were generally 
still reluctant to guarantee mathematicians a position which would 
have raised the status of mathematical knowledge. In the eyes of na-
tural philosophers a mathematician could not legitimately draw con-
clusions about the physical world from his calculations.67 This dis-
tinction was severely disputed in the 16th and 17th centuries, along 
with the work of Copernicus, Tycho Brahe and others. (The system 
of Brahe shows that he also considered that astronomical constructs 
should correspond to the observations of physical reality.) At the same 
time the social role of the astronomer changed, especially through the 
work of Galileo on one hand and the Jesuits on the other,68 but even 
if the adaptability of mathematical calculations to the study of physis 
had been accepted there would still have remained the problem of 
how to interpret these calculations correctly. 
At the University of Turku the old distinction between physics and 
mathematics was alive and well throughout the 17th century. Most 
often it was used to discount the competence of arguments defending 
Copernicanism. However, it seems that especially towards the end of 
the century some mathematicians were sometimes quite happy to use 
this distinction as an excuse for not committing themselves to any 
definitive physical truths, whatever their mathematical views might 
have suggested.69 
Medicine went through many notable changes during the 16th and 
17th centuries. What interests us here is the relationship between me-
dicine, botany and physics. From the Middle Ages on botany had 
developed as a part of medicine, although in Italy especially it had 
already developed as an independent discipline during the 16th cen-
tury.70 The pharmacological use of herbs was of course acknowledged 
at Turku too. Nevertheless, botany was officially combined with phy-
sics at Turku, while at the "mother-university" Uppsala not only bo-
tany but the whole of natural philosophy remained as an integral part 
66 Westman 1980, p. 106-107. Jardine 1979 & 1988b. 
67 Jardine 1979, 1988, p. 693-702. Dear 1987. 
68 On Galileo's new role as a court astronomer see Biagioli 1993. On the ast-
ronomer's role in general see Westman 1980. Jardine 1988b. 
69 
	
	 See sections "Ptolemy, Copernicus and Brahe" and "The Status of Astronomical 
Hypotheses" of this study. 
70 Morton 1981, p. 83-100. Schmitt 1989, XIV p. 39 ff. 
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of medical teaching. The decision to combine botany with physics 
was remarkable enough to be noticed in the title of the professorship 
which reads as "Physices & Botanices professor". In 1646 the profes-
sor of physics Georgius Alanus defined the different approaches of 
medicine and physics to botany as follows: 
We should leave medicine to the Physicians and physics to the 
Physicists. A Physicist examines plants as species of living natural 
things, but the Physician considers them in relation to medical prac-
tice, and uses them for expelling and eradicating the honors of 
periculous diseases." 
Alanus' remark illustrates the difference the two disciplines had 
in their aims (finis). But natural philosophy and medicine also over-
lapped each other as did anatomy and physiology especially. Indeed, 
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	 it has been said that the boundary between medicine and natural phi- 
losophy was "porous" throughout the 17th century.72 This is first of 
all due to the fact that natural philosophy had long served as prepa-
ratory studies for future physicians. For example, Jacopo Zabarella 
emphasised that philosophers' discussions on life, growth and the soul 
would benefit medical studies. On the other hand the anatomical facts 
in the new Vesalian anatomy were still interpreted in the Aristotelian 
natural philosophical framework.73 In the Lutheran universities of the 
sixteenth century the coalition between medicine and natural philosop-
hy temporarily received a more religious emphasis: anatomy was to 
recognize God's handiwork in creation, and to show how the faculties 
of man's soul worked.74 Medicine at Turku did not however place 
religious and moral values in such a central position. On the other 
hand the rapid growth of medicine could on some occasions challenge 
natural philosophical teaching, and even its institutional position. As 
John Gascoigne has shown, the growth of medicine and other sciences 
71 Alanus-Wassenius 1646, Th. XV. "Medica nempe medicis, Physica physicis re-
linquenda. Plantae a Physico considerantur, quatenus sunt species corporis natu-
ranis animati: a Medico vero ad praxin medicam, & diros morborum periculosis-
simorum eruciatus profligandos adhibentur." 
72 Gascoigne 1985, p. 402. As Gascoigne remarks, the word "physiology" was often 
flexibly used to refer to both natural philosophical and medical knowledge. This 
variance is obvious at Turku, too. See Alanus-Wassenius 1646, Th. XIX. 
73 Nutton 1993, p. 24. Schmitt 1985, p. 7-8. 
74 Nutton 1993, p. 20, 23, 25, et passim. Kusukawa 1993. 
associated with it at the University of Cambridge weakened the hold 
which the traditional curriculum had on natural philosophy.75 
The relationships between medicine, botany and physics were thus 
in many ways more flexible than those between natural philosophy 
and mathematics. Although medicine was considered as ars and phy-
sics scientia, the two interacted in many branches of knowledge. At 
Turku the utility of natural philosophy for medicine was noted in the 
statutes as wel1.76 The main difference between the disciplines re-
mained in their aims. The view had already been expressed by the 
professor of physics Georgius Alanus, and by the professor of medi-
cine, Laurentius Braun in a dissertation in 1695: 
It should be noted that the difference between Physical and Medical 
Physiology is not in their subject matters, which is the same for 
both of them, but in their forms or the mode of consideration. This 
is because the Physician does not consider all this in a simple way 
as the Physicist does, but speculates on it as leading to a certain 
aim.77  
Dissertations on anatomy and physiology were actually published 
more often in physics than in medicine at Turku. This mirrors the fact 
that the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Turku was not really 
for training medical doctors. It had been founded because the model 
of the University of Paris so demanded. All "real" universities would 
have a medical faculty. Of course, the lack of proper medical training 
was also a question of resources as well as attitudes. Although the 
guild of medics was organised in the middle of the 17th century in 
Sweden, appreciation of the occupation was still low,78 as is shown 
75 Gascoigne 1985, p. 396-401. 
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	 Schybergson 1918, p. 224. "De [= professors of medicine] skola även draga för- 
sorg om att kemiska arbeten utföras, för att den nytta som fysiken har för medi-
cinen må så mycket klarare skönjas." 
77 Braun-Stecksenius 1695, p. 30. "Observandum heic discrimen inter Physiologiam 
Physicam & Medicam non esse in mareriali, qvod unum idemque in ambabus 
est, sed in formali seu [?] h.c. considerandi modo, qvatenus Medicus haec omnia 
non simpliciter, prout Physicus, sed ut ad finem ducentia speculatur." 
78 Lindroth 1975, p. 378-386. The Collegium medicum was founded in 1663. The 
fact that the medical tradition at the University of Uppsala was exceptionally 
vigorous does not contradict the arguments expressed above. The tradition at 
Uppsala had more the character of a general research tradition and did not alto-
gether aim at training practising medics. 
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by the fact that some students gave up medicine and made a career 
in the state service.79 Moreover, there were extremely few places for 
the doctors: in a society where surgeons and midwives did most of 
the healing there was hardly any demand for more extensively edu-
cated medics. Only in the 18th century did the social and academic 
status of the occupation rise so much that medical training started to 
develop in earnest at Turku.80 
However, it was neither the relations between mathematics and phy-
sics nor between medicine and physics, which played the most do-
minant role in 17th-century natural philosophy. If we want to study 
what natural philosophy was like in the 17th century we must also 
consider it in relation to the most important discipline of the era. From 
a more general point of view it was also a question of the relations 
between knowledge and faith. It tells us quite a lot about the self-
image of physics to know what kind of opinions the teachers at the 
64 
	
	 University had about these matters. It tells us where the limits of 
natural philosophical knowledge stood. 
2. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
OF THEOLOGY AND NATURAL 
PHILOSOPHY 
The institutions of church, state and university were interrelated in 
17th-century Sweden. Although their tasks and functions were in many 
ways different and therefore not all clashes could be avoided, they 
also shared a great many of their interests. For the state a strong 
religion and a coherent church were valuable allies in maintaining the 
centrally led, absolutist super-power. Although the church was not 
officially state-led, it was very closely bound to the crown.81 The 
church, for its part, exercised with pleasure its hegemonous power in 
religion and aimed to do the same in cultural life in general!' The 
79 	 Perret 1983, p. 73. 
80 Leikola 1993. Leikola 1987, p. 574. Klinge 1989, p. 371-380. 
81 	 Pirinen 1991, p. 274-277. Bergendorff 1967, p. 130-132. 
last of the three institutions, the universities, were supposed to produce 
both clerical and civil servants to meet the needs of the state and the 
church. Although in principle autonomous institutions (with the right 
to their own legal procedures and taxation of the prebends), the uni-
versities were closely connected to both of their "big brothers". On 
the inter-institutional level it is the relationship between the University 
of Turku and the Bishopric of Turku especially (as the representative 
of the Swedish church) which interests us. 
The king of Sweden was in principle the highest authority of the 
Royal Academy of Turku. He could influence the university most 
through the nomination of professors, in which he exerted the ultimate 
power. The king's decisions were nevertheless always based on pro-
posals made by the Chancellor and the senate. He could also regulate 
the functioning of universities by sending them directions and circu-
lars, which could cover a great variety of matters. However, the king 
had very little to do with the everyday life of the University. The 	 65 
control of the state over the University was personified in the chan-
cellor, who represented the more aristocratic view on matters of lear-
ning. The chancellor also played an important role in the nominations, 
and the Senate of the Academy reported to him regularly on the state 
of the institution. Being a high authority, the chancellor often had to 
resolve controversies within the University. Because the chancellors 
were usually high-ranked noblemen living in Sweden on the other 
side of the Gulf of Bothnia, they did not visit the Academy very often. 
The highest authority of the University present was the vice-chancel-
lor. The bishop of Turku had acted as the vice-chancellor of the Uni-
versity since its foundation in 1640.83 Thus the control exerted by the 
two other institutions was personified in the chancellors; the vice-
chancellor representing the church and the chancellor representing the 
state. 
82 The nobility's interest in French and other Central European culture especially 
was of constant concern to the church. See Göransson 1951. 
83 	 The bishop of Turku was given the powers of a vice-chancellor in the opening 
ceremonies of the Academy. Count Brahe acted as a chancellor from the outset, 
but officially he was nominated chancellor only in 1646. Klinge 1987, p. 89, 101. 
In the 1625/6 constitution the archbishop was ordered to assist the chancellor of 
the University of Uppsala in his absence, and the same applied naturally to Turku. 
Annerstedt 1877, p. 239-240. Because the relationship between the chancellor 
and vice-chancellor remained largely unregulated, disagreements could not always 
be avoided on this front either. Göransson 1952, p. 47-50. 
According to the constitution the vice-chancellor had many duties 
and rights in supervising the University.84 In practice, it depended 
greatly on the bishop's own diligence and authority how much he 
could actually influence the University. For example in questions of 
appointments the vice-chancellor had some say, although it was the 
senate, chancellor and finally the king who made the real decisions.85 
During the period concerned there were five bishops/vice-chancellors 
in Turku: Isak Rothovius (1640-1652), Aeschillus Petraeus (1652-
1657), Johannes Terserus (1658-1664), Johannes Gezelius Sr. (1664-
1690), and Johannes Gezelius Jr. (1690-1718). 
The relationship between the vice-chancellor and the university se-
nate was not always a harmonious one and some disagreements arose, 
primarily in theological issues, matters of prestige and administrational 
matters. For example in 1664 Professor of Theology Enevaldus Sve-
nonius heavily accused Bishop Terserus of supporting syncretistic 
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	 views. As a consequence, Terserus was dismissed.86 Bishop Gezelius 
was in 1676 at odds with two members of the University staff, pro-
fessor Petraeus and secretary Achrelius. He accused both of them of 
defamation.87 But this kind of incidents have mostly to do with the 
confrontations among theologians themselves and personal matters: 
libel suits were often brought into court during that century. It interests 
us how closely the church strove to control the university in general 
and philosophy in particular at the theoretical level. Only on rare oc-
casions did the vice-chancellors interfere directly in philosophical is-
sues. For example, during the 1690's Gezelius Jr. got involved in a 
discussion over Cartesianism when he tried to prohibit the printing 
and public examination of Torsten Rudeen's Cartesian theses.88  Alt-
hough the bishop acted as the vice-chancellor in all these occasions, 
he nevertheless represented the views of another institution, the 
church. 
In the administrative system of the church, the chapter worked as 
84 Annerstedt 1877, p. 240. 
85 On the vice-chancellor's duties and especially Gezelius' actions see Laasonen 
1977b, p. 286-344. On nominations in the University see Kuusi 1935, but cum 
grano salis. 
86 Salminen 1978, p. 293-354. Göransson 1952. 
87 Laasonen 1977b, p. 307-318. Hultin 1895, p. 263-267. Gezelius was also in di-
sagreement with the Senate in some questions of nominations, finance and dis-
cipline. Laasonen 1977b, p. 288-301. 
88 	 On this incident, please see the section "The Breakthrough of Cartesianism". 
an advisory organ beside the bishop. There also was a close connection 
with the University: the three professors of theology were entitled to 
be members of the chapter ex officio. Thus, the church had several 
channels to influence and control teaching at the University, and vice 
versa. It seems, however, that the church only seldom directly censo-
red or gave orders to the proponents of natural philosophy. Besides, 
because the University had an autonomous position, it was the Faculty 
of Theology which was responsible for advocating the religious points 
of view inside the University. One can say that the control used by 
the church aimed at securing the needs which the local bishopric had 
for training priests.89 
At the intra-institutional level philosophy and theology meet first 
of all as different faculties. The Faculty of Theology was the highest 
and most respected of the four faculties at the University of Turku. 
The three professorships of theology were all positions very much 
aspired to because of the social respect and better salary they attracted. 	 67 
Most professors of theology were promoted to this position from the 
Faculty of Arts. Of the professors of physics Georgius Alanus (in 
1648), Abraham Thauvonius (1659) and Andreas Petraeus (1682) ac-
hieved a chair in the supreme faculty. Among professors of mathe-
matics only Johannes Flachsenius got this desirable nomination 
(1692), but of the professors of poetry and especially logic and me-
taphysics several became professors of theology.90 The pinnacle of 
one's career was, moreover, to become a bishop, which some people 
who had begun their career in philosophy were also able to do. 
What does all this mean in respect to physics then? Firstly, all 
theologians had at least studied, most of them also taught philosophy. 
Therefore we can expect that they were well-versed in natural phi-
losophy as well and could recognize legitimate physical argument. On 
the other hand it has been said that this striving for advancement was 
a major factor in natural philosophers' reluctance to accept new ideas. 
Scientific/scholarly work was retarded in all other areas except theo-
logy, because most professors in the Faculty of Arts... tried to get 
a promotion to the Faculty of Theology as quickly as possible. This 
89 Klinge 1987, p. 173-174. 
90 	 From poetry: Petrus Laurbecchius 1688, David Lund 1691, Torsten Rudeen 1706; 
from metaphysics: Nils Nycopensis 1650, Jakob Flachsenius 1679, Simon Tålpo 
1700, Gabriel Juslenius 1717. 
was because those professorships were more respected and better 
paid. The aspiration for promotion meant that the interest of many 
professors was more directed to theology from the beginning than 
to their own subject, for which reason the study of their own sub-
jects was only a matter of temporary dabbling.91  
This claim hardly holds true for physics and mathematics. In fact 
all professors who were promoted to the Faculty of Theology were 
actively teaching their own subject (except Anders Petraeus).92 Besi-
des, it was one's years in service which counted most for promotions. 
It is also a common notion that this aspiration for a better office would 
have bound the professors' tongues: 
Until the 19th century the professors of physics were usually ele-
vated to better positions, i.e. to professorships of theology and to 
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	 bishopric, and therefore did not want to spoil their opportunities in 
advance.9' 
This argument presupposes that the physicists would have had 
things to say which were contrary to theology. This first undermines 
the fact that physicists and mathematicians most probably had personal 
religious convictions. It does so because it takes for granted the idea 
that science (true knowledge) and religion are necessarily in opposi-
tion with each other. We hardly can support conclusions claiming this 
kind of opportunism. However, at the same time we have to notice 
that just because these people were good, believing Christians they 
would not have accepted just any anti-theological ideas, or ideas con- 
91 	 Myrberg 1950, p. 10. "Tieteellistä työskentelyä muilla kuin jumaluusopin alalla 
oli omiansa ehkäisemään se, että useimmat filosofisen tiedekunnan professorit... 
pyrkivät mahdollisimman nopeasti siirtymään teologiseen tiedekuntaan, jossa pro-
fessorin virat tuottivat suurempaa arvonantoa ja enemmän tuloja. Tästä syystä 
monien professorien mielenkiinto suuntautui usein jo alunperin teologiaan ja oman 
alan tutkiminen jäi tilapäisen harrastuksen varaan." In Finnish there is no diffe-
rence of expression between scientific and humanistic scholarship. 
92 	 See Vallinkoski 1966 for the list of academic dissertations. The same holds true 
for most other professors e.g. in theoretical philosophy, who advanced to the 
Faculty of Theology. 
93 	 Niini 1953, p. 2. "1800-luvulle asti fysiikan professorit tavallisesti siirtyivät myö-
hemmin parempiin, ts. teologian professorin ja piispan virkoihin eivätkä tietysti 
ennakolta halunneet pilata ylenemismandollisuuksiaan." See also Heikkinen 1969, 
p. 93. 
sidered to be that. Moreover, putting forward new and controversial 
scientific ideas was not necessarily an obstacle to becoming a theo-
logian. For example, two theses of Torsten Rudeen aroused heated 
discussion in the 1690's because they proposed Cartesian dualism. 
Dualism and other ideas which he defended in his theses were still 
not accepted by the church by the time he became a priest in 1699. 
Rudeen advanced to professor of theology in 1707, and he ended his 
days as a bishop of Linköping.94 
Although elements of theology were obligatory for all students, 
natural philosophy was studied by most students who wanted to be 
ordinary clergymen. In fact, many students never took a degree in 
theology. A certain amount of philosophical study was thus a require-
ment for deeper studies in theology, law or medicine.95 This demand 
for reciprocity was set down in the 1661 statutes as follows: 
Anyone who presents for an exam in jurisprudence, medicine or 
philosophy may not take the exam unless he has proof from the 
theological faculty that he has the necessary knowledge of the prin-
ciples of faith. In other words he must rightly understand the main 
dogmas of the Christian faith as they are expressed by its symbols 
and the confession of the Swedish church. And he must also un-
derstand dogmatics, as it is taught by the author which the academy 
has accepted, so that he can also show the primary ground of the 
dogmas in the Holy Scriptures. He must also have some knowledge 
of the biblical history of the Old and New Testaments. Conversely, 
anyone who wants to take some degree in theology, jurisprudence 
or medicine, must have evidence from the philosophical faculty that 
he has the necessary knowledge (which must be in accordance with 
his aim) in general history, languages and the philosophical disci-
plins.96 
94 Heikel 1940, p. 61, 86-87. 
95 	 On the significance of the arts course see e.g. Ong 1983, p. 132-133. 
96 	 Schybergson 1920, p. 150. "Var och en som komma till examen i juridik, medicin 
eller filosofi, skall icke ra avlägga den, om han icke har vittnesbörd av teologiska 
fakulteten om en nödvändig kunskap i trosartiklama, nämligen att han rätt förstår 
såväl själva den kristliga trons huvudsytcken efter symbola och den svenska kyr-
kans trosbekännelse, såsom ock den vid akademien antagna auktorn i dogmatik, 
och att han tillika kan uppvisa deras förnämsta grund i den heliga skrift, jämte 
det han också har någon kunskap i gamla och nya testamentets bibliska historia. 
Och omvänt skall den, som vill taga någon grad i teologi, juridik eller medicin, 
hava vittnesbörd av filosofiska fakulteten om en nödig kunskap, i överensstäm- 
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It was no small amount of theological knowledge which was de-
manded of the arts students. This regulation is first met in the 1655 
statutes, and it was not accepted without a formal objection by the 
Faculty of Arts at Uppsala.97 
Future theologians were thus supposed to have basic knowledge of 
the philosophical disciplines. Therefore what was taught in natural 
philosophy was not unimportant either. Although it was only an 18th-
century phenomenon that country priests would practise all kinds of 
natural philosophical subjects (in order to gain economic utility for 
the nation), basic knowledge of the arts course was useful for the 
17th-century clerics as well. Mathematics was important for the corn-
putus ecclesiasticus. On the other hand natural philosophy was part 
of the general studies, which taught disputation (an indispensable skill 
against heretics!) and accustomed the student to arranging and pre-
senting knowledge by the right method. Natural philosophy was ba- 
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	 sically knowledge of God's creation, the book of nature, which would 
ultimately lead man to admiring God. Knowing the causes of things 
also undoubtedly helped to recognize and fight superstition and sor-
cery. What is more, religious dogmas could be supported by physical 
"facts" too, as we will see in the next section. 
melse med hans mål, i allmänna historien, språken och de filosofiska discipliner-
na." 
97 The demand for philosophy students to participate in theology courses was mo-
tivated by the fear that students ignorant about the fundamentals of the Lutheran 
religion, especially those who studied abroad, might be easily seduced to Catho-
licism or Calvinism. See Göransson 1951. The Philosophical Faculty at the Uni-
versity of Uppsala sent a memorandum to the Chancellor on 7.3.1655 opposing 
the draft of the new regulations, which would have made theology studies obli-
gatory for arts students. The proposal was opposed on the grounds that this was 
not the habit in other universities and that an increasing number of students would 
leave off their studies without a degree, or at least that getting one would be 
severely delayed. Annerstedt 1910, p. 20-22. 
3. THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY - 
SUBORDINATION OR SUBMISSION ? 
Angels or Villains of the Philosophical Enterprise? 
Historians of science have typically despised theological elements in 
17th-century science, and regarded theological arguments as some-
thing inferior to physical arguments, even if only Aristotelian ones. 
For these positivistic-minded historians, being a handmaiden of theo-
logy really seems to mean a prostitution of philosophy. On this view 
the 17th-century Scientific Revolution is considered to be a liberation 
of Real Science not only from scholasticism but most of all from the 
dominance of theology. It is then claimed that in Finland this liberation 
was delayed because of the tight control exercised by the theolo-
gians."  
It can be asked, however, whether physical and non-theological 
reasoning should be preferred over theological when talking about the 
history of science. In fact, by appreciating non-theological reasoning 
more we evaluate the past in terms of our own views, which leads to 
the hazardous way of anachronism and presentism. Previous science 
is to be assessed by its own criteria. If theological arguments were 
being accepted as relevant in physics at a certain time, it was not 
despicable for the scholars of that time to use them. Indeed, it would 
have been more odd for them not to use theological arguments when-
ever it was habitual to argue in that way. The use of theological ar-
gument in physics was nevertheless not without specific limitations. 
What is more interesting is the less direct forms of interaction between 
theology and physics, which not always are so readily recognized. 
Historically speaking the question is often about the formation and 
rearrangement of the boundaries between the proper fields of physics 
and theology. A major discovery in either of the fields usually de-
mands some sort of renegotiation of these boundaries, so that it is of 
great importance to study periods of transition when different scientific 
(and theological) views and values compete. This helps us to find out 
98 Salminen 1983, passim. Myrberg 1950, p. 9-10. Niini 1953, p. 2. Sandblad 1944, 
p. 179-180, et passim & 1945, p. 118, et passim, takes a somewhat more neutral 
position. Rein 1908, p. 60-63, et passim. Forsström 1904, p. 182-183, 186-187, 
287, 289. Slone 1898, passim. 
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when and especially why and how a new attitude towards these boun-
daries is embraced. As regards the relationship between science and 
religion, the Scientific Revolution did not generally mean the separa-
tion of faith and knowledge altogether, but rather a rearrangement of 
their mutual relationship.99 In studying the situation at Turku in the 
17th century we will also have to look at the two parties as historical 
entities and not define their boundaries according to modern criteria. 
It should not be understood as undermining the above that in reality 
there certainly is some truth in the ideas of an obstructive and "anti-
scientific" attitude of the conservative church. Clutching at the autho-
rity of the Bible, theologians certainly tried to discourage the accep-
tance of the Copemican world view and changes in scientific thought. 
On the other hand, in the 18th century the attitudes of the clerics 
changed in this respect and natural philosophy became a new kind of 
ally of religion in the form of so-called natural theology.100 We ought 
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	 to ask why did theologians adopt these strategies? Obviously these 
attitudes were created by a complex of social, intellectual and religious 
causes, stemming both from the desire to maintain existing socio-pro-
fessional and epistemological structures and from new challenges set 
for theology by new religious and philosophical movements. Changes 
were thus brought about by profound rearrangements in society, po-
litics, and academic life, including religious thought itself. 
Another type of approach to the relationship between science and 
religion has been that religion has in some essential way contributed 
to the progress and development of science - or the transformation of 
natural philosophy into science. The milder interpretations of this view 
claim that some churches just were less obstructive than others.i01 On 
the other hand, the stronger versions of this assertion presuppose that 
there are some intrinsic characteristics in certain denominations which 
are especially favourable to science. This view is best known in its 
extreme form as the so-called Merton thesis, according to which pu-
ritan values played an important role in triggering off the rise of em-
pirical science in the 17th-century England.102 This view has inspired 
99 Brooke 1991, p. 52-81. 
100 Brooke 1991, p. 155-161, et passim. For natural theology in Sweden see e.g. 
Lindroth 1978, p. 217-228. Klinge 1987, p. 668-675. 
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	 Deason 1986 tries to show that the 17th-century mechanists' conception of pas- 
sivity of matter was supported by the Protestant idea of radical sovereignty of 
God. He does not, however, claim any causal connection between them. 
102 The Merton thesis has been criticised, with good reason. On Merton and the 
and motivated decades of discussion and research, which tries to com-
pare the relationships which different Christian churches had towards 
generation and diffusion of the new science.103 Differences have been 
sought not only in dogmatic structures between Protestant and Catho-
lic confessions, but also in their general attitudes towards new ideas, 
including their relative willingness to use censorship. 
One of the more specific claims which the discussion around the 
Merton thesis has produced concerns the possible interdependence of 
certain confessions and the progress of science by examining a single 
development, namely the acceptance of the Copernican system in dif-
ferent countries. It is supposed that the Protestants (thus not only Pu-
ritans) would have adopted the new theory more readily than the Cat-
holics. When this hypothesis is tested it proves to be quite untenable.104 
The case of Finland seems to challenge the view of Protestantism as 
especially favourable even to Copemicanism strongly. Although a Pro- 
testant province, Finland was nevertheless persistent in resisting new 	 73 
philosophical and astronomical ideas in the 17th and 18th centuries. 
This confirms the idea that other explanatory factors than religion 
must be sought to explain processes of change - or stability - in 17th-
century science. But this also invites us to tum our attention to the 
fact that in the 17th century the function of the universities was not 
to create new knowledge, but to relay existing knowledge to new 
generations. 
In more recent studies of Finnish history of science the problem of 
the relations between science and religion has been set aside and more 
emphasis has been laid on the role of Aristotelian physics in retarding 
scientific change.105 However, it is not the aim of this chapter to exa-
mine whether religion inhibited or accelerated scientific change in 
Finland, but to show how these two were intertwined and where the 
boundaries between them were drawn.106 
discussion of his thesis see Cohen 1990, especially the article of A. Rupert Hall 
of 1963 reprinted in it. Brooke 1991, p. 4, 83-116. Brooke also produces an 
extensive bibliography on the discussion of various sides of the problem related 
to the Merton thesis, p. 361-366. Henry 1992. 
103 See e.g. Ashworth 1986. Shea 1986. Webster 1986. Westfall 1986. 
104 For a thorough examination of the theme see Westman 1986. Brooke 1991, p. 
89-94. Questions arise such as in what sense was the theory accepted, as a physical 
reality or as a hypothesis? Which parts of the Copemican system were embraced? 
Which other factors apart from religious ones played a role in this process? 
105 Lehti 1979. Klinge, Knapas, Leikola, Strömberg 1987. 
106 	 For an analysis on the possible causes of stability see Conclusion. 
"Science" and Religion as Knowledge and Faith 
"Religion" generally refers to an organized institution, which through 
the practice of certain rituals exerts authority over beliefs about such 
things as the supernatural, right morality, and human destiny after 
death. Denomination, on the other hand, is the preferred orientation 
of these beliefs.107 Orthodox Lutheranism, which prevailed in North 
Germany and Scandinavia, adopted a very controversial policy against 
other Christian churches after 1648.108 Curiously enough, this ecclesia 
militans arose only after the end of the Thirty Years' War, which had 
been propagated as a religious war both by Protestant and Catholic 
leaders. At Turku this strong orthodox tendency was strengthened 
from the 1660's on especially by the active appearance of the profes-
sor of theology, Enevaldus Svenonius.'°9 
Orthodox Lutheranism was characterized by fundamentalism, literal 
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reading of the Bible and quarrelsome opposition to other religious 
confessions."' The Catholic and Calvinistic churches and a large 
group of more or less systematised "heresies" (such as synchretism 
and socinianism) especially were seen as threats and repeatedly at-
tacked in order to keep the purity and consistency of the national 
Lutheran church. At the same time this tactic brought coherence to 
Lutheran theological thinking and forced it to refine its doctrines. In 
this study I would like to preserve a relatively wide meaning for the 
concept "religion". Religion was a factor permeating the whole society 
and as such it certainly affected every scholar of natural philosophy. 
We can not disregard the fact that every scholar must have had some 
kind of religious conviction since atheism as denying the existence of 
God was hardly known in 17th-century Lutheran culture."' 
Thus, if "religion" refers to a larger set of beliefs and practices, 
107 	 On slightly different ways of defining "religion" and on the dangers of defining 
it too restrictively, without reference to the historical context, see Brooke 1991, 
p. 6-11. 
10s Hägglund 1971, p. 274, 279. 
109 Salminen 1978. 
110 Ratschow 1964, p. 82, 100, 106-116, et passim. 
111 Laasonen 1977a, according to whom "an atheist" became a common name for 
all proponents of divergent religious beliefs. On the other hand, the "practical 
atheists", i.e. people living in godlessness and impiety, were the most common 
type of atheists, whereas only few theoretical atheists really denied the existence 
of God and the godhood of Christ. On the possibility of non-religious life see 
also Febvre 1982. 
which build the framework of Lutheranism, "theology" is a more li-
mited concept. It includes the study and maintainance of the dogmatic 
core of the religion. In this piece, the role of the faith is played mainly 
by theology, whereas religion forms a part of the setting. It is, after 
all, for the most part a question of the relation between the conceptual 
frameworks of philosophy and theology which are scrutinised in this 
study. 
The other part of the relationship in question is philosophy. The 
exact scope of the term "philosophy" has not always been defined 
when talking about the relationships between theology and philosophy; 
this is true of both 17th- and 20th-century authors. However, in this 
study we are not concerned with the philosophy as a whole, but with 
certain parts of it: natural philosophy or physics, and metaphysics to 
a lesser extent. Although physics was considered to be a philosophical 
discipline, it is important to make a distinction between the two. It is 
evident that the relation between metaphysics or logic and theology 	 75 
for example, or between ethics and theology was different from that 
between natural philosophy and theology. The importance of this dif-
ference will be further demonstrated later in the text. 
Thus in this chapter we will examine what the relationship between 
theology and philosophy (or natural philosophy, whenever the diffe-
rence can be drawn) really was like at the 17th-century University of 
Turku. Was it more a relationship of domination or of collaboration? 
Or can it be described as either of them at all? What forms did their 
mutual intercourse take on the theoretical level? After some general 
remarks I shall start with an examination of the attitudes which the 
proponents of theology and natural philosophy respectively themselves 
had towards the relationship between their disciplines. Theological, 
metaphysical and physical theories formed a network of knowledge 
in which different arguments were strongly interrelated and dependent 
on each other. At the end of this chapter I shall concentrate on the 
problem at the level of natural philosophical theories. 
Theologians on Philosophy 
Theology has two basic strategies towards philosophy, which it has 
adopted during varying cultural tendencies. This is a coarse genera-
lisation, and obviously the motives for this have varied in different 
historical contexts as have the means used by theologians for ac-
hieving their respective goals as well. At times theology has tried to 
separate itself from philosophy and other disciplines. This "Augustini-
an" tendency prevailed especially during the Reformation because of 
the desire of the reformers to keep theology untainted by mundane 
knowledge or "philosophical hairsplitting". According to this view, 
knowledge cannot usually bring any essential help on the road towards 
salvation, which is dependent on faith alone. This kind of view tends 
to disregard mundane knowledge such as natural philosophy as less 
important or even futile.12 
However, for the most part of the western world's history theology 
has adopted just the opposite view in its relation to other disciplines. 
Theology has been the queen of sciences, making use of other disci-
plines by subordinating them as its "servants". What this servitude has 
meant, then, has greatly varied in detail, but in general knowledge 
has been regarded as able to aid faith - or at least help in organising 
theological knowledge. Indeed, the very existence of certain disci-
plines has occasionally been warranted because of the support they 
offered to theology."' Nevertheless we can hardly talk about any fu- 
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	 sion of theology and philosophy. Different forms of conceptual justi- 
fication for being subalternate had already been developed during me-
dieval scholasticism, usually based on some interpretation of Aristot-
le's notion of subalternate sciences.' 14  
St. Aquinas' ideas on the relationship between philosophy and theo-
logy were influential in medieval philosophy. Aquinas thought that 
matters of faith could be clarified by analogies with philosophical 
doctrines. Thus philosophy as a sort of purified reason and combined 
with revelation could help in establishing theological truths, but 
Aquinas' philosophy was guided by his religious principles.115 Whe-
reas Aquinas had little reverence for the consistency and integrity of 
philosophical conclusions except if they were suitable for theological 
use, William Ockham for example carefully preserved the autonomy 
of natural philosophy in his works. Certainly he gave preference to 
revelation whenever it was in contradiction with philosophy, but he 
did so without destroying the integrity of philosophical ratiocination."' 
The alliance of natural philosophy and theology did not come to an 
end with the fall of scholasticism, only the modes in which they were 
112 	 Of course, when Luther attacked against scholastic Aristotelianism he did so be-
cause he saw it as representing and maintaining the power of the pope. Kusukawa 
1990, p. 23-41. Kusukawa 1992, p. 36. 
113 Brooke 1991, p. 59. 
114 	 Sylla 1975, p. 355-356. 
115 	 Sylla 1975. Copleston 1985 II, p. 312-323. Brooke 1991, p. 60-61. 
116 Sylla 1975. 
related to each other changed."' For example in the 18th- and 19th-
centuries it was common to see natural science as revealing the Book 
of Nature, for the majesty of the Creator could be seen in his work. 
The strategy of subordination and use of philosophy for the benefit 
of theology was the prevailing attitude at the time this study is con-
cerned with. The way theologians at Turku viewed philosophy must 
be considered in a wider context, and in relation to the discussions 
about the relationship between faith and knowledge. This aspect had 
been widely discussed in the Lutheran world. One of the most central 
demands of Luther's reformation was to make a clear distinction be-
tween revelation and rational knowledge. This separation was to a 
great extent a heritage from the Occamist tradition.18 Luther main-
tained that man's rationality was feeble because his nature had been 
spoilt in the Fall. Therefore he had to rely on faith, based on the truths 
found through revelation, which was the only way to God's mercy. 
On the other hand his revolt against the scholastic forms of the Cat-
holic theology demanded purging religion of philosophical "hair-split-
ting" and "nonsense". 
Not even the reformationists, however, were unanimous on this 
matter. For example Melanchthon was more ready than Luther to ac-
cept philosophical representation and analysis of religious knowledge, 
provided the philosophy used had been transformed to meet the special 
requirements of the Lutheran faith.' 19 Around the middle of the 17th 
century this tension finally lead the Lutheran world into two conten-
ding parties between the Wittenbergian and Helmstedtian schools, of 
which the former stood for a wider use of philosophy in theology. 
Wittenbergian theology regarded philosophy as worthless in itself, but 
useful as an instrument in theology. Contrary to this the so-called 
Helmstedt school respected the difference between theological and 
philosophical disciplines.120 
117 Brooke 1991, p. 52-81. 
118 Risse 1964, p. 81. 
119 Kusukawa 1992, p. 33-34. 
120 Kusukawa 1990, p. 23-66. Preus 1970, p. 129. Salminen 1987, 234-236, et passim. 
In my opinion Kusukawa fails to pay enough attention to the point that the ques-
tion of whether philosophy was applicable to theological use was also very much 
one of principle. One should also be careful about saying in what respect phi-
losophy was "rehabilitated" in practice. Although philosophy became the basis 
for moral law, and the study of nature showed the Providential Plan of God and 
thus proved His existence, limitations on the use of philosophical terminology in 
theology still remained even after Melanchthon's new arts curriculum had been 
The orthodox Lutheran movement, which began around 1600, was 
based to a great extent on Neo-Aristotelianism and Neo-Scholasticism. 
It actually discarded Luther's opinions on philosophy, and after 1648 
philosophical argument especially played a major role in theology. 
Orthodox Lutheranism was eager to employ especially metaphysics 
and logic in order to fight other confessions (especially the Jesuits) 
with their own weapons.121 The rank of the discipline was thus deter-
mined by its ability to aid theology in its great crusade. This is a 
strikingly different motivation from that of Melanchthon, who stressed 
the importance of philosophy as the basis for moral law and know-
ledge of the existence of God. It was a conspicuous feature in the 
attitude of the orthodox Lutheranism, as represented by the Witten-
bergian theologian Abraham Calovius that elaborate argumentation 
was developed to show that theology and philosophy were not mutu-
ally contradictory. 122 This was, of course, necessary, because nothing 
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	 contradictory to theology could assist it. The fact that Calovius needed 
to argue for the compatibility of philosophy and theology also shows 
that the anti-philosophical attitude of Luther was still very much alive. 
Many of the arguments used by Calovius we shall also meet in dis-
cussions at Turku. 
During the first two decades after the foundation of the University 
of Turku the relation between theology and other disciplines was dis-
cussed only seldom. Theology was the highest and most respected of 
all disciplines, but its position was self-evidently so without any furt-
her argument. A new kind of emphasis on religious purity appeared 
in the statutes of 1655 and 1661, which made theological studies ob-
ligatory for all students. Obedience to the main dogmatic document 
of the Lutheran church, the so-called Augsburg confession was stres-
sed, and the ceremonial oath sworn in the magisterial promotion set 
the Word of God as the primary criterion of philosophical truth.t23 In 
1662 we hear for the first time a theologian claim hegemony for his 
discipline. Enevaldus Svenonius presented in the last disputation of 
introduced to Lutheran universities. (Kusukawa 1992, p. 38-42.) 
121 	 Hägglund 1971, p. 192, 274-281. Lewalter 1967, p. 7-9. 
122 	 Preus 1970, p. 130-133. 
123 	 Schybergson 1920, p. 112, "Stadgar och förordnar Kunglig Majestät, att ej något 
annat vid Åbo akademi offentligt och enskilt skall läras eller framställas av någon, 
av vad stånd han vara må, än det som överensstämmer med den Heliga Skrifts 
grund och med den oförändrade Augsburgska bekännelsen, som vid Upsala möte 
år 1593 blivit vedertagen.", 155-156. 
his Gymnasium capiendae rationis severe demands for the proper role 
of philosophy. Philosophy should be humble and serve theology "like 
Hagar had served Sarah", i.e. like a slave her mistress. Any philosophy 
which thought itself competent to judge matters of faith and criticize 
the foundations of the Orthodox dogma by mere reason, was regarded 
as foolish and presumptuous because reason was blind.124 
Although Svenonius regarded philosophy as a valuable servant of 
theology, he carefully emphasized the dangers of excessive philosop-
hizing. 
We learn from Cicero that in the old times the Stoics, such as Zeno, 
Diogenes and others, exceeded moderation in their philosophizing. 
The Scholastics were not better than them: Thomas [Aquinas], Sco-
tus, Suarez, Bonaventura, Ockham, Vasquez, Lombard and others 
who had the most pernicious desire to wallow in obscure terminolo- 
gy and various useless distinctions. And they pursued a practice - 	 79 
as do the followers of the papists even today - which makes difficult 
things even more difficult with their complicated questions; and the 
obscure things they envelop all the more tightly under the cover of 
questions and dreadful-sounding ambiguities of words.125 
Svenonius claims that the scholastics "had such a desire for cont-
roversy" that they substituted academic subtleties for religious 
truths.126 Obviously this was the greatest danger in excessive use of 
philosophy, but even the pagan philosophy was not without other (mo-
ral) hazards. Following Calovius' opinion Svenonius recommended 
that certain books of antique authors should be replaced by Christian 
authors' works. This would bring the advantage that the students 
would learn matters of piety and religion at the same time as they 
124 Salminen 1978, p. 236-269. Svenonius 1662, p. 326. "Magnum est periculum, 
res fidei humanis committere rationibus. ...Mysteria fidei, Rationi humanae stul-
titia sunt." 
125 Svenonius 1662, p. 2-3. "Fuerunt igitur, ut ex Cicerone patet, modum in Phi-
losophando excedentes olim Stoici, qualis fuit Zeno, Diogenes, aliique. His non 
meliores Scholastici fuerunt: Thomas, Scotus, Svarezius, Bonaventura, Occamus, 
Vasquez, Lombardus & similes, quibus pruritus terminorum obscurorum variarum-
que inutilium distinctionum pemiciosissimus infeliciter affrictus fuerat, quibus id 
egerunt, hodieque agunt imitatiores Pontificij, ut quae difficilia sunt, reddant spi-
nosis suis quaestionibus difficiliora, quae vero obscura, quaestionum involucris 
& horrisonis verborum ambagibus magis involvant." 
126 Svenonius 1662, p. 6-7. 
strove to learn the language. If pagan authors were to be read for the 
sake of the Latin language, the works in question had first to be ren-
dered suitable. 
Thus, as we see that it is dangerous to study Philosophy from pagan 
philosophers' books, we shall publicly promise, in accordance with 
the Senate of the Academy, that using Aristotle as the leader in 
Philosophy and Cicero in rhetoric will be permitted only if pro-
fanities have thoroughly been marked beforehand, attention paid to 
decent remarks, inducements to sin have been removed and all other 
changes are done.`" 
Svenonius thus aimed to redefine the areas of competence of the 
two disciplines. His rejection and outright mutilation of antique aut-
hors in favour of religious views is a clear indication of this. Svenonius 
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	 goes on to define what kind of use the various parts of philosophy 
would have for theology. Logic would be necessary for clear thinking 
and consistent phrasing of religious arguments; the premises should 
nevertheless be based on the Holy Scripture, because even formally 
valid reasoning could occasionally lead to false conclusions. Whereas 
metaphysics produced some of the most important general concepts, 
mathemathics, for example, was useful for deciding chronological dis-
putes and interpreting (astrological) signs of future events. `28 
In 1656 (when he was still a professor of Latin) Svenonius had 
already claimed in a disputation that the prime function of metaphysics 
should be rendering philosophical terminology appropriate for theo-
logical use. All deficiencies could be removed from philosophical con-
cepts, but this would presuppose eliminating and adding them, and 
amplifying their meanings. Aristotelian philosophy would not as such 
be suitable for theological use. All in all philosophical knowledge 
should be modified to serve theology, because as such it was not 
suitable for solving theological questions. Therefore it was theology 
127 Svenonius 1662, p. 11. "Ideoque cum videamus periculosum esse Philosophiam 
discere ex libris Ethnicorum, non nisi fideliter significatis abominationibus, ob- 
servato decoro, amputatis scandalis, mutatisque mutandis, principem Philosopho- 
rum Aristotelem & ducem oratorum Ciceronem juxta consist. Acad. publice pro-
fitemur." 
128 Svenonius 1662, p. 300-302, 304-306. "Mathesis... controversijs Chronologicis 
decidendis & finiendis, signis variorum eventuum solide dijucandis ac observandis 
afferat..." 
which should have the last word about the contents of philosophical 
disciplines. 29 
In his Gymnasium Svenonius praises the study of physics as a lo-
vely and suitable exercise for sharpening one's wits. But just like 
everything else, physics was most useful for disputing heretical views. 
Svenonius names several physical questions in which the accepted 
theory differed from the Calvinists' views, for example "Whether the 
bodies of the blessed are immobile and whether they can be where 
ever they want to in an instant? We Agree, Calvinists Deny", "Whether 
God is the place of the world? We Agree, Calvinists Deny" or "Whet-
her an Empyrean heaven exists? We Deny, Calvinists Agree."130 Need-
less to say, it was not up to physicists to decide which interpretation 
was right from the theological point of view. Moreover, only few of 
the questions named by Svenonius were actually discussed in physical 
dissertations. 
According to Salminen, Svenonius possibly seems to have meant 
that philosophy, which was in no way connected to theology, should 
not be admitted to the University. In any case it was Svenonius' aim 
not only to exclude philosophers from theological discussion but to 
subdue theoretical thinking in philosophical disciplines to the control 
of theology.131 In his view, "The human reason must be captured, so 
that it will obey faith."132 In other words he regarded unfettered reason 
as dangerous, because it could end up doubting matters of faith. Cap-
tured and harnessed to theology philosophy could still be useful for 
achieving higher goals. 
Enevaldus Svenonius was a dominant figure at the University from 
the 1660's until his death in 1688. His polemics was a part of his 
larger programme to establish the so-called Wittenbergian school of 
theology in Turku. Moreover, the introduction of Wittenbergian theo-
logy to Turku is connected with the controversies on syncretism, 
which raged in Uppsala and Turku during 1660-1664. For example 
bishop Terserus, who was heavily accused by Svenonius of syncre-
tistic views, preferred Helmstedtian theology in this respect.133  Terse- 
129 Salminen 1978, p. 228-237. 
130 Svenonius 1662, p. 303-304. "An corpora gloriosa sint immobilia, & in momento 
esse possint ubi voluerint? Nos A. Calv. N.", "An Deus sit mundi locus? Nos N. 
Calv. A." or "An detur coelum Empyreum? Nos N. Calv. cum Pont. A." 
131 Salminen 1978, p. 268-269, 416. 
132 Svenonius 1662, p. 326-327. "Ratio humana erit captivanda, ut fidei obediat." 
133 Salminen 1978, p. 234-236. Göransson 1952. 
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rus was dismissed in 1664 as a result of the process initiated by Sve-
nonius. After this it was Svenonius' opinions which determined theo-
logians' attitudes towards philosophy. As Salminen puts, "...the Lut-
heran Orthodoxy and variations of scholastic Aristotelianism, which 
was modified to meet the needs of theology, formed a coalition. This 
coalition reigned supreme over Finnish scholarship, and hardly any 
deviations from it were tolerated."'34 
The relationship between theology and philosophy was not, how-
ever, as simple as this. The new regulations especially written for the 
University of Turku in 1661 included a stipulation, according to which 
the professors were entitled to dispute only over such matters that 
belonged to their own faculty. Making theological statements was ex-
pressly forbidden for non-theologians.135 The regulation handed down 
by queen Christina in 1651 was also aimed at establishing a certain 
distance between theology and philosophy. This regulation denied the 
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	 nomination of theologians or priests to any position in the Faculty of 
Arts, and conversely taking holy orders was prohibited for philosop-
hers.136 It seems that this regulation was not always followed at Turku, 
because Svenonius for example was a well-advanced theologian when 
he was nominated professor of eloquence in 1654. 
As early as 1666 there was a serious wrangle between two profes-
sors of the University, which indicated that theology was not supposed 
to have too close a friendship with philosophy after all. In April 1666 
the newly-appointed professor of theology Petrus Bång published a 
dissertation De ecclesia militante in genere in order to get the degree 
of Doctor of Theology. The professor of eloquence, Martinus Milto-
paeus had been invited to be one of the opponents. Miltopaeus, it was 
later reported, used very harsh language and claimed that the argu-
ments in Bång's thesis were absurd and contradictory to other Luthe- 
134 	 Salminen 1981, p. 93. "...luterilainen täysortodoksia ja teologisia tarpeita varten 
modifioitu skolastinen aristotelismi eräine muunnelmineen muodostivat suoma-
laista tieteenharjoitusta suvereenisti hallitsevan koalition, josta ei juuri poikkeamia 
sallittu." On syncretistic controversies see also Göransson 1952. 
135 Schybergson 1918, p. 216 "Alla ordinarie professorer skola sammanskriva och 
hålla sina vissa disputationer, åtminstone en om året, vilket rektor skall driva på. 
Men var och en skall bliva inom sin fakultets termer och uttryckssätt.", p. 217 
"Ingen utom teologiska fakulteten skall efterlåtas att i sina teser inblanda några 
teologiska teser eller tillägga korollarier, som höra till teologin, och vilka näm-
ligen på intet annat sätt än genom guds särskilda nåd äro uppenbarade." 
136 	 Annerstedt 1877, p. 398. Christina to the Senate of the University of Uppsala 
8.11.1651. 
ran theologians' writings. Because the Faculty of Theology had al-
ready vetted Bång's thesis and accepted it, it seemed as if Miltopaeus' 
attack was targetted at the whole University (i.e. at the proponents of 
the highest faculty of the University). The quibble continued in later 
disputations and even the students were called on to take sides in the 
controversy. The disagreement was settled only by the interference of 
Chancellor Brahe himself.137 
This incident is remarkable in view of the relationships between 
theology and philosophy. What Miltopaeus seems to have attacked in 
Bång's thesis was primarily the scholastic terminology it used. It 
seems to have been debatable what was to be regarded as "right" 
philosophy, and whether and to what extent philosophy should be used 
in theology.138 The controversial questions really employed scholastic 
terminology and included the following problems: in what sense can 
God be said to be the primary instrumental (i.e. efficient) cause of 
the Church? In which sense can He be said to be causa ministerialis 
in salvation? Was the Holy Trinity in its entirety the efficient cause 
of the Church? and in what sense can the congregation be said to 
have a double form (i.e. internal and external forms)?'39 
In his resolution of the case Chancellor Brahe did indeed warn 
Bång for using "unnecessary" metaphysical concepts in a theological 
dissertation. Brahe was in accordance with the old Lutheran tradition 
which generally stood against introducing metaphysical concepts into 
theological discussion. On the other hand, Miltopaeus, "a mere phi-
losopher", was reproached for getting into theological problems, which 
137 	 For more detailed descriptions of this controversy, see Laasonen 1977b, p. 301- 
307. Simolin 1912, p. 37-43. See also Gezelius' report to Brahe, "Status contro-
versiae" 25.8.1666. UUB manuscript N 65. 
138 In addition to Laasonen 1977b, p. 302-303, see the appendices to Gezelius' report 
written by Bång and Miltopaeus, UUB N 65. 
139 These questions are discussed by professor Svenonius in his "ludicium theologi-
cum" sent to Chancellor Brahe, UUB N 65. Svenonius sees nothing troublesome 
in the answers provided by Bång to these questions although other theologians 
in Turku (Gezelius and Abraham Thauvonius) had considered some of the ter-
minology "novelties". Laasonen 1977b, p. 303. In his report Svenonius recalls 
the need to revise philosophical concepts: "Denique dum Termini philosophici, 
physici, Metaphysici [?] usurpantur ad explicandum res Theologicas, dicuntur 
oppido liberandi [?] ab omni impuritate quae rebus naturalibus adhaerescit, exem-
plo Jacobi Martini in Partitionibus Metaphysicis, Scharfij in peculiari Disser-
ta[ti]one et aliorum, imprimis contra Socini fratres [N]eo photinianos, ut et Cal-
vinianos." Svenonius UUB N 65. 
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were not in his area of competence.140 Once again, from the theolo-
gians' point of view the relationships between theology and other dis-
ciplines were basically a question about the power and authority of 
portraying and interpreting religious knowledge. 
Miltopaeus' attitude in this controversy is extraordinary for a 17th-
century Finnish discussion. In his letter to Chancellor Brahe Miltopa-
eus defended his doings by claiming his freedom of speech. He as-
serted that if an invited opponent was not allowed to express his cri-
ticism, academic learning would not be advanced. Stagnation of lear-
ning would also be imminent, if all dissenting opinions were imme-
diately labelled heretical.141 
If there is no liberty at all to freely express oneself against theses 
in public disputations, and say what seems to be relevant (to the 
subject) and truthlike, then everything will become dull and chil- 
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	 dlike. And it will not be of any glory (to the academy) or const- 
ructive for the listeners. What is true stays true irrespective of what 
the opponent says against it.142  
Liberty is a gift of God and his principle in order to make the free 
sciences flourish. But if anyone applies this practice to academic 
exercises, he will soon realize that one cannot disagree the least bit 
with the ideas written in these authorized booklets without being 
called a heretic, seducer (of youth) and whatever infamies.._143 
Miltopaeus' claim for more freedom of speech is, on the one hand, 
certainly a protest against the tightened control of Orthodox Luthe-
ranism. On the other hand, however, it is against the increased use of 
philosophical terminology in theology, which Miltopaeus regards as 
harmful - most probably to theology itself. Thus we can see here a 
14° Laasonen I977b, p. 302-303. 
141 	 Laasonen I977b, p. 304. 
142 	 Miltopaeus to Brahe 7.7.1666. PBB II: 2, p. 78. "Om man inthet in disputationibus 
publicis hahr den Libertet, att man frijt far säija emot theses, hwad som skäligt 
och sanningen lijkt synes wara, så skeer alt frigide och pueriliter, och med ingen 
hedher, eller medh Auditorij upbyggelse. Sant blifwer ändoch sant, ehwad man 
der emot tanquam opponens sägher." 
343 	 Miltopaeus in UUB N 65. "Qvod artes liberales floreant, Dei munus ac principis 
liberalitas est: Verum si exercitijs Academicis hanc vim inferas, ut ne latum qvi-
dem ungvim a consignatis in charta sententijs disceden[dum] liceat, nisi qvis mox 
haereticus, seductor & qvidqvid infamiae et opprobrij est, audiat..." 
chasm both between two Lutheran traditions - the old Lutheranism and 
the Orthodox Lutheranism - and between theology and philosophy. 
It is most interesting to see what kind of attitude the theologians 
adopted especially towards natural philosophy. The philosophical 
school, which most occupied theologians' thoughts in 17th-century 
Sweden was Cartesianism. At the Diet of 1664 Svenonius was already 
active in giving the clergy's official answer to the "Cartesian questi-
on". The clergy demanded a ban on all peregrinations, especially for 
those travels to "Cartesianism-infected" universities. Lecturing on Car-
tesianism in local universities should also be controlled, according to 
an extract from the minutes signed by Svenonius. Cartesianism was 
suspect, because it taught that only matters concerning religion had 
been revealed by the Holy Spirit in the Bible, while sayings dealing 
with nature and chronology were written only according to common 
opinion. At this time, one of the main concerns behind the clergy's 
polemics was the fear that Cartesian philosophy would smuggle the 	 85 
hated syncretism into the country.'44 
Cartesianism was attacked for other theological reasons too at Tur-
ku. Methodical doubt would lead to atheism as soon as it was extended 
so as to cover the Works of God also, theologians thought. All in all, 
Cartesianism was heresy.145 It was not thus physical but primarily ot-
her philosophical and theological reasons which made the "new phi-
losophy" unacceptable.146 This was true in other European countries 
as well, e.g. the Netherlands. 
It was largely due to Cartesianism that the theologians started to 
change their views on the role of philosophy and the Faculty of Arts 
in general. The Faculty of Theology now wanted to close itself off 
from philosophy, which - as it seemed - had sunk into a sea of heated 
disputes (although not yet at Turku). According to Salminen the stra-
tegy favoured by Svenonius was to make the Faculty of Arts a sort 
144 
145 
146 
Lindborg 1965, p. 93-96. Göransson 1951. Salminen 1978, p. 350. It seems that 
Svenonius had changed his attitude towards physics since his earlier days, when 
he was not altogether negative towards it. In 1645, i.e. before he had studied 
under the guidance of Calovius in Wittenberg, Svenonius had written that the 
"scopus & intentio" of the Bible was other than the matters of nature. Therefore 
far from all problems of natural philosophy were dealt with in the Bible. This 
silence should not be taken to mean that scrutiny of nature was futile, but that 
it should be guided by nature itself and the general principles of right faith. 
Wexionius-Svenonius 1645, Th. I. 
Salminen 1981, p. 94-97. 
See also the chapter "Cartesianism and Natural Philosophy" of this work. 
of bulwark for theology. This tendency reached its height in the 
1680's. Cartesianism should be met on the philosophical front and 
killed there, so that unanimity in theological matters would not be 
endangered. Philosophers were also allowed to incorporate theological 
points of view in their positions if only they argued for the Orthodox 
dogmas and not against them. At the same time theology distanced 
itself from all philosophy, including Aristotelianism. However theo-
logy and philosophy separated more radically only in the 1720's.147 
The anti-philosophical attitude became visible even in some no-
minations. In 1681 Laurbecchius applied for the professorship of theo-
logy, but his application was turned down. The reason for this was, 
as Svenonius put it, that Laurbecchius was too well-versed in Car-
tesianism - albeit in opposing it. Svenonius' own favourite candidate, 
professor of physics Anderas Petraeus had studied philosophy (i.e. 
logic and metaphysics) only very little. According to Svenonius this 
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	 was a merit, because those well acquainted with philosophical subti- 
lities would be more prone to heresies.148 It seems also highly possible 
that Svenonius' arguments are just good pretexts for him wanting his 
own son-in-law to be nominated to a good position. Nevertheless it 
is significant that even in that case Svenonius used Petraeus' inex-
pertness in philosophy as the main argument for him. 
The apparent differentiation of theology and philosophy by no 
means meant more liberty and independence to the latter. Instead of 
being indifferent to what was written in philosophical dissertations, 
theologians kept an even keener eye on the propriety of discussion in 
philosophical theses. As long as there was no obvious deviation from 
accepted philosophical and theological dogmas, theologians did not 
interfere with philosophers' doings. Undoubtedly philosophers bene-
fitted from this arrangement: because they had fully accepted the pro-
orthodox line themselves, they could live and work in peace. Indeed, 
it has been claimed that just as theologians were ready to skip away 
from Aristotelian philosophy, the philosophers still stuck desperately 
to it.'49 
147 Salminen 1981, p. 98-99 and 1983, p. 63. However, Salminen has not satisfac-
torily shown whether this caused a change in theological argument, too. On the 
18th-century developments see Salminen 1983, p. 82-84. 
148 	 Salminen 1981, p. 98. 
149 Salminen 1981, p. 98. 
Natural Philosophers on Their Own Status 
According to most scholars at Turku, knowledge of natural things was 
a gift given by God. Adam was the first physicist, who gave names 
to all species on the Earth. Since the Fall only small parts of the 
knowledge had been preserved, and now men had to take great pains 
in gathering the scraps.150 The best way to do this, it was thought, 
was to read the Book of Nature: 
The world is like a Book: heaven, earth and water are its Leaves 
and its Letters are the inhabitants of its abodes... We do not want 
to understand here by contemplation of Nature that man should 
think only about the external forms of things, ...but should penetrate 
to the interior of things with his understanding and reason, and 
investigate their causes, principles, affections and other proper-
ties.' S1  
The fact that natural philosophy was a gift from God was of fun-
damental importance for the whole discipline. When the Wittenbergian 
theologian Abraham Calovius argued that there was no contradiction 
between philosophy and theology, he made exactly the same state-
ment. Because natural philosophical knowledge came ultimately from 
God, it could not contradict his Word.152  This notion also asserted 
some degree of epistemological certainty for physical knowledge. If 
natural philosophy was a gift from God, it implied that the human 
mind had been created in such a way as to match the intelligibility 
of nature. Therefore positive knowledge of nature was possible. 
In the previous subsection we have seen that at times theologians 
150 Alanus-Wassenius 1646, Th. II. Thuronius 1660, De Philosophia in Genere, p. 
26-28. Thuronius-Sutthoff 1665, p. 6-7. Miltopaeus-Kiellin 1672, Theorema Pro-
paempticum. Miltopaeus-Lithomannus 1668, Th. I. Flachsenius 1678, De Phi-
losophia in Genere, p. 16-18, Appendix, p. 131-132. Hahn-Granbeck 1685b, Th. 
II. Hahn-Hasselqwist 1698, Prooimion. Hahn-Frolander 1692, p. 2-3, 7. Tålpo-
Askbohm 1697, p. 2. This is one of the points raised by Calovius, Preus 1970, 
p. 131-133. Cf. Brooke 1991, p. 19. 
151 Thuronius-Sutthoff 1665, p. 5-6. "Liber mundus est: Folia sunt coelum, terra, 
aqua: Literae sunt illorum domiciliorum incolae... Talem verö nos hic intellectam 
volumus Naturae contemplationem, non qua Homo externas tantum rerum formas 
oculis intuetur... Sed qua ad interiora rerum mente & ratione penetrat, earumque 
causas & principia, affectionesque & proprietates subtiliter investigare satagit." 
See also Wexionius-Svenonius 1645. 
152 Preus 1970, p. 132. See also Thuronius 1660, De Philosophia in Genere, p. 89-90. 
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made strong demands on philosophy to consent and to fight against 
philosophies potentially dangerous for theology. It should be noted 
that the gradual separation of philosophy and theology from the 1680's 
on did not necessarily mean that philosophy itself was regarded as 
invalid.153 But how did the philosophers respond to the claims for 
control and to the exclusion of Aristotelianism from Theology? In 
natural philosophy, which most interests us, no direct responses to 
these challenges were made. The general attitudes of the philosophers 
can however be traced. 
It seems that in the 17th century the majority of philosophers at 
Turku were ready to assert the old slogan: philosophia est ancilla 
theologiae.154 But what did this subalternation mean in practice? In 
1647 the professor of physics, Georgius Alanus started a "philosop-
hical dissertation" with a thesis which claimed that philosophy was 
not subordinated to theology.t55 Alanus was working on the definition 
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which was given by metaphysics for subordination. In order to be 
subordinated, two disciplines must have the same subjects of study, 
the same first principles and the same goals.156 None of these three 
requirements were fulfilled. Theology studied supernatural things by 
the light of faith, in order to achieve the summum bonum theologicum, 
whereas philosophy was a rational enterprise dealing with natural mat-
ters. What Alanus means, actually, is that philosophy was not a sub-
faculty of theology. Hence, philosophy was an autonomous, but cer-
tainly not an independent discipline. 
Being the handmaiden of theology meant first and foremost res-
pecting the principle of the unity of truth. This is what Calovius had 
also stressed when he argued for the compatibility of philosophy with 
153 	 The articles of Salminen referred to above seem to suggest that the theologians 
questioned the relevance of Aristotelian philosophy itself. He has not shown, 
however, whether this really was the case or whether theologians had lost con-
fidence in philosophy only as an instrument for theology. 
154 	 See e.g. Justander-Westhius 1654, Th. VII. For a history of the ancilla-concept 
see Grant 1986, p. 50-54. 
155 Alanus-Ulstadius 1647, Th. I. "Philosophia non subordinatur Theologiae". 
156 	 For a slightly different criterion of subalternation see Thuronius 1660, De Phi-
losophia in genere, p. 50. He claims to follow Suarez and Scheibler in his pre-
sentation, according to which a discipline is subaltemated to another, I. if the 
subject matter of the subaltemating science includes the one of the subalternated, 
2. if the subalternated discipline additionally discusses only accidental differences, 
which the subaltemating discipline does not deal with, and 3. if the conclusions 
of the subaltemating science produce the principles of the subaltemated discipline. 
theology.157 In one of his first dissertations Alanus put it as follows: 
"The truth is only one - not double, not multiple. It is the voice of 
God irrespective of whether it talks to us through Nature or Scriptu-
re."158 Truth in theology and in physics could not be contradictory, 
because both disciplines studied the works of God, only from different 
points of view. There were wrong philosophies which produced con-
clusions contrary to the word of God. All these heretical (but not 
necessarily pagan) views should be abandoned, because they were 
useless and pernicious (non utilis & perniciosa). Proponents of non-
Lutheran confessions, especially the Calvinists, were accused of fa-
vouring double truth, which applied different criteria for natural know-
ledge and faith. Religious heresy and philosophical (especially me-
taphysical) dissidence were thus associated.159 
Yielding to the truth in theology was not only negative from the 
point of view of philosophers. This aspect received expression in other 
European countries too. For example in France many Cartesians and 
the founders of the Academie des Sciences were happy to point out 
that philosophers were not competent to make judgements about mat-
ters of theology, trying to keep away from theological controversies 
and secure their working peace.t6°  
As well as theologians, philosophers could themselves claim the 
usefulness of their discipline to theology, except that philosophy 
should be used in the right way.161 It was especially in combatting 
adversary religions that philosophy was regarded as most serviceable: 
"Anyone who does not have a fungus in the place of his brain sees 
that Philosophy is in some way necessary for refuting the contentions 
of adversaries and for repelling the insanities of the heretics."162 Once 
157 Preus 1970, p. 132. 
158 Alanus-Kempe 1646, Th. I. "Philosophiam S. Theologiae contrariari falsum est." 
"Unica duntaxat est veritas, non duplex, non multiplex. Dei vox est, sive per 
Naturam sive Scripturam ad nos fiat." 
159 Alanus-Kempe 1646, Th. I. Miltopaeus-Lithomannus 1668, Th. I. Thuronius 1660, 
De Philosophia in Genere, p. 89-90. Hahn-Granbeck 1985b, Th. II. Tålpo-Steen-
bergius 1685, Th. I. 
160 Clarke 1989, p. 37-42, 224. 
161 Justander-Westhius 1654, Th. V-X. Wexionius-Jeronius 1656, Th. II-VII. We-
xionius was a professor of history and politics, but his thesis discusses the use 
of every philosophical discipline in theology. He did not, however, represent the 
Wittenbergian school in his views. Salminen 1978, p. 231. 
162 Thauvonius-Forstadius 1652, Th.I. "Philosophia est maxime utilis & Theologiae 
neutiquam contraria." "Ad strophas adversariorum refutandas & haereticorum 
quisquilias evertendas quam sit utilis imo quodammodo necessaria Philosophia, 
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again this was one of the arguments expressed by Calovius, too.163 It 
is not unusual for a discipline to motivate and legitimate its own ex-
istence and methodology by referring to those values which are con-
sidered most important in that particular community at a certain time. 
In the 17th century one of the most respected academic values was 
theological utility. Despite this rhetoric, philosophy was not pursued 
entirely for the aid it could provide for theology, but as Alanus clai-
med, physics had a finis of its own; to know the causes of natural 
bodies. This more independent trend marks a difference from certain 
early medieval meanings of the ancilla-concept, which implied that 
philosophy was not to be studied for its own sake at all. The study 
of the visible world was encouraged by God only because man would 
find the way to contemplating the invisible world and thereby honour 
Him. The study of nature as proposed in the quadrivium would also 
give man means for gaining the God-ordained dominion over the 
90 	 world.164 
In this context "philosophy" referred mainly to metaphysic and lo-
gic. All in all however, the Bible and religious tradition were thought 
legitimate sources of knowledge in natural philosophical enquiry also. 
In fact, they were the recognized authorities for settling the truth in 
obscure cases. During the 17th century the single theory which most 
threatened this alliance was the Copernican world-system. It ques-
tioned the idea of the unity of truth because accepting Copemicanism 
would have meant giving up the fundamental exegetical principle of 
orthodox Lutheranism, i.e. the literal reading of the Bible. For this 
reason Copernicanism became very much a matter of faith.165 
One of the few physicists who openly turned against the Copernican 
non-literal reading of the Bible was Achrelius. In his Contemplationes 
mundi he accused the Copernicans of saying that the Bible was com-
posed partly in accordance with our understanding and partly accor-
ding to vulgar opinions. Achrelius seems to have been at least vaguely 
videt qui non fungum pro cerebro habet." See also Miltopaeus-Lithomannus 1668, 
Th. I. Thuronius 1660, De Philosophia in Genere, p. 90, also mentions other uses 
for philosophy in theology, such as sharpening the reason, explicating concepts 
and intrerpreting the Bible accurately. 
163 Preus 1970, p. 133. 
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	 Grant 1986, p. 50. Grant mentions Philo Judaeus from the first century A.D., St. 
Augustine (354-430), Peter Damian (1007-1072), Hugh of Saint-Victor (d. 1141) 
and St. Bonaventure (1221-1274) as proponents of this view. 
165 Ratschow 1964, p. 82-116. See also Svenonius 1664, p. 14-15. 
aware of another group which opposed literal reading of the Bible in 
matters concerning nature. He states that in criticizing the authority 
of the Bible the Copernicans move to the party of the Pre-Adamites. 
All suspicions against the word of the Bible Achrelius repels by citing 
the Psalm 104.166 
The Cartesian natural philosophy progressed at Turku during the 
1690's. The reason this philosophy had caused so much dispute else-
where was that it approached the Bible from a different point of view 
and no longer automatically accepted it as an authority in physical 
matters. At Turku, however, scholars were careful not to make any 
direct statements questioning of the relationship between theology and 
(natural) philosophy. For example the thesis by Magnus Ståålhöös in 
1697 seems to promote only a slightly more independent status for 
philosophy. 
It is not up to the Scriptures to name or explain everything which 	 91 
occurs in nature, but to show the way and to give philosophy the 
ability to judge things in the right way; which and what kind of 
things do exist, and in what way they are congruent with the highest 
Entity.' 67 
Thus, according to Ståålhöös, while the Bible could not produce 
answers to all questions concerning nature, it should direct the inquiry. 
In another passage from Ståålhöös the drifting apart of theology from 
philosophy is beginning to show. 
Although the statements and utterances of GOD are not norms by 
which to judge philosophical controversies, nevertheless all induc-
tions and conclusions in Philosophy must be formulated and posed 
166 Achrelius 1682, p. 196 "Existimantes multa ibi tribui rebus, partim secundum 
nostrum concipiendi modum, partim secundum vulgi opinionem.", 201 "At Scrip-
turarum auctoritatem dum vellicant, Pleno gradu vadunt in castra Prae-Adamita-
rum. Enimvero Spiritus Sanctus cum de rebus loquitur, non secundum apparen-
tiam vel ex hominum sennu, sed juxta ipsam veritatem easdem proponit, ut docet 
Psalmus CIV." 
167 Hahn-Ståålhöös 1697, p. 13. "Non equidem scripturae est, omnia quae in rerum 
natura occurrunt, nominare vel explicare: est tarnen ejus, viam sternere, atque 
ausum dare philosophiae, rite dijudicandi res; quae & gvales sint, & qvomodo 
cum Ente summo conveniant." 
so as to really consent not only with nature itself but also with the 
Divine mind, whose contents they consist of.168 
The physical theories should thus be in accordance with the word 
of God. Ståålhöös had in mind the so-called metaphysical truth, which 
differed from ethical and logical forms of truth.169 Because God was 
the creator of the world, the truth about nature was therefore in ac-
cordance with the ideas in his mind. 
Ståålhöös' point of view is closely connected to the context where 
he expresses these ideas. He is arguing that we should not assume 
that there is a sphere of fire below the moon since the Bible makes 
no mention of it. In doing this he is trying to discard the way of 
arguing which stems from rejecting the so-called topos of negative 
authority. It says that the non-existence of something cannot be argued 
from silence in the Bible. The course of ratiocination which Ståålhöös 
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	 opposes runs in the following way: the Bible does not mention the 
existence of X. Rejecting the topos of negative authority, it becomes 
possible to state that this does not deny its existence and thus, it is 
possible for X to exist. Ståålhöös does not mention any authors, who 
would really have argued in this way, but since the condemnations of 
1277 it had become usual to argue for the possibility of the existence 
of certain things by saying that the Bible did not deny its existence. 
Stating otherwise would have been regarded as an attempt to limit the 
power of God.170 Arguing for the possibility of existence comes very 
close to jumping to the conclusion that certain entities actually do 
exist if their existence is even a possibility, which is not rejected in 
the Bible. In my reading Ståålhöös is arguing against something which 
he considers as misuse of the rejection of the topos of negative aut-
hority. Another important point to take notice of is the express state-
ment that there are occasions in which the Bible is useless for physical 
168 Hahn-Ståålhöös 1697, p. 12-13. "Qvamvis igitur oracula & elogia DEI, non sint 
notnia controversiarum philosophicarum dijudicandarum, interim tarnen omnes, 
in Philosophia, inductiones & conclusiones, sic formari ac dirigi debent, ut non 
tantum cum ipsa natura, qvin & cum mente Divina, in cujus conformatione omnia 
consistunt ac sita sunt, revera consentiant." 
169 	 Thuronius 1660, Tractatus Prooemialis, p. 20. "Metaphysicam [veritatem], in con-
gruentia rei cum intellectu potissimum Divino consistentem, quae dici quoque 
solet transcendentalis, objectiva, Entitativa & veritas in essendo." Ethical truth 
was "consent of the heart and the speech" whereas the logical truth had to do 
with e.g. the formal consistency of an argument. 
170 	 Moss 1993, p. 164, et passim. 
argument and thus should not be used for that purpose. 
Only a handful of statements can be found in which something is 
said about the role and status of natural philosophy (or philosophy in 
general) beside and below theology. In all these public statements 
philosophy seems glad to accommodate itself to the higher criteria of 
truth. Not even the emergence of Cartesianism changes these attitudes. 
Therefore, it is more interesting to see what kind of role theology 
actually plays in natural philosophical thinking. 
4. THEOLOGY AS THEORIES 
IN NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 
In the previous subsections of this chapter I have tried to sketch an 
idea of the relationships between theology and philosophy both on 
the inter-institutional and intra-institutional levels. These relationships 
form a net of power relations and social factors, which on a grand 
scale influence all learning at the University. How is this influence 
mirrored at the level of physical theories, then? The pattern is made 
more complicated by the notion that logical and metaphysical dogmas 
were also in many ways involved in natural philosophical thinking. 
In a way, metaphysics was a transmitter between the two disciplines, 
since physical theories had to be in accordance with metaphysical 
ideas, which in turn were reconciled with the theological dogmas. 
Logic, on the other hand, was essential for all these disciplines because 
it offered the rules and patterns needed for syllogistic reasoning. E.D. 
Sylla has very aptly compared the learning of logic in medieval uni-
versities to the place that mathematics holds in the modern universi-
ty."' Logic was the key to most other areas of knowledge, just as 
mathematics is considered to be today. On the other hand the truth 
of certain logical or metaphysical dogmas could be argued for by 
171 	 Sylla 1975, p. 351. 
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physical arguments."2 All in all different disciplines form a network 
of knowledge where everything is interrelated with other disciplines. 
We can discern three ways in natural philosophical thinking in 
which theology and natural philosophy crossed each other. First of 
all, arguments supporting physical theories could be based on the Bib-
le, although other arguments could also be used. Slightly different 
from this were the cases in which the contents of a natural philosop-
hical theory were fundamentally based on a theological dogma. Fi-
nally, sometimes physical explanations or descriptions were sought 
for Biblical events - even for miracles. Let us now turn our attention 
to those instances in which the first type of argument was utilised. 
Arguments from the Bible 
Theological arguments could well be brought into natural philosophi- 
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cal discussion. The most well-known, and for a modern scientist also 
probably the most notorious examples of the influence of religion upon 
science are the cases where a natural philosophical factual claim was 
either rejected or verified by appealing to the authority of the Bible. 
The most famous, and for the 17th century admittedly also the most 
important case was that of heliocentrism. Although the physical reality 
of heliocentrism had already been denied during the 16th century, the 
Copernican theory did not arouse much opposition during that century. 
However, from 1600 on different churches all over Europe started to 
see it as a threat to the Biblical world-view.13 If heliocentrism was 
asserted to be physical reality, as Galileo Galilei and some other scho-
lars had done, it would mean that the Holy Spirit speaking through 
the Bible would either lie or err on the question of the Earth's loca-
tion.14 Both of these alternatives were thought intolerable, because 
the authority of the Bible was according to the Lutheran dogma bound 
172 Flachsenius 1678, Collegium Logicum I, p. 288. According to Flachsenius the 
generation of a natural body, as is shown by physics, proves that there really are 
four causes. 
73 	 Among Lutheran scholars Melanchthon had already used the book of Job to re-
pudiate the physical reality of the Copernican system. Elert 1962, p. 414-431. 
However, he did later on accept the so-called Wittenberg interpretation of the 
theory. Westman 1986, p. 83. Obviously it was not until the middle of the 17th 
century that the Lutheran theologians started to employ Biblical argument against 
heliocentrism on a larger scale. Preus 1972, p. 227-229. The Catholic Church 
declared Copernicanism heretical in 1616. 
174 	 Scholder 1966, p. 56-78. 
to a literal reading of the Holy Book. A wide range of hermeneutical 
problems became involved in the question.15 Thus not only was the 
good old world-view at stake but, what was more important, the aut-
hority of the Holy Scriptures and the authority of the church against 
mathematicians and philosophers to lay claim to its proper interpre-
tation. Therefore innumerable natural philosophers and astronomers 
adopted the view which made the Bible the most forceful argument 
for geocentrism. On the other hand in Lutheran countries the so-called 
Wittenberg interpretation, according to which Copernicanism could be 
used in astronomical calculations but not accepted as physical reality, 
because this would contradict the literal reading of certain biblical 
passages, had also gained a strong foothold in the sixteenth century. 
Let us now see how this problematics was dealt with at Turku. 
As a theory, Copernicanism was already known at the University 
of Turku by the time of its foundation. At this time, however, most 
arguments were physical and affirmative in nature: the immobility of 	 95 
the Earth was stated more often than the opposite view was rejected. 
At Alanus' time Copemicanism had not yet been attacked with a bun-
dle of Biblical quotations. Religion did nevertheless play an important 
role in the reasoning. It was stated that the stars move and the Earth 
rests because God had created their natures to be such. The ultimate 
guarantee of the traditional world-view was in the order of the cosmos 
as ordained by God.176 
Since Thauvonius, Thuronius and Petraeus did not much deal with 
matters concerning the structure of the universe, there is about three 
decades' pause in arguments on heliocentrism in physics theses. The 
one who really introduced Biblical arguments into discussion of he-
liocentrism was Petrus Laurbecchius in his 1661 mathematical thesis 
"...adversus Copernicum redivivum".177 Laurbecchius' work was the 
first at Turku to discuss the Copernican system in detail. Although 
Laurbecchius elaborately introduced over two pages of Biblical quo-
tations in support of the geocentric system, these were certainly not 
the only arguments he found against Copemicanism. What is impor-
tant, though, is the status given to the Biblical arguments; because 
reason alone could not provide the crucial argument one had to rely 
175 	 Westman 1986. Moss 1993, p. 129-147, et passim. See also Svenonius 1664, p. 
14-16. 
176 	 Alanus-Moderus 1645, Th. XVII-XXI. Alanus-Lacmannus 1648, Th. XXII-XXIII. 
177 	 Kexlerus-Laurbecchius 1661, Cap. III, 2. See also Salminen 1983, p. 60. 
on the word of God. I would like to describe this kind of approach 
as "dogma-determined reasoning". It can be asked whether both the 
qualitative and quantitative importance of Biblical arguments in theses 
discussing Copernicanism continued on the line opened by Laurbec-
chius. 
Discussion of the different world-systems became fashionable from 
the end of the 1670's on - before that date neither physicists nor 
mathematicians troubled themselves much on the subject. The space 
and emphasis given to Biblical argument seems to vary in theses, 
although it was at least in principle always given a primary episte-
mological status. The majority of authors did not present such an ex-
tensive quantity of Biblical quotations as Laurbecchius had done.t78 
Some of them more often presented physical arguments, but it was 
nevertheless common to guarantee the Bible a crucial role in deciding 
the matter.19 
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	 One of the most thorough studies on the different world-systems 
was written by the professor of mathematics Johan Flachsenius in 
1679. This ardent apology for geocentrism has been noted as an ex-
pression of arch-conservativism at the University of Turku - to a great 
extent because of its reliance on the Bible.180 Curiously enough the 
importance placed upon the authority of the Bible in it is out of all 
proportion to the few lines in which Scriptura Sacra is referred to. 
...because what is thought to be right is often utterly false, it seems 
that Christian people can hardly respect the revered testimonials of 
the Holy Scripture enough. One divine manifestation of such works 
of God is more valid than the wit of all human minds...181 
178 Flachsenius-Forsman 1678, Th. II. Flachsenius-Grimsteen 1679, Membrum Ter-
tium. Tålpo-Rhydelius 1682, Th. VI, XVI, XX-XXI. Flachsenius-Bergius 1682, 
Th. VIII. Hahn-Granbeck 1685a, Th. XI. Hahn-Alm 1688, p. 18-21. Hahn-Tålpo 
1699, p. 16-19, 26ff. Hahn-Flodin 1707, p. 10-21. Tammelin-Nidelström 1706, 
p. 15-18. 
179 	 Especially Flachsenius-Forsman 1678, Th. II. Flachsenius-Grimsteen 1679, Mem-
brum Tertium. Hahn-Wijsing 1685, § V. Hahn-Flodin 1707, p. 10-21, emphasised 
the qualitative power of Biblical arguments. 
180 Myrberg 1950, p. 8-9. Sandblad 1944, p. 185-186. Slotte 1898, p. 26-27. Lehti 
1979, p. 48-49. 
181 	 Flachsenius-Grimsteen 1679, Memb. III, Th. 1. "...cum non rara falsissimum sit 
qvod verius esse putatur, hominibus Christianis divinis scripturae Sacrae testi-
monijs firmatis haud satis digna habenda videtur: De talibus enim Dei operibus 
una divina manifestatio pluris est, qvam omnis humanarum mentium sagacitas..." 
And somewhat later Flachsenius writes, confirming the overwhel-
ming authority of the Bible: 
The passages of the Scriptures which establish the Thesis which 
attributes rest to the Earth and movement to the Sun, are clear to 
us. The testimony of the Holy Spirit, the creator of all nature, is 
so excellent that it exceeds a thousand times all certitude of the 
human mind... I82  
A more cautious but nevertheless equally determined position was 
taken by Samuel Flodin in a thesis published in 1707 under the gui-
dance of professor Hahn. According to him we should stick to the 
Bible until some necessity requires us to believe otherwise. It can be 
read between the lines that this "necessity" was unlikely to come. 
We regard it as wiser not to stick to [those] opinions, at which so 	 97 
many Fathers, Theologians and Philosophers laugh. Especially be-
cause no necessity urges us it would be rash to relinquish those 
passages of the Holy Scriptures which ascribe rest to the Earth and 
continuous movement to the stars.1ß3 
Those authors who made more frequent use of the Bible concent-
rated mainly on proving two things by it. Firstly it was stated that the 
Earth was created as immobile. This argument can be found even in 
the earliest theses at Turku. Secondly the miracle explained in the 
book of Joshua was thought to imply that the Sun would have to 
revolve in order to stand still.184 Both mathematicians and physicists 
as well seem to have been equally attracted to using theological ar-
gument. It might be asked, though, to what degree their interest was 
to save the authority of the Bible and how much they strove to save 
182 Flachsenius-Grimsteen 1679, Th. 10, Qvaest. I. "Nos verö cum clara sint scrip-
turae loca, qvae Thesin de Terrae qviete Solisqve motu stabiliunt, tantumque sit 
unicum Spiritus Sancti totius naturae authoris testimonium, ut omnem humanae 
mentis certitudinem mille transcendat..." 
183 Hahn-Flodin 1707, p. 14. "Consultius autem ducimus non [?] sententiae adha-
erere, quae tot Patrum, Theologorum, & Philosophorum adridet palato, praecipue 
nulla urgente necessitate, temerarium foret, recedere ab istis Scripturae Sacrae 
locis, quae Telluri quietem, sideribus motus perpetuos addunt." "?" indicates a 
damaged spot in the text. 
184 Achrelius 1682, p. 197-198. Hahn-Wijsing 1685, § V. Hahn-Weckelman 1694, 
p. 8-20. 
the geocentric world-view. Probably these motives cannot be separated 
from each other, although in mathematical and physical theses the 
main emphasis naturally was on their respective subject-matters. Mo-
reover, the Bible was not expected to provide answers to all questions. 
In 1685 a thesis was published in which the essential prerequisites of 
physical knowledge were studied. It argues that neither reason nor 
experience nor the Bible alone were enough to acquire knowledge, 
but the three had to be combined in the proper relation. The restrictions 
of the Biblical argument were stated as follows: "He who sticks only 
to the Scriptures will remain ignorant of things which are most evi-
dent, and will come to incomplete and deficient knowledge of nature, 
for it is not the first intention of the Bible to explain the natural 
world."185 
Although the Bible certainly gave the ultimate answer in a dispute 
which human reason was considered incapable of settling, it was far 
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from being the only argument used. Thus it seems that we have to 
be cautious in our views concerning the importance and frequency of 
theological argument in this matter, since while it played an important 
role in dealing with cosmological or other natural philosophical ques-
tions, the fact remains that most authors did not cite the Bible exces-
sively and exclusively to support their views. 
There were questions in natural philosophy in which the authority 
of the Bible did not play such a crucial role as it did in the question 
of the proper world-system. In most cases, the Bible produced just 
another argument among others, albeit often the most powerful one. 
What kind of issues were argued for with the help of the Bible or 
theological dogma? For example, in 1650 Thauvonius and Warelius 
wrote that the fiery element does not exist exclusively in the sphere 
below the moon, but all over the elementary world. This was not only 
because fire would have been of no use to man if it was situated 
unreachably high, but also because the Holy Scripture did not mention 
its existence.18' They thus have direct recourse to the topos of negative 
argumentation. Another important dogma to argue for was the exist-
ence of souls. Although it was evident even from physics that certain 
actions could not be caused otherwise than by a soul, and most "sane" 
185 	 Hahn-Govinius 1685, Quaest. V. "Scripturae qui adhaerebit tantum, quae eviden- 
tissima sunt, nesciet, & mancam & mutilam dabit scientiam naturalem. Non enim 
prima hujus est intentio, explicare mundum." 
186 Thauvonius-Warelius 1650, Th. XXXI, see also Th. XXVIII. 
philosophers agreed with the claim, the best evidence came from the 
Bible.187 
There were, indeed, many things which could be argued for on the 
authority of the Bible. Support was found both for the sphericality of 
the Earth and the innumerability of the stars and for the existence of 
giants.'88  It was common to all these cases that the Bible was not the 
only ground for the statement. These questions could be answered and 
answers proved already by referring to physical causes. Nevertheless, 
support from other (profane and clerical) authorities was willingly ad-
duced in addition. It was also typical to refer almost exclusively to 
the Old Testament. Sometimes it seems that the quotations were se-
lected quite indifferently, without much concern for their proper con-
text or the intentions of the author.189 This kind of use of texts, which 
allowed quotations to be taken out of their context, was legitimised 
by the literal reading of the Bible. If all of the text was literally true, 
it would not change its true meaning to present only excerpts from 
it. Usually the content of the verses named or quoted was not further 
analysed, the right interpretation being thought self-evident. 
Formally this kind of argument fell into the area of dialectical rea-
soning. Dialectical, or probable reasoning differed from the purely 
scientific reasoning because its premises or basic principles were less 
certain and not necessary. Thus, the premises relied on "opinions" on 
what was commonly thought to be the rule, or on what was regarded 
as true generally or for the most part. The more authoritative the opini-
on was on which the reasoning was based on, the more secure the 
result of the reasoning was considered to be.190 Although in principle 
dialectic could produce only probable conclusions, the special divine 
status of Biblical authority made it totally certain. 
187 Thauvonius-Rosander 1652, Th. II. Hahn-Håf 1685, p. 3-4. Hahn-Hornaeus 1690, 
p. 3- 
188 Thauvonius-Miltopaeus 1653, Th. XXII. Thauvonius-Gyllenius 1655, Th. XXIII. 
Petraeus-Westman 1674b, Th. XII. See also Thauvonius-Forsenius 1650, Th. 
XXVI-XXVII. 
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	 An example of this might be Achrelius' claim that the Bible speaks the truth and 
not only according to human understanding. (Cited above in subsection "Natural 
Philosophers on Their Own Status, note 69). He cites Psalm 104 for support, 
which describes the works of God in nature extensively and presents him as the 
cause of all the processes of nature: "He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, 
and herb for the service of man...". 
190 Moss 1993, p. 3-9. 
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Theories Entirely Based on Theological Dogmas 
In Lutheranism there was no attempt to entirely "theologize" physics, 
as was the case for example in the Calvinist tradition. However, there 
were fundamental concepts and theories in natural philosophy, which 
could not be formed on the basis of philosophical reasoning, but had 
to be grounded on theological ideas. For example, it was self-evident 
for all scholars at Turku that the world had been created by God. This 
assumption could be expressed in terms of Aristotelian philosophy by 
saying that God was the efficient cause of the world. This aspect was 
hardly ever passed over unnoticed in dissertations: whatever entity the 
question was about in a thesis, God was mentioned as its prime uni-
versal efficient cause.191 More immediate causes of things were always 
searched out as well, and regarded as vital, but in questions of cos-
mology especially God was reserved a major role. For instance, it was 
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argued that because the heavenly bodies did not generate, their exist- 
ence could be explained only by creation. In this sense natural phi-
losophy also could produce evidence for the existence of the Crea-
tor.t92 God was not only the primary efficient cause of the world, but 
he was also the final cause of everything, because all entities in the 
world were created for the glory of God.'93 
Being the originator of the world it was no wonder that God was 
thought to play a significant role in many processes of nature. The 
theological basis for the ideas about God's action in nature can be 
found from the dogmas about providence and omnipresence. God's 
providence was a concept which was always bound up with creation 
in Lutheran theology. Providence was seen as a personal act of God 
and not just as a force which had been set in motion and which then 
191 See e.g. Alanus-Ketarenius 1644, Th. XII. Alanus-Kempe 1647, Th. 6. Alanus-
Lacman 1648, Th. VII. Thauvonius-Sundius 1656, Th. XI. Tålpo-Rhydelius 1682, 
Th. IX. Achrelius-Rungius 1686, p. 7. Hahn-Granbeck 1685a, Th. VII. Halm-Alm 
1688, p. 7. On division of the efficient cause into primary and secondary, universal 
and particular, etc., Thuronius 1660, Institutiones logicae I, p. 155-172. Flach-
senius 1678, Collegium Logicum I, p. 301-325. 
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	 Flachsenius 1678, De Philosophia in Genere, p. 18. "Discere debuissent isti au- 
daculi, quod philosopia sit partim cognitio Dei, quantum hic ex operibus creationis 
lumine naturae cognosci potest, partim cognitio creaturarum ac operum ci Deo 
conditorum." 
193 Thuronius 1660, Institutionum logicum I, p. 187-199. Flachsenius 1678, Colle-
gium Logicum I, p. 319-320, 347ff. 
operated in accordance with predetermined laws.194  The purpose of 
providence was to maintain the existence of creation together with its 
life and movement (conservatio). But it was also supposed to organise 
and direct the course of both natural processes and human activities 
(gubernatio). During the 17th century a three-level system of provi-
dence was largely accepted in the Lutheran world. The first level was 
God's general or universal providence, whereby he sustains and up-
holds all things, such as the orderly movements of heavenly bodies, 
regular rainfall or growth. This sort of providence was called creatio 
continuata by some Lutheran theologians. The second and third level 
of providence were for more individual concerns of men and their 
moral acts.195 
Providence was viewed as God's ongoing activity in nature. For 
Calvinists God's omnipresence was in fact His actus providentiae. 
This theory obviously had certain important implications for nature. 
All natural bodies were inherently inert and immovable, and therefore 
God had to play an active role in all nature's processes.196 The Lut-
heran scholars of the 17th century could not accept the Calvinist view 
of predetermination, which they regarded as too strong. Nevertheless 
it was claimed that God had a direct influence on the causes and 
effects of created things. This was because all secondary causes were 
created by God and thus dependent on Him and their causality was 
subordinated to the primary cause as well. An excessive interpretation 
of this statement was regarded as problematic, though. If God were 
the sole cause of everything, there would be no free will in man, the 
inborn abilities for action would have been created in vain in natural 
things, and what is most serious, God would have been the cause of 
the evil acts of men as well. The metaphysical theses published at 
Turku concentrated on solving this theological-philosophical dilemma, 
and the mode of action of God in the world was considered to be 
grounded in the hierarchy of the causes itself.197 
In physics, however, the intentions of the authors were different. 
It was thought that God had empowered the secondary causes in na- 
194 This question became especially acute when Descartes and the Occasionalists 
based their explanations of nature on this kind of deus ex machina. Ratschow 
1966, p. 231. 
195 Preus 1972, p. 193-203. Elert 1962, p. 442-443. Ratschow 1966, p. 208-247. 
Svenonius 1664, p. 33-40. Flachsenius 1690, p. 57-58. 
196 Deason 1986. 
197 Tålpo-Jung 1690. Juslenius-Limnander 1706. 
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ture. In other words He was the efficient cause of all secondary causes, 
the ultimate cause which cut short the infinite regress of causes. Hen-
ce, although physics was mainly concerned with explanation by se-
condary causes, it needed not exclude ultimate reference to a primary 
cause.198 Despite the actual omnipresence of God and his continuous 
action as the primary efficient cause there was plenty of room left for 
the secondary causes which were the proper subject of study for phy-
sics. In fact, this action of the divine providence assured that we could 
rely on the orderly performance of nature and acquire knowledge 
about it.'99 
The ability of God to perform miracles by voluntary acts was na-
turally never disputed. The omnipotent God could by his mere will 
hinder, alter, mitigate and overcome secondary causes.200 At Turku, 
however, we find an emphasis on the view that God would never 
operate against nature, but only above it 201 It was not up to physical 
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	 theses to discuss the nature of miracles more closely, and therefore 
what Thauvonius actually means by this also remains somewhat obs-
cure. In my view it only stresses the supernatural character of genuine 
miracles to say that they were not violations of nature's laws, but a 
surpassing of them. God would not act against his own creation, but 
he could certainly act altogether independently of it. 
Whereas providence was an act which secured the normal course 
of nature, on special occasions God could manifest himself as certain 
unusual phenomena, which nevertheless were not miracles. Comets, 
for example, were thought to be divine signs for mankind which told 
people to rue their sins and to perform penitence. Even here the dif-
ference between creation (a miraculous act of God) and generation 
(natural reproduction) was made clear. Turku scholars emphasised that 
God did not create portentous phenomena, i.e. produce them from 
non-existent matter. This was because the Bible said that God had 
finished his creation on the sixth day. He would rather operate on the 
laws of nature and existing matter when producing something like a 
comet.202 
198 	 For a discussion on the causa procreans and causa conservans as effective causes 
see Flachsenius 1678, Collegium Logicum I, p. 310-315. 
199 	 Preus 1972, p. 196. It is notable that the imputation theory, which originally was 
a concept used in kinematics has here been applied to theological use. On impu-
tation theory in the Middle Ages see Maier 1951, p. 113-314. 
200 Preus 1972, p. 203. 
201 	 Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, Sect. I Membr. II Artie. IV Ax. 1. 
In the case of the theory of comets it was both theology and physics 
which benefitted from the interpretation. Theologians had in this theo-
ry a weapon spectacular enough to appeal to the masses in the fight 
against sin. In physics recourse to a theological dogma also served 
the conservative physicists' aims well. The idea of the non-elementary 
nature of celestial matter and its incorruptibility was still central to 
natural philosophy at Turku.203 However, the existence of comets and 
"new stars" could no longer be denied, especially because Tycho Bra-
he, the revered authority in astronomy, had been one of the discoverers 
of "new stars". Claiming that comets were supernatural products sol-
ved the problem, because it did not presuppose giving up the theory 
of the incorruptibility of the heavens. 
Though the origin of comets was regarded as supernatural, it was 
still thought possible to study these phenomena physically and mat-
hematically. The movements of comets could be seen and their speed 
and orbit calculated. The case was different in regard to some other 
natural entities, the existence of which could not be sensed but was 
only guaranteed by the Bible. Aquae supracoelestae are a classic 
example of this. They were invisible and therefore their existence was 
known only because the Bible said so.204 In 1711 Michael Polviander 
described human ignorance as follows: 
Nothing is more hidden to the reason than both the existence and 
location and order of these [supracelestial waters] in their place 
which was decreed in the first Creation. It is no wonder, because 
they are located hidden in the most remote place, to which neither 
the sharpness of our eyes can penetrate nor any other function of 
the senses can reach. They escape our senses and mind. Only the 
Holy Scripture informs us of this miraculous divine work. If it [the 
Bible] were silent about them, they could not be known and studied 
with any sharpness of man's ingenuity nor with any scrutiny of the 
reason but would stay enfolded in darkness of ingorance for ever.2205  
202 Alanus-Moderus 1645, Th. XXXII. Alanus-Lacmannus 1648, Th. XLV. Hahn-
Ekedahl 1695, p. 24-26. 
203 	 See chapter "The Structure of the Cosmos" of this work. 
204 Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, Sectio II, Artic. II. Thuronius-Pryss 1664, Th. IV. 
Miltopaeus-Lithomannus 1668, Th. IV. Hahn-Govinius 1685, Quxst. V. Tålpo-
Bachster 1686, passim. Hahn-Löngreen 1709, Th. IV. Hahn-Polviander 1711. 
Tammelin-Tammelin 1711, p. 4-5. 
205 Hahn-Polviander 1711, p. 4. "Nil rationi magis absconditum quam harum tum 
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The existence of aquae supracoelestae was generally acknow-
ledged to be proved by the Bible, because there could be no other 
evidence for it. Only seldom something was assured on theological 
grounds, but contrary to all sense perceptions and ratiocination. In 
1702 Carolus Erling raised a question about the source of moonlight. 
Philosophy and theology held different opinions in the matter, and 
this is how Erling responded: 
And although none of the sane Philosopers consider all this light, 
whatever it is, to belong to the Moon as a peculiar or inherent 
quality, because of its waxing and waning, and alternation of its 
Phases which make it appear sometimes full, sometimes half and 
sometimes crescent. We, however, trusting and following Thelo-
gians, dare to attribute to it some innate light, and we base this 
assertion on documents... provided by the Holy Scripture...206 
Erling's views were not common at the University of Turku. They 
show, however, how high a point confidence in the Biblical evidence 
could reach. 
When we talk about physical theories grounded on Biblical argu-
ments, the examples where the very existence of a physical entity was 
made dependent on the Bible were certainly the most extreme. There 
were also instances, when there were several equal answers produced 
to a problem by Aristotelian natural philosophy. The right answer was 
then decided by criteria derived from orthodox Lutheran dogma. These 
cases are analogous to the problem of Copernicanism in as far as the 
ultimate answers are given by the Bible. The type of argument we 
are talking about now is, however, slightly different in manner. In 
existentia, tum situs & ordinatio in istum suum locum in primordio creationis 
facta. Nec minim, cum in occulto nobis remotissimoque lateant loco, quo nec 
oculorum nostrorurn acies penetrare, neque ullius sensus operatio pervenire potest. 
nostros istae ludunt & sensus & mentem. sola sacra scriptura est, quw de hoc 
opens divini mirabili nos informat opificio, qua' si tacuisset nullo sagacitatis hu-
manw acumine rationisque indagine cognosci ac investigari potuisset: sed perpetus 
ignorantiw tenebris involutum latuisset." 
206 
	
	 Halm-Erling 1702, p. 16-17. "Et licet neuro saniorum Philosophorum sit, qui totum 
hoc lumen, quantumcunque est, Lunae tanquam proprium & congenitum adscribat, 
propter ejus incrementum & decrementum, Phasiumque vicissitudine, qvä modo 
plena, modo dimidiata, modo falcata, apparet, nos tarnen, niti, Theologoru secuti, 
aliqvid lucis innatae ipsi tribuere audemus, stabiliendo hanc assertionem docu-
mentis... ex S. Scriptura...". 
104 
question of "dogma-determined theories" (like anti-Copernicanism) 
theological argument comes only at a dead end, where philosophical 
and mathematical reasoning cannot (or is not allowed to) lead to a 
conclusion. On the other hand in "dogma-impregnated theories" theo-
logical aspects are involved at all levels of the reasoning which make 
the theory construct. 
The dogma that God had created the world and all species in it 
had some consequences for physical theories. One of the most signi-
ficant ideas in this respect was that the number of species in the cos-
mos was thought to be constant. New species would not evolve neither 
could any of them become extinct. In this context the word species 
did not refer to living organisms only, but to all entities or substances 
on earth including the lifeless ones. Man-made artefacts were not new 
species properly speaking, because they were always made of already 
existing materials. 
It was known that living organisms especially were subject to chan- 	 105 
ge, alteration and finally to death. Therefore the conservation of the 
species must have been arranged somehow. The primary means for 
this was, of course, generation. All generation was caused by form, 
which had the potential to start and guide the process of generation. 
Matter was unable to generate by itself because it was passive by 
nature. Because generation was first and foremost generation of the 
form, it was important that the physical theories were in accordance 
with metaphysical dogmas on the propagation of form. The views held 
in metaphysics were on the other hand dependent on theology. And 
why were the concepts concerning generation so important for the 
theologians? Mainly because the answers given to the question of 
generation also had certain implications for views on man's soul. 
Since the apple scandal the descendants of Adam and Eve were 
burdened not only by worsened living conditions but also by an in-
delible spiritual stigma, original sin.207 Painted with dark colours, the 
Lutheran dogma emphasized the despicable sinfulness of man's very 
nature. In this context original sin was seen as something very real, 
222 07 Flachsenius 1690, p. 60. "Peccatum originale est intima atque habitualis totius 
naturae humanae, justitia originali per lapsum primorum parentum privatae, cor-
ruptio, in omnes omnino homines naturaliter ex Adamo descendentes, per cama-
lem generationem propagata, eosdemque reos faciens irae Dei, & aeternae dam-
nationis." Svenonius 1664, p. 49-63. S. regards original sin as consisting of two 
aspects: the privation of the original status of man as the image of God, and of 
"the most sordid type of lusts".  
almost touchable. However, the substance as such was unknowable 
for man but could be understood only through its accidents. Original 
sin was thus an essential accident in man, belonging to all individuals 
among this species. Now this sin needed a channel for its propagation, 
because its metaphysical status was that of an accident. According to 
the logical rules an accident could neither exist nor form new a subs-
tance by itself.20S Therefore, also the hereditary mechanism of original 
sin had to be physically explained. The solution to this problem was 
provided by a theory called propagatio per traductionem. A new 
form/soul was excited by the souls of the parents; this incident was 
often described by an analogy with one fire arising from two sparks.209 
This traductio was also the channel through which original sin was 
propagated from soul to soul, from generation to generation. 
It was essential from the point of view of theology that metaphysics 
and physics follow its accepted dogmas. This was important not only 
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	 for the dogmatic coherence's sake but most of all because of the needs 
of theology. Because philosophical concepts were essential for theo-
logical theoretisation, their purity was the more important. It has been 
said that it was the dogma of angels especially, which was dependent 
on the right description of substantial forms.210 In physics, however, 
substantial forms were not defended on these grounds. This was be-
cause the dogma of angels was a part of theology and thus outside 
of the area of competence of physicists. 
Physical Explanations of Biblical Events 
The impact of religion upon natural philosophy is visible also in the 
third type of argument, which concentrates on explaining events in 
the Bible on physical grounds. The roots of this tradition go back to 
the medieval times, where e.g. Peter Lombard's widely used textbook 
208 	 Achrelius 1682, p. 349-350. Hahn-Ljungdahl 1704, p. 43. "...quia peccatum qvod 
est accidens, non potent per se absque subjecto poprio, nempe anima, subsistere." 
Thuronius 1660, Institutionum Logicum Tractatus Prooemiale, p. 57-69. Flach-
senius 1678, Collegium Logicum Prooemiale, p. 135-147. 
209 	 Alanus-Jurvelius 1647, Th. XLVII. Thauvonius-Laurbecchius 1653, Sect. I. Thau-
vonius-Helsingius 1658, Th. 1-4. Thuronius-Mathesius 1665, Th. 2. Hahn-Ulholm 
1689, p. 103-104. Miltopaeus-Enebergh 1667, Th. XIII-XX. Hahn-Collander 
1699, p. 6-7. Hahn-Hornaeus 1690, p. 10-13. On "traducianism" at Turku see 
Leikola 1983a, p. 238-240. 
210 Salminen 1981, pp. 99-100. 
of theology, Sentences (written around 1150), was full of natural phi-
losophical material. Not only did several medieval authors apply phy-
sical knowledge to the exegesis of the creation and other important 
events in the Bible, but they also developed a special genre of hypot-
hetical problems.' 1 Despite these long traditions this was not an 
overwhelmingly usual practice in dissertations written at Turku. This 
may be due to the tendency of the Lutheran church, which M. Büttner 
has pointed out, to omit directly Biblical explanations. Geography for 
example aimed at demonstrating how the world created by God func-
tioned, and for this purpose we had to study the facts of this world 
in order to understand God.212 This kind of argument was not, how-
ever, entirely unknown at Turku either. Usually it was integrated in 
one or two quaestios or corollaries in the final part of the thesis. 
Nevertheless, this type of argumentation also deserves to be looked 
at more closely. 
When approaching this kind of practice the question of its motiva-
tion arises. As against Büttner's description of Melanchthonian phy-
sics, the seventeenth-century Lutherans were occasionally also inte-
rested in explaining the way God had ruled the world in the past.213 
Why were events in the Bible reduced to physical terms? What func-
tion did this kind of approach serve? The intention was certainly not 
to strip God's works and miracles of their divine aura. Secularization 
was totally out of question. There seems to be no single motive for 
handling these problems. The following examples illustrate the way 
biblical themes were treated in physics and at the same time how they 
clarify their function. 
The creation of the world and its species was a subject which was 
studied repeatedly.214 The order of different acts of God in creation 
was a matter of physical explanation. The fact that only the Bible 
could tell us about these matters was not disturbing, because the Bible 
was considered as an authoritative source for physical knowledge. Of 
course, dogmatic questions greatly influenced the way in which the 
details of creation were interpreted. For example, definitions of the 
211 Grant 1986, p. 59-86. 
212 Büttner 1979. 
213 Büttner 1979, p. 163. 
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	 Thauvonius-Lilius 1656, Th. 15-18. Hahn-Ulholm 1689, p. 2-5. Hahn-Weckelman 
1694, p. 42-50. Hahn-Wijsing 1685, § III. Hahn-Helinus 1694, p. 10-11. Hahn-
Amnelius 1688, p. 10-11. Halm-Melliin 1687, p. 16. See also Svenonius 1664, 
p. 25-30. 
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nature of the nothingness from which the world was created were 
given. 2215 Creation was one of the most central doctrines in Luthe-
ranism, and its exegesis could be aided by introducing certain physical 
terms into the discussion. The events in the Bible were thought to be 
literally true and this may have given impetus to human curiosity. 
The beginning of the world has always fascinated man, and the exact 
date of the creation was subject to speculation for a long time. There 
was some disagreement as to which day the creation of the world 
actually took place, and theologians were sceptical about the possibi-
lity of determining the date.216 However, physical facts spoke for the 
autumn: 
Thus there is no doubt that the world was created in autumn, es-
pecially because after the establishment of the world at the very 
beginning, trees were created heavy and burdened with apples, 
108 	 which are product of autumn.217 
On the other hand one reason to explain phenomena described in 
the Bible was to make them sound more easily believable. The first 
man, Adam, had all knowledge of nature. His mastery over nature 
was confirmed, when he gave names to all the species of animals.218 
How this actually took place was considered problematic: how could 
Adam catch all the fishes, especially big marine fishes and give them 
names? Paradise was not situated on a shore, anyway, but in the Mid-
dle East. A "rational" and "believable" explanation was possible in 
physical terms: 
An extremely vast river, which was divided into four branches, 
originated in Eden (these are Moses' words) in order to irrigate 
Paradise which was located in Mesopotamia. Eden was a region in 
Mesopotamia which was located outside Paradise. ...Now it certain- 
215 Hahn-Ulholm 1689, p. 2. "...massam chaoticam primo devolvimus, quam Deus 
miro modo creavit, non de sua substantia, nec alia sibi coaetema... sed de nihilo, 
& quidem negativo non privativo, qvia omnis privatio praesupponit subjectum..." 
216 Svenonius 1664, p. 32. Svenonius 1662, p. 303. "An creatio mundi in tempore 
rationibus philosophicis certo demonstrari possit? Nos N. Caiv. A." 
217 
	
	 Thauvonius-Lilius 1656, p. 15-18. "Dubium igitur non est, praesertim cum mundi 
conditi initio arbores pomis gravidae & onustae creatae sint, quales autumnus 
profert, ipso autumni tempore mundum creatum esse." 
218 Alanus-Wassenius 1646, Th. II. Achrelius-Hwal 1683, p. 12-15. 
ly becomes credible that [God] could convoce those immense in-
habitants of seas before Adam. And who would deny that the gat-
hering together of Whales could have happened through such a 
deep river.219 
It seems that Achrelius and Hwal assume that Biblical geography 
was the same before the Flood as it was in their times. Because of 
the analogies with their own era the location of Paradise could at least 
in principle be determined, and the name-giving act be explained by 
referring to existing rivers. 
Elisaeus Hwal's (=Whale) thesis also contains other aspects in 
which the world-view of the Bible is made to sound physically more 
reasonable. Hwal states that no whales nor any other fish were brought 
into Noah's Ark during the Deluge, because no fish could have lived 
long on dry land, but that there was plenty of space for the fish during 
the Flood.220 In the same partly critical, partly explanatory manner 	 109 
Hwal deals with the question of whether it really was a whale which 
swallowed Jonah. The Biblical story is thoroughly described, but the 
possibility that the big fish in question was a whale is denied. Hwal 
does not refute the validity of the story itself, but maintains that the 
fish must have been of some species other than a whale.271 At this 
time whales were usually regarded as dangerous beasts, but Hwal has 
physiological knowledge which makes him think otherwise: 
Although Valaena, Pristis and Physeter are vast and immense ma-
rine animals, their throats nevertheless consist of such a narrow 
meatus that they could not swallow a whole man, as is also testified 
by many authors cited above.222 
219 	 Achrelius-Hwal 1683, p. 14-19, 22. "Ex Eden (Mosis verba sunt) egrediebatur ad 
irrigandum Paradisum in Mesopotamia situm vastissimus fluvius in quatvor 
brachia divisus. Eden namque erat regio in Mesopotamia extra Paradisum sita. 
...Dum convocasse ingentes ulos maris incolas ad Adamum, credibile certe foret, 
nec qvis negaret, mediante tantae altitudinis fluvio, congregatio Cetorum qvin 
posset fieri." 
220 Achrelius-Hwal 1683, p. 43-44. 
221 	 Achrelius-Hwal 1683, p. 91-103. 
222 	 Achrelius-Hwal 1683, p. 92. "Quia Valaena, Pristis aut Physeter, utut sint Belluae 
marinae vastissimae atque permagnae, cum tarnen gulae meatus habeant angus- 
tiores, solidum hominem transglutire non possunt, sicut id etiam perplurimi tes-
tantur scriptores prius citati." 
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Sometimes the subject of a natural philosophical study could be motivated by biblical themes. 
Johannes Helin, who wrote this thesis under the guidance of Petrus Hahn in 1694 claims that 
he got the inspiration to study doves from the Bible. The Holy Book mentions the bird several 
times; for example it was a dove who brought Noah evidence that the Deluge had stopped. 
The dove was also praised for its chastity and it was said to have as many virtues as it had 
feathers. 
The biblical story thus offered a matrix in which to discuss a certain 
physical characteristic of whales. 
Arguments explaining certain events in the Bible were very often 
derived from verses of the Bible itself, which referred to the physical 
environment. It was noticed, however, that the Bible did not mention 
all possible facts concerning nature. What kind of effect did this have 
on the status of theories and facts about which the Bible kept silent? 
For example, Moses did not mention the creation of the four elements, 
or the three Paracelsian principles. Instead of doubting the existence 
of these natural things it was claimed that Moses talked in simple and 
general terms.223 Remarkably enough, the same interpretation of the 
Bible had been fiercely rebuffed when it was used to defend heliocent-
rism! 
There are two dissertations which discuss the question of whether 
there were rainbows in the world before the Deluge." The problem 
was caused by the assumption that the rainbow was a sign of the 
convenant between God and men and also served as a portent. Was 
there need for such a sign before the Deluge? The answer could thus 
clarify our picture of natural conditions at the very beginning of the 
world. It was stated that all conditions necessary for producing a rain-
bow already existed in the world before Noah's Ark. If the natural 
causes were present, and nothing impeded it, the result would occur 
automatically, so that Abraham Melliin could conclude in his thesis 
that the res itself had existed before Deluge, but its officium did not.225 
The scholastic mode of writing theses sometimes left its marks on 
their contents. One can only conclude that questions like "Did Adam 
get another rib from the God?" were primarily meant to be discussed 
and disputed. Similarly studies about where the dove of Noah found 
the twig of an olive-tree exist to indicate that the flood was receding. 
We are also given the physical reasons why Lot's wife was transfor-
med into a pillar of salt rather than into some other stone. Pondering 
this kind of question was probably more or less just practice for de-
veloping arguments, defending and opposing them.226 
223 Hahn-Imbergh 1704, p. 6-7. 
224 Hahn-Melliin 1686, p. 37-40. Hahn-Pryss 1691, p. 19-20. 
225 Hahn-Melliin 1686, p. 40. 
226 Hahn-Govinius 1685, Quaest. VII. Adam got a new rib from God after the crea-
tion of Eve. The argument for this goes as follows: If Adam had an extra rib 
ready when he was created, he would have been monstrous, which was an impious 
statement. On the other hand, if one of his ribs had simply been taken away, he 
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The purpose and function of this kind of argument is not always 
easy to determine. However, in the 17th century these problems were 
considered as relevant as any other natural philosophical problem. The 
fact that this kind of question was put indicates a change in compa-
rison with the sixteenth-century Melanchthonian tradition. The study 
of Creation and ancient times had been typical of the Catholic and 
Calvinist traditions from which Lutheran science had tried to diffe-
rentiate itself in the sixteenth century.227 Now the emphasis had chan-
ged. The Bible represented for orthodox Lutherans the same reality 
as could be found in the authors' own environment. These studies 
may have been inspired by varying and unarticulated motives, and 
they may have been carried out only seldom in practice. Sometimes 
these kinds of research problems were merely a by-product of more 
general research schemes. The fact that they were dealt with at all 
tells us, however, much about the various ways in which religious 
112 	 thought and natural philsophy were intermingled. 
I have in this chapter described the academic context in which natural 
philosophical learning found itself in 17th-century Turku. I have ar-
gued that the ideology behind the foundation of the Academy influen-
ced its preferred functions and contributed to the shaping of the hie-
rarchical order of the disciplines. The disciplinary boundaries were at 
the same time epistemological ones, which was also reflected in the 
form and methodology of natural philosophical inquiry as presented 
in academic dissertations. Since theology was the dominant science 
of the day and all other disciplines had to accommodate themselves 
to the framework it produced, the relationships between it and natural 
philosophy are also important to understand. I have pictured these 
relationships on three levels: between the institutions state, church and 
university, between the faculties of the University and finally at the 
level of theories. I have argued that it is necessary to see both theology 
and natural philosophy as historical entities to which our present stand-
ards for their proper role and boundaries cannot be applied. According 
to physicists, natural philosophy was the scientia of the causes of 
natural bodies. In the next chapter I shall offer a view of the natural 
philosophical theories embraced at the University of Turku. 
would have been disfigured all the same. Thus God must have given him a new 
rib. See also Hahn-Helinus 1694, p. 22-24. Hahn-Hahn 1702, p. 43-44. 
227 Büttner 1979. 
The Body of Knowledge: 
Physical Theories at the 
University of Turku 
1. THE COMPOSITION OF 
A SUBSTANCE 
When Aristotle formed his theory of substance it was one of his pri- 	 113 
mary tasks to explain the play of variety and uniformity of natural 
things. The theory of substance would be the apparatus with which 
the continuous process of change - generation, growth and decay - 
could be explained reasonably. The existence of individual as well as 
specific characteristics in natural bodies could also be analysed into 
form and matter, the two constituent parts of a substance. 
All theorizing in Aristotelian natural philosophy was based on the 
concept of substance which Aristotle formulated in his metaphysics.' 
Aristotelian philosophy itself went through several dogmatic transfor-
mations during its florescence among Arab and Western philosophers. 
In the Middle Ages and Renaissance the birth of various modifications 
was often motivated by the various preferences of different Christian 
sects. The ambiguities in translations and not least in Aristotle's texts 
themselves contributed to this variety of interpretations. Being one of 
the most fundamental concepts in Aristotelian philosophy, it is not 
surprising that by the 17th century numerous versions of the theory 
of substance had been developed.' Whatever interpretations of it were 
favoured on religious or other grounds, the choice was certainly not 
insignificant from the point of view of natural philosophical theory 
formation either. 
I 	 For a general account of the role of substance in Aristotelian metaphysics see 
Lear 1988, p. 247-293. 
2 E.g. Wallace 1988, p. 201-231. 
The subject of study in physics was the finite substance, in parti-
cular as identified with a corpus naturalis, a natural thing or body. 
In order to be a real substance a thing was presumed to have a self-
sufficient existence, or as the Aristotelian terminology put it, a subs-
tance ought to be able to esse per se. Every substance was, however, 
ultimately dependent on a benevolent act of God (creator) as the pri-
mary efficient cause of its existence.3 But how was this condition of 
self-sufficiency fulfilled? The ontological status of a substance gained 
its meaning through the distinction made between substance and ac-
cidence. 
In Aristotelian tradition the concept "accidence" was used in various 
senses. An accident could be specified generally as a predicate - either 
necessary or contingent - among other predicates such as property, 
genus or differentia. On the other hand an accident could refer to 
something which might or might not belong to a an individual, e.g. 
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paleness or being seated. For example in term rational animal, "ra- 
tional" could be classified as a differentia (a characteristic peculiar to 
the species of man only) and thus it could not be an accident. How-
ever, it could be understood as a quality as well, and all categories 
other that that of substance could be collectively classified as "acci-
dents".` The latter reading was usual in physics theses at Turku, alt-
hough ambiguities are not avoided altogether.' In physical theses the 
differentia of a substance consisted of causes and affections, which 
were all dependent on the substance and were thus accidents. For 
example Thuronius in his metaphysics counts quantity, quality, rela-
tion, action, passion, duration, location, disposition of parts and state 
as accidents. On the other hand the metaphysical concept affectio re-
ferred to certain general concepts used of an entity which nevertheless 
were not accidents.6 
From the physical point of view the scholars at Turku maintained 
that there was a real distinction (distinctio realis) between a substance 
3 Thuronius 1664, p. 334-337, et passim. Flachsenius 1678, Collegium Logicum 
Prooemiale, p. 131-148, et passim. 
4 Henry 1982, p. 128-131. 
5 See e.g. Falchsenius 1678, Collegium Logicum Prooemiale, p. 137-138. 
6 
	
	 Thuronius 1664, p. 343-352. "Summa Accidentium genera juxta Aristotelem re- 
censentur novem: Quantitas, Qualitas, Relatio, Actio, Passio, Quando, Ubi, Situs 
& Habitus." (p. 345) On affections Thuronius 1664, p. 75-87, et passim. Thuronius 
counts as affections perfection, unity, goodness, duration, necessity and contin-
gency, finiteness and infinity, and causation. 
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and its accidents. This meant that they belonged to different ontolo-
gical categories.' Accidents were unable to form a substance by them-
selves, because a substance was more than the mere sum of its cons-
tituent parts.' Correspondingly no accident could exist free without 
belonging to a substance: 
Contradictory things cannot be true simultaneously. Now to inhere 
in substance belongs to the definition of an accident; to be an ac-
cident and not be in a substance is a contradiction. But it pertains 
to the definition of a substance not to be in a substance but to exist 
by itself and have its Being in itself.' 
Nevertheless, accidents were not unimportant, because only they 
enabled men to gain knowledge of a substance. No substance could 
be known by itself, but only through its accidents. 
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A substance was a so-called composite whole consisting of form 
and matter. In physics the subject was most often approached by stu-
dying the constituent parts of a substance separately. Form and matter 
were also considered to be the principles of a substance - they were 
called principles because they were not derived from anything else, 
but rather everything else was derived from them. When it comes to 
the composition of a substance, it was stressed that a substance could 
not be formed without the presence of both principles, the form and 
the matter.10 Only occasionally could either form or matter be referred 
to as "substance", but then always as "incomplete substances", which 
would not have real existence in nature.' In other words there would 
be as many substances in the world in a physical sense as there were 
composite wholes. 
7 Thuronius 1664, p. 260-261. 
s 	 Hahn-Bolhemius 1688, p. 2-4. 'Fatet sic nullum accidens posse constituere subs-
tantiam ut causam per se & solitariam, adeoque Affectiones corporis, ejus causae 
non sunt dicendae." See also Thuronius 1664, p. 334-352. 
9 	 Hahn-Herkepa'us 1703, p. 1-2. "Nec enim contradictoria simul possunt esse vera. 
Jam ad definitionem accidentis pertinet tö in esse substantiae: esse vero accidens, 
& non esse in substantia, contradictionem implicat. Ad substantiae vero de-
finitionem pertinet, non esse in substantia, sed per se existere & Essentiam suam 
habere in se." see also Hahn-Florinus 1693, p. 14-15. Hahn-Bolhemius 1688, p. 
20-21. 
10 Petraeus-Wallenius 1674, Th. VI, VIII. 
l I 	 See e.g. Thuronius-Waghner 1664, Th. I. 
Actuality and potentiality, and their derivatives activity and pas-
sivity were characteristics which were included essentially in form 
and matter. In classical Aristotelianism they were of crucial impor-
tance in explaining various processes in nature. The basic arrangement 
of things was still valid at Turku too, the form was the active part of 
the pair, whereas matter was the passive one. However, they seem 
not to have played as important an explanatory role in natural phi-
losophy at Turku as they had done in some earlier versions of Aris-
totelianism. 
Privation, for Aristotle as well as for many of his followers even 
in the 17th century, had been the third principle of substance besides 
form and matter. It played an important role in generation, because 
generation was considered to be "movement" or change from non-
being (privatio) to being. To put it differently, a privation was the 
absence of a definite form. In 17th-century literature a difference was 
often made between privation as an absence of form and as pure ne-
gation.12 Thuronius makes this same distinction in his Metaphysics as 
well. He means by negation the absolute absence of an essence (e.g. 
not-man), and by privation he means "negation of an Essence in a 
subject which is capable of it" (e.g. blindness).13 Thuronius also dis-
cerns various aspects of privation, and among other things he distin-
guishes physical from logical privation. Most physical authors at the 
Academy of Turku do not mention privation at all, and those few who 
do deny its existence. In this they are talking about the privatio phy-
sica, which in Thuronius' definition was the absolute absence of a 
generating form.14 Privation in this sense was labeled an absurdity of 
the "Peripatetics" or a "foetus of idle little minds" (vanorum cerebel-
lorum foetus), which thus ought not to be accepted as an explanation 
of any kind of generation. 
Privation is not a principle of generation. It would be and not be 
simultaneously; it would be when it would function and not be 
12 Wolter 1965, p. 136-137. Reif 1962, p. 78-84, 131-132. On the differences of 
privation and negation and their connection with the discussion on the existence 
of vacuum see Grant 1981, p. 9-14. 
13 
	
	 Thuronius 1664, p. 29-30. "Ens negativum est. quod essentiam destruit & toll it. 
Estque pure negativum, quod omnimodam essentiae absentiam, vel negationem 
Entitatis absolute notat, diciturque nihil negativum, ut non homo, non visus: ve! 
privativum, quod negat Essentiam in subjecto capaci, diciturque nihil privativum, 
ut caecitas." 
14 Thuronius 1664, p. 31. 
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because it would never exist. It is absurd to claim that in the instant 
of mutation terminus ä quo would unite with terminus ad quem. 
Hence it would be and not be simultaneously. ...I ask when would 
privation be? Not in generation, because then there is a form. Not 
before generation because then there should not be any form, and 
thus no privation either. Before generation there is only remote po-
tency present, but privation demands immediate potency, which is 
considered as act.15 
In other words Tålpo is here disputing the existence of privation 
in the Aristotelian sense, which he takes as the absolute negation of 
an entity (cf. Thuronius' definition). Privation can exist only relatively, 
i.e. as the absence of something which already exists and is capable 
of being something. The concept "privation" was actually used some-
times in physics, but then always in a relative sense.16 As nothing 
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could actually exist without a form, the existence of privation as ne- 
gation or non-being was excluded by definition. Privation was thus 
accidental in the same sense as form and matter were accidental, i.e. 
as far as they were compounds of a substance. We do not get a very 
clear picture of the nature of privation from physical dissertations. 
There seems to have been no urgent need to discuss the status of this 
Aristotelian principle, because generation simply was no longer regar-
ded as a change from non-being to being. 
The Form Defines the Characteristics of a Natural 
Body 
The form was regarded as the subject matter of physical inquiry only 
as far as it was considered to be a constituent of a corpus naturalis, 
i.e. in its state of being connected with matter." To put it in the 
15 Tålpo-Höök 1690, p. 10. "Privationem non esse generationis principium. Nam 
simul esset & non esset, esset cum operaretur, non esset cum nunquam existeret. 
In instanti mutationis concurrere terminum å quo, & terminum ad quem, absurdum 
est statuere. Sic enim idem simul erit & non erit....Qvaero quando datur privatio? 
non in generatione, quia in hac forma datur, non ante generationem, quia tunt 
forma adesse non debet, ergo nec privatio. Ante generationem non nisi remota 
adest potentia, at privatio connotat proximam, proxima potentia habetur pro actu." 
Cf. Sperling 1662, p. 13. 
16 	 See chapter "On the Structure of the Cosmos", the discussion on light and dark-
ness. 
17 	 Flachsenius-Lund 1681, Th. IV. According to Reif 1962, p. 97 in most early 17th 
Aristotelian terms of the four causes, form was defined as one of the 
two internal causes of a substance, matter being the other. Forms were 
whole and indivisible. The indivisibility was mainly due to the fact 
that forms lack extension and thereby quantity.18 The lack of extension 
guaranteed form the ability to penetrate a whole body and still be 
whole in every part of the body (toto esse in quolibet pane totius). 
The existence of a spirit or any other intermediate between form and 
body was denied; angels and demons represented the only species of 
"spirits". These creatures were actually pure form, but they could also 
be called spirits, because unlike ordinary forms they were not perisha-
ble.19 
A form was, as a respondent put it, the "...disposition of a natural 
body, through which it is what it is."20 A form was the principle which 
gave an entity its specific and individual characteristics, which distin-
guished it from other natural bodies!' Two closely interrelated prob-
lems are connected to the question about the function of form. Firstly, 
all individual substances (i.e. composite wholes consisting of matter 
and form) belonged to a wider class of beings, which was called the 
species. Thomas Aquinas for example thought that although universals 
had no separate existence in the real world, there had to be some 
universal element, which places objects in their species. For Aquinas 
the form was the bearer of universality.22 This leads us to the second 
aspect in relation to the question of the function of form. If form was 
the carrier of specific characteristics, what then differentiated indivi-
duals within the species? 
According to the thomist view the primary principle of individu-
ation was so-called materia signata quantitate. The complicated de- 
century physics textbooks far less space was taken in propounding arguments for 
substantial form than for matter. 
18 
	
	
An interesting discussion of the indivisibility of material form (= form conjoined 
to matter) exists in Thuronius-Pryss 1664, Th. I. Reif 1962, p. 95. On form see 
also Thuronius 1660, Institutiones Logicae I, p. 179 ff. Flachsenius 1678, Colle-
gium Logicum I, p.328-347. 
19 Thauvonius-Forsenius 1653, Ax. IV. Thuronius-Pryss 1664, Th. I. Petraeus-Wal-
lenius 1674, Th. XIII. 
20 Petraeus-Wallenius 1674, Th. XVI. "...dispositio Rei Naturalis, per quam est id 
quod est." 
21 Thauvonius-Forsenius 1650, Th. VIII. Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, Sectio I 
Membr. II Artic. III Ax.I. "Forma est causa intema, per quam C.N. constituitur." 
Petraeus-Wallenius 1674, Th. XXVI-XXXIII. 
22 Copleston 1985, II, p. 326-327. 
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tails of Aquinas' view need not concern us here, but the important 
point to remember is that matter was for him the basic cause of in-
dividuation. Other medieval philosophers had different answers to the 
problem of individuation. St. Bonaventure for example regarded the 
actual union of form and matter as the primary source of individuation. 
Further interpretations were put forward by some of the leading scho-
lastics of the 17th century, such as Francisco Suarez, who had a con-
siderable influence on Protestant metaphysics. He differentiated be-
tween a material substance considered experientially, and considered 
in itself. Because our knowledge of the substance was based on ac-
cidental notions such as quantity, etc., matter could be considered as 
the principle of individuation. However, if material substance is exa-
mined in itself, its individuality must be ascribed to its form.23 Where 
do the authors at Turku stand amongst these traditions? 
This question is not easy to answer because the question was not 
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put as clearly as this at Turku. Although the discussions which took 
place there are related to the problem of individuation, no difference 
was clearly made between specifying the species and individuation of 
the individual within a given species. It was at least partially the prob-
lem of individuation which led the scholars at Turku to accept some 
remarkable divisions concerning the form. I have claimed above that 
indivisibility was thought to be an essential property of a form. Indeed, 
this was held to be true when it came to the actual existence of things. 
Nevertheless, at the conceptual level some important distinctions were 
introduced. 
First of all, a form could be considered either essentialiter or for-
maliter. Form essentialiter could be called a substance, although not 
properly speaking in the physical sense. It was conceptually different 
from its matter. A form considered formally was then the form in 
actual connection with the matter thereby constituting the species.74 
Obviously this distinction could also be seen as the basis of the dis-
tinction which was made between the generic and the specific part of 
the form.25 Specific form (forma specifica) was the proper form of a 
23 	 Lewalter 1967. Copleston 1985, II, p. 272-173. Copleston 1985, III p. 360-361. 
Trentman 1982, p. 822-824. 
24 Thuronius-Waghner 1664, Th. I. "Absoluto uno seu Entitativo, quo omnis forma 
in se actu est & substantia, (licet incompleta), å materia in qua, tanquam domicilio, 
habitat diversissima. Respectivo altero seu formgli, quem juxta non quamlibet, 
sed aptam informat materiam, eamque actuat ac perficit, ut cum eä elaboratå 
certam constituant speciem." 
thing, giving the substance its specific characteristics and holding the 
substance together, so to speak.26 However, because of its dominant 
position the specific form also accounted for the characteristics of an 
individual. Although the differences between individual substances, 
which we could discern with our senses, were produced by the generic 
form, it was incapable of acting without the specific form.77 Specific 
forms were always perishable, only excepting the form of man, or the 
rational soul. 
"Generic [form] is what more inheres in matter rather than form, 
and does not constitute the species."28 Generic form was thus "the 
visible form" of things, and was responsible for producing the qualities 
which could be referred to the material component of the substance. 
However, it clearly had the ontological status of a form. If the generic 
form - though subservient to the specific form - thus was the principle 
of individuation within the species, we cannot assign the interpretation 
accepted at Turku to any of the traditions described above. To be fair, 	 121 
the question of individuation was not openly asked at Turku, but ques-
tions of the function of form in the composite whole and the relation 
between different parts of the form could not avoid dealing with si-
milar problems. 
Generic forms could further be divided into partial, subordinated 
and accidental forms. Subordinated forms were thought to be latent 
in a body, and could only exercise their proper functions if freed from 
the dominance of the more general form. For example, the forms of 
the four elements were subordinated in mixed bodies. Considered from 
a different point of view it could also be said that the forms of ele-
ments existed both essentialiter and formaliter in elements, but only 
25 Thauvonius-Forsenius 1650, Th. XIII. "Dividitur Forma Physica, in Genericam 
& Specificam. Fundamentum hujus divisionis est ipsa natura, quae formas non 
unius conditionis esse voluit, sed unam propriam, plures improprias, unam ope-
rantem adeoque imperantem, plures quiescentes adeoque obedientes mistis voluit 
largiri. Nam Forma potent alicubi esse Essentialiter tantum, alicubi etiam Forma-
liter. Essentialiter est ubicunque est formaliter v. in ea materia quam proxime 
informat, ita ut informando speciem constituat. Ita formae Elementorum in Ele-
mentis sunt & essentialiter & formaliter, in homine v. tantum essentialiter ha-
bentes se ad modum materiae, quia anima humana ibidem est formaliter." 
26 Thauvonius-Forsenius 1650, Th. XXI. Thuronius-Waghner 1664, Th. XI. 
27 E.g. Thuronius-Waghner 1664, Th. VII says of accidental forms that they "in 
mistis corporibus sine lege sine ordine stabulantur, imperioque formae specificae 
subsunt." 
28 	 Thauvonius-Forsenius 1650, Th. XIV. "[Forma] Generica est quae magis materiae 
quam formae rationem habens, speciem non constituit." 
essentialiter in the body of man, in which the rational soul was the 
form formaliter.29 Accidental forms like fatness or baldness existed 
only temporarily. This hierarchy of forms helped to explain how an 
individual substance could remain a continuous unity despite trans-
formations during a longer time span. Although Socrates grew bald 
and old, we would nevertheless have grounds to call him Socrates, 
because these transmutations were only accidental and thus did not 
threaten the integrity of his substance. Finally, it was the partial forms 
which enabled every organ of a body - e.g. heart, nerves, stomach - 
to function in a specialized manner.30 Although the divisions displayed 
here were only conceptual, they nevertheless played an important role 
in explaining nature's processes. 
A classical question in scholastic philosophy had been how new 
individuals were born, i.e. where did new forms come from. The topic 
was subject to a wide-ranging discussion among 17th-century Aristo- 
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telians too. Interestingly enough Aristotle himself regarded the gene- 
ration of form as an absurdity.31 For the scholars at Turku this was 
an important question, because it was intimately related to me-
taphysical and theological dogmas. Several answers to the question 
of the origin of form had been given in the course of the centuries. 
It could be stated, for example, that the souls of men were directly 
created by God, whereas other forms were educed when virtual forms 
(rationes seminales) residing in matter became activated. This ex-
planation was considered good by St. Bonaventure, whereas some ot-
her medieval authors denied the existence of any "hidden" forms in 
matter, because forms were always actual. They regarded matter only 
as having a "potency and natural aptitude" (potentia et aptitudo na-
turalis) to receive certain kinds of forms. The idea of rationes se-
minales was linked especially with the Augustinian tradition, while 
some other scholars preferred the creation of forms.32 Theories like 
this were often dealt with in dissertations written at Turku, although 
29 Thauvonius-Forsenius 1650, Th. XIII. 
30 Thauvonius-Forsenius 1650, Th. XIII-XXII. Thuronius-Pryss 1664, Th. II-III. 
Thuronius-Waghner 1664, Th. V-XII. 
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Reif 1962, p. 140-141. Gill 1989, passim. This was because Aristotle regarded 
form as a principle and thus not derivable from anything else. 
32 Copleston 1985, II p. 75-77, 223, 275-276, 328. Steneck 1976, p. 34-35. Wolter 
1965, p. 142-144. 
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their proponents were hardly ever named.33 The importance of the 
doctrine becomes evident from the way many authors use strong lan-
guage against the supporters of these other views. (They were often 
called such names as dreamers and hallucinators.) 
But competing theories on the origin of forms were also rejected 
at Turku on various other grounds. It was said, for instance, that forms 
could not be created, because this would have presupposed a con-
tinuous act of creation by God. (But according to the Bible the work 
of creation had been finished on the sixth day.) The astronomical 
influence of the stars or the warmth of the sun would not do either, 
because it supposed the ultimate source of activity (the efficient cause) 
to be extrinsic to the form itself. A relatively tenacious emphasis was 
placed on the point that forms could not "be deduced from the potency 
of matter" (educi é potentia materiae). This view was generally held 
among Catholic scholars, and a slightly different interpretation of it 
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was favoured by some Dutch Aristotelians.34 Passivity belongs to the 
essence of matter, it was stressed, and consequently it could not act 
independently. The elicitation of forms from the potentiality of matter 
was also objected to because in that case an accident would bring 
forth a substance. This alternative was rejected as logically and me-
taphysically absurd.35 
A proper theory of the origin of forms had to cover two different 
aspects. First of all there was the ultimate origin of forms, explained 
by God's creation: He had created a form for every species at the 
beginning of the world. He had also given these created forms a power 
to multiply by generation. This explanation accounted for the "normal" 
propagation of forms. A new form was produced by two forms or 
souls per traducem, as two different fires brought about a new single 
flame by a spark from both of them. Semen would function as a 
33 An exception to this is the foreword in Alanus-Lidenius 1643, who also uses 
strong language. He connects "wrong" opinions with opposition to theologians or 
religious groups, such as the Jesuits. "Hinc prostant illa somnia de immissione 
formarum e coelo, quod est Fernelij de eductione formarum e potentia materiae, 
qui error cum Thoma Aquinate est Toleti, Picolominei, Ruvionis Rhodensis, Co-
nimv. Complut. Pererij, Zanardi, Morisani, aliorumque praecipue Iesuitarum so-
ciennorum. De origine formarum ex qualitatibus contemperatis quod Magirus 
somniat. Et quae sunt hujus furfuris alia." 
34 Reif 1962, p. 140-141. Lindroth 1939, p. 162-164. 
35 Thauvonius-Forsenius 1650, Th. XXVI. Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, Sectio I 
Membr. II Artie. III Ax 2. Petraeus-Wallenius 1674, Th. XIX-XX. Thuronius-
Waghner 1664, Th. XIV-XVI. 
vehicle for the form/soul in animated creatures, including man. The 
scholars at Turku did not rely solely on the Bible in this, but thought 
that the truth of traducianism was satisfactorily confirmed by reason 
and experience as well. How else could it be explained, it was said, 
that humans gave birth to humans, and asses to asses, but not asses 
to humans?36 
At least as important as the question of the origin of forms was 
the theory of their destruction, an issue far less discussed at Turku. 
It was stated that when the conjunction of form and matter dissolved, 
the form became a complete nothing.37 The nature of this nothingness 
was not, however, philosophically more closely defined. The question 
"What is a form and how is a new form produced?" seems to have 
occupied professors' minds especially during the first decades of the 
existence of the University. Entire theses were dedicated to the subject 
at Turku, and the "correct" theory of the propagation of form was 
frequently referred to in dissertations on other subjects of physics too. 
After the 1680's the same ideas were still accepted in dissertations 
written by Petrus Hahn. However, the mode in which they were pre-
sented had changed. They seem not to have been matters of great 
urgency any more and were asserted only occasionally and then as 
statements of facts. This indicates, first of all, that the theory had been 
well established, and was by no means decreasing in importance. On 
the other hand the latter part of the 17th century posed different kinds 
of challenges to the theory of substance in the form of Cartesianism. 
Defending the theory of the propagation of forms was not so essential 
when the whole concept of forms was being attacked. 
Material Constituents of the World 
All matter in the world was made of the four Aristotelian elements 
earth, water, air and fire. These elements and their forms were created 
by God from absolute nothingness (ex nihilo). The idea of ex nihilo 
creation was self-evident on a purely biblical basis, but on one oc- 
36 Alanus-Kempe 1646, Th. VIII. Alanus-Jurvelius 1647, Th. XII-XXV. Thauvonius-
Forsenius 1650, Th. XXVII. Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, Sectio I Membrum II 
Artie. III Ax.1. Petraeus-Wallenius 1674, Th. XXI-XXV. Thuronius-Waghner 
1664, Th. XVIII-XIX. Achrelius-Hwal 1683, p. 42, 52-53. 
37 Alanus-Lidenius 1643, Sectio II, Th. XXI. Thuronius-Mathesius 1665, Th. 7. Ac-
cording to Thuronius this can be stated on purely physical grounds, although 
nothing prevents God from annihilating a form if He so wishes. 
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casion we meet philosophical arguments which were presented in or-
der to defend the claim that God actually could create matter ex nihilo. 
The judgement rested on the onmipotency of God. Precisely because 
the essence of God was independent and self-supporting, the mere act 
of His will was sufficient to bring forth an effect, unrestricted by any 
necessary preconditions.38 
The basic features of the Aristotelian theory of the elementary qua-
lities are generally well-known, so that there is hardly any need to go 
over it in detail here. It is, however, advisable to represent a general 
survey of the subject as it was understood by the scholars at Turku. 
The four basic qualities hot, cold, wet and dry inhered in the four 
elements. In fact, it was these accidents which caused the elements 
to act in a manner specific to them. In addition to the classical hot-cold 
and wet-dry contraries several other qualities were introduced into 
discussion in the dissertations written at Turku. 
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There could be two classes of qualities in general, manifest and 
occult. The former were clearly sensible qualities, which we know 
from our everyday lives, such as warmth, coldness, redness or softness. 
The latter, however, derived their name from the fact that they could 
not be sensed in any way. Their existence could only be inferred from 
certain effects and manifestations which they produced, such as the 
magnet's power to attract iron or a drug's power to purge ill blood. 
All qualities, including the occult ones, were produced by the specific 
form.39 
Christian Aristotelians had not always been ready to accept the 
intelligibility of the occult qualities. (Indeed, even their existence was 
sometimes questioned.) According to the mainstream of medieval tra-
dition there could be no scientific knowledge, i.e. knowledge of the 
causes, of insensible and irregularly behaving things.40 The new 
mechanistic philosophies of the 17th century did not reject the class 
of occult qualities as such, but rather attacked the boundary line se-
parating the occult and manifest qualities. For mechanical philosop-
hers such as Descartes and Walter Charleton all qualities became in 
38 	 Hahn-Justander 1707, p. 11-14. "Ergo etiam naturaliter notum esse debet, DEUM 
ad agendum per se sufficere, nec indigere ulla materia, ex qua operetur." 
39 Alanus-Muntehlius 1645, Th. I, XXV-XXXV seems to attribute at least some of 
the causes of occult qualities to subordinate forms. Th. XXXV: "...Rhabarbrum 
cum purgat, vis purgandi non a specifica, sed subordinata fluit forma." Achre-
lius-Hagert 1689, p. 2. Hahn-,Eimelaaus 1698. 
4° Hutchison 1982, p. 233-242. 
a sense "occult", because even the apparently sensible qualities of bo-
dies were generated by insensible mechanisms4` The position accepted 
at Turku is an intermediate one between the two and relies very much 
on Daniel Sennert. Sennert was one of the philosophers to reshape the 
ideas concerning the sensibility - and thus intelligibility - of "occult 
qualities". According to him we should not deny the existence of what 
is manifest by experience, although we might not always know their 
causes.` The causes of occult processes could thus be studied in phy-
sics as far as something could be judged by its effects. 
However, qualities could be classified in innumerable other ways 
too; e.g. divisions into active, passive, and sometimes intentional qua-
lities were introduced. (The nature of the intentional qualities was not 
specified, and they were discussed only seldom anyway. Light was 
usually mentioned as an intentional quality, because it could "operate 
at a distance".)4' The partition into primary and secondary qualities 
followed the aforementioned division. In traditional Aristotelianism 	 127 
the primary qualities of the elements would consist of a combination 
of the contrary pairs hot-cold and dry-wet. The Aristotelian criteria 
for the priority of these four qualities was their activity, or ability to 
affect other bodies - a hot stone in a tub could make the water warm, 
but it could not transfer its hardness to it.44 Hot, cold, wet and dry 
were also all tangible qualities. 
At Turku the division into primary and secondary qualities was 
sometimes expressly denied. However, the criterion of primacy op-
posed here was different from that mentioned above. According to 
the view criticised primary qualities would arise from the form, whe-
reas secondary ones would be brought about by the matter. This idea 
is disputed, because all qualities were thought to stem ultimately from 
the form.45 Other, and often even more tangible qualities than the four 
classical ones were introduced. We learn, thus, that earth was "most 
coarse, most firm and heaviest, cold and dry"46 and fire "subtlest, ligh- 
41 Hutchison 1982, p. 242-253. On Descartes' views on qualities see e.g. Garber 
1992, p. 292-297. Wilson 1993. 
42 Hutchison 1982, p. 134, 242. 
43 Alanus-Munthelius 1645, Th. XVII-XXI. 
44 Maier 1952, p. 9-10. 
45 Petraeus-Schepherus 1668, Th. XXII. This is not to say that the division into 
primary and secondary qualities was not known or that it would have been re-
pelled on every occasion, see e.g. Achrelius 1682, p. 6. 
46 Tålpo-Rhydelius 1682, Th. VI, XIV-XVIII. Hahn-Alm 1688, p. 12-16. crassissi- 
test, hottest and driest"." As even the use of language implies here, 
the relative amounts of each quality in each element could be weighed. 
This was because two elements could include the same qualities, but 
they might be present in different degrees. These qualities were just 
a part of the general characteristics, so called affectiones, of the ele-
ments. Other affections common to the class (genus) of elements were 
e.g. number, quantity, impurity, round figure, movement and indi-
visibility.48 These affections were essential to the nature of the ele-
mentary world in general. 
The four elements could not, however, be responsible for all the 
sensible qualities found in nature. The three Paracelsian principles 
salt, sulphur and mercury therefore played an important role in phy-
sics. Paracelsus had himself considered these three principles the basic 
material elements of the world. The Wittenbergian doctor, Daniel Sen-
nert, had criticised Paracelsus for undervaluing the elements, and he 
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could not approve of the position reserved for them by the Paracelsian 
system. The Sennertian reading of the Paracelsian dogma was follo-
wed at Turku too: salt, sulphur and mercury would be composed of 
the elements earth, air, water and fire.49 
It was often stated that ordinary salt, sulphur and mercury should 
not be seen as the three principles. The spiritual power of the princi-
ples would lie in real salt, mercury and sulphur only analogically and, 
so to speak, make its powers visible through them.5° 
And this differs from common salt especially in respect of its purity 
and subtility, because this [i.e. common salt] contains in addition 
to this bitter chemical fluid, which is nearest to the nature of salt, 
also sulphur or oil, and mercury, which is a certain kind of spiri-
tuous liquids` 
mum, firmissimum, & gravissimum, frigidum & siccum. 
47 Thauvonius-Warelius 1650, Th. XXVIII. subtilissimum, levissimum, calidissu-
mum & siccissimum. See also Th. XVI, XX, XXV. Alanus-Kollanus 1642. Thau-
vonius-Warelius 1652, Sectio II Artic. III De Elementis in Genere & Specie. 
48 Alanus-Ketarenius 1644, Th. XVIII-XXII. Thauvonius-Warelius 1650, Th. VIII-
XII. Thauvonius-Sundius 1656. 
49 Thauvonius-Bergius 1656, Th. I, 3. Hahn-Florinus 1693, p. 18, 29, et passim. 
Lindroth 1943, p. 263-264, 267. Pagel 1958, p. 339-341. Partington 1961, p. 
271-276. 
50 Achrelius 1682, p, 50. Hahn-Florinus 1693, p. 10. Hahn-Weckelman 1694, p. 
6-7. 
51 	 Hahn-Hahn 1702, p. 8. "Et differt hoc å sale communi praesertim ratione puritatis 
Salt was on one hand a principle of solidity, but on the other hand 
of solubility, and was the primary cause of all savours. Sulphur was 
fatty, flammable and the cause of odours and colours. Mercury was 
liquid, spiritual and the cause of all inconsistency in bodies. It also 
was partially responsible for the production of colours, savours and 
odours. Salt, sulphur and mercury were omnipresent in nature, but 
they could in particular be seen as a sort of vapour or effluvium eva-
porating from bodies.52 
Along with the question of the essence of matter the problem of 
prima materia arose. The nature of prime matter was widely discussed 
from the Middle Ages on until the seventeenth century. Because Aris-
totle's original meaning in this question was (and still is) under dis-
cussion, several interpretations of the dogma of prime matter were 
given.5' Most usually the term had the meaning either of pure po-
tentiality or unformed matter of which the four elements were made. 
The task which most preoccupied philosophers concerning the prime 
matter was to determine the nature of the matter which underly all 
generation. This prime matter would thus be the substrate which per-
sisted through the transformations of the elements into each other. 
Unless there was something pre-existing in such things as fire, which 
changed into air, the air would come into being from nothing (ex 
nihilo) and the fire would be reduced to nothingness. This was regar-
ded as an untenable conclusion, because outside God's creative act 
ex nihilo nihil fit. 54 
At Turku the notion of prime matter was either accepted or rejected, 
depending on the meaning the term was given. The existence of prime 
matter could not, however, be accepted "as far as it is understood to 
be matter for generation, in which all generations occur and which is 
not generated itself."55 The notion of prime matter which had been of 
atqve subtilitatis, cum hoc praeter acrem succum istum chymicum, salis naturae 
propinquissimum, etiam sulphur seu oleum, & mercurium seu liquorem qvendam 
spirituosum in se continet." 
52 Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, Sectio II Membr. II, Artic II. Thauvonius-Bergius 
1656. Hahn-Florinus 1693. Hahn-Bjurbeck 1697, p. 1, 4. Achrelius 1682, p. 30-36, 
49-50, et passim. 
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	 According to some recent studies Aristotle never committed himself on the ques- 
tion of the actual existence of prime matter. According to this reading of Aristotle 
the four elements are the simplest existing matter. Gill 1989. 
54 Reif 1962, 85-87, 90-93, 107, et passim. Weisheipl 1965, esp. p. 147-156. Wallace 
1987, p. 99-100. 
55 Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, Sectio I Membr.II Artic II Ax. 1. "gvatenus illam 
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crucial importance for earlier Aristotelians was thus rejected. This was 
because the problem itself had become irrelevant. The transmutation 
of pure elements into each other was denied at Turku, so there was 
consequently no need to presuppose any pre-existing matter under-
lying them. In this context the old conception of prime matter came 
to be understood as a source or reservoir of potential things. This was 
again thought to be an absurd notion, because it was impossible for 
passive matter to generate things without the impact of a form: things 
(forms) would not arise from the potentiality of matter. The view 
expressed in the quotation at the beginning of this paragraph is sup-
ported by another argument, which was promoted by professor Tålpo 
and his student Laibec. According to them "the Aristotelians" made 
a mistake when they called the chaos which God first created prima 
materia because of its homogeneousness. In Tålpo's and Laibec's 
opinion the primordial chaos was not homogeneous, because it already 
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contained the four elements, even though they were not yet structured 
into more developed species of things.56 There was thus a fixed order 
underlying all reality in our material world. 
The existence of prime matter could thus be accepted in another 
sense of the word. In his Fasciculus Physicae Petrus Warelius asserts 
that prima materia exists as far as the question is about the ultimate 
components of matters' The same line of thought can be found in the 
metaphysical dissertation by Tålpo and Laibec, who write: 
I cannot see that anything else can be understood by the first subject 
of a natural body, except the first or most remote material principle 
of natural bodies, or the matter of what natural bodies consist of 
and are produced from. ...if we have matter which is composed of 
something already existing it is necessary that there also be the 
matter of which it is primarily produced. Otherwise there would be 
regress to infinity, which nature abhors.58 
dicunt esse subjectum generationis in quo omnes generationes fiant & quod non 
generetur." See also Miltopaeus-Thuronius 1679, Th. XIII. Thauvonius-Sundius 
1656, Th. XII. 
56 Tålpo-Laibec 1680, Th. XII-XV. See also Achrelius 1682, p. 4. Petraeus 1668, 
Th. XII. 
57 Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, Sectio I Membr.II Artic II Ax. 1. 
58 Tålpo-Laibec 1680, Th. XI. "Per primum enim subjectum cujusque rei naturalis, 
non video aliud posse intelligi, quam primum vel remotissimum corporum natu-
ralium principium materiale, seu materiam ex qua corpora naturalia & constant 
Although the prime or first matter was not observable by the sen-
ses,59 its existence could be proved by appealing to the philosophical 
principle according to which infinite regress was against the natural 
order of things. It can be concluded, thus, that for the authors at Turku 
the matter of the four elements, of which everything is made and into 
which everything resolves, was the prime matter proper. True enough, 
the elements could be divided into matter and form, but this division 
could be made only conceptually. Elementary matter without elemen-
tary form could not exist.6°  
The notion of the four elements as the prime matter leads us quite 
naturally to the discussion about the theory of atoms. When talking 
about Aristotelian influenced "atomistic" theories we cannot avoid tal-
king about minima naturalia either. This doctrine had been a classical 
part of the Aristotelian natural philosophy, having been presented in 
different forms in the course of the centuries, and its importance as 
an explanatory principle in physics also varied. There is no single 
meaning for the term minima naturalia. Although Albertus Magnus 
had in the 13th century identified them with the Democritean atoms, 
in their most usual meaning they were understood as the smallest 
possible part of a substance. Every substantial form, especially living 
beings, would have certain maximum and minimum limits for exist-
ence.61 Hence, the minima of the element earth was a particle, anything 
smaller than which would lose its identity as earth. The same applied 
of course to mixed bodies. In the 16th century the Averroist tradition 
of minima and Lucretian corpuscularism brought about a new and 
intense interest in corpuscular theories. In the early parts of the 17th 
century Daniel Sennert finally reconciled the Aristotelian minima theo-
ry with Democritean atomism.62 The theories which were held at Tur-
ku accepted two different views on the "microstructure" of matter. 
The doctrine of the maximum and minimum quantity of a physical 
substance was not openly discussed at Turku. Other views on the 
finitude of the physical world were used as arguments though. The 
world according to the Aristotelians was finite in magnitude: "...it has 
& producuntur; ...data enim materia aliunde producta, necessum est dari earn ex 
qua primo producitur, alias progressus fieret in infinitum, unde abhorret natura." 
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For a discussion on the nature of prime matter and its unknowability see Wolter 
1965. Reif 1962, p. 92-94. 
60 See e.g. Thauvonius-Warelius 1650, Th. XII. 
61 Maier 1949, p. 179-196. Wallace 1988, p. 214-215. 
62 Wallace 1988, p. 215. Nielsen 1988, p. 299. 
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already been stated that there exists in nature a body of maximal 
magnitude (i.e. the supercelestial waters). Therefore it is necessary, 
that the smallest possible particle exists as well."63 One of the funda-
mental presuppositions in physics was that nature was not capable of 
infinity (natura non est capax infiniti). Therefore, it was certain on 
metaphysical grounds that atoms of some kind existed, although they 
would escape our sight because of their extreme smallness.64 The prob-
lem of minima in the scholastic tradition was usually connected with 
problems of divisibility and continuum in time and place, but this was 
not the case at Turku. The physical world needed the smallest possible 
indivisible parts. 
Christopher Meinel has in his article on atomism categorized three 
types of arguments used for the existence of atoms in early 17th cen-
tury.65 Of these arguments those based on divisibility, such as the one 
cited above, were ranked among the most effective at Turku. Secon- 
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dly, traces of arguments based on experience and "experiments" can 
also be found in our dissertations. The sight of dust particles floating 
in a ray of light was according to Meinel a typical argument based 
on experience. However, it was often stated at Turku that the particles 
of dust were far too big to be real atoms. But there were other proofs. 
A tiny amount of a smelling substance could suffuse large areas. Gold-
en rings could be worn out and wet clothes dry without our noticing 
any transportion of matter. Thirdly, it was said that we have learnt 
from chemistry that all compositions could be resolved into their cons-
tituent parts. These processes could not be explained unless atoms 
existed.66 This kind of experience-based argument was common and 
circulated widely in 17th-century physical literature.67 
The existence of atoms (the word was regularly used in dissertations 
written at Turku) was thus proved. But what were these atoms like, 
then? There was a tendency in 17th-century Aristotelian atomism to 
63 	 Hahn-Langelius 1688, p. 3. "...dato jam corpore maximo in natura (puta aquas 
supra coelestes) utique corpus quoque minimum darf omnino necessum erit". 
64 Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, Sectio II Membr. II Artic. II, Ax.2. "Dantur reverä 
atomi". Thauvonius-Eurenius 1655, Th. III. Miltopaeus-Blanck 1667, Th. III. 
Hahn-Langelius 1688, p. 2-3. Hahn-Herkepxus 1703, p. 2-3. Hahn-Bolhemius 
1688, p. 11-13. 
65 Meinel 1988. 
66 Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, Sectio II Membr. II Artic. II, Ax.2. Miltopaeus-
Blanck 1667, Th. III, et passim. Hahn-Langelius 1688, p. 3-9, 25-30. 
67 Meinel 1988. 
fuse together the doctrines of atoms and elements.68 At Turku the 
indivisible atoms were on one hand equated with elements.69 The ele-
ments were, after all, the ultimate constituents of matter. On the other 
hand it was stressed that elements could never exist in pure form in 
nature, although in some discussions the elements are treated as if 
they did actually exist.7° They had the potentiality to achieve an actual 
existence in a pure state, but in the present state of the world they 
were more or less just theoretical abstractions. Therefore, the smallest 
possible actually existing particle of every composite body was called 
an atom as well. These atomi mixti included the essential properties 
of the substances they were parts of.71 We are not told in what sense 
the mixed atoms were the very smallest parts of composite bodies, 
but it seems possible that the concept of mixed atoms got close to 
traditional readings of the minima naturalia theory. This double sense 
of the concept of atom thus meant that only one type of atom existed 
in actuality, which were at least qualitatively, possibly even quantita- 	 133 
tively different from each other. The doctrine of the atomi mixti gains 
meaning and importance in explaining some of the more complicated 
processes in nature. 
Atoms performed many "visible" functions in nature, but in addi-
tion the doctrine offered a physical explanation, or proof, for an im-
portant principle. "Nature abhors a vacuum" was as much a physical 
as it was a metaphysical statement, and no explanations of natural 
phenomena could be allowed to violate this principle. Conversely the 
same statement could be used as a proof of the existence of atoms, 
because the only way that nature could be saved from the vacuum 
was the movements of atoms.72 The brevity of the statements where 
vacuum is dealt with at Turku does not allow us to draw any far-
reaching conclusions about its nature and other characteristics. In any 
case, the cosmological plenum was achieved by the movement of 
68 Meinel 1988, p. 73. 
69 Thauvonius-Warelius 1650, Th. XII. "[Elementa ...] NDIVISIBILIA vero ea 
propter dicuntur, quod non possint dividi in partes specie & essentiå differentes, 
simplicia enim sunt, sic & homogenea..." 
70 Alanus-Kollanus 1642, Th. VIII. Alanus-Ketarenius 1644, Th. I, IX, XX. Thau-
vonius-Sundius 1656, Th. VIII, IX, XXI. Petraeus-Schepherus 1668, Th. X, XIX. 
Achrelius 1682, 5-6, 10-11. Hahn-Weckelman 1694, p. 2-8. Tålpo-Rhydelius 
1682, Th. VI, VIII, X, et passim. Hahn-Alm 1688, p. 6, et passim. 
71 	 Miltopaeus-Blanck 1667, Th. XV-XXII. Hahn-Langelius 1688, p. 17-25. 
72 Cf. Nielsen 1988, p. 318-319. 
atoms: "[The element of air] is invisible and can permeate all things. 
It joins with and separates from other bodies quickly, and it is capable 
of filling in every place which is not occupied with any other body, 
even through the smallest gap, so that there would be no vacuum in 
nature."7' The permeability of air seems to imply that all materials 
were porous to some degree, and they were thus capable of conden-
sation and rarefaction too. The dimension of a body and the place it 
occupied were equal, because there could be no penetratio dimen-
siorum in the natural world.74 
The Problem of Mixtures 
Whereas an element was a corpus simplex, consisting only of form 
and matter, all other material things were their mixtures. Even the 
visible substances of earth, water, air and fire were always mixed 
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	 bodies. Elements could thus never be sensed, and they only existed 
more or less as abstractations. How to explain the birth of a mixed 
body from the elements was, however, a serious problem for Aristo-
telian natural philosophy. If several forms could not occupy the same 
body, and if the substantial forms could not change without losing 
their identity, how was a mixture to arise? Closely related to this was 
the problem of how the transformations which undeniably occurred 
in nature were to be explained in terms of the Aristotelian philosophy. 
Every time food, let us say, turned into blood and muscles, it took a 
new form in the human body. But how and when was the old form 
abandoned, where did it go and how was the new form produced? 
These problems were often discussed by studying the paradigmatic, 
and at the same time the simplest possible case of mixtures - the 
mixing up of elements. 
However, the word mixture could refer to many different kinds of 
things. There was not just one sort of mixture, but they could be either 
natural or artificial, and not all of them were linked with the same 
kinds of problems. Hahn and iEimelzeus discern three kinds of mix- 
73 	 Alanus-Kollanus 1642, Th. XVI. "[Elementum aeris...] Quod sit invisibilis, & per 
cuncta rerum permeabilis. Cito enim accedit & recedit omnemque locum nullo 
alio corpore repletum, etiam per minimam foramen, ne detur vacuum in rerum 
natura, complere aptus natus est." See also Hahn-Langelius 1688, p. 20. Milto-
paeus-Blanck 1667, Th. XVII. Achrelius 1682, p. 4. 
74 	 On conceptions of void see Grant 1981. 
tures in their De Mixtione. First of all there was a mixture in which 
the surfaces of the mixed bodies remained unbroken, like grains of 
oats and barley in the same vessel. This type of mixture did not cause 
any problems, because a new kind of an entity was not born. Secondly 
there was the mixture in which two or several components formed a 
homogenous compound. A mixture of wine and water, for instance, 
did look continuous, but the forms of both water and wine could ne-
vertheless be discerned - at least conceptually. The third type of mix-
ture according to Hahn and fEimelxus was the mixture proper. It oc-
curred "whenever a plurality of miscibles are mixed up with each 
other in a way that they give birth to a third substance, the nature of 
which differs from the natures of the components."75 It was due to 
this type of mixing up that the four elements were capable of being 
matter for such a variety of substances from the human body to mi-
nerals and plants. Salt, sulphur and mercury were the prima mista of 
this type. 
The difficulties arose from the concept of substance itself. Qualities 
of a body were principally determined by the form. Even so they were 
only accidents, and the presence of any specific accident in a substance 
was not logically necessary.76 In other words, in principle any accident 
either could or could not belong to a certain substance. The problem 
was to determine how many qualities could change without endange-
ring the integrity of the form. What was the step beyond which we 
could no longer talk of the same substance as before? 
There were a few basic models of explanation for how a mixture 
could come into being. In one early dissertation Alanus and Tobetius 
report some of them. According to the Averroistic interpretation of 
the Aristotelian theory of mixture both the forms of the mixing bodies 
and their accidents remained in actu in a mixture. The forms could, 
however, stretch or intensify so that they could include all the new 
qualities and thus form a new body. In Avicenna's version of the 
75 Hahn-i£imeleeus 1698, p. 4. "quando miscibilia plura ita commiscentur, ut tertium 
qvoddam gignant a natura componentium diversum". See also Maier 1952, p. 19. 
"Unter mixtio proprie dicta dagegen ist lediglich eine Mischung aus den vier 
Elementen zu verstehen, die so geartet ist, dass eine einheitliche homogene Subs-
tanz entsteht, und kein Gemisch aus mehreren Substanzen." 
76 In this case no difference was made between accidents which would necessarily 
inhere in a certain substance, and "accidental" accidents. Thuronius 1664, p. 343. 
"Inhaerentia est modus inexistendi in alio, accidenti proprius. Accidens est Ens 
substantiae inhaerens: vel Accidens est Ens extrinsice substantiam afficiens." 
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theory the forms remained whole, but the qualities were broken and 
so could communicate with each other. According to Duns Scotus all 
forms were destroyed, but a new form came into being, which in turn 
inherited qualities from the previous forms." Although Alanus' and 
Tobetius' description of these theories contain some inaccuracies, it 
shows that they had some kind of idea about the traditional explanati-
on models. These theories were carefully considered, but the argu-
ments were weighed in the balance and found wanting. In fact, these 
theories were presented as characteristic examples of fallacious argu-
ment.78 
Averroes' and Avicenna's views on the mistio theory were rejected 
because the scholars at Turku could not accept any changes happening 
to the form, if it was to be presumed that the substance itself did not 
change. Therefore any transmutation of the elements - once a corners-
tone of Aristotelian physics - was strictly denied as well.79 The integ- 
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rity of forms was almost a sacrosanct matter; not even any altering 
or "stretching" was allowed to the substantial forms, a view supported 
by the following philosophical argument: 
Because the Elements differ from each other having opposite forms, 
even common sense suggests that they cannot easily transmute into 
one another. This is so although the Peripatetics jointly claim that 
the water becomes air, the air fire, and that all the elements trans-
mute into each other - not totally, however, but at least partially, 
as they assume. Because this opinion causes two absurdities, it can-
not be tolerated at all: it introduces vacuum into nature, and claims 
a place to be smaller than the thing located there....if all other 
things which are contrary to each other, also transmuted into each 
other in respect to their substances, the snake would transmute into 
man, a hawk into a dove and a wolf into a sheep.80 
77 	 Alanus-Tobetius 1647, Th. XIII-XIV. The description of Duns Scotus' stand more 
resembles the so-called thomistic interpretation than Scotus' own account. A de-
tailed survey of medieval solutions to the mistio problem can be found in Maier 
1952, p. 3-140. 
78 Alanus-Tobetius 1647, Th. XIII-XIV. Hahn-1Eimelaeus 1698, p. 9-15. 
79 Alanus-Ketarenius 1644, Th. XXVIII. Thauvonius-Warelius 1650, Th. X. Petra-
eus-Schepherus 1668, Th. XX. On Aristotle's view on the transmutation of ele-
ments see Gill 1989. 
ß0 Thauvonius-Sundius 1656, Th. XVI. "Quemadmodum Elementa differunt op-
positis formis, ita non facile inter se transmutari ipsa ratio dictitat, quamvis Pe-
ripatetici communiter ex aqua fieri aerem. ex aere ignem, cunctaque Elementa 
Rejecting the possibility of the transmutation of pure elements led 
to certain conclusions concerning the cosmos. It was implied that if 
the elements could not transmute or alter, they could not disappear 
either. The amount of matter in the universe was constant - it had 
neither increased nor decreased since the Creation. "Thus elements 
can neither transmute, alter nor generate, but they exist in the same 
quantity today as they were in the prime creation and will remain so 
ever after."S1 The idea of ungenerability and incorruptibility of matter 
was itself explicitly already held by Plato and Aristotle, and the scho-
lastic philosophers during the Middle Ages also thought that the 
amount of matter in the world was stable. In fact, maintaining this 
idea underly many of the difficulties in theories on generation and 
corruption.82 The particular justification of the doctrine at Turku was, 
as we have seen, different from previous views. 
If the transmutation and alteration of elements were excluded as 
alternatives, how could the origin of a mixture be explained, then? 	 137 
According to the originally Sennertian definition, cited from J. Sper-
ling, "Mixture is a union of miscibles, divided into their minimal parts, 
made by a specific form."83 This implied that only the smallest pos-
sible corpuscles could be united in a new way to form a mixture, 
because "elements cannot unite in major particles because their qua-
lities are mutually contrary."84 The fight between the contraries was 
weak enough only in atoms (i.e. in single elementary or mixed parti-
cles) to allow the forms of the miscibilia to unite under a new form 
of a higher rank. "Lower" forms did not disappear, but were transfor-
med into subordinated ones. It was the uniting form that had the ac-
tivity to bring forth a mixture 85 It still remains unexplained, however, 
inter se transmutari, non totaliter quidem sed partialiter autument. Quae opinio 
cum duo infert absurda, vacuum in naturam introducit & locum locato minorem 
arguit, minime toleranda est. ...si enim omnia contraria substantialiter in se invi-
cern transmutari debent, etiam Serpens mutabitur in hominem, accipiter in colum-
bam & lupus in ovem." 
81 	 Miltopaeus-Thuronius 1679, Th. XVII. "Elementa igitur non transmutari nec al-
terari aut generari possunt, sed in tantå mole in prima creatione facta sunt quanta 
protempore dantur & posthac manebunt." See also Thauvonius-Sundius 1656, Th. 
XVI. 
82 Weisheipl 1965, p. 147-148. 
83 Hahn-1Eimela'us 1698, p. 4. "Mixtio est miscibilium, in minima divisorum unio, 
a forma specifca facta". See also Alanus-Tobetius 1647, Th. IX. 
84 Hahn-€Eimeleeus 1698, p. 15. "elementa ratione qualitatum sibi contraria, in ma-
joribus particulis uniri non possint". 
85 Hahn-€imelmus 1698, p. 18. Alanus-Tobetius 1647, Th. XXII-XXVII, XXXII-
XXXIII. 
how this "uniting form" originated. 
Nature consisted materially of the four elements. The diversity 
which was characteristic of it was produced by an endless chain of 
mixtures. The less mixed matter was, the more imperfect it was. The 
ladder of nature led substances gradually (natura non facit saltum) 
from less perfect mixtures to the most perfect one - the matter of the 
human body.86 
2. THE STRUCTURE OF THE COSMOS 
Unravelling the structure and origins of the universe seems always to 
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have fascinated man. The 17th century especially was a time of rival 
world-systems. Cosmological themes were not unusual in physical dis-
sertations written at the University of Turku either. Cosmological and 
astronomical themes were naturally discussed in mathematics as well. 
Although the physicists and mathematicians looked at the subject from 
different points of view, and posed different kinds of questions in 
their studies, they both shared similar views on fundamental issues 
such as the structure of the universe. In the following I shall pay 
attention to the difference between mathematics and physics only on 
those occasions when it has some particular significance for the theo-
ries supported. 
The Age and General Structure of the Universe 
In accordance with the Christian doctrine it was, of course, self-evi-
dent that the world had a beginning and an end.87 The certainty of 
these facts was derived from the Bible. It has been stated in some 
studies in history of science that there was a generally pessimistic 
feeling in 17th-century scholastic natural philosophy. According to 
this view the world was ageing and would soon come to an end. The 
86 Hahn-fEimelxus 1698, p. 17. Alanus-Tobetius 1647, Th. XXXVI. 
87 Thauvonius-Lilius 1656, Th. 15-18, 20. Flachsenius-Lund 1679, Positio II. Kex-
lerus-Herlicus 1643, Th. XXXIII. Thuronius-Norman 1661, Th. XXXVIII-XLIII. 
Gezelius 1672, p. 243. 
new natural science would then have been the one to bring new op-
timistic attitudes into human life.88 
It seems that the matter cannot be generalized that simply though, 
at least as it concerns the academics at Turku. True enough, serious 
concern was felt because of the hardness of the times and - as it seemed 
- the increasingly deteriorating morals of mankind. The annihilation of 
the world would, however, happen suddenly and supernaturally. 
Indeed, as truly as this world's machinery did not come into being 
by physical generation, as little will it cease from being by physical 
corruption so that its internal and natural principles would be co-
vered by another natural form. But it will be resolved beyond na-
ture's laws by God when it pleases his wisdom to do so.89 
Because of the supernatural character of the destruction, there was 
no reason to interprete phenomena like floods or crop failures as in-
dicating degeneration or aging of the Earth. Only after the Fall of 
Adam had there been a sudden falling-off in the living conditions 
provided by nature for man, but this, of course, also had a supernatural 
cause. In every other respect the Earth and the species inhabiting it 
remained in the state they had been at the time of the creation.90 Thus 
there was no quest for the kind of optimism aroused by the new scien-
ce, which was to improve the conditions of life in this world. No 
scientific or other human efforts in this world could dispel the fear 
(or hope) of doomsday. 
The world had a temporal existence, but what exactly was time 
thought to be? Only a few authors were interested enough in the nature 
of time to write about it. Time was said to be a "real essence" which 
existed independently, without being thought of by man. So-called 
particular time was an affection of every natural body, and it deter-
mined the temporal limits of its earthly existence. Universal time was 
however some sort of meta-time, common to the entire world. It was 
88 Frängsmyr 1981, p. 20. See also Erikson 1969b, p. 139ff. 
89 Thuronius-Norman 1661, Th. XLI. "Verum ut nulla generatione Physica coepit 
haec mundi machina: Ita nec corruptione physica ex interno & naturali principio 
superinducta nimirum alia forma naturali, esse desinet: Sed å Deo cum ipsius 
sapientiae visum fuerit, supra extraque naturae legen solventur." 
90 Flachsenius-Forsman 1678, Th.V. "Naturam senio deficere atque langvescere ab-
sonum est." Frängsmyr 1981, p. 22, 33-34, also refers to similar views held e.g. 
by Hakewill. 
139 
this universal time which could be measured by clocks or by the mo-
vements of planets. In fact, the movements of planets actually produ-
ced universal time. From the meagre discussion we can see that the 
conceptions of time at Turku followed standard Aristotelian ideas, 
according to which time and change were closely bound to each other. 
Everything in the real physical world happened in successive duration 
- only spiritual beings were capable of instantaneous actions. The only 
exception to this was generation, which was regarded as an instan-
taneous act.91  
The question of the plurality of worlds was a theme which had 
been speculated upon since the Middle Ages, and in the 17th century 
the discussion intensified. This happened not least because of the 
spreading acceptance of Copemicanism, which produced a physical 
framework within which the existence of other earth-like worlds be-
came possible.92 However, at Turku the question did not attract much 
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attention. The unity of the world was simply stated as a matter of 
fact, relying on the old notion of the perfection of the cosmos. "Uni-
verse" was by definition something which included everything, the 
cosmos was thus perfect and complete and nothing was left to make 
another world of. 
Most evident reasons persuade us that there is only one world. If 
yet another world existed, it would contain bodies either the same 
as this world, or diverse from them. If diverse, universe would not 
be universe, because it would not include everything in itself ...The-
refore, we firmly draw the conclusion that there is only one world 
which contains everything.93 
This one integer world was divided in a traditional way into two 
essentially different regions: the sublunar elementary world and the 
91 Alanus-Neostadius 1646. Tålpo-Rodde 1682, Questions: "An tempus sit duratio 
successiva? Aff. Dist." and "Differtne duratio ab essentia Realiter? Neg.", Tål-
po-Höök 1690. On Scholastic understanding of time see e.g. Davies 1993, p. 
105-109. Knuuttila 1981. Maier 1955, p. 47-64. Normore 1982, p. 367. 
92 Dick 1980, 1982. 
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	 Thauvonius-Lilius 1656, Th. 25. "Unum tantum esse mundum rationes evidentis- 
simae nobis persvadent. Etenim si adhuc aliud esset mundus, ille corpora con-
tineret, aut eadem cum his, aut ab his diversa: Si diversa, universum non erit 
universum, quia non complectetur omnia. ...ergo unum tantum esse mundum, qui 
omnia comprehendit, firmiter concludimus." See also Thuronius-Norman 1661, 
Art. IV Q. 3. 
supralunar heavens devoid of any processes of generation and corrup-
tion.94 In Aristotelian philosophy the matter of the heavens has usually 
been called the fifth element or the ether. According to the favoured 
interpretation of this phrase at Turku the heaven could indeed be said 
to consist of some kind of a fifth essence, if understood as an essence 
different from the elements and thus not subject to mutation.95 
Some other authors at Turku claimed that we would always remain 
ignorant of the nature of the matter of which the heavens was made 
(excluding the matter of the stars and planets, which was known). It 
was certain, in any case, that the heavens were material. This was 
because it possessed both figure and magnitude - affections which 
were characteristic of matter.96 On some occasions we are told that 
heaven is made of liquid matter, in which the planets swim like fish 
in water. Yet for Lutheran scholars such as Melanchthon and the ast-
ronomer Reinhold, in whose opinion it would have been impossible 
to explain the regular movements of the planets unless they were car- 	 141 
ried along certain spheres this view was unacceptable. The liquid theo-
ry adopted at Turku is then derived from later authors, mainly from 
Tycho Brahe.97 Physicists and mathematicians at Turku shared the 
same view concerning planetary spheres. The non-existence of any 
solid spheres was presupposed - they were thought to be mathematical 
constructions devoid of any physical reality, built only for helping the 
human imagination.98 
There are no traces of this official view changing during the period 
concerned in this study. There was, however, one proponent of a ra-
dically different conception. The professor of eloquence, Daniel Ach-
relius, argued in his Contemplationes mundi for the idea that celestial 
matter did not differ from the sublunar. If, Achrelius claimed, the 
94 Alanus-Ketarenius 1644, Th. I. Kexlerus-Herlicus 1643, Th. IV, XIV. Gezelius 
1672, p. 251. 
95 Alanus-Terserus 1648, Th. 16. Kexlerus-Krook 1664, Th. XI. On medieval un-
derstanding of the quinta essentia see e.g. Grant 1978, p. 286-289. 
96 Alanus-Terserus 1648, Th. 15. Hahn-Granbeck 1685, Th. VIII. 
97 Achrelius 1682, p. 61-62. Gezelius 1672, p. 244-245. Gezelius stresses that the 
matter of the heavens is liquid, tenuous and pure, has light and the power to 
penetrate other bodies. Aiton 1981, p. 98-102. Donahue 1975, p. 256, et passim. 
98 	 Kexlerus-Naezenius 1663, Th. VII. Achrelius 1682, p. 61-62. Flachsenius-Bergius 
1682, Th. I. Flachsenius-Tålpo 1675, Th. V. Tammelin-Gjöslung 1704, p. 2-3. 
Tammelin-Odelin 1712, p. 1, 5, et passim. On the question of the solidity of 
spheres in 16th and 17th-century astronomy see Aiton 1981. Donahue 1975. Jar-
dine 1982. 
world was created from a chaos of the four elements, both the Earth 
and the heavens would be made of the same matter. The influence of 
stars and planets on the Earth was essential in Achrelius' magnetical 
natural philosophy. According to him the heavenly bodies would not 
be able to produce the effects they indubitably did on the Earth unless 
they consisted of an essentially similar kind of matter.99 
Achrelius also noticed that celestial bodies were proved to be subject 
to change and therefore had to consist of the four elements.100 The 
immutability of the heavens had been a traditional argument proving 
the greater nobility of the heavens in comparison with the Earth. Ach-
relius, however, questions the whole idea of simplicity as a criterion 
for a greater nobility. For him, perfection was variation and multitude: 
The absolute perfection of the world consists of the variety and 
plurality of things, and I doubt strongly whether simplicity adds 
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any pre-eminence and some kind of dignity to the Celestial bodies. 
Certainly nobody doubts that the machinery of the human body is 
composed of the four elements, and yet it would be absurd to deny 
that it is the most perfect among the created substances. l01  
Achrelius' view was not without European predecessors. There was 
in fact no universal agreement during the 17th century about the idea 
that the heaven and the earth should be so radically separated. The 
distinction had begun to weaken in the latter part of the 16th century, 
when J.C. Scaliger for example rejected the dichotomy between these 
two areas in his Exercitationum exotericarum. This work was well-
known at Turku too. On the other hand the Reformation tended to 
place new authority in physical matters also on the Bible which could 
be interpreted to mean that the heavens and the earth were similar in 
matter but different in form only.102 Even older roots for the idea can 
99 Achrelius 1682, p. 13, 11. "Si corpora Coelestia å sublunaribus differrent, illa 
haud dubi6, in inferiora Elementa, å quibus in totum discrepant, agere non po-
tuissent." On Achrelius' natural philosophy see Kallinen 1991a. 
loo Achrelius 1682, p. 13-14. 
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	 Achrelius 1682, p. 14. "Atque in hac varietate & pluralitate rerum mundi consistit 
absoluta perfectio. At vero an simplicitas illa Dignitatem aliquam ac prxeminen-
tiam corporibus Coelestibus addat vehementer dubito. Cert& corporis humani fab-
ricam ex 4. Elementis compositam nemo dubitat, & tamen velle negare quin non 
inter omnes creatas substantias pra;stantissima sit, absurdum foret." 
102 Donahue 1975, p. 246-248. 
be found. William Ockham had already proposed that there was no 
reason to postulate two different matters because phenomena could 
also be explained by reference to one kind of matter only.103 However, 
only the adoption of new physical concepts in the 17th century could 
make a wider range of scholars take this suggestion seriously. One of 
the most prominent proponents of the homogeneity of the world was 
Descartes, who also rejected the four elements. Compared with Des-
cartes, Achrelius' view, (derived from the writings of a jesuit scholar 
Athanasius Kircher), was still very traditional. Nevertheless it was 
radical enough to arouse a heated discussion in the Senate, and the 
imprimatur for further parts of the book was almost cancelled.104 
In traditional Aristotelian natural philosophy the four elements were 
thought to inhabit certain concentric spheres. The Earth was placed 
in the middle, followed by water and air, while the highest place 
below the moon was reserved for the sphere of fire. This view was 
generally maintained in most dissertations, nobody suspecting that the 
element/globe of earth would not lie immobile in the centre of the 
world.105 In some aspects, however, the traditional view had started 
to collapse at Turku. 
Because no element could exist in nature in a pure state, it was 
also unreasonable to expect any strictly defineable spheres of the ele-
ments to exist. The visible earth, water, air and fire were not elements 
proper. Neither did the qualities gravity and levity, which were tradi-
tionally seen as the causes of elementary movements downwards and 
upwards, have any absolute value but a relative one only. Even the 
light air, it was stated, could be found in underground caves and con-
versely, particles of earth (dust) could levitate in the air. The existence 
of a separate sphere for fire below the moon was especially criticised 
in the latter part of the 17th century, this being for a very anthropo-
centric reason. 
Although it is true that the fire ascends, nevertheless it is not in 
accordance with truth that it would strive for a predetermined place 
103 Wolter 1965, p. 144-146. 
104 Consistorium Academicum 5.12.1678, CAAP IV, p. 476-477. See also chapter 
"The 1680's: Sharpening Critics and the First Proponents". 
105 Alanus-Kollanus 1642, Th. V, XIII, XVII. Alanus-Ketarenius 1644, Th. XXIII-
XXIV. Thauvonius-Warelius 1650, Th. I, IV, XIV, XX, XXV. Thauvonius-Sun-
dius 1656, Th. IV, X. Gezelius 1672, p. 151-152. Halm-Alm 1688, p. 14. 
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under the sphere of moon ...because there it is of no use to man. 
...but we conclude it to be justified to judge that it occupies its 
place under and above the earth.106 
The treatment of earth and water as a single body was begun in the 
fourteenth century by Albert of Saxony and Pierre d'Ailly. However, it 
was not until the early sixteenth century that this aggregate was conceived 
as a single sphere. In this respect Copernicus was one of the pioneers. 
By the 17th century the concept "terraquaeus sphere" finally found its 
way even into the more traditional scholastic textbooks.107 This develop-
ment also finds expression at Turku, where terraquaeus globus is pro-
bably the most common nomination for the earth. 
On Stars and Planets 
The structure of the elementary spheres was thus no longer the tradi-
tional one we meet in most standard descriptions of a Medieval and 
Renaissance Aristotelian universe. Let us now turn our attention to 
the statements concerning the structure of the supralunar heavens. 
The universe was assumed to hang in a complete nothingness. Fart-
hest up, there were the aquae supracoelestae. It was an invisible body, 
but its existence could be assured by appealing to the Bible, where it 
says that "And God made the firmament in the midst of the waters, 
and divided the waters which were under the firmament from the 
waters which were above the firmament: and it was so."108 Aquae 
supracoelestae were made of simple, non-elementary matter, because 
otherwise they would have resided in a place unnatural to a heavy 
body like ordinary water. Although these things could not be observed 
by the senses nor understood by the reason, the word of the Bible 
was enough to make the nature and existence of aquae supracoelestae 
106 Thauvonius-Warelius 1650, Th. XXXI. "Quamvis hoc sit verum quod ignis as-
cendat; tarnen locum determinatum sub concavo lunae appetere veritati non est 
constaneum; ...Quia nulli usui ibi homini est. ...sed infra & supra terram, sedero 
suam occupare concludere fas esse judicamus." See also Thuronius-Miltopaeus 
1679, Th. IX. Hahn-Ståålhöös 1694. Hahn-Flodin 1707, p. 9. 
107 Grant 1984, p. 22-23, 27-29. 
108 The Bible (Genesis I:6-7.) as quoted by Thuronius-Pryss 1664, Th. IV. "Et fecit 
Deus expansum in medio aquarum, divisitque aquas quae erant sub expanso, ab 
aquis quae erant super expanso & fuit ita." See also Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, 
Sectio II, Artic. II. Hahn-Govinius 1685, Quast. IV. Hahn-Polviander 1711. Mil-
topaeus-Lithomannus 1668, Th. IV. Tammelin-Tammelin 1711, p. 4-5. 
a subject of physical inquiry.109 Whereas the authors at Turku seem 
to be very sure about the proper composition of the "waters" above 
the firmament, Thomas Aquinas for instance took a more agnostic 
stance. According to him there were several opinions about the matter, 
which were all compatible with the scriptural text, and he saw neither 
need nor any way to choose between them.1' 
Unlike in the most common versions of Aristotelian cosmology and 
astronomy," no primum movens was supposed to exist above the 
aquae supracoelestae. The existence of the prime mover was very 
seldom discussed in physics, and the same applies to other principles 
of kinematics and dynamics as well. Since natural movement of the 
simple bodies would always be caused by an internal principle of 
motion, the form, no extraneous mover was needed for simple bodies 
such as stars and planets - nor could an extraneous agent of motion 
have caused a continuous natural motion, only a violent temporary 
one."" This view is in clear contrast with the views of the Calvinists, 
who regarded all natural bodies as inherently passive and dependent 
on an impetus from God for all their actions.' 1 ' But, as has been stated 
in chapter "Theology as Theories in Natural Philosophy", for Luthe-
rans explanation by physical causes did not exclude an ultimate ref-
erence to God's power. However, this was not a matter for the phy-
sicists to discuss. 
The sphere of the fixed stars was located immediately below the 
aquae supracoelestae. They were called "fixed" because they always 
kept the same distance in relation to each other and to the Earth. A 
more dynamic picture of the subject was offered by Achrelius, who 
stated that not all fixed stars were situated at the same distance from 
the Earth. The deepness of the skies would hide innumerable stars, 
which no man could ever see and count. Gezelius also mentions this 
possibility in passing.14 Planets, on the other hand, were often also 
tog Hahn-Govinius 1685, Quxst. V. Tålpo-Bachster 1686, p. 14, 21-22, et passim. 
1° Grant 1986, p. 64. 
11 See e.g. Grant 1978, p. 280-284. 
112 Kexlerus-Laurbecchius 1661, Cap. III.6. (G2). "...neque enim astra, aut primo 
Mobili, aut vehiculo materiae caelestis raptantur, ut qui motus eorum necessariö 
tum foret violentus; sed vi insitå, ab intemöque principio, ipsa sele in alia aliåque 
loca promovent." 
113 Deason 1986. 
114 Alanus-Lacmannus 1648, Th. XXVIII. Gezelius 1672, p. 347. Achrelius 1682, p. 
128-129. 
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called stars or "erratic stars" (stellae erraticae) because of the apparent 
irregularity of their movements in relation to the Earth. Planets could 
also be differentiated from the stars because of the latters' scintillati-
on.15 The existence of "new stars" was discussed very seldom. Ge-
zelius however regards them as real stars, because they could not be 
discerned to have any parallax and thus they had to be located in the 
same place as the ordinary stars. He concedes that they might be stars 
previously not seen, but finds it much more probable that that they 
are temporary signs lit up by God.16 
It was frequently stated that the most important final cause of the 
heavenly bodies was to generate time by distinguishing one moment 
from another by their movements. The actual measurement of the mo-
vements was a task left to the mathematicians, and they did, indeed, 
focus more on the movements of the stars and planets. Mathematicians 
and physicians generally shared the same basic assumptions about the 
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structure of the universe. Another theme which was very popular 
among mathematicians in addition to the descriptions of planetary mo-
vements, was the causes and mechanics of solar and lunar eclipses."' 
It strikes a modern reader that for mathematical dissertations these 
theses contain very little calculation and other mathematical reasoning, 
excluding some geometrical proofs. At Turku even these proofs seem 
to be relatively clumsy for 17th century-mathematics. 
In physics, standard problems concerning stars and planets were 
quite different. Following the typical method of inquiry, the central 
themes which were dealt with were the form, matter, final causes, 
number, movements, quantity and other qualities of the celestial bo-
dies."' An example of this kind of scrutiny is that of Alanus, who 
115 Alanus-Lacmannus 1648, Th. XXXII. Gezelius 1672, p. 324-343. Hahn-Erling 
1702. Hahn-Wijsing 1685. 
116 Gezelius 1672, p. 349-351. "Stellae igitur fuerunt, forte ob distantiam antea in-
visibiles, propius divina providentia accedentes aliquandiu conspiciendas se prae-
bebant & denuo ad pristinas sedes abierunt." 
117 Flachsenius-Petreius 1672. Flachsenius-Woivalenius 1684, Quast. IV. Flach-
senius-Bergius 1682, Th. II-IV. Flachsenius-Tålpo 1675, Th. VI-XVII. Flach-
senius-Forsman 1678. Tammelin-Frostman 1700. Tammelin-Nidelström 1706. On 
the measurement of time Kexlerus 1661. Kexlerus 1664. On eclipses also Tålpo-
Laurbecchius 1698. 
118 Alanus-Moderus 1645. Alanus-Lacmannus 1648. Thauvonius-Holstius 1656. 
Thauvonius-Thuronius 1651. Gezelius 1672, p. 343-344. Hahn-Amnelius 1688. 
On constellations and astrology see Achrelius 1682, p. 128. Hahn-Bruzelius 1712. 
On the galaxy Hahn-Ljungdahl 1706. 
describes the three furthest planets as follows: 
XXXIV Saturnus emits leaden light, it is cold and dry, inimical to 
the life of animals, twenty two times bigger than the Earth. 
XXV Jupiter is a very bright Planet, moderately warm and moist, 
friend of life, exceeds the magnitude of the Earth fourteen times. 
XXVI Mars is a Planet which has a shade of red like a flame, it 
is warm and dry, thirteen times smaller than the bulk of Earth...19 
In 17th-century Turku, dissertations on this kind of subjects formed 
the major part of the astronomical discussion in physics, and only a 
part of the existing literature concentrated on discussing Copemi-
canism. I would like to claim that from the 17th-century point of view 
proving the centrality and immobility of the Earth was just one theme 
among others, albeit an important one. 
Kexlerus' "Astronomia" 
The most notable manuscript which has been preserved to us from 
the 17th century is a textbook of astronomy. This approximately 70 
page treatise has become famous for two reasons. First of all it was 
written in Swedish. Although Sigfridus Aronus Forsius had written 
his (also unpublished) Physica in Swedish, it was still unusual to use 
the vernacular in an academic treatise. Latin was still the dominant 
language of learning in Europe, although such big names in 17th cen-
tury natural philosophy as Bacon and Descartes had also written in 
the vernacular. This work has been accorded even more fame by his-
torians of science because it is the earliest work in the whole of Swe-
den which states that the Earth revolves around its axis. Although the 
exceptional and even "advanced" character of this work has been ac-
knowledged, the references to its contents are very short and partially 
misleading.120 For these reasons it is helpful to have a closer look at 
this textbook. This discussion is not intended to be exhaustive, how- 
119 Alanus-Lacmannus 1648. "XXXIV Saturnus Est planeta plumbax lucis, frigidus 
& siccus, vitae animalium contrarius, terra vicies bis major. XXV Jupiter est 
Planeta maxime lucidus, temperate calidus & humidus, vitae amicus, terram mag-
nitudine decies quater excedens. XXVI Mars est Planeta flammae in modum 
rubens, calidus & siccus, terrae mole decies ter minor..." 
120 Sandblad 1944, p. 182-183. Salminen 1983, p. 60-61. 
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The real author of the manuscript Astronomia undoubtedly was Simon Kexlerus, although he 
did not necessarily complete this exemplar which has been preserved to our time. The text 
is a fair copy having almost no corrections at all. This is how Kexlerus presented the 
Copemican planetary system. Outermost is the 'unmoving sphere of fixed stars". He calls 
Jupiter "the lord's planet' (herrestiema) and Mars "the planet of the war' (krigzstiema). 
Although the Earth is located above Venus and Mercury, Kexlerus still expects the 
elementary sphere to reach up to the Moon. 
ever. I shall restrict myself to an overall description of the contents 
of this work, with emphasis on the arguments for the revolution of 
the Earth. Closer scrutiny of its sources and the technical details of 
astronomy will be left for later studies. Because access to this ma-
nuscript is much more limited than to the printed and for the most 
part microfilmed dissertations, I shall quote it more extensively than 
usual. 
This manuscript has peviously been attributed to the professor of 
physics and botany, Andreas Thuronius. Indeed, the title-page of the 
work declares Thuronius to be the author. However, judging by the 
handwriting the title has probably been added to the manuscript af-
terwards, and thus cannot be relied on entirely. Contrary to the pre-
vious view Jaakko Lounela has produced convincing evidence in his 
fairly recent article that this work was written by the professor of 
mathematics, Simon Kexlerus.'Z' 
Lounela's most compelling argument are those based on informa-
tion gleaned from the correspondence of Chancellor Brahe. It seems 
that Chancellor Brahe thought it important that someone at the Aca-
demy of Turku write a textbook on astronomy. He had charged Kex-
lerus with writing the book, and during the 1660's Kexlerus reported 
to Brahe that he was busy with the project. in In his letter of 1663 
Kexlerus complains about the many other responsibilities which re-
tarded his progress in the work and he asks Brahe to liberate him 
from his office in the cathedral chapter. Moreover, he finds it hard to 
find equivalent Swedish expressions for astronomical terminology.'23 
There are also other facts which strongly speak for Kexlerus' aut-
horship. First of all the contents of the book is typical of mathematical 
astronomy; it would be strange if a professor of physics had written 
in quite that style, because the professors of physics did not generally 
121 Lounela 1987. 
122 Lounela 1987, p. 54, 57 
123 Kexlerus to Brahe 5.2.1663, PBB 1I:2, p. 8-10. "Wijdare hwadh belangar thet 
werck, som iagh lofwadt H.G. Excell. och nåde att Förfärdiga, nemligen göra 
Astronomiam på Swenska språket, så haflwe]r iag full thet under händer, men 
thet lijder intet mycket för migh. Ty först wardt iagh förhindrat genom rättegångs 
processer, både uthi den Kongl. rätten och uthi Consistorio Acad. man finner och 
beswärligen sdana Svenske ord som til samma konst tiena, och elfest hafwer iagh 
i medler tidh mäst want opasslig, ...nu wille iagh medh all flijt samma werck 
fulborda, men iagh blifwer icke ringa förhindrat uthaff Consistorio Eccles. som 
titt och offra hålles: therföre är min tienstlige och ödmiuke böön och begäran, 
...at iagh kunne blifwa libererat ifrån samma consistorij arbete..." 
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"lower" themselves by writing astronomical works. (Not that most of 
them would have had the competence to so.) When Thuronius writes 
about astronomical matters, he does so consistently from the point of 
view of physical astronomy.'" Secondly, the manuscript "Astronomia" 
shows such expertise in astronomy as we could expect Kexlerus to 
have. Kexlerus had studied in Leiden during the 1630's and was the-
refore well-informed on the latest developments.'25  In addition to this 
several other aspects, like the style of handwriting, settle the case of 
authorship in favour of Kexlerus. 
Kexlerus' work was never published, not even finished. The ma-
nuscript ends at the title of the XIII chapter, and whatever might have 
been written after that has not been preserved.126 The dating of this 
work remains somewhat open. We know that Kexlerus had been wor-
king on it around 1663, but possibly some parts of it had already been 
written during the 1650's; Brahe had given the task to Kexlerus so- 
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metime between 1648-1651.177 The style of handwriting varies so- 
mewhat, which might indicate that the work had been written over a 
longer period, or that various clerks had been copying it. This would 
match with the fact that the manuscript is a fairly finished text which 
contains only few corrections. Therefore it hardly is an early draft of 
the work. The original manuscript lacks page numbering, although a 
later hand has numbered the openings. I prefer a more accurate page 
numbering than that, and for the sake of clarity I shall in the following 
refer to the pages as if they had been numbered normally from one 
onwards. 
Kexlerus opens the discussion with the notion that all "stiärnekon-
sten" or "science of the stars" should be preceded by geometry. He 
therefore gives a short overview of the basic concepts of geometry, 
explaining what a straight or curved line, or a rectangle should be 
like. Having got to the structure of a sphere he feels ready to go on 
to astronomy itself:28  According to Kexlerus astronomical knowledge 
is based on arithmetical and geometrical operations which deal with 
the observations made of the movements of heavenly bodies. Wise 
124 See e.g. Thuronius-Alanus 1664. 
125 Lounela 1987, p. 60. Kexlerus referred approvingly to Kepler's and Galilei's 
mathematics. Lehti 1983, 1984. 
126 Kexlerus A301, p. 68. "Thet XIII Cap. Om Wänttergatan och huru man alla 
stiämesoopar him[m]elens lättelig kan igenfinna". 
127 Lounela 1987, p. 54. 
128 Kexlerus A301, p. 1-7. 
men use "instruments and tools" to aid observation. These computa-
tions give rise to hypotheses which display and show the different 
orbits of stars and planets. This leads us to the final cause of ast-
ronomy, which is to measure time and to foretell future events on the 
Earth. Kexlerus discerns thus two parts in astronomy: the computation 
of movements and astrology. Both are based on knowledge of natural 
events, but the former is sufficient (subjectum adequatum) for proper 
astronomical knowledge. Because computational astronomy is thus 
"an adequate subject matter" of astronomy, Kexlerus prefers to con-
centrate his work on it. Kexlerus seems to grant some legitimacy to 
astrology, although he is not prepared to go into it himself. The status 
of astrology was by no means unambiguous, for both the church and 
the humanist tradition had for centuries criticised astrological practi- 
129 
ce. 
The movements of all heavenly bodies can according to Kexlerus 
be divided into daily movements which are said to be common to all 
"stars". The other type of movement is the motus proprius of stars, 
which is peculiar to each of them. In a typical 17th-century manner 
Kexlerus calls both planets and fixed stars "stars". He first declares 
his doctrines on the "erratic stars" or planets, and goes on to describe 
the "erraticness" of their movements.130 Kexlerus then tackles the prob-
lem of the reality of the heavenly spheres. This topic had been dis-
cussed in Uppsala while Kexlerus was studying there.''' Kexlerus' 
opinion does not differ from these in its main points: the heaven does 
not consist of hard concentric spheres "like an onion" (lijka som uthi 
en löök then ene krettzen omfattas then andra), the heavenly circles 
129 Kexlerus A301, p. 7-8. "Thet aldraförste skiäl, Prima principia, på hwilcke dhenne 
himmelske wetskapen i sanning sig grundtager, aff Räkne- och mäterikonsten, 
Arithmet[hik] och Geometria, hwar till lyda dhe synnerlige händelsers observa-
tioner och achttagningar förmede[..] begwämlige och aff wijse man dertill upfin-
der instrumenter och Redskap. Effter desse utdrager nog wisse och nödwändig 
wilckor Hypotheses, genom hwilcka stiärnomes lopps åtskilligheet i märghfallige 
krettsar och ringar klarligen framställe och gryndelig bewijsas, så att dhe som 
denne konsten hafe giordt sig kunnig, kunna icke allenast sielfe förståå stiärnomas 
rörelser och lägenhet utan ock dher om andra nöijackteligen underwijsa. Förd-
henskuld är stiämekonsten Endeorsak, causa Finalis, och hwarför man dhen lära 
skall; Nembl. att weta till alle framfame och närwarende, som tillkomande tijder 
stiärnomes rätta rum och gestalt i Himelen upleeta och betycka. Ther effter man 
sedan kan åtskillia tijdema och tillkommande händelser på Lordens afhsee och 
förespåå." (p. 8) On criticism of astrology see e.g. Barker 1993, p. 5. Garin 1983. 
130 Kexlerus A301, p. 8-11. 
131 Sandblad 1644, p. 165-166. 
151 
being just abstractions. Kexlerus describes some of the opinions about 
the number and order of these spheres which the ancient authors had 
put. At the same time it was of course a question of the order of 
planets. None of the opinions of the "old authors" pleases Kexlerus.'32 
Therefore he turns to the more modem authors, Tycho Brahe's and 
Nicolaus Copernicus' planetary systems being discussed in consider-
able detail.'33 
Kexlerus finds it very positive in both Copernicus and Brahe that 
they do not expect the planetary spheres to be hard and material bo-
dies.134 He explains carefully the three motions which Copernicus had 
attributed to the Earth. This was certainly not the first time that Kex-
lerus wrote about Copernicanism in detail. His thesis De Sole which 
had been published at the University of Uppsala in 1632 under Mar-
tinus Gestrinius' supervision was the first work in Sweden in which 
the Copernican system was thoroughly discussed.135 In the manuscript, 
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both systems were illustrated with appropriate drawings. According 
to Kexlerus the old authors had erred in so many issues that both 
Copernicus' and Brahe's opinions were progress in comparison with 
them.136 However, since Kexlerus cannot accept either of these sys-
tems outright, he develops a compromise view. We shall come back 
to Kexlerus' arguments somewhat later. 
Having finished his profound discussion on the proper world-sys-
tem Kexlerus goes into more practical matters, such as the astronomi-
cal principles of cartography. Thus in the fifth chapter of his book he 
explains what kind of circles there are in celestial and ordinary maps, 
and what they mean from the astronomical point of view. Concepts 
such as the poles, equator, ascension and declination circles and the 
order of signs on the zodiac are explained. We know that the Academy 
of Turku had access to some astronomical maps and "instruments" 
132 Kexlerus A301, p. 12-16. 
133 	 Kexlerus A301, p. 17-20. 
134 Kexlerus A301, p. 17. "The 2 förnemblige och uthi stiämekonsten widt förfame 
män, Nicolaus Copemicg och S[ah]l[ige] Tycho Brahe giöre bägge ett taal på 
kretzar i him[m]elen, men uthi theras ordning kom[m]a the inte öfreens. Och 
behålla desse kretzar ichke som dhe wore hårde och stadige kroppar i himmelen, 
som skulle stiemomes kringföra, effter then gambles meening; men allenast till 
att betäckna stiämomes ordning i him[m]elen, och genom sådana welckor theste 
bättre uppleeta theres lopp och rörelsser." On Copernicus' views on the reality 
of orbs see Jardine 1982. See also Aiton 1981. Donahue 1975. 
135 	 Sandblad 1944, p. 161-162. Nordenmark 1959, p. 34. 
136 Kexlerus A301, p. 20. 
and Kexlerus also explains their use.'37 
The rest of the book concentrates on the fixed stars. First of all he 
discusses their number, magnitude and height. The uncertainty of our 
knowledge is obvious, because various authors have come to different 
conclusions concerning the number of the fixed stars. Kexlerus re-
marks that the different results can partly be explained by the fact 
that the observations had been made on geographically different places 
on the Earth. However, the final number of stars was known only to 
God.138 Probably for this reason Kexlerus has no established opinion 
about which of the numbers is right. He divides fixed stars into six 
classes according to their magnitude, which is measured in relation 
to the magnitude of the Earth. For example the biggest stars (stellae 
prima magnitudinis) are therefore in the relation 6852:64 to the 
Earth.139 The rest of the manuscript consists of lists of variously clas-
sified star constellations and their descriptions. Kexlerus seems reluc- 
tant to take definite stands on matters such as magnitudes, numbers 	 153 
and distances, but he likes to confront Tycho Brahe's opinions with 
those of Landsbergius. He also occasionally refers to other, mainly 
modern authorities.140 
But let us now get back to the claims which Kexlerus makes con-
cerning the proper world-system. After having introduced and descri-
bed the two modem planetary systems Kexlerus proceeds to give his 
judgement about them in the fourth chapter called "On the first mo-
vement in general, which happens from East to West".14 ' First of all 
he states that Tycho Brahe's system has been accepted by most scho-
lars. It is in its favour that it agrees both with daily experience and 
137 	 Kexlerus A301, p. 30-49. The catalogue of the University Library mentions the 
following "Instrumenta Mathematica": several exemplars of Globus Terrestris 
and Globus Coelestis, Sphoera Ptolomaica, Sphoera Coperniccea, Sphoera itidem 
Coperniccea, qua triplex terrace motus demonstratur, Globus Terrestris and Glo-
bus Coelestis in minori forma, Sphoera Armillaris. See Wallerius 1682. 
138 Kexlerus A301, p. 49-50. 
139 	 Kexlerus A301, p. 50-54 (about the biggest stars p. 50-51). 
140 Kexlerus A30I, p. 54-68 on p. 62 for instance he reports that Galileo has found 
several new stars in Taurus. "Galilaeus, en förfaren konstnär, bekänner sigh medh 
sine instrumenter hafwa i then [?] hoopen, forutan the 6 allomkunnige öfwer 40 
stiärnor sedt och observeradt." 
141 	 Kexlerus A301, p. 21 "Thet 4de Capitel. Om then första Rörelssen i gemen som 
ähr ifrån Öster till Wäster....Så weele wij the 2 nye meningar med theres skiäl, 
Nembl[igen] S[ah]l[ige] Tycho Brahes och Copemicij kortteligen öfrläggia och 
iämpnföra med hwar annan, på thet then gunstige läsaren må kunna see, hwilcken-
dera sanninge[n] lijckare ähr, och ther wad han sig hålla skall." 
the word of God.142  In Copernicus' system there are more things to 
be refuted. Kexlerus regards the claims that the Sun is the centre of 
the world and that the Earth would accomplish a yearly journey as 
absurd, because they would demand the world to be almost infinitely 
large and they are against the Holy Scripture.14' The daily motion of 
the Earth instead seems far more acceptable to him. 
What Copernicus understands by the daily movement, with which 
the Earth rotates around its axis every day from west to east, is not 
so despicable if one understands it so that the Earth is not therefore 
less in the centre of the world like its centerpoint. l44 
Thus, Kexlerus concludes that the third opinion (i.e. in addition to 
Brahe's and Copernicus') is the best one, for nature as well. One 
should say in accordance with Brahe that the Earth is the "most central 
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element" and the centre of the world. On the other hand, we could 
accept the daily rotation of the Earth and still retain its central posi-
tion.145  Kexlerus goes on explaining in detail, how the rising and set-
ting of the Sun can be understood if the rotation of the Earth is ac-
cepted. Kexlerus' main physical argument for this semi-Tychonic (K. 
does not himself use this term) system is the argument from the ease 
Kexlerus A301, p. 22. "[?]elangande SI. Tycho Brahes meening, så ähr then hoos 
mesteparten dhe lärde i Academier antagen, alldenstund then kom[m]er öfreens 
icke alleenast med dagelig förfarenheet, utan och med Gudz ord." 
Kexlerus A301, p. 22-23. "Men hwad Copernici mening wedkom[m]er så bör 
ther uti utan att twifel ogillas och fdrkastas thet hen giör solen medlest i werlden, 
som ther skulle ståå stilla och orörlig och Iorden i then stoore åhrlige omlopps-
kretzen under förmörckelsse linien förrätta thet åhrlige loppet ifrå wäster till öster. 
Ty om det wora sandt, så wore thenne wärldenes stoorlek och widd nästan oän-
delig, och wij fördes tillijka med Iorden i him[m]elen, ther dock then H. Skrifft 
thetta nedriga ifrå thet öfan till ähr och him[m]elen klarligen åtskillier." 
Kexlerus A301, p. 23. "Thet Copemico förehåller om then dagelige rörelssen, 
ther med lorden wijd sin axel ifrån wäster till öster i hwart och ett dygn wändes 
omkring, om en wille thet fdrståå sålunda, att lorden icke blifr theste mindre 
stadigt och obeweekeligen mitt i wärlden såsom en medelprick, wore thet icke 
platt föracktandes." 
Kexlerus A301, p. 23. "Then altså af desse mootsträfige meeningar en 3de med 
natursens altsomstörste fördeel och behändigh utdragas och om man säger 1. Med 
Tycho Brahe, att Iorden ...ähr det medleste Element och kropp, och lijka som en 
medelprick i heele wärlden... 2. Med Copemico, att Iorden på sam[m]a sitt aff 
gudi förordnat ställe, wijd sin stadige axel och orörlige medelpunct wardar ifrå 
wäster till öster dagelig på 24 tijmars förlopp omwänd och omwältrad hwaremot 
heele him[m]elen tyckes gåå ifrå öster till wäster, och the dagelige loppet full-
borda..." See also p. 25. 
142 
143 
144 
145 
or simplicity: "As nature in all its works always chooses the easiest 
and most convenient way, so it is true that she does not underrate such 
a thing in grounding the system of the world either."16 This system 
would be especially convenient for the sphere of the fixed stars, because 
the speed of its rotation could be diminished considerably.147 According 
to Kexlerus the whole cosmos was in a homogenous motion from West 
to East, both the stars and the Earth as well. The movement of the 
tides and seas, the speed of wind on high mountains and many other 
things were evidence of the Earth's rotation.148 But how could all this 
be reconciled with the word of the Bible? 
The solution which Kexlerus offers for this problem appears more 
than questionable, considering the emphasis which orthodox Luthe-
ranism placed on the literal reading of the Bible. 
Al. When the Bible talks of the immobility of the Earth, it is un- 
derstood that the Earth does not altogether change places but stays 	 155 
where God has placed it. B2. Whatever the Bible says about the 
movement of the Sun and the stars does not refer to the first, but 
to the second movement from West to East. C3. The Bible talks 
about the Sun and the Moon standing still in accordance with peop-
le's opinion. Thus it means nothing else but that the daily movement 
of the Earth was prevented. D4. The claim that the shadow of the 
Sun retarded 20 steps could happen if the Earth turned its course 
backwards.149 
The third argument especially, which claimed that the Bible would 
speak in accordance with people's understanding, was often fiercely 
refuted in debates about Copernicanism. This so called topos of ac- 
146 
	 Kexlerus A301, p. 25. "Såsom naturen uthi alla som wärck alltijd utwällier the 
som behändigast och lättast ähr, så ähr sanningen lijkt, att hoon och i wärldens 
lopps förrättande sådant icke underlåter." 
147 Kexlerus A301, p. 26-27. 
148 Kexlerus A301, p. 27. 
149 	 Kexlerus A301, p. 27-28. "Al. När skrifften talar om iordens orörligheet, förståår 
hen ther medh, att iordhen heel och hållen icke wardar förd ifrå det ena stället 
till den andra utan stadigt blifwer ther gud henne satt har. B2. Thet skrifften seger 
om solenes och stiärnomes lopp förståås icke om then förste, utan om then andre 
rörelse[n] ifrån wäster till öster. C3. Om solenes och månens stillastående i hi-
melen talar skrifften effter meniskiors meeningh, och förståår ther medh intet 
annat ähn then dagelige rörelsens förhindrande, then wij meena i solen förrätta. 
D.4. Att solens skugga gick 20 streck tillbaka, thet kunde wäl skee igenom iordens 
tillbakawändningh." 
commodation had been presented in some form or other by several 
early 17th-century authors, although its most famous proponent was 
of course Galileo.150 Kexlerus does not however refer to any author 
in expressing this view. The same argument was put by Kexlerus in 
print, in his Cosmographiae Compendiosa published in 1666. In this 
work Kexlerus also refutes the possibility of the annual motion for 
the Earth, but he seems to be more optimistic about matching the 
scriptural evidence with the idea of daily motion. However, in this 
publication Kexlerus does not actually commit himself to the daily 
rotation of the Earth.151 The central location of the Earth is more im-
portant for Kexlerus than its immobility. He can accept the daily mo-
vement but not the annual movement, because it would endanger the 
central position. 
In the manuscript Kexlerus refutes two physical objections made 
by Tycho Brahe to the daily rotation of the Earth, in addition to the 
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theological arguments. Both of Tycho's arguments turn on the point 
that no direct movements, either horizontal or vertical, would be pos-
sible if the Earth was in motion. Kexlerus develops a detailed geo-
metrical proof to show that a stone dropped from a tower falls at its 
foot. His main argument is, however, based on the metaphysical as-
sumption that because everything in the cosmos is revolving from 
West to East, even the direct movements are carried along; thus we 
cannot tell the difference.fs2 
There hardly is anything new and spectacular in Kexlerus' views 
if one looks at the matter from an all-European viewpoint. However, 
from the viewpoint of Turku, and Sweden in general, Kexlerus' ideas 
remain a unique peculiarity at this time. Moreover, it is evident that 
these views had no wider effect on the public discussions which took 
place at Turku on astronomy and on cosmology. 
150 Johannes Kepler, Paolo Foscarini, Tommaso Campanella, Giordano Bruno and 
Galileo Galilei all advocated some form of the topos of accommodation. Moss 
1993, p. 129-211. 
151 Kexlerus 1666, Liber I, Cap. I, IV. "Immobilitas globi terreni in medio mundi, 
qua nullo modo terra ad praeditas laterales partes moveri, aut unquam centri 
locum mutare queat. Job. 26:7. psa1.24:2. psal. 104:4. quod non prohibet terram 
ab occasu ad ortum in eodem Axe revolvi singulis diebus una pene revolutione 
Philosophica haec sunt, quae sine salutis aeternae jactura possunt & recipi & 
rejici ad lubitum. Certum est quoq;, Spiritum S. extra fidei articulos sese ac-
com[m]odare ad captum nostru[m], ut a nobis possit intelligi." See also Lehti 
1984, p. 224. 
152 Kexlerus A301, p. 28-30. 
Ptolemy, Copernicus and Brahe 
Whereas dissertations representing the general structure and "affec-
tions" of the universe/heaven were published regularly in physics, dis-
sertations concentrating on the question of the competing world-sys-
tems are relatively rare, and appear mostly in mathematics. The pros 
and cons of the different world systems were discussed more profoun-
dly by Simon Kexlerus/Petrus Laurbecchius in 1661, Johannes Geze-
lius in 1672, Johannes Flachsenius in 1679, Daniel Achrelius in 1682, 
and by Magnus Steen in two theses in 1694 and 1697. All of these 
authors were professors of mathematics, except Gezelius, who was 
Bishop and Vice-Chancellor and Achrelius, who had chair in Latin 
literature. (Laurbecchius became an assistant professor of mathematics 
in 1666.153) We shall examine more closely only those occasions when 
more grave opinions pro or contra were expressed. At the same time 
we will see, whether any change in the astronomical thought of the 
period really happened. 
It could be claimed that the reason why there was so little discus-
sion about the real world-system might at least partially be discursive 
tactics; nobody wanted to endanger breaking the highly respected aca-
demic peace by making a fuss about a physically and theologically 
delicate matter, or perhaps keeping a low profile in matters of he-
liocentrism was a calculated strategy to decrease the risk of students 
gaining enough knowledge of the new system to believe in it. This 
interpretation does not, however, seem very plausible because the sub-
ject was nevertheless regularly, if not always extensively discussed. 
Moreover, the 1626 statutes of the University of Uppsala had already 
decreed that Copernican theory should be lectured upon.154 Thus in 
my opinion it is more probable that the scholars at Turku did usually 
not feel an overwhelmingly strong need to defend the geocentric sys-
tem, because nearly everybody believed in it. It was probably known 
that in European universities the "Copernican pestilence" was sprea-
ding alarmingly, but in the relatively secluded life of Turku, Coper-
nicanism aroused no more opposition than some other "absurdities" 
approved by adversary philosophers. 
In the competition between geocentric world-systems (those of Pto-
lemy, Brahe and Riccioli) and heliocentric ones (those of Copernicus, 
153 	 Slotte 1898, p. 18. 
154 Annerstedt 1877, p. 277. 
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Achrelius provides a lively picture of the cosmos in his Contempfationes mundi (1682). 
Achrelius favours the Jesuit Riccioli's planetary system in which the Moon, the Sun, Jupiter 
and Saturn orbit the Earth, whereas Mercury, Venus and Mars make their orbit around the 
Sun. In addition to the speedy comets, Achrelius also represented the four moons of Jupiter 
and two 'lanterns' of Saturn. Harmony of the cosmos was an important theme for Achrelius 
and he describes how the planetary system moderates the various influences of planets. The 
sentence at the bottom of the page was usual in mystical literature of the age. It means that 
"The spirit, spread throughout the limbs (parts), enlivens from inside. The mind agitates the 
body.' 
Galileo, Kepler and Newton), three main issues were at stake. First 
of all, there were the notions of a) an essential difference between 
celestial and mundane matter, and the consequences of this division 
for the physics of moving bodies; b) the incorruptibility and immuta-
bility of the heavens and; c) the immobility and central position of 
the Earth. We shall see how these questions were approached at Turku. 
One of the fundamental constituents of the Aristotelian world-view 
was the idea of the immutability of the heavens. This notion was 
closely but not necessarily related to the idea of the incorruptibility 
of the heavens. We have seen that at Turku all except Achrelius and 
possibly Magnus Steen conceived the heavenly matter to be something 
different from the elements and devoid of all generation and corrup-
tion. (Steen does not actually specify his view on this, for he only 
speaks of the heavenly matter as "ether".155) Bearing in mind Achre-
lius' idea of the homogeneity of the universe, it is no wonder to see 
him generally describing the roughness of the moon, the sunspots, 
comets and new stars. Achrelius gets enthusiastic about the irregula-
rities on the surface of the moon, seeing seas, mountains, valleys and 
forests there. Perhaps there were even living beings there! 156 But how 
did the more traditional Aristotelians explain the observed mutations 
in the celestial region, then? 
Most authors refrained from more extensive comments about co-
mets and new stars. The idea of the simplicity of heavenly matter 
could be saved only by appealing to the supernatural character of 
these phenomena. "New stars are a certain kind of supernatural phe-
nomenon and signs produced by God in the celestial region. They 
presage destruction of the world and other imminent deplorable 
events."157 If the cause of new stars and comets was supernatural, 
there was no reason to deny their existence on the supralunar area, 
as some Aristotelian scholars still claimed at the beginning of the 17th 
century. 
155 Steen-Petrejus 1697, p. 10, 20. 
156 Achrelius 1682, p. 61 "Enimvero apparuisse saepius in firmamento novas stellas, 
astronomorum observationes docent.", 100-101, 118, et passim. In 1656 Thau-
vonius mentions the maculae lunae, saying that they are caused by variation of 
density on the moon's surface. Thauvonius-Holstius 1656, Qvaest. 13. On theories 
on comets see Yeomans 1991. 
157 Alanus-Moderus 1645, Th. XXXII. "Stellae novae sunt quaedam supra naturae 
ordinem ab ipso Deo in coelesti regione producta phainomena & ostenta, mundi 
ruinam aliosque tristes eventus minantia & portentia." See also Alanus-Lacmannus 
1648, Th. XLV. Hahn-Ekedahl 1695, p. 24-26. 
159 
The same views about the supernatural origin of comets is revealed 
in the notes which Andreas Thuronius made about his comet obser-
vations in 1664. Thuronius had observed a comet appearing in Taurus 
during Christmas 1664 and early January 1665. Thuronius' manuscript 
describes the location of the comet in the sphere of the fixed stars. 
Most of the manuscript, however, concentrates on interpreting the 
meanings of this omen.158 Although Thuronius' manuscript reflects the 
views commonly held at Turku, his observations had no effect on the 
treatment of the subject in academic dissertations. Generally it was 
thought that even though comets were produced by God, their move-
ments, colours and place in the heavens could be physically scru-
tinized.159 On the whole, the way the observations of new stars and 
comets was merged into the traditional framework of knowledge is a 
very good example of the flexibility of Aristotelian natural philosophy. 
When talking about the immobility of the Earth a distinction was 
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made between its supposed yearly movement around the Sun, and the 
daily revolution around its own centre - just as Kexlerus had done in 
his manuscript. However, both of these movements were rejected on 
very similar criteria. The immobility of the Earth was by no means 
just an astronomical question, but the matter could very well be dealt 
with in connection with the element earth too, with regard to the pro-
per place (locus) of the element. Achrelius and Kexlerus, on the other 
hand, discussed the subject as a part of the so-called general geo-
graphy, which studied the affections of the Earth: its figure, magni-
tude, place and movement - or in this case immobility.'60 Achrelius 
on the other hand based his discussion very much on the model of 
Varenius' famous Geographia Generalis. 16' 
One of the most effective arguments ever for the immobility and 
centrality of the Earth was based on Aristotelian physics and was 
found among the essential qualities of the element earth. Because of 
its gravity, it tended towards the lowest possible place, i.e. the mid-
point of the cosmos. Only there could the element/globe of earth be 
158 	 Thuronius 1665, HYK Ms/Mf 550. 
159 Hahn-Gråå 1691, p. 10-20. Hahn-Ekedahl 1695. Scholars in Turku were precise 
about God not creating comets, since He had stopped creating on the sixth day. 
Instead of creating, God only produced comets from already existing matter. 
160 See e.g. Kexlerus 1666, Geographiae Liber Primus Cap. I. Gezelius 1672, p. 
255-256. 
161 	 On Achrelius' connection with Varenius see Kallinen 1991a, p. 20, 47-48, 80-81. 
in a natural state of rest; no violent motion could move the Earth 
continuously. This could be achieved only by a natural tendency to 
spherical motion.162  Everyday experience and the astronomical know-
ledge of the reader were sometimes called as witnesses for the case. 
Who had felt the Earth move? Would not dropped stones fly along 
with the movement of the Earth rather than fall straight to ground, if 
our globe revolved? Would not in that case stars and planets seem 
now to be closer and bigger, now smaller and farther away?'63 Most 
convincing of all arguments was, however, the authority of the Bible, 
which was interpreted as disproving Copernicanism. 
The arguments proposed for the immobility of the Earth at Turku 
were by no means new or original - they were well-known in other 
Swedish Universities and in Central Europe as well.164 Since discus-
sions of Copernicanism at Turku have also been studied several ti-
mes,165 it is hardly necessary to go through it again in detail, but 
something might still be said of the most eminent theses in the field. 	 161 
As Edward Grant has stated in his article, physical, astronomical 
and theological arguments were generally introduced in discussions 
of the centrality and immobility of the Earth. Of these three types, 
astronomical arguments were least often used.166 This scheme is by 
and large true for the cosmological discussions at the University of 
Turku too. The usual types of argument against Copernicanism were 
theological, astronomical, natural philosophical (the gravity of the 
Earth), as well as those based on observation. Petrus Laurbecchius, a 
professor of poetry and theology to be, neglected none of these in the 
expansive dissertation which he published under the mathematics pro-
fessor Simon Kexlerus in 1661.167 In addition to themes like squaring 
a circle and measuring the dimensions of the Earth, this thesis sur-
veyed Copernicanism at a length and profoundity not seen before at 
Turku. Laurbecchius was moreover the first scholar at Turku to men- 
162 Halm-Alm 1688, p. 14 "Terra etiam gravissima est, ...posita est in loco infimo, 
ut illa non detur magis profundus locus.", 18-21. Hahn-Weckelman 1694, p. 9, 
17. Hahn-Flodin 1707, p. 5-10, 13-21. Tålpo-Rhydelius 1682, Th. XVI, XX-XXI. 
163 	 Ibid., Kexlerus-Laurbecchius 1661, Cap. III. Achrelius 1682, p. 199. 
164 	 On Copernicanism in Sweden see Sandblad 1944-45. On the immobility and cent-
rality arguments see Grant 1984. 
165 	 Slotte 1898, p. 5-34, et passim. Sandblad 1944, p. 181-186, Sandblad 1945, p. 
117-123. Lehti 1979. Leikola 1987, p. 565-574. Markkanen 1970. 
166 Grant 1984. 
167 This thesis is very advanced both mathematically and astronomically and it is 
reasonable to presuppose that Kexlerus played a major role in writing it. 
tion the failure to discern stellar parallax as a weak point in Coper-
nican astronomy. In his thorough refutation of Copemicanism Laur-
becchius even harnesses the ancient wisdom concealed in Hebrew on 
the side of the geocentrists' by appealing to etymology. But his main 
argument is based on epistemological grounds, which is not a very 
common procedure in our dissertations. 
Laurbecchius' argument runs as follows: Cartesians assert he-
liocentrism by virtue of the geometrical method, which according to 
them is the most trustworthy method of all. There is, however, a dif-
ference between a methodus inveniendi rei and methodus docendi. Ac-
cording to Laurbecchius, the Cartesians have mixed up these two met-
hods and thus claim that their geometrical method is suitable for in-
veniendi. However, geometrical principles can never be applied to 
physics (and from false principles a proper conclusion cannot be 
reached, says Laurbecchius). Only in teaching and demonstrating phy- 
162 
	
	
sical facts might geometry be of some help. Therefore, it was false 
to claim the validity of a mathematical hypothesis in physical reali-
ty.168 It was not unusual to associate Copemicanism with Car-
tesianism.169 Was there a rising danger for either of them, then? It 
seems that no greater campaign against Copemicanism was launched 
at that time, and no concern about the matter was expressed in the 
Senate of the Academy either.170 The motifs arising from Cartesianism 
will be examined more closely in the next chapter. Here it suffices 
to say that in 1661 there hardly was any pressing reason to attack 
Cartesianism at Turku. 
Eleven years after Laurbecchius' thesis Gezelius took up the ques-
tion in his Encyclopaedia Synoptica. He describes the order of planets 
in the systems - or hypotheses as he calls them - of Ptolemy, Coper-
nicus, "the Egyptians", Tycho Brahe and Riccioli. It is peculiar to 
Gezelius' work that he takes no stance among the systems, although 
it is clear from other places that he favours a geocentric system:71 A 
more thorough presentation of the subject was achieved by Achrelius 
and Flachsenius at the turn of the 1680's. Achrelius, faithful to his 
168 Kexlerus-Laurbecchius 1661, Cap. I, III. 
169 See also Hahn-Tålpo 1699, passim. Tammelin-Nidelström 1707, p. 13-18. For 
instance, in Tübingen the theologian J.A. Osiander added Copemicanism to the 
list of lins of the Cartesians. Lindborg 1965, p. 71-73. 
170 CAAP II. 
171 	 Gezelius 1672, p. 324-328. 
peculiar style preferred Riccioli's system to that of Brahe. It was the 
Brahean system which usually was favoured by those authors who 
ever named any system preferable.172 It was more usual to refute Co-
pemicanism outright than to present a positive description of the 
"right" and preferred geocentric mechanism of the world. Flachsenius' 
thesis starts with discussion of the metaphysical foundations of ast-
ronomical knowledge presenting the three cosmologies with plenty of 
illustrations:73 This anti-Copernican peak undoubtedly spread the 
knowledge of Copemicanism among students, although it certainly 
did not encourage adopting these views. 
Magnus Steen was appointed professor of mathematics in 1692, 
when Flachsenius had moved upwards in the academic hierarchy to 
a professorship of theology. Steen was the first scholar at Turku who 
could be called a Copernican:74 His attitude towards Copemicanism 
was so positive that one is tempted to believe that he really supported 
the system. Not even Steen, however, was ready to claim physical 	 163 
reality for Copemicanism openly. In fact he seemed more pleased to 
leave the decision to each reader's own judgement. We have his word 
for the fact that this reservation was made for theological reasons: 
"...the Ptolemaic system seems to agree more with the Holy Scriptures, 
the Copernican with nature and its phenomena...".15 Steen presents 
detailed descriptions of the Ptolemaic, Tychonic, Copernican and 
semi-Tychonic systems in two theses. (The latter were systems in 
which only the daily rotation of the Earth was accepted, but not the 
annual movement.) Most of his arguments include nothing new. He 
bases his pro-Copernican tendencies on the idea of harmony in nature, 
and on the simplicity of the Copemican system.16 
172 Achrelius 1682, p. 14-15, 192-201. In Brahe's system only the Moon and the 
Sun orbited the Earth, and the other planets revolved around the Sun. Riccioli, 
however, had only Mercury, Venus and Mars orbiting the Sun, which orbited the 
Earth together with Jupiter and Saturn. 
173 Flachsenius-Grimsteen 1679. 
174 On Steen see Slotte 1898, p. 28-31. Sandblad 1945, p. 118-120. Leikola 1987, 
p. 569. 
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	 Steen-Petrejus 1697, p. 17. "...Ptolemaica scilicet Scripturae Sacrae: Copernican 
naturae & phaenomenis magis (ceu videtur) consentanea..." See also p. 21 and 
Steen-Heinricius 1694, Membr. III. 
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	 Steen-Heinricius 1694, Steen-Petrejus 1697. A good description of these theses, 
especially of the former, can be found in Slotte 1898, p. 28-31. However, Slotte 
pays no attention to Cartesianism in Steen-Petrejus' thesis. Copernicus preferred 
his own system because of its simplicity compared with the Ptolemaic system. 
See Hatfield 1990, p. 106-108. Harmony and simplicity were essential features 
Despite the fact that both geocentrics and heliocentrics agreed that 
the Copernican system was simpler than those of Ptolemy and Brahe, 
this did not settle the question. For Copernicans, simplicity was a 
convincing argument pro. Their adversaries, however, refused to see 
simplicity as a necessary feature of physical reality. 
It cannot be denied that the calculation of all phenomena would 
become easier for the understanding if the Earth moved on the Ec-
liptic. ...However, it has been demonstrated above that the author 
of this world did not create all things so that they would be easier 
for our understanding."' 
An interesting feature in Steen's heliocentric tendencies is that for 
the first time in the history of learning at the Academy of Turku 
Copemicanism was dressed in a Cartesian mantle in a positive sense. 
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At the University of Uppsala it had for a long time been normal to 
link Cartesian and Copernican ideas. Steen had never studied there, 
however. Indeed, Cartesianism was refuted at Turku partly because it 
was thought to be smuggling heliocentrism into the country. Steen 
describes the Sun as residing in the middle of a vortex, from where 
it makes the planetary system move by the power of its rays. Steen 
also seems to approve of the Cartesian explanation of the birth of 
comets. Convinced of the explanatory power of the vortex theory 
Steen wonders how could the Earth not be moving along with the 
ether-stream.18  
Cartesian cosmology influenced Steen's ideas on the size of the 
universe, too. Before Steen, only Daniel Achrelius in 1679 had ex-
pressed the idea that the area of the fixed stars might stretch further 
from the Earth than ever imagined. Moreover Achrelius assumed most 
fixed stars to be suns similar to our own.19 Achrelius did not, however, 
of the heliocentric system for Kepler too. Westman 1972, p. 248-261. 
177 	 Kexlerus-Laurbecchius 1661, Cap. III, 6. "Negari non posse, faciliorem intellectu 
fieri rationem omnium phainomenon, motu Terrae in Eclipticå:...Verüm, neque 
ea rebus creandis collineasse naturae auctorem, supra demonstratum est, quid 
nobis esset cognitu facilius." 
178 	 Steen-Petrejus 1697, p. 10-15, 20. 
179 Achrelius 1682, p. 128-129, 131. "Ego vero omnino existimo, in penitissimis 
aetheris latebris, adhuc novam stellarum scenam aperiri, quae nullo tubo ab oculis 
mortalium potest discerni; & eapropter revera statuo, non alium posse numerare 
tot myriades stellarum, praeter Solum Deum..." (p. 128) 
go as far as to claim the universe to be of an indefinite magnitude. 
Steen's argument goes along Cartesian lines: because our mind can 
always imagine a bigger quantity or magnitude, there is no logical 
reason to deny the world an indefinite size. Like Descartes, Steen 
insists on the difference between indefiniteness and infinity: 
Wherefrom it is concluded that the world is of indefinite size, which 
differs from the infinite. The latter has no positive limits as all, like 
GOD, but the former is only negatively so, which is that we cannot 
find the limits it has...180 
It is difficult to estimate how deeply Copernican ideas became roo-
ted in students' minds during Steen's five-year long professorship.18 ' 
If there were converts to Copernicanism, they kept quiet about it. 
Steen's successor, Laurentius Tammelin turned the course sharply 
backwards to geocentric Tychonism,182 and the non-mathematical dis-
sertations show no sign of anything else. The stand which had been 
adopted decades ago remained living; a physically wrong hypothesis 
could be accepted as a tool for calculations.183 
The Status of Astronomical Hypotheses 
At this point it would be wise to have a look at what was actually 
meant by hypothesis. On the whole, any discussion on the role of 
hypotheses in science was generally met only in astronomy at Turku, 
whereas elsewhere in Europe there was much discussion about the 
status of hypotheses in natural philosophy/science too.184 Since early 
antiquity the main project of astronomers had been to build a geo-
metrical system which would reduce the apparently irregular move-
ments of planets to a coherent description of uniform and circular 
movements. They were thus supposed to "save the phenomena". It is 
not generally remembered, however, that even Ptolemy saw that the 
180 Steen-Petrejus 1697, p. 16. "Unde mundum indefinitum esse concluditur, qvod 
contradistingvitur infinito, quatenus hoc positive nullos agnoscat terminos, ut 
DEUS, illud negative tantum, ut si quos habeat invenire å nobis non possunt..." 
181 Steen died in 1697. 
182 E.g. Tammelin-Nidelström 1707. 
183 Alanus-Moderus 1645, Th. XXI. Kexlerus-Laurbecchius 1661, Cap. III. Flach-
senius-Grimsteen 1679, Th. 10. 
184 See e.g. Clarke 1989, p. 131-144. and several articles in Madden 1960. 
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geometrical hypothesis must match the empirical observations and 
describe them adequately. Geometrical hypotheses, and especially that 
of Ptolemy which came to involve several eccentric and epicyclic 
spheres, contradicted the Aristotelian cosmological views. In order to 
solve this dilemma several ancient, and later medieval scholars adop-
ted the view that the mathematical models of planetary movements 
did not represent physical reality. They were pure fictions suitable for 
calculating the apparent motions.185 
Copernicus' claim for a new kind of status for the astronomical 
hypothesis only gradually found recognition. According to Copernicus 
and his followers a hypothesis which would with sufficient accuracy 
correspond to the observed phenomena, would really represent a phy-
sical truth. This stance, although very roughly put here, is usually 
known as the "realist" view as opposed to the "fictionalist" view, ac-
cording to which astronomical models only serve as tools for calcu- 
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lation.186 Faced with the challenge which the heliocentric theory posed 
to it, the epistemological status of the astronomical hypothesis became 
the subject of wide-ranging discussions in the latter part of the six-
teenth century and the early seventeenth century.187 The attitude adop-
ted by certain scholars at Wittenberg, according to which "Wittenberg 
interpretation" the Copernican system could be accepted as a mathe-
matical tool, but it could not be granted physical reality, became by 
and large the model which was applied at Turku too.188 However, the 
Protestant camp did not stay unanimous for long. Tycho Brahe for 
example was not content with mere mathematical fictions, but aimed 
at building a planetary model, or a hypothesis, which would corres-
pond to the real physical disposition and movements of the heavenly 
bodies. Similar demands for the physical reality of astronomical hy-
potheses were further promoted by astronomers such as Kepler and 
Galileo.'89 
This is by and large the background for the concepts of hypothesis 
185 	 Blake 1960, p. 22-25. Duhem 1969. On Ptolemy's understanding of hypothesis 
see especially Taub 1993, p. 40-45. 
186 I have to emphasize here that this Duhemian division into "realist" and "fictio-
nalist" approaches does little justice to the great range of views during that period. 
Here the concepts are used for a very rough grouping only. 
187 Blake 1960, p. 25-29. 
188 Blake 1960, p. 29-31. Westman 1975b. 
189 On Tycho see Blake 1960, p. 35-37. On Kepler see e.g. Westman 1972, p. 239-
240, et passim. Jardine 1988b, p. 211-224, et passim. 
which we can expect to find at Turku. But before going into it a 
general remark should be made. The entire concept hypothesis, or 
suppositio as it reads in Latin, still suffered very much in the 17th 
century from the connotations it had had in Aristotelian philosophy. 
Whereas the Aristotelian concept of science recognized demonstration 
as the only basis for scientific knowledge, the hypothetical reasoning 
associated with rhetoric and dialectic inevitably carried the stigma of 
not being demonstrated knowledge.190 Thus, a hypothesis could not in 
principle stand as a foundation for legitimate philosophical argument. 
Kexlerus refers at the beginning of his astronomical manuscript to 
the formation of an astronomical hypothesis. Hypotheses are based on 
observations, which if possible are made with the help of instruments. 
The meaning of hypotheses is then to "present and prove" the move-
ments of stars and planets. He thus seems to favour the view that 
mathematical descriptions of the planetary movements are merely 
mental devices. In his discussion of the possible movement of the 
Earth Kexlerus does not refer to mathematical theories of planetary 
movements. Indeed, he accepts the daily movement of the Earth on 
physical and theological grounds, which leaves the status of mathe-
matical hypothesis ambiguous.191 On the other hand the work which 
was probably written in co-operation by Kexlerus and Laurbecchius 
takes a much more strict stance towards astronomical hypotheses. The 
basic mistake made by the Copernicans is that they falsely attribute 
physical truth to their astronomical hypothesis. However, astronomical 
hypotheses should correspond to the observed phenomena as well as 
possible in order to fulfil their function of describing and predicting 
the movements of planets.192  
A clear and simple evaluation of astronomical hypotheses is given 
by bishop Gezelius in his Encyclopaedia Synoptica as well. He states 
that astronomical hypotheses are either physical or geometrical.193 The 
'9° 	 Clarke 1989, p. 144-152. Moss 1993, p. 7-12, 46-49. On the nature of truth and 
the degrees of certainty in scholastic philosophy see Dear 1992. 
191 Kexlerus A301, p. 7-8, 17-30. 
192 Kexlerus-Laurbecchius 1661, Cap III, 4. "...fatendum est equidem, systema Pto-
lemaicum phaenomenis non satis congruere..." 
193 Gezelius 1672, p. 328 "Physicae sunt, quas å Physico mutuatas vel ut veras sup-
ponit, vel etiam observationibus suis ulterius confirmat." p. 330 "Geometricae 
hypotheses sunt ex Geometriae petitae, sola quidem imaginatione coelo adscriptae, 
sed naturae rei conveninetes, & proinde ab omnibus concessae, quibus phaino-
mena melius explicantur & declarantur." 
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former represent the physical truth - possibly reinforced by observa-
tions - whereas geometrical hypotheses are mere fictions intended for 
the explanation and declaration of natural phenomena. Gezelius is un-
commonly open in his claim that the astronomers may accept even 
false hypotheses if they render the calculations of the planetary mo-
vements more easy.194 
Johannes Flachsenius produces the most elaborate discussion on 
hypothesis we can find at Turku. He not only produces a nominal 
definition of it, but also discusses its genus and differentiae, the effi-
cient, formal and material causes of a hypothesis. I shall attempt to 
extract the most essential features of Flachsenius' presentation here, 
without going into its exhausting details. The general meaning of a 
hypothesis is according to Flachsenius manifold. Among other things, 
it means any physical or moral cause, or any demonstrative principle 
which sheds light on a problem.195 Flachsenius distinguishes several 
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uses of the word hypothesis, and it seems that the concept has a dif- 
ferent content in every discipline. In physics a hypothesis has no con-
notation of uncertainty, although it deals with matters not so readily 
known to our senses. 
In Physics [a hypothesis] follows less perfect understanding of cau-
ses, and it means a perception or conclusion which has arisen from 
comparison of things and the matters around them. When a physicist 
inquires into the position, figure, rdundness and other characteristics 
of the earth, the heaven and the heavenly bodies, which he cannot 
see with his eyes and which cannot be explained and presented 
with apodictic demonstrations, he then anxiously proceeds from the 
causes of more apparent things. He nevertheless digs out certain 
judgements and conclusions, with which he indubitably shows that 
the matter can not be otherwise, and names these conclusions hy-
potheses.'96 
194 Gezelius 1672, p. 329. "Sive enim hoc, sive illud [hypothesis] verum sit, Ast-
ronomo etiam falsas hypotheses assumere licet, dummodo tales sint, quibus cal-
culus totuum coelestium, vere & facilius expediri possit." 
195 	 Flachsenius-Grimsteen 1679, Membrum Primum Thes. I. "Omnis causa sive phy-
sica sive moralis... Qvodvis principium demonstrationis, qvo posito rei cognitio 
elucescit." 
196 	 Flachsenius-Grimsteen 1679, Membrum Primum Thes. 2. "In Physicä vero minus 
manifestam causarum cognitionem seqvitur, & ex collatione rerum earundemqve 
circumstantiis, humanae mentis beneficio, enatam perceptionem conclusionemqve 
According to Flachsenius physical hypotheses differred from ast-
ronomical ones. Whereas in physics a hypothesis follows from less 
certain cognition of causes, in astronomy a hypothesis has most of all 
instrumental value. His view is thus directly opposite to that of Kepler, 
for example, who explicitly urged the validity of astronomical hypot-
heses in the physical world.197 For Flachsenius an astronomical hy-
pothesis improperly speaking was the body of astronomical knowled-
ge. Properly speaking a hypothesis was any concept which referred 
to the "real essence" of planetary movements, as inferred from obser-
vations and calculations.198 What Flachsenius then means by the verä 
motuum coelestium essentiä & habitudine is somewhat ambiguous. In 
my reading he is not claiming a more "realist" reading for hypotheses, 
but simply means that some astronomical hypotheses describe the pla-
netary motions better than some others. My reading is supported by 
Flachsenius' view of the finis of astronomical hypotheses. He states 
the aim of hypothesis to provide exact cognition of the movements 
of the celestial bodies so that they make it possible to discern temporal 
differences.199 Indeed, Flachsenius stresses in his work that hypotheses 
are mental concepts which the mind builds up in order to organise 
and understand certain ideas better.'00 Similarly Magnus Steen regards 
hypotheses primarily as mental concepts. He does not differentiate 
between a physical and astronomical hypothesis in this respect: "Phy-
sical and Astronomical hypotheses are cognitive principles, invented 
artificially by the Human mind, in order to ease the understanding of 
the subject matters of the discipline."201  
dicit. Cum enim Physicus de terre, coeli, corporumque coelestium positum, figu-
ram, rotunditatem & habitudinem, qve nec oculis videri, nec apodicticis demon-
strationibus zr5co[?]uS ostendi ac declarari qveunt, inqvirat, anxius sane de appa-
rentiarum causis procedit; certa tarnen Styµarra ac conclusiones, qvibus rem non 
aliter sese habere indubitanter ostendit, emit, easqve hypotheseos nomine insig-
nit." 
197 Westman 1972, p. 240. Kepler, on the other hand distinguished geometrical hy-
potheses from astronomical ones. For the former he did not demand any physical 
reality. 
198 Ibidem. "Idia propria, utputa, doctrinalem conceptum seu sententiam mentem in-
habitantem, de verå motuum coelestium essentiä & habitudine, succursu instru-
mentorum, ingeniiqve industriå cognitam, & calculo Astronomico comprobatam 
innuit." 
199 Flachsenius-Grimsteen 1979, Membrum III Th. 7. 
200 Flachsenius-Grimsteen 1979, Membrum II Th. 5. 
201 Steen-Petrejus 1697, p. 2. "Physicis & Astronomicis hypotheses nihil aliud sunt 
qvam principia cognoscendi a mente Humana artificiose excogitata, ut ad cogni- 
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Steen adopts a strikingly sceptical attitude towards astronomical 
hypotheses in his presentation. Similar views had been already advan-
ced by Flachsenius, who counted them as "impeding causes" of ast-
ronomical hypotheses. Although Flachsenius sees the uncertainty of 
the hypotheses as due to the weakness of man's intelligence as caused 
by the lapse of Adam, he stresses the status of astronomy as science."' 
Steen also attributes the uncertainty of astronomical hypotheses to the 
weakness of our reason. Moreover, the subjects of astronomical study 
are so distant that our senses can scarcely reach them.703 An astronomi-
cal hypothesis can be physically false, and indeed some astronomical 
hypotheses are, because there are many of them, whereas the physical 
truth can be only one.204 All these sceptical arguments had been put 
at the end of the sixteenth century by Nicholaus Ursus and Nicodemus 
Frischlin. Flachsenius even cites Frischlin extensively.205 He does not 
nevertheless adopt Frischlin's extensive scepticism, which denied the 
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possibility of knowledge of the heavens. Hypotheses were theories, 
which were assumed to be true as far as "demonstrations" and calcu-
lations of the astronomical phenomena were concerned, although no 
certain conclusions about the physical structure of the world could be 
drawn. 
How can we account for the fact that these two men, who held 
such divergent views in astronomy, seemingly have such similar ideas 
about the nature of an astronomical hypothesis? Here we have to turn 
our attention to the use these men made of hypothesis in their work. 
What was the function of hypothesis for them? In Flachsenius' work 
the boundary drawn between astronomical and physical hypothesis 
obviously supported his anti-Copemican position. Astronomical hy-
pothesis also gets a meaning for Flachsenius which it had for many 
other authors too: hypothesis is a systema mundi.706 It was a set of 
claims which presented a model of the structure of the world. Using 
somewhat anachronistic terminology we could say that in this sense 
tionem objecti disciplinans eo melius perveniatur." 
202 Flachsenius-Grimsteen 1979, Membrum II Th. 3. 
203 	 Steen-Petrejus 1697, p. 2-3. Cf. also Flachsenius op. cit. 
204 Steen-Petrejus 1697, p. 1-2. "[hypotheses sunt] qvae Astronomice tantum, pro ut 
phasibus respondit, nec non demonstrationibus atque computationibus inserviunt, 
verae supponuntur, licet Physice possint esse falsae, ut ex diversitate illa Hypot-
hesium, qvarum uni tantum veritas Physica competit, facile ligvet." 
205 Jardine I988b. Jardine 1988, p. 700-702. 
206 Flachsenius-Grimsteen 1979, Membrum III. Achrelius 1682, p. 192-201. 
a hypothesis was a fact-claim. But there were several of these fact-
claims around and only one of them could win the prize, i.e. also be 
physically true or at least most truthlike. In much of the discussion 
there seems to be an implicit assumption that an astronomical hypot-
hesis which would sufficiently match the physical expectations could 
indeed also be physically true, although its truth-value could not be 
judged by mathematical standards. Flachsenius's scepticism leaves 
room for the ultimate judge, the Bible, because human reason is in-
capable of settling the matter. The uncertain character of hypotheses 
is evident from the fact that many authors use words such as "opinion" 
in a similar context to that in which the word hypothesis was also 
used.20' 
Steen on the other hand expressly stresses the uncertainty of the 
hypotheses. However, the rest of his discourse implies that in fact he 
believed the Cartesian version of the Copernican hypothesis to be 
physically true. It seems Steen's main motive is to play the old game 	 171 
with a new goal. For the more traditional Aristotelians the hypothetical 
status of heliocentrism made it possible to reject its physical truth 
while taking advantage of the mathematical accuracy it offered. The 
lower status of mathematical/astronomical science secured the mono-
poly of truth for physics in this question. Steen however seems to use 
the cover of hypothetical presentation to advance an idea which was 
found unacceptable by most of the academic community. He could 
not be accused of defending mistaken ideas when he only was ex-
plaining a hypothesis. Probably for this reason he so explicitly throws 
the responsibility of deciding the superiority of the theories on the 
reader. Similar strategies had been used already by Osiander in Co-
pernicus' De Revolutionibus, and by Descartes. He presented his vor-
tex theory as a hypothesis, because it was to be feared that it would 
offend the theological dogma of creation.208 
207 	 E.g. Kexlerus A301, passim, talks of "dhe lärdes åtskillige meeningar" or "the 
various opinions of the learned men" (p. 13). Achrelius 1682, p. 196-197 talks 
of astronomical systems as "sententiae". 
208 	 However, for Descartes the vortex theory was not a hypothesis in the Aristotelian 
sense. In his rhetoric it sometimes functioned as if it were "only a hypothesis", 
though. For Descartes the hypothetical status of the theory primarily meant that 
it was the most probable and truthlike theory of all available explanations. Clarke 
1989, p. 158-159. 
The Influence of Heavenly Bodies upon the Earth 
It has been shown above that in spite of Daniel Achrelius' and Magnus 
Steen's efforts to break the pattern of the traditional Aristotelian 
world-view, essential features of the old world-system were retained. 
Part of this traditional view was the belief in heavenly influences upon 
the Earth. Astronomy and astrology had intermingled as sciences at 
least from the times of Ptolemy, for whom knowing the movements 
of planets was just a means to a higher knowledge about their in-
fluences upon the Earth. On the other hand astrology could be viewed 
as something like physics, which explained terrestrial phenomena by 
reference to the celestial influences. In this sense astrology sought 
support from Aristotle's ideas: Aristotle had asserted in his Meteoro-
logy that the heavenly revolutions were the main cause of all move-
ments and changes upon the Earth. During the Middle Ages and Re- 
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naissance the dogma about the cause-and-effect relationship between 
planets and the elementary world was then further developed, and 
astrology became intimately associated with Aristotelian physics. The 
enterprise of astrology was not without critics, however, as the Chris-
tian Church especially saw heretical features in much of it.709 
Belief in the influence of stars and planets upon the Earth was 
widely accepted in the 17th century as we11,210 and at Turku it was 
self-evidently a part of the official natural philosophy. Every star and 
planet would have virtual or "hidden" qualities, which could influence 
natural processes occurring on the Earth in several ways. There were, 
first of all, astrological influences which caused a certain kind of 
"magnetism".211 On the other hand, light was one of the most com-
monly observed influences, caused especially by the Sun. Let us turn 
first to the astrological influences. 
It is possibly misleading to call these influences astrological, be-
cause the group of phenomena concerned refers to a much greater 
variety of processes than mere astrological events - if astrology is 
understood in its most usual meaning as the practice of reading future 
209 On Ptolemy's astronomy see Taub 1993. Aristotle, Meteorology 339a20-33. On 
Medieval and Renaissance ideas see Steneck 1976, 90-104. Copenhaver 1988. 
Clulee 1988, p. 40-41. 
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	 For a basic treatment of astrology in the 17th century see Thomdike 1958a, p. 
89-152. Thomdike 1958b, p. 302-351. 
211 Certain repulsive and attractive processes were called magnetism in Achrelius' 
natural philosophy. See Kallinen 1991b. 
events from the stars. The heavenly influences were thought to cause 
various kinds of physical events: generation and corruption in general, 
sympathies and antipathies in nature and meteorological phenomena 
were, for example, always affected by the heavenly bodies.212 Judicial 
astrology was in fact a sort of subspecies of this general astrology. 
However, contrary to "physical astrology", judicial astrology was often 
met with disbelief. It is not reasonable to name here all the possible 
processes which were thought to be caused by the heavenly influences. 
Something more general about their causes and effects might however 
still be said. 
The belief in heavenly influences rested most of all on evidence 
provided by everyday experiences and observations, which were ob-
vious and attainable for all. For example the influence of sunlight on 
vegetation was clear for everyone to see. The regularity of certain 
processes on Earth was considered to follow from the regularity of 
the heavenly revolutions. The occurrence of tides and some processes 
in human body (say menstruation) were early associated with the 
moon.213 Why would there not also be other phenomena - albeit not 
so readily recognizable by the senses - which were caused by the 
influence of the planets? Besides, it was argued that everything in 
nature had an end (finis), and the purpose of heavenly bodies was to 
regulate life on Earth by their influences. 
What were these influences and how did they function? Was it a 
question only of the movement which the revolution of the planets 
caused and which was transferred to the elementary sphere? We are 
told only that the ability to influence the Earth was an essential pro-
perty or affection of the heavenly bodies.214 I think, however, that we 
can safely assume these influences not to be material but only virtual 
in the same sense that most medieval authors understood the point. 
The problem was how to attribute qualities such as hot or cold to 
planets which were located in the non-elementary part of the world. 
212 Thauvonius-Holstius 1656, Th. 17. Thauvonius-Thuronius 1651, Th. 32. 
213 Alanus-Lacmannus 1648, Th. XXV. Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, Sectio II, Art. 
II. Ax. 5. Thuronius-Alanus 1664, Th. I. Achrelius 1682, p. 101-102, 120, 122, 
124, 126, 131-135. Hahn-Wijsing 1685, Membr. III, § VI. 
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	 Only Thuronius gives a fuller explanation. Thuronius-Alanus 1664, Th. VI. "Astra 
interventu solius lucis, non operantur, in hisce inferioribus, sed etiam, per alias 
occultas vires, quas communiter, influentias vocant. ...Sunt proinde Influentiae, 
qualitates astrorum nobis incongitae, per quas coelestia illa corpora, peculiares 
circa sublunaria exercent operationes." 
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It was claimed that planets did not have these qualities formaliter but 
only virtualiter, which meant that the aforementioned qualities did not 
inhere in them, but they were capable of producing such effects in 
bodies located in the elementary world.215 In other words the influence 
was in a way qualitative, consisting neither of movement nor of ma-
terial particles. Only in Achrelius' homogeneous cosmos were many 
qualities of the heavenly bodies really attached to their physical bo-
dies, and indeed caused by the four elements. Material effluvium would 
then transfer these qualities from the planets to the Earth. In fact, 
according to Achrelius the influence of the stars on the Earth would 
be possible only if both consisted of the same kind of matter.216 
 Ge-
zelius, on the other hand stresses that the heavenly matter has the 
"excellent" property of being able to penetrate other bodies - some-
thing which the coarser elements were not able to do. In this way 
they could spread their powers more widely.217 
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Even though the whole enterprise of astrometeorology was based 
on the assumption that weather could be forecasted by calculating the 
movements of the planets, and thus the amount of various influences 
upon Earth, influences would not always act that directly. It was often 
stressed that stars could not force human will, because it was ens 
immaterialis. Only indirectly, by affecting the human body, could stars 
influence human behaviour. On the other hand, the influence of the 
stars was considered to be of a very general nature. For example in 
generation processes the heavenly influences acted only as a universal 
cause, which could not only by itself initiate the process (sol & homine 
generant hominem). No heavenly influences had fatal effects. The ac-
tivity of influences could also be inhibited, for example if other more 
efficacious mundane causes intervened.218 
215 Grant 1978, p. 286-289. See also Flachsenius-Lund 1679, positio tertia. "[Sol] 
Virtualiter vero ardorem excitat quod non facultate quadam innatå ex forma prof-
luente, verum virtute diversarum rerum sibi adunitarum aliquid facit incalescere." 
216 Achrelius 1682, p. 11-12. 
217 
	
	 Gezelius 1672, p. 245. "Tertium [accidens coelis] est, vis penetrandi per alia 
copora, qua etiam coelum excellit; reliqua inferiora corpora seriatim decrescunt. 
Est enim ea coelestium corporurn vis, ut latissime & longissime possint suas vires 
spargere, etiam per densissima corpora." 
218 Alanus-Lacmannus 1648, Th. XXVI. Petraeus-Wallenius 1674b, Th. XV. Thu-
ronius-Alanus 1664, Corollaria 1-2. Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, Sectio II, Art. II. 
Ax. 5. Thauvonius-Holstius 1656, Quaest. 12. Thauvonius-Thuronius 1651, Th. 
35, 36. Hahn-Chorinus 1685, Th. III. Hahn-Wijsing 1685, Membr. II, § VI, Qva;st. 
I-II. Flachsenius-Bergius 1682, Th. V. On the universality of influences Thu- 
Light and Darkness 
"Light is a quality of a luminous body, by the virtue of which it is 
luminous itself and illuminates others."219 This was a very typical de-
finition of light. Light was a quality which substantially pertained only 
to certain kinds of bodies. Stars and the sun had so-called lux prima-
eva, which was an inborn quality created in them by God. Although 
light was considered as a quality, it was also called the matter of these 
luminary celestial bodies.270 Lux spread from its source by radii and 
formed lumen, the visible light, which was in fact the precondition 
for all vision. Different types of radii (rectus, obliquus, rusus, fractus, 
refractus) were distinguished, but a more detailed analysis of them 
was never made, since it was considered to be the subject matter of 
optics.221  
Light and radius were called qualities for certain metaphysical rea-
sons: 
Who would doubt that light and radius are not qualities after I have 
above shown light to be like a quality. They are like progeny [of 
lux] as they disperse through the entire air, which bodies could not 
do without penetrating dimensions.222 
ronius-Alanus 1664, Th. II-III, VII-VIII. 
219 Thauvonius-Lucander 1653, Th. III. "Lux est qualitas corporis lucidi, qua ipsum 
lucidum est & alia illuminat." 
220 Alanus-Moderus 1645, Th. II. "Stellae sunt corpora naturalia simplicia, å Deo 
conditore omnium, ex luce primogenia, quartå creationis die facta...", V. Alanus-
Lacmannus 1648, Th. V, IX, XVII. Thauvonius-Lucander 1653, Th. X. Thau-
vonius-Thuronius 1651, Th. 13, 20-23. Thauvonius-Holstius 1656, Th. 9, 14. Ach-
relius widens the class of luminous bodies: Achrelius 1682, p. 20-21. "Lux vero 
illa, quae corporibus concreata est, Originalis appellatur: residetque in stellarum 
plurimis, in Sole, in Cincidelis, Gemmis noctilucis & similibus, in quibus perpetua 
agitatione, lucida materia sese agitat, å centro ad peripheriam." Hahn-Wijsing 
1685, Membr. II, § IV. 
221 Alanus-Moderus 1645, Th. VII-XI. Alanus-Lacmannus 1648, Th. XVIII-XXI. 
Thauvonius-Lucander 1653, Th. XV. Thauvonius-Thuronius 1651, Th. 26-28. Op-
tics was the main theme only in one mathematical thesis published in the period 
concerned. Kexlerus-Lithovius 1650. 
222 Thauvonius-Thuronius 1651, Th. 27. "Qualitates esse lumen & radios non est 
quod quis ambigat, tum quod lucis quam qualitatem esse supra probavim: sint 
soboles, tum quod per totum aera se diffundant, quod corpora sine penetratione 
dimensionum praestare non possunt." On the ideas on penetratio dimensiorum 
see e.g. Grant 1981. 
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It was one of the metaphysical principles of the Aristotelian natural 
philosophy that two bodies could not occupy the same place. In scho-
lastic terms, no penetratio dimensionum could occur.22' A quality was 
a nonmaterial and thus a nondimensional entity, thus explaining the 
almost ubiquitous presence of light. 
Light was thus the most sensible one of the celestial influences. 
Warmth was another quality which often accompanied light. It had 
been usual in Aristotelian natural philosophy to see warmth being 
caused by the movement of the Sun. Indeed, this activity was even 
used as an argument against Copernicanism, defending the necessity 
of the movement of the Sun instead of its standing still in the centre 
of the world.274 Quite a few authors at Turku saw it as essential to 
refute this view. It was not movement which caused warmth and heat; 
rather, the rays of the Sun had the virtue of extracting fiery atoms 
from bodies, whereby the released atoms were enabled to utilize their 
176 	 quality or ability of warming up.225 
We have learnt that the existence of privatio, as the non-existence 
of form was refuted at Turku. There were, however, no obstacles to 
accepting privation in another sense. Privation of a quality was per-
fectly possible, because a quality was always dependent on the entire 
substance. Shadows and darkness were nothing more than privations 
of the quality of light. 
Light is opposite to shadow and darkness. Shadow is privation of 
light caused by the interposition of opaque body in the direction of 
light. Darkness on the other hand is privation of light caused by 
the absence of the luminous body.226 
223 See also Hahn-Herkepacus 1703, p. 3-5. 
224 Sandblad 1944, p. 164-165. Aristotle, On the Heavens 289a20-35, Meteorology 
340612-14, 341a13-36. 
225 Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, Sectio II, Membr. II, Artic. II, Ax. 1. Thauvonius-
Thuronius 1651, Th. 33. Thuronius-Alanus 1664, Th. IV-V. Hahn-Wijsing 1685, 
Membr. III, § II. Flachsenius-Lund 1679, positio tertia. 
226 Alanus-Moderus 1645, Th. XII. "Lumini opponitur umbra & tenebrae. Illa est 
privatio luminis ob interpositionem opaci facta in parte luci opposita; hae vero 
sunt privatio luminis ob remotionem corporis lucidi facta." See also Thauvonius-
Lucander 1653, Th. XVI. Thauvonius-Thuronius 1651, Th. 29. Achrelius 1682, 
p. 26-30; on Achrelius' theory of medical effects of shadows see Kallinen 1991, 
p. 56. 
It seems appropriate to deal with ideas on the formation of colours 
along with the theories of light. Doing this we have to notice the 
slight anachronism of this move, because these things were not usually 
handled together in the 17th-century dissertations. Theories of colours 
were dealt with very seldom, anyway. Light was a prerequisite for 
seeing colours, but otherwise they were not thought to be related phe-
nomena. Colours were, so to speak, chemical properties of mixed bo-
dies, caused by minute particles of sulphur. These colours were called 
real (colori reali). Although no variations of rarity and density or 
perspicuity and opacity could form colours, on some occasions refle-
xions of light or mutations in the media between the coloured object 
and the eye could create the illusion of certain colours. These so-called 
apparent colours (as contrary to colori reali) could be seen e.g. in 
rainbows, clouds and the feathers of certain birds.227 
3. METEOROLOGY 
The rise of experimental science in the 17th century changed the who-
le image of physics. Meteorology also changed from an almost totally 
theoretical discipline to an experimental science par excellence. It star-
ted building its theories on Newtonian physics, and it made experi-
ments and observations. Many of the measuring instruments developed 
in the 17th century which played a crucial role in the rise of modern 
meteorology have more or less come to symbolize the Scientific Re-
volution. The thermometer, barometer, hygrometer and anemometer 
among other instruments were all innovations of the 17th century, 
born along with the interest in and admiration for measurement in 
science.228  
Meteorology was, however, an integral part of university curricu-
lums long before the meteorology based on observation and measure-
ment was born. It was this antique and medieval tradition of mete-
orology which was taught at the University of Turku too. Faint echoes 
227 Achrelius 1682, p. 30-36, 282-284. Hahn-Bjurbeck 1697. 
228 Frisinger 1977, p. 47-95. 
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of the developments in the 17th-century meteorology in Europe were 
heard at Turku only during the first few decades of the 18th century. 
Two different kinds of meteorological tradition can be discerned at 
the University of Turku. Firstly there was a medieval tradition of ast-
rometeorology, which only the professors of mathematics took an ac-
tive interest in. Secondly, there was a tradition of philosophical me-
teorology, which was a part of the traditional physics. Even in the 
seventeenth century both were seen as separate from each other. 
Astrometeorology 
Astrometeorology was an attempt to forecast weather from astronomi-
cal and astrological calculations. In the ancient Greek tradition weather 
had already been forecast by means of the ascension and descension 
of certain stars.279 Astrometeorology became popular in Europe during 
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	 the Middle Ages. As early as the 11th century astrometeorological 
texts translated from Arabic to Latin circulated widely, but the activity 
of Latin authors reached its peak especially in the 12th and 13th cen-
turies. Scholars well-versed in astrometeorology could be found in all 
educated classes of a medieval society, from university astronomers 
to court astrologers, monks and doctors.23° 
Astrometeorology was based on the assumption that heavenly bo-
dies could influence weather conditions and the state of health. The 
influence of stars on weather and through that on health is an apparent 
supposition in the Hippocratic writings.231 On the other hand the Aris-
totelian tradition, which established its position in European learning 
during the 13th century, presupposed very clearly a causal relationship 
between the movements of the planets and the changes in the elemen-
tary world.232 The theory of four elements was interrelated with ast-
rology since every planet would have characteristic cooling, heating, 
moistening or drying effects. The movements of the planets on the 
zodiac were of crucial importance in the theoretical construction of 
astrometeorology. If a planet was situated in its own house (i.e. in the 
229 Taub 1993, p. 125. Aristotle's most famous disciple, Theophrastus also wrote a 
treatise "On Weather Signs". 
230 Jenks 1983, p. 185-189, 195-197. 
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	 Hippocrates 1983, p. 149. "...astronomy plays a very important part in medicine 
since the changes of the seasons produce changes in diseases." 
232 Grant 1978, p. 288-289. 
sign in which it was created), the planet's influence was strengthened. 
On the other hand, if a planet was in a sign of a different nature or 
if another planet with a different nature was in the same sign, all 
influences were cancelled. During the seventeenth century especially 
the role of conjunctions and oppositions of planets in predicting the 
weather grew in importance. In principle, weather-forecasting was the-
refore a relatively simple process of adding up and subtracting relevant 
influences at a given time. The planet with the greatest influence 
would determine the weather.23' 
In Central Europe the basic dogma of astrometeorology held good 
until the 17th century at least. Occasional differences emerged in met-
hods of calculating the movements of the planets and concerning in-
terpretations of the meanings of different planetary constellations. Alt-
hough not much was said about the theoretical grounds of astromete-
orology, it seems that these same basic assumptions were held at Tur- 
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It was the professors of mathematics who dealt with astrometeoro-
logy. Because only they had the know-how for computing the plane-
tary movements, it became a part of their job to compile a yearly 
almanac for the latitude of Turku. In the 17th century the so-called 
prognosticons were an integral part of the almanacs. Prognosticons 
were weather forecasts made by astrometeorological methods, usually 
covering the entire year. The professors of mathematics seem to have 
had no interest in astrometeorology other than almanac-making. No 
trace of astrometeorology can be found in their dissertations, which 
mainly concentrated on questions concerning arithmetic, geometry and 
mathematical astronomy. All in all astrometeorology was regarded as 
separate both from astronomy and from physics.73' 
In the middle of the 17th century the validity of astrometeorology 
had not yet been called into question, although the general restrictions 
of astrological prediction were approved. The physicists shared the 
belief in astrometeorology with the mathematicians: 
277 Jenks 1983, p. 190. Kelly 1991, p. 156-160. 
234 Thauvonius-Ikalensis 1656, Th. VIII. Kexlerus 1661, p. 49 ff. Angervo 1957, p. 
89-96. On computation methods in almanac-making see Kelly 1991. 
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	 The only exception to this is Kexlerus 1661. De Tempore is a textbook on chro-
nology and compiling almanacs, and thus it also deals briefly with astrometeoro-
logy. 
6. Astrologers can make predictions which are based on observa-
tions of stars. 
Some people deny this strenuously, some affirm it more eagerly 
than is justifiable. You will be on most secure ground in between 
these opinions. It is useless and vain to try to predict from the stars 
advice for individual persons, the course of their lives, marriages 
and deaths. This rejects the freedom of will and is unjust towards 
God. Astronomers can see rains, ilnesses, colds and infertility, but 
not as they would happen necessarily but only contingently. It is 
up to the most supreme director to mutate it a11.236 
It seems, though, that in the latter part of the 17th century and 
especially at the beginning of the 18th century the results of astrome-
teorological forecasts and the basis of the theory itself were called 
into question more and more frequently.237 Mathematicians seem to 
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have lost their reliance on astrometeorology earlier than those versed 
in physics. But the common folk wanted their forecasts: in spite of 
some unsuccessful attempts to omit astrometeorological prognosticons 
from the almanacs, some relics of this tradition were preserved as 
long as till 1887.2238  
236 	 Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, Sectio I, Membr. II, Artic. IV. Axiom. 6."6. Astrologi 
ex observatione syderum praedicare possunt. Quidam hoc strenue negant, quidam 
largius aequo affirmant; medio tutissimis ibis. Ex astris velle singulorum hominum 
consilia, vitae cursum, conjugia & mortem praedicere vanissima est vanitas; tollit 
enim libertatem voluntatis, & DEUM injustum facit. Possunt pluviae, morbi, fri-
gora, sterilitates &c. praecemi non ut necessariö sed ut contingenter fiant: Penes 
enim supremum directorem est ea immutare." See also Sectio II, Membr. II, Artic. 
III, Ax. 5. Flachsenius-Bergius 1682, Th. V. 
237 Kexlerus, Almanach 1650, p. 18, Cap. I. Kexlerus A.S., Almanach 1678, p. 18. 
Tammelin, Almanach 1700, p. 15, et passim. Tammelin, Almanach 1705, p. 28. 
"Mutta mitä Almanacan kirjoittajat puhuwat ilmasta/ se on turha/ ja on se joca 
sen ensin alkanut on/ enämmin pyytänyt pettä cuin ylösraketa/ yhtestä cansa..." 
("What the authors of the almanacs write about the weather is nothing, and the 
one who first started doing it has wanted more to cheat folk than to be useful.") 
Tammelin, Almanach 1722, Prognosticon. Hasselbom, Almanach 1726. Hassel-
bom, Almanach 1732. Et alia. 
238 	 Vallinkoski 1957, p. 314-315. Angervo 1957, p. 93. Vilkuna 1957, p. 12-13. See 
also Hasselbom, Almanach 1727, p. 15 ff. Hasselbom, Almanach 1732, p. 15-16. 
Philosophical Meteorology 
Whereas astrometeorology was mainly directed at the reading public 
outside the University, the other tradition of meteorology remained 
purely academic. Aristotle had already included meteorology in the 
field of natural philosophy. According to another great ancient autho-
rity in meteorology, Seneca, "Omnis de universo quaestio in caelestia, 
sublimia, terrena dividitur." i.e. all research concerning the universe 
can be divided into astronomy, meteorology and geography.239 
Classifying and making divisions was typical of Aristotelian and 
Scholastic natural philosophy. Although classifying the concepts was 
supposed to reveal knowledge about the causes of a phenomena, it 
was, on the other hand, quite simply a method of organizing compli-
cated knowledge in a logical form. It would be false to claim, though, 
that classifying the phenomena was the main concern in dissertations 
written at Turku.240 The source and behaviour of meteorological phe-
nomena were usually more deeply studied topics. The classification 
is, however, a key to understanding the meteorological theories. 
Meteorological phenomena were usually classified by two princi-
ples: the material cause of the phenomena and the modes of their 
manifestations. The latter distinguished between the so-called real phe-
nomena (meteora hypostatica) and apparent phenomena (meteora em-
pathica). Real phenomena were based on some element or other subs-
tance which really existed in the physical world (like rain or wind). 
On the other hand, there were the apparent phenomena, which were 
not of the substance they seemed to be: "Qvae speciem, qva adparent, 
non obtinent realem". Most of these phenomena, such as rainbows, 
halos and parhelia could be explained by different reflexions of light. 
Some fiery phenomena appeared to be or were actually caused by the 
elementary fire.24' Shooting stars and a number of other, fabulous phe-
nomena also belong to this group.242 
239 Aristotle 1978, 338a20-339a5, p. 4-5. Seneca 1972 II, 1.1-3, p. 98. See also 
Wallace 1988, p. 211. Seneca's division was adopted by Achrelius. In his Con-
templationes mundi the first book deals mainly with astronomical matters, the 
second book is called "Meteorologicus" and the third "Geotechnicus". 
240 An exception to this might be Gezelius 1672, p. 245-260, where classification 
and definition are the main concerns in presenting the whole system of knowledge. 
241 Thauvonius-Ikalensis 1656, Th. X. Hahn-Unnerus 1698, p. 12. Hahn-Melliin 
1686, p. 15, 35. Hahn-Pryss 1691, p. 3. Gezelius 1672, p. 246, 257, 259. 
242 Hahn-Unnerus 1698, p. 11. "STELLA CADENS est Meteorum Emphaticum, ex 
effluvio superne accenso genitum, & ob loci frigiditatem repressum atqve deorsum 
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A phenomenon typical of the northern areas of our globe is the 
Northern lights or aurora borealis. Ancient authors most probably 
knew about the phenomenon243, and most of the scholars at Turku 
must have had personal experiences of the aurora. However, there is 
no common term for the Northern lights in classical and early modern 
literature. It is probable that at least some of the more fabulous no-
minations for apparent phenomena describe Northern lights of diffe-
rent forms. However, descriptions of e.g. draco volans, capra saltans, 
trabs, fax, flamma, pyramides, clypeus ardens, etc. are so short and 
vague that it is impossible to identify the phenomenon described.244 
Scholars at Turku did not make any personal contributions in this 
field, confining themselves in writing of those phenomena which their 
model authors had also written about. At the end of the 17th century 
an interest in aurora borealis finally was aroused in Europe and at 
the same time this new term was adopted to describe the phenomenon 
182 	 and to distinguish it from others.245 
The unusual composition of apparent phenomena provoked the 
question of whether they could be studied in physics at all. Physics 
would only study real entities, and apparent phenomena were not 
that.246  Pryss sought the solution to his own question from the various 
senses in which we could claim an entity to be realis. He ended up 
saying that the rainbow was real in the sense that it had an actual 
existence outside men's mind.247 In this way apparent phenomena 
could also be subject to physical enquiry. 
Every real phenomenon was dominated by one of the four elements, 
which was at the same time the material cause of the phenomenon. 
We can easily imagine how water would dominate clouds, rain, snow, 
rainbows, dew and other "wet" phenomena. The element of air would 
be the material cause of winds and earthquakes, whereas thunders- 
detrusum, Stellarum e coelo Cadentium imaginem offerens." 
243 Stothers 1979, has tried to reconstruct the ancient auroral cycle by comparing 
mentions in classical literature. Stothers identifies some phenomena mentioned 
in literature as auroras on grounds, which can be severely criticized. Nevertheless, 
it seems that the aurora borealis was known at least to some scholars in the Greek 
and Roman period. 
244 E.g. Achrelius 1682, p. 152-154. Gezelius 1679, p. 247-248, 258. 
245 Briggs 1967. 
246 Hahn-Pryss 1691, p. 3. "Meteora Emphatica vera sunt Phasmata & simulacra, 
qvae mirifice nos fallunt atque ludunt, Enda non sint realia adeoque nec Consi-
derationis Physicae, siquidem Physica ut Disciplina est Realis, ita realia tractat." 
247 Hahn-Pryss 1691, p. 3. 
torms, igni fatui and related phenomena were based on the element 
of fire.248 Earthquakes were also ranked among meteorological phe-
nomena, because they were thought to be caused by moving air or 
winds in underground tunnels and cavities. This Aristotelian theory 
was the most popular during the 17th century together with another 
explanation which originates from Seneca stating that earthquakes 
were caused by explosions. This theory was modified in the 17th cen-
tury by aligning it with the Paracelsian tradition. According to this 
version "chemical" substances contained by the air ("sulphur", "nitre") 
were fracted, and if they exploded in a closed cavity, an earthquake 
was caused.249 
Some of the 17th-century authors on meteorology still maintained 
Aristotle's idea that comets were also atmospheric phenomena. Ac-
cording to Aristotle comets could be caused, when hot and dry exha-
lations caught fire in the highest parts of the atmosphere. Falling stars 
would be effected in the same way. On the other hand, comets could 	 183 
appear in the heavens if they were formed from an exhalation from 
moving fixed stars.250 These kinds of comets were thus halos of stars. 
The scholars most eager to explain comets and "new stars" as meteora 
were those who were devoted to maintaining the theory of the immu-
tability of the heavens. This theory was threatened by the accumula-
ting quantity of new observations by Brahe, Galileo and others.25' 
However, although there was no complete agreement about the loca-
tion of comets, the Aristotelian account of their composition had been 
discarded much earlier on certain optical evidence. Whatever their 
location, comets could not be formed of dry and hot exhalations. By 
the time of Brahe the view that comets had the form of spherical 
lenses had been accepted by most major astronomers in northern Eu-
rope. In other words, Aristotle's account of the constitution of the 
comets was rejected earlier than his ideas about their location, which 
was finally done mostly by Brahe and Maestlin.752 
248 Thauvonius-Ikalensis 1656, Th. VII-IX. 
249 Aristotle 1978, II.7., 365 b 21-366 a 5, p. 204-205. Seneca 1972 VI, 12.1-2, s. 
162-163. Frängsmyr 1969, p. 45-47. Thauvonius-Ikalensis 1656, Th. IX. Achre-
lius, s. 187-188. 
250 	 Aristotle 1978, 344a8-b8, p. 48-53. See also e.g. Fromondus 1627, p. 88, 100-103. 
251  Debus 1980, p. 89. Drake 1981, p. 104-106, 267. On the Aristotelian response 
in general see Grant 1984. For a description of the development of the theory of 
comets see also the somewhat whiggish book of Yeomans 1991. 
252 Barker 1993. 
184 
VA R IFE C0ME'i'ARU;Ii FIGURT. 
Ekedahl distinguishes three explanations of comets in his thesis in 1695. 'The Aristotelians° 
believe comets arise from dry exhalations rising from the earth to the higher atmosphere, 
where they are ignited by the fire of the stars. The second class of scholars think comets 
to be some kind of cloud, or conjunction of two stars. The third opinion states comets to 
be planets, and Ekedahl places Descartes in this group: Cartesian comets are just planets 
moving from one vortex to another. Ekedahl cannot accept any of these theories, but thinks 
comets to be portents originated by God. 
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This viewpoint of the astronomers is by and large accepted in phy-
sics as well as in mathematics at Turku. Although it seems that there 
was long-standing uncertainty about the real nature of the comets, in 
dissertations written at Turku it is clearly denied that comets could 
be meteorological phenomena. Most authors at Turku considered co-
mets too big to be made up of exhalations from earth.25' 
It is incredible that such an abundance of vapours would expire 
from the earth. If you think about the magnitude of comets, you 
find them with such a mass that even if the entire earth dissolved 
into steam, it hardly would be enough for forming and supporting 
even one of them.254 
Besides, weather changed rapidly, whereas comets, the milky way, 
etc., always kept the same height and were also otherwise constant.255  
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This kind of argument had been already proposed by Seneca, whose 
influence on the discussion on comets had greatly increased during 
the 16th century.756 As we have seen, the origin of these phenomena 
was regarded as supernatural at Turku. However, the old tradition of 
regarding them as meteorological phenomena was close enough, so 
that the question was occasionally handled along with meteorology. 
The General Causes of Meteorological Phenomena 
Before we turn our attention to the alleged efficient causes of mete-
orological phenomena, a word ought to be said about their location. 
As we have learnt, the (element) air occupied the space between 
earth/water and the sphere of the Moon. (Fire was to be found eve-
rywhere in nature.) The lowest layer of the atmosphere (infima aeris 
regio) was very warm, because Sun's rays reflected from the earth 
253 	 Hahn-Ekedahl 1695, p. 7-8, et passim. Achrelius 1682, p. 135-136. In other me-
teorological dissertations comets were not even mentioned. 
254 Achrelius 1682, p. 135-136. "Incredibile quoque est tam prodigiosa flatuum vo-
lumina e terrin exspirari: Nam si quis magnitudinem cometarum considerare velit, 
inveniet tantam eorum molem esse, ut si tota in fumos tellus fatisceret, vix uni 
alendo & formando sufficeret..." 
255 Thauvonius-Ikalensis 1656, Th. IV. Thauvonius-Eurenius 1655, Th. V. 
256 	 Barker 1993, p. 3-4. Whereas in the Middle Ages discussion of comets was en-
tirely based on Aristotle's Meteorologica, from the 16th century on Seneca's 
arguments achieve ever-growing popularity. 
and winds warmed up by "underground fire" (ignis subterraneus) al-
ways tended to warm it up. The underground tunnels of air were coun-
ted in this region, too. The middle region of the atmosphere "begins 
from the region up to where the rays of the Sun are reflected back, 
and extends itself almost to the peaks of highest mountains."257 The 
coolness of this region was for the most part caused by vapours. The 
highest layer, which extended from "the peaks of the highest moun-
tains" up to the sphere of the Moon, was in turn very warm, because 
it was nearest to the Sun. Because air was a continuous body, no 
precise altitudes of the regions could be given. It was said that exact 
numbers would easily mislead, because the borders of these regions 
changed according to the weather conditions. All in all, the physical 
differences between these layers of air played an important role in 
explaining the birth of most meteorological phenomena.258 
Most of the real meteorological phenomena were caused by similar 
processes. Although God was always mentioned as the supreme and 
the most fundamental effective cause of all processes in nature, more 
particular causes were also always sought. The most essential role 
was played by the Sun. The rays of the Sun had power to extract 
vapour or effluvium from the earth, water and all other material ob-
jects. Two types of this effluvium existed, the one was dry, so-called 
exhalatio and the other moist, consisting chiefly of water vapour.259 
Sometimes the contents of the effluvium was presented in a very dra-
matic way: 
...the director of years and months, days and nights, the magnet of 
the World, life and soul, i.e. the Sun often agitates this inferior 
region together with all the army of Celestial bodies. This also ext-
racts and resolves with its attractive virtue sulphurous and greasy 
exhalations from swampy tracts, fields destined for execution of 
criminals, butcher's markets and graveyards. These released parti-
cles are then elevated and spread to form auroras which are some-
times to be seen towards the rise of the Sun.26o 
257 Achrelius 1682, p. 149 "a spacio reflexionis radiorum solarium incipit, & fere 
ad altiora culmina montium sese extendit". 
258 Thauvonius-Wellerius 1653, Th. 13-27. 
259 Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, Sect. II. Membr. II. passim. Hahn-Widebeck 1702, 
p. 22-31. Hahn-Melliin 1686, p. 12, et passim. Hahn-Unnerus 1698, p. 6, 27. 
Hahn-Heurlin 1702, p. 6-7. Hahn-Melander 1693, p. 12-13, et passim. Achrelius 
1682, p. 147, 155, 160, 163, et passim. Laurbecchius-Wännergreen 1688, p. 5. 
260 Hahn-Unnerus 1698, p. 15. "...annorum nempe et mensium, dierum & noctium 
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Exhalations consisting of various matter would be elevated up to 
the middle region of the atmosphere, which was cooler than the re-
gions above and below it. Vapours were condensed by cold either to 
rain or to snow or hailstones, depending on the intensity of the cooling. 
The movement of the effluvia in itself caused a meteorological phe-
nomenon, namely the wind.261 Vapour containing "sulphur" and "nitre" 
could explode and cause a thunderstorm and lightning.262 In other 
words, the composition of the vapour played a crucial role in deter-
mining what kind of phenomenon would actually develop. 
Composition and Essence of Meteorological 
Phenomena 
The composition of the vapour not only determined what kind of phe-
nomenon was to come into existence but it also decreed what kind 
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of effects it was to have. Meteorological phenomena were, in a sense, 
something like a sum of their component parts. The structure of me-
teorological phenomena gave rise to a peculiar problem about their 
ontological status. In order to clarify what this problem was all about, 
we have to look at the way the essence of meteorological phenomena 
was defined. 
These phenomena were thought to be bodies which were made of 
imperfectly mixed elements. Therefore they had no permanent, subs-
tantial form or essence, but only an accidental one.26' Now we have 
learned that accidents could not exist separately, without belonging to 
some substance proper. How could it then be said that meteorological 
phenomena were only accidental? The explanation given might not 
Rector, Mundi magnes, anima & vita Sol videlicet, cum toto Coeli exercitu, qvi 
nunqvam non in hunc orbem inferiorem agitat: qvae & elevans, qvod virtute sua 
adtractiva, exhalationes sulphureas & oleaginosas a paludibus uliginosis, campis 
suppliciis sceleratorum desti natis, macellis, coemiteriis extrahit atqve resolvit, 
partesqve resolutas qvod ad ortum solis interdum videre est, in auras spargit." 
261 	 Hahn-Alm-Qwist 1688, p. 3. Hahn-Melliin 1686, p. 25-26, 29, 33. Achrelius 1682, 
p. 169. 
262 	 Hahn-Melliin 1686, p. 18. Hahn-Heurlin 1702, p. 4-5. Achrelius 1682, p. 155. A 
competing Cartesian theory of the birth of lightning was argued by Hahn-Melan-
der 1693. Warm air condenses a cloud located higher than others. A condensed 
cloud is heavier and it falls on other clouds below it. It is this collision which 
finally causes lightning. There were thus a "chemical" theory and a mechanical 
one. Hahn-Melander 1693, p. 23-25. Descartes 1644, p. 260, 282. 
263 Hahn-Melliin 1686, p. 7. Hahn-Alm-Qwist 1688, p. 10-11. Hahn-Bjurbeck 1696, 
p. 6. Hahn-Heurlin 1702, p. 8. Achrelius 1682, p. 148. 
be totally satisfactory from the philosophical point of view. It was 
stated that accidents never actually left their proper substances, i.e. 
the minute particles which constitute the vapour or exhalation. These 
accidents have, however, a power to affect other things outside them-
selves. In my reading these accidents are able to bring forth a more 
general, but still an accidental form, which keeps all the particles of 
the phenomenon together. 
And this mass and congeries of Elements is what we call a Shooting 
Star. This is not an entity per se as State, Congregation, army and 
forest are not. This is because it is not caused by one substantial 
form, but by an accidential one. It has as many forms as it has 
constituent parts or components. In this way there is in an army as 
many distinct forms as there are individuals. ...This falling of Stars 
is connected by a kind of common form, but not a substantial and 
specific one, which gives an entity an independent essence, and 
distinguishes it from others and makes it act. But it [is connected 
by] an accidental form which unites it per accidens.264 
This theory was closely connected to corpuscular theories - in this 
case minima mixta. 
If any man insists like grim death that lightning ought to be con-
ceded a form, we would not admit any other kind of a form to exist 
but that which belongs to the bodies from which these particles 
have come loose. These particles have then gathered up and con-
glomerated into this inflammable exhalation. These very small par-
ticles, risen high in the air... do not give up their proper forms, but 
each one of them keeps its own nature and form..•265 
264 Hahn-Unnerus 1698, p. 4. "Sed cumulus & congeries Elementorum, & hoc ipsum 
est, qvod Stella audit Cadens; & cum illa, aeqve ac Respublica, Ecclesia, exer-
citus, sylva, non sit ens per se, qvod sit vi unius formae substantialis, sed per 
accidens, qvod tot habet formas, qvot partes integrantes vei componentes; ut in 
exercitu, tot formae numero distinctae, qvot individuae; ...hane Stellarum trajec-
tionem, communi qvadam forma connecti, verum non substantiali & specifica, 
qvae dat rei esse per se, datqve distingvi & operari; sed accidentali, qvae dat per 
accidens." See also Achrelius 1682, p. 148. "...corpuscula enim minima, sublata 
& inter se permixta, retinent quaelibet suam naturam ac formam..." 
265 Hahn-Melander 1693, p. 19. "Si qvis mordicus insisterat aliqvam fulmini conce-
dendam esse formam, tum nullam aliam admittimus, qvam ipsorum corporum, e 
qvibus progressae sunt particulae illae in exhalationem inflammabilem collectae 
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Meteorological phenomena were the first type of mixture, which 
were not proper mixtures at all in the sense that they did not form a 
new compositum, a new substance. Therefore they retain a somewhat 
ambiguous position in the natural philosophical system favoured at 
Turku. 
Observing and Forecasting the Weather 
As far as it is known to us, no series of observations of the weather 
were made at Turku in the 17th century. Occasional notions did exist, 
of course, like Achrelius' very general comment that thunderstorms 
are most frequent "in the northern regions" in summertime and in 
early autumn.266 
In certain parts of North Germany meteorological observations had 
been made as early as the 1530's. Although no official organization 
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	 for observation existed, relatively long and regular series of observa- 
tions dating from the 17th century are not rare. It is worth noticing 
that all people making the observations were laymen and none of them 
was a proponent of the academic natural philosophy.267 Of course, 
because all measuring equipment and uniform standards were still 
lacking, the notes have a very general character: "cold", "rainy in the 
evening", "south wind" or perhaps "mild springlike weather". 
The purpose of these observations was to control forecasts made 
by astrometeorological methods. It was usual to think that weather 
conditions were repeated every seven or nineteen years, because of 
certain regularities in the phases of the moon. Therefore many astro-
meteorologists tended to make at least seven-year series of observa-
tions.268 Because the astrometeorological tradition was well established 
in Finland also, it would be reasonable to expect such attempts at 
control to have existed here, too. 
All notes of (astro)meteorological observations made in the 17th 
century are very fragmentary. They consist of sporadic notes in ca- 
& conglobatae, minutissima enim corpora in altum sublata, ...formas suas non 
deponunt, sed qvodlibet suam naturam & formam retinent..." 
266 Achrelius 1682, s. 156. "Apud nos v. hic sub septentrione, aestate conspiciuntur 
fulmina crebra, ut & autumn totis noctibus, si modo Coelum fuerit serenum, 
quod me saepius notasse memini, quando circa Litora, ad retia cum piscatoribus 
cubarem." 
267 Klemm 1976, s. 5, 24, 28-37, et passim. 
268 	 Klemm 1976, s. 19, 20, 24, 28, 31, 37, et passim. 
lendars and are moreover very difficult to trace to any greater extent. 
In the eighteenth century meteorological observations became more 
common, but they were no longer related to the astrometeorological 
tradition. They had, instead, motives which were inspired by some-
thing like mere curiosity concerning the nature's regularities, or by 
the spirit of the Era of Utility.269 
Forecasting weather was mainly a concern of astrometeorology, but 
philosophers also suggested some general instructions for interpreting 
the signs of nature and other portents. Kexlerus' instructions for ma-
king prognosticons reveal that knowledge was already very stand-
ardized at that time: "It is customary to predict for the peasants as 
many stormy rains for the summertime as there are days in March of 
misty constitution. And as many snowfalls will come after Easter, and 
as many clouds will empty themselves in August as there are rainy 
nights in March."270 
It was typical of this kind of forecasts that they attempted to fore- 	 191 
cast weather (or other occurrences concerning health or society) on 
the basis of the weather conditions at the moment of making the fo- 
recast. 
In January... 
Clear Paul's day means a good year: 
If there are winds, they signify fights among people: 
If there are fogs, some animals will die: 
If snow or rain, the times will be dear. 
269 	 Tammelin, Almanach 1725, Prognosticon. "Efter några nästförledne wintrar warit 
aldeles sålsamme/ och lika såsom ifrån then wanlige natursens gång förandrade, 
observerade jag och upskref förledit åhr wäderleken/ på alla dagar i de tre första 
månademe/ hwilka woro såsom följer... Widare observerade jag intet/ eller gaf 
så noga acht på naturens sälsamma omwärling/ efter winteren war förbij/ och 
währ wederleken syntes blifwa favorablare och lijka som draga naturen uti sitt 
förra skick." Hellant, Almanach 1748, made notes concerning the break-up of ice 
in the river Tornio. He wanted to find out whether the late breaking-up of ice, 
which correlated with crop failure, followed at any certain intervals and whether 
they could thus be predicted. 
270 	 Kexlerus 1661, p. 04. "Usitatum est colonis praedicere tot tempestates pluvias 
aestate oborituras, quot dierum in Martio nebulosa fuerit constitutio, totque Pa-
scha consecuturas pruinas, & Augusto mense effumaturas nebulas, quot noctibus 
Martius irrorårit." Kexlerus' book is difficult to place entirely into the astrome-
teorological or to the philosophical tradition, having some features of both. 
Do not believe this as certain, because the rule yields so often: 
If God so will, he solely can change this a11.271  
Often these "rules" for forecasting weather resemble peasant folklore 
which still flourishes in many parts of Finland. It is not, however, 
within the scope of this study to find out how this fading academic 
tradition has influenced folklore - or vice versa. 
These forecasts are based on different natural signs: it was crucial 
whether the sky was clear or hazy, whether there was a halo around 
the Moon, or whether there was foam on the sea.272 It seems that 
academic authors did not think two different weather conditions had 
a causal relationship, but they possibly saw a more or less (self) ex-
perienced correlation or connection between them. The style of lan-
guage used lends support to this impression. Conjunctive sentences 
and expressions like "indicates" (indicat), "insinuates" (insinuat), "sig- 
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nifies" (significant), "it will be expected" (expectanda erit)", "fore- 
casts" (pronunciat) seem to repudiate a causal connection. 
In a way, other kinds of natural signs were also closely related to 
weather forecasts. This type of portent had its roots in the classical 
age. The behaviour of animals was quite generally supposed to indi-
cate future weather. "The magpie chatters exceptionally loud, the ra-
ven croaks, the mosquitos bite; you say this foretells rain. Indeed, you 
are right and there is a reason for it. Animals have subtle senses, and 
they feel the coolness which increases in the air gradually when the 
clouds are about to resolve into rain." 273 As the quotation shows, pre-
sages derived from animal behaviour were based on very natural cau-
ses. Animals had sharper senses than humans, and therefore they could 
sense mutations in weather conditions earlier than humans. 
Philosophical meteorology was after all more interested in weather 
portents than forecasts. It was usual to see phenomena which somehow 
deviated from the "normal" course of nature as portents of becoming 
271 	 Kexlerus 1661, p. 03. "In Januario....Clara dies Pauli bona tempora denotat anni: 
Si fuerint venti, designant praelia genti: Si fuerint nebulae, pereunt animalia quae-
que: Si nix aut pluviae, tunc fient tempora cara. Non credas certe, quia fallit 
regula saepe: Nam si vult Dominus convertit is omnia solus." 
272 Kexlerus 1661, p. 02-03. Hahn-Melliin 1686, s. 28. 
273 Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, Sectio II, Membr. II, Artic. III, Ax. 4. "Garrit ultra 
modum pica, crocitat corvus, pungit musca, pluvial futuras dicis, rationem adde, 
vera dixeris, subtili sensu sunt animalia, frigiditatem sentiunt, quae in aere mi-
nutim fit, dum resolvitur nuben." 
events. Comets, "bloody rains" and various light phenomena on the 
sky were typically seen as divine portents, which ordinarily preceded 
destruction of sinners or other catastrophes. Most of the horrifying 
examples mentioned were repeatedly copied from Pliny, Vergil, Ta-
citus or other classical authors.274 
Unusual meteorological phenomena had been seen as portents of 
catastrophes since classical antiquity. In the Middle Ages, another in-
terpretation expressed by Albertus Magnus for example gained sup-
port, according to which comets especially really caused the disasters 
they anticipated.275 At Turku the attitude towards portentous meteoro-
logical phenomena was clear; they were premonitions of catastrophes, 
which God would send down to earth in order to frighten sinful people. 
No causal connection existed between the phenomena and the disas-
ters. It was the Augustinian spirit that dominated: the trials of life 
were a consequence of people's sins, cataclysms were only instru- 
ments of God.276 	 193 
4. GEOGRAPHY 
The Structure of the Globe 
The difference which the physicists and mathematicians had in their 
respective approaches to astronomy and meteorology is also visible 
in geography. Whereas physicists showed more interest in the physical 
structure of the Earth, formation of wells and mineralogy, mathema- 
274 	 Hahn-Iflander 1691, s. 9-10. Hahn-Melliin 1686, s. 27-28, 38-39. Hahn-Melander 
1693, s. 9-11. Achrelius 1682, s. 148-149, 164, et passim. On ancient ideas about 
weather portents see Krauss 1930, passim. 
275 Schechner Genuth 1990, s. 299-300. See also Steneck 1976, p. 86. 
276 Achrelius 1682, p. 148, 154, 163 "...prodigia ...ä solo Deo ita disponi, ut prae-
moneantur homines, de luctuosis futurarum rerum cladibus.", et passim. Hahn-
Mclliin 1686, p. 10, 14, 27, "...satius est in causa prima acqviescere, qvae ho-
minum peccata justissimis solet ulcisci poenis.", 41. Hahn-Iflander 1691, p. 9-10. 
Hahn-Ekedahl 1695, s. 15. "COMETA est Stella extraordinaria, Divinå virtute in 
Coelo accensa, ut de futuris malis hominem praemoneat." Thuronius 1665, HYK 
Ms/Mf 550. 
ticians concentrated on measuring the dimensions of the Earth, divi-
ding the globe into zones and proving its sphericality. Mathematical 
geography was closely connected to the general scheme of Geographia 
Generalis, which studied the affections (figure, magnitude, location 
and immobility) of the terrestrial globe.27  
Most of the arguments in favour of the spherical figure of the Earth 
were already known to Ptolemy, but interest in the question was re-
vived in the discussions about the place of the Earth. The sphericality 
of the Terr-Aquaeus globus was an important matter if one wanted to 
prove that both the centre of gravity and of magnitude was at exactly 
the same place in the centre of the universe.278 At Turku, however, 
the discussion concentrated on proving the sphericality of the Earth, 
the further implications of the fact not being brought into discussion. 
In proving the sphericality of the Earth astonomical arguments in-
termingled with arguments derived from experience. First of all it was 
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pointed out that the Sun, the Moon and the stars rise and set earlier 
in Oriental parts of the Earth. If the Earth was flat, however, eclipses 
would be seen in all parts of the world simultaneously. This was not 
the case - ergo. Earth was also spherical in a north-south direction. 
This was proved by observations made by travellers. It could be shown 
that the number and position of stars seen in the sky changed when 
moving from the south to the north or vice versa. Navigation produced 
yet another argument: land could first be seen from the mast, i.e. from 
the highest possible position on the ship, and only later from the level 
of the deck.279 One of the strongest arguments for the sphericality of 
the Earth could, however, be induced from eclipses of the Moon. Lu-
nar eclipses were known to be caused by the interposition of the Earth 
between the Sun and the Moon. The shadow of the Earth which was 
cast on the Moon was round, which proved its sphericality.280 
277 See e.g. Kexlerus 1666, Lib. I, Cap.I. Gezelius 1672, p. 252-290. Lehti 1984. 
278 Grant 1984, p. 22-32. 
279 Kexlerus 1666, Lib. i, Cap. I, (B3-B5). Gezelius 1672, p. 253-259. Flachsenius-
Steen 1682, Th. III. Flachsenius-Bergius 1682, Th. VII. Flachsenius-Rothovius 
1688, Th. V. Tammelin-Almhenius 1712. Tammelin-Gjöslung 1704, Th. IV. Tam-
melin-Tammelin 1711, Th. I. There were similar arguments in some theses at 
Uppsala, but expressly to show the central position of the Earth. Sandblad 1944, 
p. 162-163, et passim. 
280 Flachsenius-Forsman 1678, Th. I. Flachsenius-Steen 1682, Th. III. 
Si vero Terra 0-et tetragona, umbra quocj; tctragon> 
figurs in EcclipG Lunari apFarcrct, Gcut hoc tchcmatc de-
tnotiftratur., 
Q.iod (I Terra cQ'et triaogularis, umbra quoquetrian- 
gulari figura in Luna apparcrct, 
	 Dctii- 
, 
D•nique fi Terra fresagona diet, he:agond gooquQ 
atnbrå Lunam obtuCcarct. 
Interim tameo noti(Iimum eft, Lunam non :lie figu- 
NI terra umbrarrt reciptre quarr rotundå,ergo & ipfa ta-
bs erst. 
Johannes Flachsenius and Johannes Forsman published a 'Philosophical thesis which 
presents some mathematical and some other suppositions' in 1678. The first theorem stated 
that the Earth is a globe. This could be proved by inspecting the eclipses of the Moon, 
since a tetragonal Earth would cast a tetragonal shadow on Moon, a triangular Earth a 
triangular shadow, etc. Flachsenius also discussed claims such as that the Earth does not 
move, nature does not degenerate because of old age, and not all people who go into a 
civil career are good politicians. 
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The physicists naturally had no different opinions about the ques-
tion.281 They were not, however, as profoundly interested in proving 
the matter as the astronomers were since the figure of the Earth was 
just one of its general affections. However, while for students in mat-
hematics the study of the shape of the Earth offered an opportunity 
to show their basic knowledge in the field, not all arguments in mat-
hematics were properly speaking mathematical, but certain a priori 
reasons were considered at least as valid as the strictly mathematical 
ones. First of all, the Earth was supposedly created analoguous to the 
whole mundus. The cosmos, on the other hand, had to be spherical, 
because this was the most spacious and noblest possible form. The 
figure of the Earth naturally followed the figure of the Universe, be-
cause residing in the middle of the world it would be everywhere 
equally distant from the heavens!" 
According to mathematicians the principal task of geography was 
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to study the longitudes, latitudes and other zones of the Earth. The 
knowledge of equator, horizon, meridian, etc. was important as soon 
as one went from geography towards cartography, navigation and ot-
her practical applications of geographical knowledge.283  Cartography 
and geodesy were important subjects in 17th century Sweden, where 
the crown laid much emphasis on surveying the country.284 Instead of 
these mathematical interests, in physics "geography" meant general 
study of the internal and external structure of the Earth. 
Most of the geographic dissertations written at Turku are typically 
very descriptive. Contrary to general geography this practice was cal-
led geographia specialis. The parts of the Earth were studied first of 
all by defining various geographical terms: what is a sea, lake, con-
tinent, etc. Examples of these were then given. After studying the 
structure of the Earth, the geographical positions of the continents and 
countries situated on them, rivers and winds characteristic of certain 
areas were listed in a rather monotonous way.285  Achrelius especially 
281 Tålpo-Rhydelius 1682, Th. XIX. Hahn-Alm 1688, p. 21-22. Hahn-Flodin 1707, 
p. 22-25. 
282 Kexlerus 1666, Cosmographia Methodice Digesta, Cap. I, (A4-A5). Flachsenius-
Steen 1682, Th. III. Tammelin-Tammelin 1711, Th. I. 
283 Kexlerus 1666, Lib. I. Gezelius 1672, p. 246-252, 257-290. Flachsenius-Tålpo 
1675, Th. XVIII. Tammelin-Odelin 1712, p. 15 ff. 
284 Lindroth 1975, p. 481-492. 
285 Kexlerus 1666, Lib. II. Gezelius 1672, p. 291-320. Hahn-Alm-Qwist 1688, p. 
25-32. Flachsenius-Frisius 1685. Achrelius 1682, p. 207-213. 
loves to use the micro-macrocosmos analogy conversely. He describes 
the globe as analogical to the human body; just as our bodies have 
bones, the Earth has chains of mountains. Just as we have our intes-
tines, nerves and vessels, the Earth is full of cavities filled with air, 
fire and water. These tunnels were essential for the vital functions of 
Mother Earth and explanations of many nature's processes could the-
refore be referred to these tunnels.286 For example the existence of 
ignis subterraneus was rather obvious. Warm natural thermae and vol-
canic eruptions especially proved that there were fiery cavities inside 
the Earth. Why would not the same be true of the other elements as 
well?287 
It was sometimes asked, whether all zones of the Earth as defined 
by the equator, tropics and polar circles, were habitable. The answer 
was yes, since if only the temperate zones were habitable, the other 
parts of the world would have been created in vain, an unacceptable 
notion. Related to the question of the habitability of the Earth was 
the problem whether antipodes existed. It was stated that this had 
originated from the ignorance of the ancient authors. They did not 
know the Earth was spherical, but in "our times" several explorers 
had shown all zones of the Earth to be really habitable. Therefore, 
instead of the fabulous creatures of classical literature, antipodes were 
now considered as ordinary people living on the same meridian, but 
on the other side of the equator. 88 
If the Earth is spherical... it follows necessarily that Antipodes exist. 
The reason why they do not fall is that all which is heavy tends 
downwards. If they fell from there, they would fall upwards towards 
the Sky, which is contrary to experience and the nature of heavy 
bodies.289  
286 Miltopaeus-Achrelius 1672, Sect. II, §3-4. Achrelius 1682, p. 202-206. Hahn-Are-
lius 1689, passim. Hahn-Ring 1688, p. 29 "Formavit namque Altissimus mirabili 
quodam consilio totum hoc Geocosmi systema, ad analogiam ac similitudinem 
Corporis humani." On micro-macrocosmos analogy in geography see Frängsmyr 
1969, p. 27. 
287 Alanus-lilstadius 1647, Th. VI. Hahn-Lundelius 1693, p. 12-30. 
288 Kexlerus 1666, Lib.I, Cap. III. Gezelius 1672, p. 274-277. Flachsenius-Tålpo 
1675, Th. XX. Flachsenius-Bergius 1682, Th. X. Hahn-Flodin 1707, p. 27-29, 
35-39. Tålpo-Höök 1685, Th. II. Steen-Pryss 1694. Pryss-Forbus 1711. 
289 Hahn-Flodin 1707, p. 37-38. "Si Terra est Spherica... necessariö sequitur esse 
Antipodes. Quod autem non decidunt, causa est, quia omne grave tendit deorsum, 
si autem deciderent, caderent versus Coelum sursum, quod experientiae & naturae 
gravium contarium." 
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There were no problems with gravity for the antipodes. Every cor-
pus gravis, including the bodies of men tend towards the centre of 
the Universe, which is the centre of the Earth, irrespective of whether 
they are located on the northern or the southern part of the globe. The 
concept of gravity as it was understood in qualitative physics was in 
general very consistently applied to different kinds of explanations. 
In a thesis dating from the 1690's we meet the idea that all people 
living on the other side of the globe actually had originally descended 
from the northern hemisphere. There were isthmuses between con-
tinents, which had made it possible for the people to migrate in the 
distant past.790 The idea of Scandinavia as the cradle of peoples was 
one of the favourites of gothic historiography, which was prevalent 
at the time.291  
Much of the Earth consisted of water in addition to continents. 
Ocean, it was thought, was one big continuous body, which simply 
had different names in different parts of the world. Lakes situated in 
the middle of the continents were also connected to the big ocean by 
underground tunnels, which occasionally enlarged into huge under-
ground lakes or water reservoirs. Whirlpools and maelstroms were 
caused in seas where the seawater was being sucked into the under-
ground tunnels.292  The salinity of seawater received attention in one 
dissertation. It was thought impossible that the water could be as salty 
as it was if salt dissolved into water from soil. It was ultimately the 
form of the Ocean which determined its salinity, but the final causes 
also explained why this was so: 
...we shall say that God created seas Salty in the first Creation, 
doing this for two purposes especially; namely so that certain 
fishes... would have a suitable and appropriate dwelling place, ...and 
that moreover the water would end up more coarse, dense, and 
full-bodied in order that its middling density would carry loaded 
ships comfortably.'" 
290 Steen-Pryss 1694, p. 10, § V. "Robur probationi nostrae tertio addet, quod com-
pertissimum sit & viam ad Antipodes esse & hos originem ex nostro Orbe tra-
here." 
291 Urpilainen 1993, p. 33-37, 185-188. 
292 Hahn-Melliin 1687, p. 2-4. Hahn-Arelius 1689. Achrelius 1682, p. 205-206, 213-
222. Achrelius-Hagman 1681, Mom. II. Tammelin-Thorwöste 1703, p. 10-18. 
Hahn-Hahn 1702, passim. Hahn-Ring 1688, p. 41. 
293 Hahn-Melliin 1687, p. 16. "...dicimus Deum ab initio creationis mare Salsum 
creasse, & hoc, ob finem duplicem praecipue, scilicet ut quidam pisces, ...aptum 
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Physical discussions about the structure of the Earth are not exten-
sive. They are either very general and descriptive in character or they 
deal with isolated problems such as the existence of antipodes or the 
salinity of the seawater. A relatively popular problem was the question 
about the origin of springs. 
The Origin of Springs and Rivers 
If the form of seawater explained its salinity, there was another prob-
lem related to it which was less easily solved, and had already occu-
pied the minds of Aristotle and Seneca: what was the origin of springs 
and rivers? Where did the water come from? What was the secret of 
their supply, why did they not run dry? Basic explanations of these 
problems had been already given in classical antiquity. Either there 
had to be a huge underground water reservoir, or hidden channels 
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	 would have to bring the water from the Ocean to the springs. The 
amount of rainwater was considered to be too small by itself to main-
tain huge streams. Aristotle's answer to the question had been that 
the water of rivers and springs was "sweat of mountains", i.e. under-
ground vapour condensed into water. Seneca, on the other hand, based 
his explanation on the transmutation of the elements. The element 
earth could tum into water, and because everything was made of the 
elements, which were in a constant process of transmutation into one 
another, the adequacy of water was guaranteed. As Seneca puts it, 
"Nothing which returns to itself will run out."294  Because the theory 
of the transmutation of the elements was rejected at Turku, Seneca's 
theory was not approved of either. 
The generally accepted theory at Turku runs as follows. Winds and 
tides agitate the surface of the Ocean. This creates pressure which 
pushes water forward into underground tunnels. The pressure is high 
enough for the water to run through these tunnels all the way up to 
the tops of high mountains. Achrelius, who seems to have been es-
pecially keen on the problem, mentions an experiment made by the 
great encyclopedic scholar Athanasius Kircher, who "tried to illustrate 
commodumque nanciscerentur habitaculum, ...cum exinde corpulentius, crassius 
densiusque evadit, adeö ut hac sua mediocri crassitie comode pondera ac navigia 
sustinere posset." 
294 
	
	 Aristotle 1978, I Ch. XIII. Seneca, 1971, III, 4-13. "Nihil deficit quod in se redit." 
On transmutation of earth into water 10-13. 
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The so-called internal explanation models for the functioning of the hydrological system of 
Earth were fashionable in the seventeenth century. This model is presented by Athanasius 
Kircher in his widely-read book Mundus Subterraneus (1664). The entire circulation of water 
happens on the surface or underground. Seawater is sucked into subterranean channels, 
which causes dangerous whirlpools on the surface of the sea. The underground channels 
lead water upwards, where they can form lakes or wells, and the rivers bring the water back 
to the sea. 
with his instruments, invented for this purpose, that the waters of a 
stormy sea can rise with the power of pressure."295  Although Kircher's 
experiment had not been very successful, his theory was nevertheless 
considered true. Seawater rose in the tunnels partly in a liquid, partly 
in an evaporated form. (The evaporation was caused by the under-
ground fire.) Near the earth's surface the vapour finally condensed 
and thus formed a spring.296 
295 Achrelius-Hagman 1681, Mom. II. "machinis suis ad hanc rem inventis modum 
illustrare coepit, quo aquae aestuantis maris vi pressae sursum fern possunt". 
296 Achrelius-Hagman 1681, Mom. II. Achrelius-Rungius 1686, p. 12-13. Hahn-Ring 
1688, p. 23 ff. See also Frängsmyr 1969, p. 26-32. Kajander 1986, p. 32-46, 
125-127. 
The question was not settled by this, however. If springs and rivers 
were made of seawater, why was the water in springs not salty as 
well? Achrelius rebuffs this potential counter-argument by saying that 
water percolated through the soil on its way, so that no salt was left 
in the spring-water. Some springs were also known to have either 
medical or lethal properties, leached from the soil into the water. From 
springs water ran to small brooks, which gradually grew into rivers. 
All rivers ran into lakes, seas and finally to the Ocean, which thereby 
received back the water which had been sucked into underground 
channels. Water was in constant circulation, just like humours in hu-
man body. It was a sign that the Mother Earth was alive.297 
Mineralogy 
Minerals were classified into four groups: stones, gems, metals and 
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	 "ordinary soil". All of them were meant to be useful for and to be 
used by men. Uses of minerals ranged from agriculture to mining and 
from medical purposes to showing off gold and precious stones.298 In 
17th-century Sweden, the copper mining industry had experienced a 
boom. Mercantilism saw iron and copper mines as the surest source 
of wealth for the nation. University scholarship, however, stayed aloof 
from the mining business and research on either the minerals or the 
techniques for treating the ore were neglected.799 At Turku, only one 
dissertation dealing with iron and steel was published, written in ac-
cordance with the usual academic tradition.3o0 
 This situation changed 
only in the 18th century, when regional descriptions became popular. 
These descriptions included a growing amount of knowledge about 
natural resources.301  
297 	 Achrelius-Hagman 1681, Mom. II. Achrelius-Rungius 1686, p. 14-15, 18, on me-
dical properties, etc. p. 19-58. Achrelius 1682, p. 218-222. See also Kallinen 
1991a, p. 77-83. 
298 Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, Sec.II, Membr. III, Art.II, Th. 2. Thauvonius-Wae-
nerus 1655, Th. VII. Hahn-Pijhlgreen 1705, p. 15-16 is sceptical about the benefits 
of gold in medicine. Achrelius 1682, p. 244-249, 255-261, 265-269, et passim. 
Hahn-Ståålhöös 1688, 26-27, et passim. 
299 	 The development of chemistry and geology in Sweden were linked to the industry 
only sporadically during the 17th century. See Lindroth 1975, p. 515-529. 
300 Hahn-Ståålhöös 1688. 
301 	 Klinge 1987, p. 623-630, 634-639, 668-703. Leikola 1987, p. 631-633, 640-667. 
It was a well-established theory in the alchemical tradition that me-
tals and minerals consisted of sulphur and mercury. Paracelsus added 
a third ingredient, salt, to metals. Salt, sulphur and mercury were ma-
terial constituents of metals according to the theories favoured at Tur-
ku too. These principles were responsible for certain properties in 
them. For example, salt gave iron its hardness, sulphur made it mel-
table in fire and mercury malleable,302 but these three principles played 
a further role in the generation of metals. 
According to the theories favoured at Turku in the 17th century, 
metals and minerals would generate like all other species in world. 
This was because 
The Divine Architect decreed wisely that generation follows from 
corruption and corruption from generation, in an alternating order 
of which the duration of things consists of. And he founded the 
order and perfection of the world on this admirable alternation of 	 203 
things following each other in their turn.303 
All generation was mediated by semen, even the generation of me-
tals and minerals. Metallic semen consisted of salt, sulphur and mer-
cury, which were omnipresent in nature - prima mista as they were. 
Thus the seminal virtue was everywhere and initiated the generation 
of metals as well as animals. Unlike the forms of animals and plants, 
the forms of metals were not animated. Theirs would lie hidden in 
the seminal salt-sulphur-mercury mixture, until astral influence stimu-
lated the generation process to begin. The "petrifying form" (forma 
lapidifica) attracted humours from the soil with its magnetic ability, 
and the underground heat gradually coagulated and hardened the mix-
ture. The materials available and the duration of the process deter-
mined the quality of the metal. For example, gold was made of the 
noblest materials and its process of formation was long.304 
302 Hahn-Ståålhöös 1688, p. 4. Achrelius 1682, p. 243-244. 
303 	 Hahn-Pijhlgreen 1705, p. 4. "Divinus Architectus, quo consisteret rerum duratio, 
sapienter ordinaverit, ut altenris legibus, generatio corruptionem, & corruptionem 
nova exciperet generatio, staretque ordo mundi & perfectio in hac admiranda 
rerum alternatim sese consequentium vicissitudine." See also Hahn-Ulholm 1689, 
P. 6. 
304 Thauvonius-Waenerus 1655, Th. II-III. Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, Sec.Il, 
Membr. III, Art.II, Ax. 1-2. Miltopaeus-Achrelius 1672, Sect. II. § 5. Achrelius 
1682, p. 239-242, 265-266, et passim. Hahn-Pijhlgreen 1705, p. 5-6. Hahn-Ståål-
höös 1688, p. 4-11. Hahn-Ljungdahl 1704, p. 34-36. 
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Stones, which represented almost perfect images of plants and animals were the subject of 
great wonder during the seventeenth century. A Danish philosopher, Nicolaus Steno claimed 
that these 'figured stones' were actually remains of extinct animals. This view was not 
accepted at Turku, where neither the extinction nor the birth of new species was considered 
possible. These figured stones were discussed by Kircher in Mundus Subterraneus. Kircher 
also described stones which represented images of the Virgin Mary and other saints. 
Stones could be generated whereever the seminal virtue and the 
ingredients necessary were present: in wine bottles, in fruit and in 
human intestines. Stones could even be generated in the air and be 
thrown to earth with lightning.305 The most curious kind of stone was 
that, in which "images of certain animals, plants and herbs are being 
inprinted."306 Several causes of the origin of fossils307 were suggested. 
First of all, plant and animal figures could be formed by chance, purely 
305 Hahn-Ulholm 1689, p. 20-24. 
306 Hahn-Ulholm 1689, p. 26. "...quorundam animalium, nec non plantarum & her-
barum imagines exprimuntur". 
307 I deliberately choose here to use an anachronistic concept "fossil". In the 17th 
century, fossils were usually known as "figured stones". 
by the function of the spiritus lapidificus. However, "in those which 
have been formed by chance there are always some defects and they 
do not constitute a coherent figure."308 Perfect animal figures could 
actually be animals, which had been displaced from their normal en-
vironment, like fishes thrown on land by storms. Lapidification could 
happen rather easily, because animal bodies also contained salt, which 
was the primary matter for stones. All that was needed for the for-
mation of a fossil was a minor change in the state and order of the 
salt particles.309 The questions that were so puzzling about the fossils 
were never asked aloud at Turku, where the extinction of species was 
thought to be a theological and philosophical absurdity. 
Not only was the generation of minerals a frequently studied ques-
tion in 17th-century natural philosophy, but the old question about 
transmutation of metals was also discussed regularly. The extent of 
these transmutations and the reliability of the results was also under 
discussion among alchemists themselves.310 At Turku there was no 
suspicion about the possibility of transmutation of "imperfect" metals 
(copper, iron, tin and lead) into each other or into gold. Sometimes 
metals could transmute spontaneously, without any human interventi-
on. In these cases it was usually a question of more noble metals 
degenerating into less valuable ones. But how was this transmutation 
possible, if the very transformation of elements was refuted because 
of the doctrine according to which specific forms could not change? 
The answer was based on the concept of subordinated forms: 
The transmutation of these metals occurs by nature, though it is 
assisted by art. ...It is true however that their specific forms cannot 
mutate; but after they have dissolved, the subordinate forms which 
previously were hidden under the dominance of the specific form, 
can then exert their powers! 
308 Hahn-Ulholm 1689, p. 27. "...in hisce, qvae fortuito fiunt, semper aliquid desit 
ad integram figuram constituendam." 
309 Hahn-Ulholm 1689, p. 26-30. See also Achrelius 1682, p. 255-259. Kircher 1664 
II, p. 22-36. 
310 Debus 1973, p. 27-34. 
311 Alanus-Ulstadius 1647, Th. VII. "Horum itaque metallorum inter se transmutatio 
fit per naturam, succurrente arte. ...Sed id vertun est de formis eorum specificis, 
quae mutari non possunt, sed cum illae tolluntur, subordinatae, quae ante latuere, 
cum sub specificae dominio fuere, postea vires suas exerunt." 
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Subordinated forms belonged to the realm of nature, but it would 
need human help to manipulate the specific form so that it would give 
way to the subordinated forms. Another thing which was called on to 
testify for transformations was just "the experience of learned men" 
(virorum doctorum experientia). The experiments described by Danish 
chemist Bartholin especially were referred to with respect.312 From the 
point of view of matter transmutation was possible, because everything 
consisted basically of the same elements and chemical principles. 
Changing their relations could at least in theory transform one metal 
into another.313 
Magnetism 
In the 17th-century natural philosophical thought nature was filled 
with many kind of "forces", either recognisable or occult. One of the 
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	 most important was called magnetism, which was of two kinds. On 
the one hand there was the phenomenon which we also know as mag-
netism, i.e. mineral magnetism. On the other hand there was a varying 
group of phenomena, which were explained by the function of "mag-
netic forces". Very often this "occult" magnetism was related to the 
so-called forces of sympathy and antipathy. 
Mineral magnetism was a phenomenon which was known already 
to Theophrastus in antiquity, and its basic features had been relatively 
accurately described in the Middle Ages. For example a little book 
written by Petrus Peregrinus in 1269 describes the relation of the mag-
net to iron and the tendency of a magnet to attract its opposite and 
repel the similar parts. At turn of the 17th century discussion about 
magnets intensified, not least due to William Gilbert's famous De 
magnete. 314 
The descriptions of mineral magnetism written at Turku did not 
add much to the picture we get from the medieval authors. Magnets 
were formed in the same way as all other stones "from Magnetic 
vapour in its proper matrix being solidified by the petrifying force".315 
312 	 Alanus-Ulstadius 1647, Th. VII. Thauvonius-Waenerus 1655, Th. VI. Thauvonius-
Warelius 1652, Sec.II, Membr. III, Art.II, Ax.3. 
313 Hahn-Pijhlgreen 1705, p. 17-19, adopts a cautious and somewhat suspicious at-
titude towards transformation of gold. His suspicions are the classical ones already 
expressed by Agricola in his De re metallica in 1555. 
314 Dijksterhuis 1969, p. 153, 391-396. 
315 	 Hahn-Procopoeus 1698b, p. 11, et passim. "ex vapore Magnetico in sua matrice 
Some properties of magnets caused a serious anomaly in Aristotelian 
physics. How was it possible that magnet could attract iron at a dis-
tance, since one of the most fundamental principles of the Aristotelian 
physics was that "all action happens through a contact" (omnis actio 
fiat per contactum). Traditionally this problem had been solved by 
claiming that magnet emitted a quality or a magnetic spirit which 
filled the space between iron and magnet. At Turku, the corpuscular 
theory that magnets emit atoms which attract iron provided a solution 
to the problem.'16 Explanations based on corpuscular and atomic theo-
ries are not necessarily mechanical, and not in this case either. The 
power of the magnet to attract or repel iron was clearly a qualitative 
one and thus pertained to the form originally created by God to be 
such. 
Mineral magnetism was in fact just another manifestation of the 
magnetic force which was thought to pervade inanimate as well as 
living nature.317 It was regarded as a some kind of code or a pattern 
of inevitable behaviour in nature, which pattern resides in the forms 
of things. As a phenomenon magnetism was closely related to sym-
pathy and antipathy. The theory of sympathy and antipathy in nature 
already proposed by Empedocles was still popular among some 17th-
century scholars. It is often difficult - and it might even be factitious 
- to differentiate between magnetism and sympathy-antipathy rela-
tions.318 However, magnetism was in principle a one-sided process of 
repulsion or attraction, whereas for sympathy-antipathy relations two 
active agents were needed. Because the causes of both of these pro-
cesses were similar, I shall not discuss them separately. 
The causes of magnetism were diverse. Because of the great variety 
of effects, it was thought inappropriate to refer all of them to one 
single universal cause, say, the action of intelligences or celestial in-
fluence.'19 The most profound and systematic discussion of the causes 
per vim lapidificam coalescente". Achrelius 1682, p. 262-265. Kallinen 1991a, 
p. 94. 
316 Hahn-Procopoeus 1698b, p. 20-21. 
317 See e.g. Halm-Procopoeus 1698, p. 3. "amicam certe ejus [magnetis] cum stella 
polari consentionem, qva licet in hujus amplexus pondere suo praepeditus, non 
possit pertingere..." 
318 Miltopaeus-Achrelius 1672, Sect. III. §1. "siquidem omnis hujusmodi virtus rebus 
inexistens secundum analogian quandam magnetis, per attractuum dispulsionem-
que contigit: qui quidem attractus, sicut in amore quodam, quo res naturali ap-
petitu similia sibi, bona, amicaque unire appetunt, ita dispulsus in odio quodam, 
quo dissimilia, mala inimicaque å se removere conantur consistit." 
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of magnetism and sympathy-antipathy can be found in writings of the 
professor of eloquence, Daniel Achrelius.320 However, similar ideas 
appear in several other dissertations by other authors, some of which 
show very well what kind of processes were presumed to exist in 
nature. 
Primary qualities were responsible for sympathy-antipathy relations 
e.g. in those cases, when a "cold" disease could be cured by restoring 
the harmonious state of the body with a "hot" medicine. It was also 
believed, for example, that an ostrich could develop such a heat in its 
stomach that it could digest an iron needle in a day. Objects could 
also emit vapour or effluvium, which included certain qualities, which 
affected a receiver. Therefore there was an eternal animosity between 
vine and cabbage; certain diseases were contagious, and some people 
hated cats. The different qualities or dispositions of subjects (receivers 
of effluvia) also played an important role in sympathy-antipathy rela- 
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tions. It was the disposition of the subject which caused some diseases 
to be harmless to European people, but lethal to the population of 
Nova Hispania. The influence of the heavenly bodies also caused con-
siderable effects on earth. Not only did some plants follow the mo-
vements of their respective planets, like the sunflower the movements 
of the Sun, but tides and the movements of the Ocean were agitated 
by the Moon.321  
Several more effects of magnetical or sympathy-antipathy relations 
could be described. In all, these phenomena form a curious mixture 
of causes. Only on occasions was there clearly a mechanical element 
combined with the theory of effluvia. For example some processes 
"...have their causes in the constitution of the pores. In this way, be-
cause of the tightness of the pores, steel is immune to the fire."j22  
However, the absolutely greatest role was played by the substantial 
qualities of objects. These qualities always functioned immaterially, 
by virtue. Even the tiny corpuscles forming the effluvia were subject 
to qualitative physics, for every corpuscle bore all the substantial qua- 
719 Achrelius-Hagen 1689, p. 8-9. 
320 On Achrelius' concepts of magnetism and sympathy-antipathy see Kallinen 
1991b. 
321 	 Miltopaeus-Achrelius 1672, Sect. III. Achrelius 1682, p. 48-59, 227-232, et pas-
sim. Achrelius-Hagen 1689, p. 9-14, 25-30, et passim. Hahn-Aeimelaeus 1698, 
passim. 
322 	 Achrelius-Hagert 1689, p. 12. "causal petunt å constitutione pororum, qva ratione 
Adamantem, ob pororum angustias, ab igne immunem volunt". 
lities of the body which it was emitted from. This was possible because 
form was immaterial and could exist "tota in quolibet parte totius". 
In this section I have somewhat artificially mapped under the same 
title such widely differing subjects as mathematical geography, mine-
ralogy and magnetism. These subjects were not seen to form any co-
herent branch of knowledge called "geography". However, this pro-
cedure might be justified for purposes of discussion, especially if seen 
in the sense in which Seneca discerned three main areas for the scru-
tiny of nature; namely, the celestial, the sublime, and the terrestrial. 
But our study of the latter region has only been begun by examining 
inanimate nature. "Biology", the study of living nature, was even more 
central to 17th-century physics. 
5. LIVING NATURE 
There is a multitude of old and new approaches to the study of the 
living nature to be found in the 17th-century European history of 
science so that it is not easy to outline the background of natural 
history at Turku either. We can in general discern at least two different 
trends in all studies of living nature during the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries, although they became intertwined to some extent. 
On one hand there was the Aristotelian study of the general concepts 
of life, such as generation or soul. On the other hand natural history 
(including both botany and zoology) saw a great upswing during the 
Renaissance. Tended in the herbaries of the medieval monasteries, 
botany began to have a much wider economic importance since the 
Age of Discovery. The flood of new and unknown plants from the 
15th century on encouraged the work of naming and describing plants, 
drawing attention to the domestic species too, which had for the most 
part been neglected in the Dioscoridean tradition. Moreover, much of 
botany was still connected more with medicine than natural philosop-
hy.323 In zoology huge compilations e.g. by Gesner and Aldrovandi 
were published. Gesner started a typically Renaissance genre of zoo- 
323 Morton 1981. Schmitt 1984, XIV. Reeds 1991. 
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logy, which reached its full expression in the work of Aldrovandi. Its 
main aim was not to describe animal anatomy and place animals in 
their proper taxonomic slot, but most of all to display the complexity 
of the associations and symbolic meanings of each animal species. 
By the 1660's this rich "emblematic" approach had disappeared to 
leave natural history to confront the ever-growing flood of "new" spe-
cies devoid of allegorical or mythological connotations.374 
The Renaissance interest in classical authors not only revised their 
texts but also revived long-forgotten perspectives on nature. For exam-
ple plant physiology, which had been favoured to some extent by 
Theophrastus, was the subject of new interest. New approaches to 
living nature were formed by it together with the rise of anatomy 
(especially human anatomy after Vesalius) and physiology, some less 
directly "biological" studies, and finally the new empirical and 
mechanical philosophies. The investigation of the structure, growth 
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and germination of plants became a favoured branch of study espe- 
cially among the 17th-century microscopists and mechanical philosop-
hers such as Nehemiah Grew, Marcello Malpighi and John Ray.325 A 
similar tendency can be discerned in zoology, where dissection - and 
in the 17th century microscopic examination - opened new views on 
the theories of the vital functions of animals. If the sixteenth century 
had been the one of emblematics and anatomy, the 17th century was 
characterized by mechanization of vital processes in plants, animals 
and even humans. 
In Sweden scholastic study dominated at the Universities. Plants 
and animals were studied from the viewpoint of Aristotelian causal 
theory, and classified according to classical standards. Cartesian ideas 
reached Uppsala in the 1660's, which caused a certain agitation in 
almost all learning and scientific practices. Botany in Sweden was 
also affected by these new ideas.326  At Turku traditional views kept 
their place for much longer. Scholastic-style classification still played 
an important role, although some studies on individual species were 
also published. Let us now see what kinds of biological problems 
were studied at Turku during the 17th century, and how scholarship 
there can be related to wider European traditions. 
Two themes dominated the study of living nature in 17th-century 
324 On Renaissance natural history see Ashworth 1990. 
325 Morton 1981. Ashworth 1990. Brown 1968. 
326 Eriksson 1969. 
Turku. Firstly, the faculties of vegetative, sensitive and rational souls 
were accurately analysed. This was because all species in nature were 
different in their degree of perfection. It was important to understand 
the number of faculties of the souls of living beings, because in this 
way could the degree of the species' perfection be induced.327 Perhaps 
more important was, however, that the physiological functions in 
plants and animals were explained by referring to faculties. The se-
cond central theme in "biology" was generation and corruption. Theo-
ries of generation were closely connected to metaphysical and natural 
philosophical ideas on the propagation of form. In the following chap-
ter I shall offer an overview of thinking in botany and zoology, but 
the main interest will be focused on the theories concerning generation 
and corruption and the vegetative and sensitive soul. A certain amount 
of repetition is difficult to avoid in doing this. The properties of the 
rational soul will be dealt with more appropriately in the context of 
human psychology. 
Vegetative and Sensitive Souls 
In traditional Aristotelian philosophy living beings were grouped into 
three classes according to the number of organic functions they could 
perform. It could be said that an unofficial fourth class of quasi-living 
minerals was later added to this scheme. As we have seen, minerals 
were thought to generate from a semen-like entity, but they were not 
considered to be really alive. The lowest degree of living forms or 
souls was that found in plants. Plants were only able to generate and 
grow, whereas animals could in addition to these functions also sense 
and move. The sensitive soul of animals was really at a relatively 
well-developed level of existence. It was, however, only the rational 
soul of humans to which intelligence, volition and ability to speech 
and laughter also pertained. We can possibly see the sense in the 
Aristotelian practice of scrutinizing the faculties of souls better, if we 
keep in mind the connection these faculties had to the actual state of 
being of the whole organism. The faculties were not important only 
from the point of view of metaphysical theory, but the soul of each 
living being expressed itself as different physiological functions. 
327 Cf. Steneck 1976, p. 106-107, 112-113. 
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The vegetative soul was the general form of all plants, although 
every species had an additional specific form. Every plant had three 
principal faculties: facultas generativa, by which the plant produced 
new individuals of the same species, facultas augmentativa, which 
was responsible for the growth of the plant and thirdly there was 
facultas nutritiva, which maintained the living functions of a plant. 
Nutrition had moreover some additional, "secondary" faculties, which 
made the process of digestion possible by attracting, repelling and 
"cooking" the nutriment. The generative faculty also had so-called 
formative and imitative forces assisting it.328 
Every animal soul had, first of all, the faculties of the lower rank 
of beings. It was typical that in animals certain secondary faculties 
were more complicated than in plants, like those assisting digestion.329 
The proper faculties of sensitive souls were facultas cognoscens, ap-
petens and loco movens. The locomotive faculty enabled an animal 
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to move from place to place in order to reach an object or to escape 
from it. Knowing whether it was salutary for the animal to escape or 
to reach for an object was obtained by the appetitive faculty. It was, 
however, the facultas cognoscens or sensation, which "perceives and 
judges upon sensible objects by mediation of certain bodily organs", 
which received most attention among writers.330 The techniques of 
animal movement however were left totally without notice. The fa-
culties of vegetative and sensitive souls did thus explain to a great 
extent the diverse functions of plants and animals. Physiology and 
anatomy were seldom dealt with independently. For example in dis-
cussions of sensation the structure of sense organs, especially of the 
eye and the ear, was sometimes described.33' 
The existence of the animal soul had been called into question by 
Cartesian philosophy, which claimed that since animal bodies were 
nothing but finely-structured machines animals could not sense or feel 
anything. This concept was fiercely objected to by Aristotelian phi-
losophers. Although some bodily functions could be caused by the 
mechanical principles, the variety of movements and expressions of 
328 	 Gezelius 1672, p. 280-281. Hahn-Hasselqwist 1698, p. 14-15. Thauvonius-Rosan-
der 1652, Th. XXVI. Thauvonius-Thuronius 1656. 
329 Thauvonius-Thuronius 1656, Th. III. 
330 Thauvonius-Rosander 1652, Th. XXVIII-XXXI. "... mediante certo corporis or-
gano objecta sensibilia percipit & dijudicat..." Petraeus-Ignatius 1673. We shall 
treat sensation more closely in the chapter on human perception. 
331 	 Thuronius-Teeth 1664, Sectio II. 
sensation could not be explained without recourse to an immaterial 
substance. Some authors went as far as to grant feelings like love, 
hatred, hope and fear to animals.332 
Spontaneous Generation 
Aram Vartanian defines in the Dictionary of the History of Ideas spon-
taneous generation as follows: 
SPONTANEOUS GENERATION is the idea that life is derived 
from any source other than an already existing, genetically related 
parent organism. Its two main versions will be further defined as 
abiogenesis, or the production of living things from nonorganic mat-
ter, and heterogenesis, or the rise of living things from organic 
matter, both animate and inanimate, without genetic resemblance 
or continuity.333 
In this definition, we have to adopt a very broad meaning for the 
word "genetic" in order not to be anachronistic when talking about 
ancient and Renaissance ideas about generation. The conception of 
spontaneous generation has been an integral part of biological thinking 
since antiquity both in philosophy and in popular beliefs. The question 
was also closely linked with the origin of form and was widely dis-
cussed during the 16th and 17th centuries.334  Although abiogenetic 
theories attracted the mechanistically-orientated philosophers in the 
17th century especially, it was usually refuted at Turku. On one oc-
casion only was a problem related to the possibility of abiogenesis 
handled as a more positive possibility.335  Cartesianism posed problems 
related to abiogenesis, too, in its denial of the animal soul. This dif-
ficulty will be handled in chapter "Cartesianism and Natural Philosop- 
332 Miltopaeus-Pryss 1668, Th. XIII. Achrelius 1682, passim. Hahn-Ruda 1695, pas-
sim. p. 9: "Materia enim seipsam informare & determinare neqvit, illa enim sem-
per habetur principium non activum sed passivum, qvo videlicet anima utitur ut 
instrumento." Hahn-Nidelström 1704. 
333 Vartanian 1973, p. 307. 
334 Lindroth 1939, p. 162-166, et passim. 
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	 Achrelius 1682 studied the possibility of palingenesis, which was supposed to be 
a process in which a new plant of the same species would be formed from ashes. 
Achrelius denied the possibility of mechanical regeneration, but conceded that 
semen contained in the ashes might producegrowth. See Achrelius 1682, p. 294. 
Kallinen 1991a, p. 97-99. 
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by at Turku". But not even heterogenesis was accepted without reser-
vation. At least the scholars at Turku were reluctant to refer to it by 
the term generatio spontanea. 
What kind of attitude did the scholars at the Academy of Turku 
adopt towards spontaneous generation? Certainly, there were some 
animals which were supposed to originate in cadavers and dirt. Insects, 
for instance, would arise from decaying bodies and worms would be 
generated in human intestines. 
It is nevertheless true that bed-bugs generate in beds, crickets in 
mud, lice in animals, moths in clothing and furs, and small worms, 
etc. in all places in fruits, herbs, trees and animals.336 
But the question is not as simple as it seems. For example professor 
Alanus' standpoint has been interpreted in the most obvious way as 
being favourable to spontaneous generation,337 but more detailed in-
terpretations could and should be given. We should examine in which 
sense this view can be called advocating spontaneous generation. It 
is most interesting that the scholars at Turku themselves clearly denied 
the possibility of spontaneous generation and did not regard the theory 
of generation they stood for as presupposing it. How did they under-
stand "spontaneous generation", then? How did they understand ge-
neration? 
According to professor Alanus, "Generation is the production of a 
new natural body in respect to an individual, not to species, serving 
the purpose of continuously conserving the species of natural bo-
dies."" There was a clear distinction between generation of indivi-
duals and the creation of new species. God had created all species at 
the beginning of the world; none would become extinct or emerge 
after the sixth and last day of creation. The purpose of generation was 
to conserve the species, and the means for this was the animated se-
men. It was expressly the soul (=anima/forma) in semen, which carried 
the characteristics of both the species and the individual parents.339 
336 Alanus-Kempe 1647, Th. 34. "Verum quidem est, generari cimices in lectis, gryl- 
los in limo, pediculos in animalibus, blattas in vestimentis & pellibus, ubivis 
locorum in fruticibus, herbis, arboribus & animalibus vermiculos &c." 
337 Eriksson 1969, p. 55. 
338 Alanus-Lidenius 1643, Th. III. "Generatio est corporis naturalis quoad individuum 
non quoad speciem nova productio, ut corporum naturalium species perpetuo con- 
serventur." 
339 Alanus-Lidenius 1643, Th. VI, XI, XXIV. Alanus-Jurvelius 1647, Th. XII- 
XXXIX. Alanus-Kempe 1647, passim. Tålpo-Höök 1690, Th. VII. Hahn-Justander 
While fully recognizing the anachronistic character of this analogy, I 
hope it elucidates the point to say that the soul here played a somewhat 
similar role in the process of generation as DNA does in modem 
theories. 
The scholars at Turku understood by spontaneous generation the 
production of individuals of new species by generation, but without 
semen. In fact, it was a sort of "spontaneous creation". 
They miss the truth (Albertus Magnus and others) who say that 
certain animals, which did not exist in the prime creation of the 
world, originate from putrid matter without any sort of semen, be-
cause the world founded by GOD was perfect and complete, thus 
including all species, hence GOD did not omit any species of the 
animals which now are to be seen in the world....therefore the 
animals which seem to have arisen from putrefying matter, cannot 
be denied the semen to which they owe their birth.34° 
Spontaneous generation was equated with generatio aequivoca, 
which means either generation outside any existing species, i.e. wit-
hout semen, or the mutation of species in normal reproduction. As 
vehemently as the existence of generatio aequivoca was refuted, the 
reality of its opposite, generatio univoca was assured: "for every ani-
mal in the whole world reproduces from a perfect and pre-existing 
seminal principle, because nothing can be its own cause and imme-
diate principle".341 However, the question of how was it to be ex-
plained that there were species of plants and insects, which "seem as 
if they generated spontaneously?" was posed.342 There had to be a 
theory which would explain the truth of every-day observations. The 
1707, Th. VII-VII. 
340 Hahn-Imbergh 1704, p. 30-31. "Veritatem etiam celant (Albertus Magnus aliique), 
qui dicunt quaedam animalia jam ex putrida nasci materia absque aliquo semine, 
quae non fuerunt in prima mundi creatione: quia mundus å DEO conditus fuit 
perfectus & omnibus numeris absolutus, ergo nullam DEUS omisit speciem illo-
rum animalium, qua' nunc in mundo visuntur. ...Itaque animalibus, quae videntur 
ex putrida oriri materia, suum non negandum est semen, cui natales suos debent." 
341 Halm-Ljungdahl 1704, p. II. "nam omnia in universum animalia, & perfecta & 
ex prxexistente seminali principio quotidie generentur, nihil enim potest esse 
causa & immediatum principium sui ipsius". See also Alanus-Jurvelius 1647, Cor. 
II. Alanus-Kempe 1647, Th. 9 "...Non dan generationem Aequivocam, qua ge-
nerans & genitum sunt diversae speciei..." Hahn-Kjellberg 1703, p. 11-12. On 
generatio univoca & aequivoca see Leikola 1965, p. 101 and 1983a, p. 240-241. 
342 Halm-Kjellberg 1703, p. 6. "sponte quasi provenire videntur" 
215 
basic explanation had been already given by Alanus and the view did 
not change for decades. It was the dogma of subordinated forms, 
which was called to assist: 
But furthermore, in investigating the true origin of spontaneously 
arising insects, it seems true to state that there are underlying and 
subordinated forms in living creatures. ...these subordinated forms 
are assistant as long as the superior or specific form of the creature 
dominates....but as soon as this more noble specific form of the 
living being leaves its seat, which happens in death, the subor-
dinated forms are released in the body and become independent. 
And excited by the surrounding warmth they reach their due dis-
position, and elevate into the status of a soul, and join their souls 
to a body...343 
216 	 This view was derived from the great authority in biological mat- 
ters, Daniel Sennert, whose theories became popular in Sweden in the 
1630's and retained a dominant position at Turku for the whole pe-
riod.344 
There was, however, still another way how apparently spontaneous 
generation could be explained. It was thought that nature was full of 
seminal principles or virtues. According to Achrelius, the seminal vir-
tue was hidden in the Paracelsian salt-sulphur-mercury-principle. 
Being constituted directly of the four elements these principles were 
present in all matter, and thus their seminal virtue was also ubiquitous. 
All that was needed for the activation of seminal principles was sui-
table surroundings or a "matrix" and the presence of a seminal form.345 
Here matter would also play a role. It would on its own behalf create 
the right conditions for the formation of certain species of insects. 
Achrelius writes: 
343 	 Halm-Kjellberg 1703, p. 12-13. "Sed ulterius in indaganda vera insectorum sponte 
nascentium genesi, consentaneum videtur, formas in viventibus sucenturiatas & 
subordinatas statuere; ...Hae formae subordinate, quamdiu forma illa superior 
sive viventis specifica regnat, ministrae sunt, ...Quamprimum autem forma illa 
nobilior viventi specifica suo domicilio egreditur, quod fit per mortem, evadunt 
in cadavere forme subordinate sui Juris, & å calore ambiente excitate idoneam-
que dispositionem nacte sunt, in anima modum elevantur, & corpori suo sese 
in animam communicant..." 
344 On spontaneous generation in Sweden and on Sennert see Lindroth 1939. 
345 Achrelius 1682, p. 270-274, 296-298, et passim. Hahn-Uhlholm 1689, passim. 
Hahn-Ljungdahl 1704, p. 12-15. On Achrelius' conception of seminal virtue see 
Kallinen 1991a, p. 96-99, 104-105, et passim. Lindroth 1939, 167-168, 176-177. 
And the spermatic seeds, warmth and inner virtues of the semen 
concealed in it {=matter] are fermented and digested, and conve-
nient things are joined to form the suitable dispositions for gene-
ration. They form such an animal as postulates the matter, the put-
refactions from which the animal is educed. Therefore the consti-
tution of insects arising from rotten mud is different from those 
arising from water polluted by decay or whatever earthly dirt there 
is. In the same way the characteristics of those originating from 
plants is different from those arising from animals.346 
Frequent experience would confirm the existence of seminal prin-
ciples. Young boys and women, who greedily ate sweet fruits exposed 
themselves to premature death, because the fruits contained semina 
of worms. It was at least as dangerous to drink water from ponds and 
bogs, because the water was suffused with frog and toad semen.347 
Judging by the present criteria of what we understand by spon-
taneous generation, the scholars at Turku believed in it. Nevertheless, 
their stand is far from trivial in this matter, because they repeatedly 
emphasized the crucial role of semen - or subordinated forms - in 
every kind of generation. There seems to have been a desperate need 
to stress the difference from old, especially Roman Catholic views on 
generation. This was precisely because of the connection the discus-
sion of spontaneous generation had with the problem of the propaga-
tion of form, which was in many ways also a theological matter. 
Botany 
In Sweden the two classical literal genres of botany still flourished in 
the 17th century. On one hand botany was dealt with as a part of 
Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy. On the other hand, herbals 
and lists were published, which had more in common with the medical 
tradition of botany. Scholastic botany acquired a rival in the 1650's, 
346 Achrelius 1682, p. 298. "In qua; latentia spermatica initia, calor & interiores 
seminis virtutes, junctis dextris, ob proximas ad generationem dispositiones, fer-
mentant, digerunt, & in tale animal efformant, quale postulat materia, e cujus 
putredine educitur, hi= alia est constitutio insectorum, quw ex limo putrido, aqua 
tabe correpta, vel ex foetidis quisquilis terreis prodeunt: Alia itidem eorum indo-
les, qua' ex vegetabilibus & animalibus nascuntur." See also Miltopaeus-Achrelius 
1672, Sectio II, § 10. 
347 Hahn-Ljungdahl 1704, p. 13. See also Hahn-Ulholm 1689, p. 78-79. 
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when the energetic Olof Rudbeck Sr. was appointed professor of me-
dicine at the University of Uppsala. Having studied abroad he did not 
hesitate to introduce the new ideas he had learned. In the 1660's he 
started to promote the new mechanical botany, inspired by Robert 
Boyle, Marcello Malpighi and Edme Mariotte.348 At Turku, however, 
botany took a more conservative stance in the 17th century. 
Unlike the medieval tradition, which was still followed at Uppsala, 
botany was clearly associated with general natural philosophy instead 
of medicine at Turku. The new order was emphasized by the title of 
the physics professor, which was Physices & Botan ices professor. The 
close centuries-old relationship between botany and medicine was not, 
however, completely broken by this move. 
In 1673, the professor of medicine Elias Til-Landz published a list 
of plant names. Ten years later it was published in a revised edition 
together with another book, which contained over 150 illustrations of 
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plants,349 clumsy copies from earlier herbals. The main reason for this 
was probably the expense of printing more refined picture-plates, and 
more generally the poor equipment of the University Press at Turku. 
However, it is not self-evident in the 17th century that the pictures 
necessarily were expected to produce perfectly realistic reproductions 
of the plants. The "rhetoric of realism" in illustration was certainly a 
rising trend during the 17th century, and the most spectacular books 
in this respect, Otto Brunfels' Herbarium vivae eicones and Leonhard 
Fuchs' De historia stirpium, had already been published in 1530 and 
1542 respectively. But were the cheaper books expected to meet the 
same standards? In a way, a good picture was like an authoritative 
statement: it was simple enough to be replicated whenever necessary, 
and everyone knew what was meant by it.35° 
In spite of the not so realistic character of illustration in Til-Landz's 
plantbook, his effort was an interesting one, not least because it desc-
ribed local plants growing in the surroundings of Turku. Swedish and 
Finnish names of the plants were given in addition to Latin names. 
Like its well-known models, the herbal books of Fuchs, Matthioli, 
348 Eriksson 1969. 
349 Til-Landz 1683a and 1683b. See also Leikola 1993, p. 63-64. 
350 Reeds 1991, p. 145-146. The immediate advantage which the illustration might 
have brought to the identification of plants is more than dubious. Most printers 
favored cheap, ready-made plates, which were not always very realistic in style; 
they were also often used carelessly. See also Kemp 1993. 
♦f 
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The 1683 edition of Catalogus plantarum also included pictures of the main species of the 
plants. Although some of the plants can be recognized from the pictures, it was not 
self-evident that the images were even meant to be perfectly realistic. Teaching the medical 
use of plants was the motivation in Til-Landz's book: the 'winter-green' or 'cadaver-worm 
herb" (on the right) was mentioned as especially good for curing wounds. 
Tabernamontanus and Lobelius - to mention just a few of the most 
established botanical works - Til-Landz's book displayed knowledge 
relevant to medical botany: descriptions of plants and their habitats, 
their medicinal properties and pharmaceutical use, his own notions 
and observations, etc. Here the properties of plants were expressly 
based on Galenic humoral doctrine.351 Had medicine been a more po-
pular subject at Turku, herbal medicine might have flourished more. 
351 Til-Landz 1683a. Advanced medical studies were carried abroad until the mid-
18th century. The first professor in medicine, Eric Achrelius (professor 1640-69) 
could not publish any dissertations because of the lack of students. See also Reeds 
1991, p. 146-147. 
During the sixteenth century Italian universities rose to a leading 
position in botany. Moreover, the instruction in botany was there stri-
kingly practical in nature.'52 Echoes of this had reached Turku too, 
for it was not unusual for Til-Landz to take his students out on ex-
cursions, to identify plants and herbs on site.353  There also obviously 
was a small botanic garden in Turku, although its significance for 
academical teaching has been regarded as low during this century.354 
Naming and classification of plants seems otherwise to have been an 
almost neglected branch of knowledge at Turku. In this respect it is 
Achrelius who presents in his Contemplationes mundi the largest sche-
me for the classification of plants. He borrows his classification prin-
ciples from Theophrastus, although he is not totally satisfied with the 
grouping. In establishing criteria for subgroups, the most various kinds 
of principles could be made use of: the colour of flowers, their odours, 
the form of fruits or almost anything else could serve as grounds for 
220 
	
classification.355 
But we must realize that the main aim of the Aristotelian philosop-
hical botany was not to classify plants, but to give as perfect a de-
finition of the subject of study as possible. In order to achieve a full 
definition, much attention was naturally paid to the four Aristotelian 
causes of plants, especially the effective cause. The spontaneous ge-
neration discussed above was far from the only way for plants to 
generate. Normal seeding, sprouting, plantlets and grafting were men-
tioned as more common ways of plant reproduction. 56 It may be need-
less to point out that before Linne, plants were not ascribed sex.'57 
Other physiological functions of plants such as nutrition, growth, 
sympathy-antipathy relations etc. were also discussed. Most authors 
attributed these functions to the vegetative soul, whilst Achrelius re- 
352 	 Schmitt 1984, XIV, p. 39-40, et passim. 
353 	 Leikola 1993. According to Leikola professor Thauvonius would also have taken 
students out on excursions, p. 61. 
354 	 Bremer 1920. The "botanical garden" would actually have existed on Til-Landz's 
own plot. 
355 Achrelius 1682, p. 279-281. On Achrelius see Kallinen 1991, p. 100-102. Hjelt 
1896, p. 27-29. See also Hahn-Hasselqwist 1698, p. 32-34 classification of trees. 
On Theophrastus and his authorship of various biological treatises see Huby 1985. 
On the philosophical background to (botanical) taxonomy see Slaughter 1982, 
Ch. 2-3. 
356 Alanus-Lidenius 1643, Th. XXV-XXXVII. Hahn-Hasselqwist 1698, Th. XVI-
XVII. Achrelius 1682, p. 270-272. 
357 Alanus-Lidenius 1643, Th. XXV. Alanus-Kempe 1647, Th. 20. Hahn-Ljungdahl 
1704, p. 33. 
mained silent about it altogether and explained nutrition by the "mag-
netic virtue" of a plant.358 
These nutriments are not contained only by the interior of the Earth, 
in the channels of which a copious amount of liquid is wandering 
for the nourishment of plants, but it is also to be found in the air 
as well. From there the plants suck this subtle fluid. And should 
someone wonder how on the same field such a variety of plants 
can be nourished by attracting one and the same fluid, the explanati-
on is that every plant reaches for only that nutriment which is sui-
table to its nature, and nothing else.359 
This was not, however, the only departure from the Aristotelian 
faculty theory in explanations of physiological processes. Most cons-
picuously, Hahn and Lönwall made use of corpuscular theory in their 
thesis when explaining the nutritional functions of a plane tree.36° 
...the plane tree benefits from its tighter pores, and the material 
parts in it are connected with each other more tightly than is usual 
for dry woods, ...elementary particles which nature has intended as 
nutriment for the trees are attracted through the pores and arranged 
in various parts of the tree. It should not be called into question 
that the trees each have their pores, their veins and arteries analo-
gous to similar parts in animals. In these the particles which have 
ended up as nutriments then circulate, ferment and are converted 
into the substance of the tree.361 
358 Achrelius 1682, p. 275-278. See also Kallinen 1991b. 
359 Achrelius 1682, p. 277. "Continentur autem ista pabula, non modo intra terram, 
in cuius rivis copiosus humor ad alendas plantas errat, verum etiam in ipso aere, 
unde succum, subtilem & defecatum, hauriunt vegetabilia. Nec quempiam moveat, 
in uno campo, ex unius humoris attractu, tantam diversitatem plantarum nasci; 
quia una quaelibet herba, ex communi alimento, id tantum & non aliud appetit, 
qua quod naturae suae oppido est conforme." 
360 Hahn-Lönwall 1695, p. 12-13, et passim. Eriksson 1969, p. 88, 123 sees botany 
at Turku as heavily influenced by Cartesianism. "Med Petrus Hahn slutligen 
...erövras naturläran inklusive botaniken definitivt av cartesianismen även i Åbo." 
Whilst it is true that Achrelius refers in 1682 to Descartes in his treatment of the 
colours of plants (p. 282-284), the claim is nevertheless quite overstated. For 
example Lönnwall's corpuscularism is restricted almost exclusively to the theory 
of nutrition, and even that resembles not only Cartesian but Sennertian corpus-
cularism as well. 
361 Hahn-Lönwall 1695, p. 12-13. "...arctioribus gaudeat platanus poris, arctiusque 
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Lönnwall attributes circulation of nutriments to plants, analogous 
to the circulation of the blood, and offers a vivid image of the phy-
siology of the plane tree. 
Although no comments on the respective validity of these three 
theories are known, it is fairly safe to suppose that no fundamental 
disagreement arose. These theories could have been seen as presenting 
the same thing from different viewpoints: a vegetative soul would 
have a "magnetic virtue", which performed its functions with the aid 
of corpuscles. After all, it had never been fully explained, in what 
way the nutritive faculty of the vegetative soul physically operated, 
which left room for various physiological explanations. In this respect 
17th-century natural philosophy was very flexible and tolerant. 
Although it was clearly stated that once created, species could not 
change nor become extinct, it was supposed that some individual 
plants were able to change generically. 
So the European apple, planted in Indian soil, produces an entirely 
different kind of a fruit, whether you inspect its figure, colour, smell 
or taste. In the same way poisonous plants brought from Asia to 
Europe produce the most wholesome fruits. So the authors say that 
cinnamon, landed outside its proper tracts degenerates to laurel 
and pepper to ivy. Ginger also, if it is deprived of its native climate, 
wanes away in its sorrow on foreign land.362  
Not only were expensive exotic spices subject to alleged mutation. 
Even more serious problems were caused in agriculture because wheat 
tended to degenerate into ryegrass (Lolium) or barley, and cress into 
sese invicem connectant partes materiales, quam alias fit in arboribus siccioribus, 
...attrahuntur namque & in varias partes arboreas per poros disponuntur paticulae 
elementares, in alimentum arborum å natura destinatae. Nec in dubium revocari 
debet, arboribus suos esse poros, suas venas, suasque arterias, per quandam ana- 
logiam cum partibus ejusmodi in animalibus, convenientes, in quibus circulantur, 
fermentantur, atque in substantiam arboream convertentur, particulae in nutrimen-
tum cedentes." 
362 Achrelius 1682, p. 278. "Sic pomus Europce, in Indiz solo plantata, toto coelo 
differentem fructum parit, sive figuram, colore, odorem, saporemve spectes. Sic 
venenosz herbz, ab Asia vectz in Europam, saluberrimum fructum producunt. 
Ita cinamomum extra p(roprJiam, commissum terrce, in laurum; Piper in hederam 
degenerare, auctores referunt. Zingiber pariter nativo coelo privatum, in aliena 
tellure maerore conficitur." 
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mint.363  Explanations of this were several in addition to climatic fac-
tors as quoted above. Achrelius accepted a view which emphasizes 
the role of external physical factors in change. 
The cause of these metamorphoses is to be sought in the quality of 
the location, the operation of the Sun and the stars, the strength of 
the powers of elements, some characteristic of the nutriments, the 
various and wondrous mixture of earthly fibres; also from the effect 
of subterranean fire, which alters and agitates matter by 'coo-
king' ...364 
There was, however, another type of explanation also, which was 
built on the metaphysical dogmas. Degeneration was caused by the 
same subordinated forms which were responsible for spontaneous ge-
neration too. This explanation was also seen as a saviour from the 
perilous thought of transmutation of species. 
The specific form of a plant does not mutate into the specific form 
of another plant, because such transmutation of natural species is 
impossible. But the inferior form, which in a way was under the 
superior form like specific matter, is now liberated from its do-
mination and independently constructs itself a suitable dwelling pla-
ce, and so it becomes a specific form and starts to fulfil the func-
tions belonging to the specific form.'65 
The tendency to evaluate nature from man's point of view was 
deeply rooted in natural philosophy. Of course, grain is more valuable 
for man than weed. Philosophically it was also quite a natural thought 
363 Thuronius-Pryss 1664, Th. II. Daniel Sennert's Hypomnemata physica was men-
tioned as a source to this information. Of course, some cultivated plants really 
do "degenerate" which leads to reduction of crops. 
364 Achrelius 1682, p. 278-279. "Quarum metamorphoseon causa, qua'renda est, in 
loci genio, solis siderumque operatione, elementarium virtutum energia, alimen-
torum alia aliave facultate, principiorum naturae in terrenis fibris varia & mirabili 
permixtione; tum subterranei ignis efficacia, qua' coquendo alterat agitatque ma-
terias..." See also Hahn-Ulholm 1689, p. 44-46. 
365 Thuronius-Pryss 1664, Th. II. "Non enim forma specifica unius plantae mutatur 
in formam specificam alterius plantae, talis enim transmutatio specierum naturae 
est impossibilis, sed forma inferior, quae antea superiori nempe specificae instar 
materiae suberat, jam dominio illo excusso, ipsa sui juris facta Bibi conveniens 
domicilium extruit, tumque fit specifica & specificae formae edere incipit opera-
tiones." 
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that transmutation of plants was at the same time always deterioration 
or degeneration. The phenomenon was caused by subordinate forms, 
which were already by concept weaker than the specific form. More 
worthless forms could produce nothing but more useless plants. The 
concept of subordinated forms was not thus merely a technical term 
but also had an evaluative tone. 
Zoology 
Classification of animals was more or less just a method of presenting 
the different species in a systematic order in the Renaissance and 
17th-century zoological literature. Taxonomy as such was not the main 
point of interest. Although the classification was chiefly based on Aris-
totle's old grouping of animals into quadrupeds, birds, fishes and in-
sects, different types of general classifications or orders of presentation 
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	 of the animal kingdom were introduced during the 17th century.'66 In 
the old Aristotelian system the classification of animals involved a 
rating of the degree of their perfection, but this was not an explicit 
motive in studies carried on at Turku. Moreover, it was not usual 
there to produce any general view on the animal kingdom. The only 
comprehensive classification scheme which we meet at Turku was 
offered by Achrelius, who divided animals into the four usual groups 
and into several subgroups.367 Animals were often given human attri-
butes. It seems that it was one of the more noble aims of zoology 
overtly to mirror human moral values in animals. Thus lions were 
considered noble, wolves greedy, doves chaste, camels patient and so 
3 
on.
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Over and over again one comes across theses where generation is 
discussed in different contexts. Generation of animals had already 
been a dominant theme in some medieval treatises, and it was central 
to zoological inquiry during Alanus' professorship too.369 Professors 
366 There is a broad discussion on the importance of classification in Aristotle's 
zoology. On the more recent research on the subject see e.g. Boylan 1983, p. 
59-66, 141-217. Lloyd 1991, p. 4-7. Pellegrin 1986. Slaughter 1982, p. 32-37, et 
passim. On medieval classification schemes see also Steneck 1976, p. 110-112. 
367 Achrelius 1682, p. 306. Hahn-Justander 1688. On Achrelius see Kallinen 1991a, 
p. 108-114. Hjelt 1896, p. 29-33. 
368 Achrelius 1682, p. 307-321. Hahn-Hielmerus 1691, p. 6-7. On association of 
moral attributes with animals see Ashworth 1990. 
369 Steneck 1976, p. 107. 
Thauvonius and Thuronius seem to have been less interested in the 
study of the animal kingdom. Studies on the animal soul were, how-
ever, published under their supervision. In the latter part of the 17th 
century Achrelius and Hahn revived the interest in zoology. Compared 
with Alanus' time there was a different emphasis in framing the ques-
tions and subjects. Studies on individual species or classes of animals, 
their causes and "differences" now dominated the field:370 Despite the 
differences between Alanus' and Hahn's literal production there were 
also some common areas of interest. Most of all, animal anatomy and 
physiology were discussed regularly. 
The importance of generation was based on the fact that it was the 
act by which the final cause of all plants, animals and humans was 
completed, namely the conservation of species. This aim had been 
ordained by God, when he told all his creatures to be fruitful and 
multiply and to replenish the earth.371 Generation from semen in de-
caying bodies or dirt was only an extreme form of generation among 
animals as it had been among plants too. Different modes of proc-
reation were considered: viviparous animals (quadrupeds) and humans 
bred by copulation and oviparous (birds, fishes, reptiles) by coition 
or spawning. Some extravagant theories were also advanced; phea-
sants, for example, were thought to have oral copulation.372 
Although contrary to Aristotle's opinion, the idea that both male 
and female semen were essential for insemination was commonly ac-
cepted.373 A more seriously discussed question seems to have been 
what semen actually was. An opinion which was eagerly rebutted was 
that semen would be a some sort of an excrement.374 
370 	 This is actually a very Aristotelian practise. For Aristotle the search for differences 
in animals ("classification") served the purpose of finding the causes of their parts 
and of their generation and other living functions. Balme 1987, p. 80-89. 
371 Alanus-Lidenius 1643, Th. VI, IX. Alanus-Jurvelius 1647, Th. XVI, XXI. Alanus-
Kempe 1647, Th. 1, 23. Hahn-Ulholm 1689, p. 47-50. Hahn-Ljungdahl 1704, p. 
7, 26, 40, 51. 
377 Alanus-Lidenius 1643, Th. XXXVII. Achrelius 1682, p. 296-298, 319. Compare: 
Hahn-Helinus 1694a, p. 12-13 mentiones this and other similar theories, but does 
not seem to believe in them. On other ways of generation see Hahn-Ulholm 1689, 
passim. 
373 Alanus-Kempe 1647, Th. 38. Achrelius-Hwal 1683, p. 57. Hahn-Ulholm 1689, 
p. 52-53, et passim. "...semen autem eorum [leonum], est liqvor quidam crassus, 
candidus & spumans, qui ab utroque sexu emissus digeritur...". Hahn-Helinus 
I694a, p. 35. 
374 Alanus-Jurvelius 1647, Corollaria I. Hahn-Ljungdahl 1704, p. 24. Pagel 1976, p. 
87. 
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But it is false to think that semen is mere rotten excrement, because 
if we are talking about the semen of animals, it is cooked and 
prepared laboriously in a certain organ from pure blood. Certainly 
nature would never have constructed such an amazing structure of 
preparatory organs for producing excrements. ...to be an excrement 
and to be useful is as contrary as to wear red mourning clothes.375 
Semen was thus prepared from blood in testicles by elaborate pro-
cesses of concoction.376 (Females were also supposed to have some 
kind of internal testicles.) Achrelius expressed the matter somewhat 
differently: 
A great portion of seed is cut from the brain and from singular soft 
and solid parts of the entire body as well. Indeed, if semen did 
come from all these members, the respective parts could not be 
226 	 formed in the foetus.377 
Although this idea reflects Gassendi's atomistic theory, it can in 
fact be found in Hippocratic writings already, where this so-called 
pangenesis theory served to explain the similarity between parents and 
their offspring.378 The 17th-century proponents of corpuscular phi-
losophies naturally espoused the doctrine with pleasure. It was, after 
all, very much compatible with their own modes of thought.'79 Ach-
relius followed the Hippocratic line of thought when he argued that 
this theory would best explain why some characteristics of people and 
375 Alanus-Kempe 1647, Th. 14. "Sed falsum est semen esse purum putum excre-
mentum, cum si de semine animalium loquamur, in peculiari organo ex puro 
sanguine, non sine labore coquatur & elaboretur. Certe tot vasorum praeparantium 
& coquentium mirabilem structuram pro excremento nunquam formesset natura. 
...excrementum enim esse, & utile esse, oppositum in apposito & atramentum 
rubrum est." 
376 Alanus-Kempe 1647, Th. 13. Petraeus-Ignatius 1673, Th. XVII. Hahn-Ulholm 
1689, p. 49. Hahn-Helinus 1694a, p. 37. Hahn-Ljungdahl 1704, p. 20-21. 
377 Achrelius 1682, p. 347. "Multa quidem seminis portio ä cerebro, ab universo 
corpore, a singulis ejus tum mollibus tum solidis particulis, diciduum est. Sane 
vero nisi ab omnibus membris deflueret, neque ex eo omnes & singulae foetus 
partes possent formari." 
378 Dean-Jones 1994, p. 162-166. 
379 Hippocrates 1983, p. 317, 319, 321-322, et passim. See also Le Grand 1979, p. 
796. It is not sure whether Achrelius got this idea directly from Hippocrates or 
from Le Grand. We know, however, that he had relatively good knowledge of 
Le Grand's writings. See Kallinen 199la. 
even diseases were clearly hereditary.380 Semen was not totally mate-
rial, however. No semen could fertilize and grow unless it was ani-
mated. Generation was essentially production of a new form or soul 
- a task which could be completed by two living souls only.381 How-
ever, the soul was not so much a part of the semen as co-existing 
with and acting upon it. Semen was the vehicle of the soul. 
Ideas on the physical development of an embryo were mainly dis-
cussed in connection with the human foetus. An interesting exception 
was made by Johannes Helinus, who in his massive thesis of ninety 
pages on birds discusses the structure of an egg, the brooding and 
hatching of a chicken at considerable length. In addition to books by 
Aristotle and Aldrovandi, Helinus refers quite often and with approval 
to Harvey's research on the subject.382  Here it may suffice to say that 
according to the standard opinion every semen had so called vis plas-
tica or formatrix, which were faculties of the vegetative soul. It was 
their task to guide the development of the embryo. 
The formation process did not work out successfully in all indivi-
duals of a species. The results were called monsters. The word "monst-
rum" had several meanings. The meaning of the word covered a) mal-
formation, b) hybrids, and c) fabulous monsters known e.g. from clas-
sical Greek and Roman literature. It was by no means self-evident 
that the causes of malformations should be studied in physics. Scientia 
was usually attainable from the necessary and normal regularities 
found in nature. Now "monsters" were by definition contrary to nature, 
and hence not illuminating of the natural order. It becomes evident 
against this background why the opposite view that even the abnor-
malities could tell us something about nature was expressly stated at 
Turku. These unlucky creatures had a meaning in life too. According 
380 	 Achrelius 1682, loc. sit. Hippocrates 1983, p. 322. "If from any part of the father's 
body a greater quantity of sperm is derived than from the corresponding part of 
the mother's body the child will, in that part, bear a closer resemblance to its 
father; and vice versa." 
381 Alanus-Lidenius 1643, Th. XXIV. Alanus-Jurvelius 1647, Th. XVI-XX, XXIII, 
XXV, XXVII-XXXIII, XXXVIII-XLII. Alanus-Kempe 1647, Th. 5, 11-12, 17-
19. Hahn-Ulholm 1689, p. 50, et passim. Hahn-Helinus 1694a, p. 36. Halm-Ljung-
dahl 1704, p. 44, 46-47. Pagel 1976, p. 86-87, 89. 
382 Hahn-Helinus 1694, p. 34-54, et passim. See also Hahn-Ulholm 1689, p. 56. 
Helinus also seems to have adopted something of Aldrovandi's Renaissance style, 
in which a wide variety of aspects concerning each animal species are studied. 
This is somewhat atypical at Turku. For Aldrovandi see Ashworth 1990, p. 313-
316. 
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to Achrelius "Malformations redound on their part the glory and ma-
jesty of God. They are also partly signs of the punishment to come, 
when people mix with each other without proper mode, without any 
law and in a shameful intercourse."383 On the other hand those people 
who strove to produce hybrids (like mules) for human use, committed 
a grave sin. God had created species to be constant and it was not 
man's business to mix them with each other.384 
Both the flora and fauna had their deformities. There were several 
causes of malformation. The excess or scarcity of matter caused re-
dundance and deficiencies of limbs and organs. The formative virtue 
could also get lost and form organs in inappropriate places or other-
wise deform them. A dangerous source of malformations was maternal 
imagination. For example a pregnant woman startled by a bear could 
give birth to a completely hairy child.385 
Anatomical descriptions of animals were an integral part of zoology 
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in those theses which concentrated on certain species of animals. The 
whale was described in detail by Elisaeus Hwal, who had chosen the 
subject because of his family name, which is old Swedish and means 
"whale". At the beginning of the 1690's there was something like a 
renaissance for birds at Turku: in addition to the thesis by Helinus 
already mentioned, two dissertations on doves were published. Perhaps 
the most exotic contribution to zoology at Turku was presented in 
1709, when the student Lannerus published his theses on elephants 
and their uses as war machines.386  Elephants, camels, crocodiles, gi-
raffes and many other African animals were already known in antiq-
uity, and camels and elephants were not unheard of in 15th-century 
European courts. The classical bestiaries were well-provided with 
knowledge about these animals. It is remarkable, though, how little 
the discoveries of new animals effected biological theory. Most often 
383 Achrelius 1682, p. 342. "Enarrant autem monstra partim Dei gloriam & majes-
tatem; partim futura sunt ultionis signa, quando homines sine modo, sine lege, 
nefando concubitu se miscent." On monsters generally and their being against 
nature see Huet 1993. 
384 Thauvonius-Gyllenius 1655, Th. XIII. 
385 Alanus-Kempe 1647, Th. 62-65. Thauvonius-Gyllenius 1655, Th. XI, XIX-XXI, 
et passim. Achrelius 1682, p. 337-341. Hahn-Ulholm 1689, p. 50-51. On early 
eighteenth-century ideas on maternal imagination see Wilson 1992. For a more 
general survey of the role of imagination in natural philosophical theories see 
Southgate 1992. Huet 1993. 
386 Achrelius-Hwal 1683. Hahn-Lannerus 1709. Hahn-Helinus 1694a-b. Hahn-Hiel-
merus 1691. 
229 
The "physical and historical" thesis on elephants and their use in war was published by 
professor Hahn and Daniel Lannerus in 1709. Lannerus concentrates first on studying the 
origin of the word °elephant" and he discusses what ancient authors have said about the 
animal and its habits. According to Lannerus elephants are made martial and prepared for 
fight by letting them drink wine. Showing them something of white colour is said to make 
them pugnacious as well. 
in the 17th-century books the new species - if described at all - were 
pushed into the traditional classifications.387 
Usually the descriptions of animals were restricted to the external 
structure of the body. The anatomy of sense organs, especially the 
eyes was, however, relevant from the point of view of physiology and 
the theory of perception as well. Therefore the anatomical structures 
and functions of these organs are relatively accurately described both 
787 George 1980. 
in dissertations dealing with zoology and the sensitive sou1.388 Related 
to this is the interest which was occasionally shown in the production 
of voice. Although animals could produce only inarticulate voices, 
they could still express joy, fear or anger. Differences in animal voices 
were caused either by different epiglottal and thoracic structures or 
by the varying temperaments of their dispositions.389 
It was typical of the scholarship at the 17th-century University of 
Turku that local knowledge and every day observations of nature were 
very seldom made use of. Most of the information was taken either 
directly from the classical or from 17th-century Aristotelian authors' 
texts. A few exceptions naturally exist, though. In botany, Elias Til-
Landz described plants in the vicinity of Turku. In zoology an author 
outside of the discipline of natural philosophy proper contributed most 
to the knowledge of local fauna. 
The thesis which the professor of poetry, Torsten Rudeen, published 
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in 1707 has a fresh view on its subject. The author's personal know- 
ledge and expertise is visible in the way he describes the anatomy, 
habits and subspecies of the Gulf of Bothnia seals. He also spends 
half of the dissertation describing the methods and equipment used in 
sealing.390 Rudeen clearly had Cartesian sympathies and he was often 
critical of old beliefs and mythological stories. His attitude is displayed 
for example in his thesis on the song of the swan. He does not believe 
that a dying swan would sing in a heavenly voice: "...all times' ex-
perience rather teaches the contrary: the voice of this bird is rough 
and hard as long as it lives."391 The same conclusion was reached six 
years earlier in a somewhat more traditional-style thesis On the 
Swan.392  It had been typical of Renaissance and 17th-century natural 
science to refer to ancient mythology. Sometimes the stories in clas-
sical literature, which were actually meant as metaphors, were taken 
literally. However, it is also possible that the younger generation in 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century exaggerated the cre- 
388 Achrelius-Hwal 1683, p. 61-75, 81-87. Hahn-Weckelman 1697, p. 14-17. Hahn-
Helinus 1694b, p. 8-11. 
389 Hahn-Lindebergh 1687, p. 14-19. Achrelius 1682, p. 42-45. Hahn-Helinus 1694a, 
p. 82-87. 
390 Rudeen-Wijkar 1707, p. 5-7, 10-15, et passim, on sealing see p. 23-44. 
391 
	
	 Rudeen-Granroot 1703, p. 15. "...quin prorsus contrarium omnium docuit tempo- 
rum experientia, esse scilicet asperam streperamque huic avi vocem quamdiu vi-
vit." 
392 Hahn-Weckelman 1697, p. 28-34. 
dulity of Renaissance authors in order to emphasize their own critical 
attitude.393 
We have seen that the study of living nature operated in the fra-
mework of the Aristotelian "research programme". Most theses appro-
ached the subject by following the established order of presentation, 
in which most attention was paid to the real definition of the subject. 
In pursuing living nature the scope of the differentiae scrutinized had 
naturally to be modified. In addition to causes (especially the efficient 
cause or generation) things such as birth, habitat, magnitude, voice, 
etc. were relevant. 
No account of living nature was complete without consideration of 
its most perfect production, man. In the following chapter we shall 
turn our attention to the ideas which deal with this microcosm. Many 
of the ideas concerning man had much in common with the theories 
about the other parts of living nature. 
6. THE HUMAN BEING 
The study of man was a not insignificant part of natural philosophical 
inquiry. Not only were various aspects of human anatomy and phy-
siology discussed, but a major concern was human psychology, i.e. 
the faculties of the rational soul. Although intelligence was a particular 
feature of the rational soul, the study of human perception and the 
physiology of the sense organs was considered essential for under-
standing human psychology, since Aristotelian empiricism claimed 
that our concepts were derived from the senses. In this chapter I shall 
first present the views held about the structure and functions of the 
human body, then consider ideas of the rational soul and perception 
processes. From the point of view of 17th-century natural philosophy 
it was not without relevance to study the moral aspects involved in 
the position of the human being in the world. The relationships be-
tween man and nature and man and supernatural beings (angels and 
393 	 Rudeen e.g. argues that it is a fairy tale of Ovid that a human being could trans- 
form into a swan. Rudeen-Granroot 1703, p. 8-12. 
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demons) revealed the limitations of humanity. This third theme is also 
briefly considered at the end of this chapter. 
6.1. Anatomy and Physiology 
The 16th and 17th centuries have become known as revolutionary 
centuries in human anatomy and physiology. The publication and great 
success of Vesalius' anatomy in 1543 launched new interest in me-
dicine - a tradition which flourished in Italian universities especially. 
Another fruit of this Paduan tradition was William Harvey's discovery 
of the circulation of blood. New instruments such as microscopes 
opened new view on the subject in the course of the 17th century. 
The microscopic studies of Malpighi and Antoni van Leeuwenhoek 
for example are revered as major advances in "biomedical" sciences. 
On the other hand, Paracelsian medicine and pharmacology were par- 
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	 tially transformed from deviant "science" to an accepted branch of 
medicine by 17th-century scholars like van Helmont, Sennert and 
Erastus.394  The use of metals and minerals as medicines gained support 
among the practitioners of medicine. Along with these two traditions 
the old Galenic medicine still held its established position in many 
European universities. 
One of the leading seats of medical learning in the 17th century 
was the University of Leiden. Many students from Sweden (including 
Finland) finished their medical degrees at Leiden. New ideas were 
rapidly carried to the University of Uppsala,395  whereas at Turku scho-
lars preferred to cling to the old dogmas. 
The Structure and Functions of the Human Body 
During the 17th century only lower studies in medicine were carried 
out at the University of Turku, although in principle the professorship 
in the subject would have enabled more thoroughgoing studies.396  Un-
der the first professor of medicine, Eric Achrelius (1642-1670) no 
394 	 Pagel 1967, 1976, 1986. Singer 1962, p. 88-144. Singer's straightforwardly prog-
ressive view on the development of anatomy and physiology has been criticised 
e.g. by Nutton 1993. See also articles in Wear, French & Lonie 1985. 
395 	 E.g. Olof Rudbeck discovered the lymphatic system in 1650 and also demonstra-
ted it in 1652 to Queen Christina. See e.g. Lindroth 1975, p. 390-401. 
396 On medicine at Turku see Perret 1985. Fagerlund & Tigerstedt 1890. 
theses were published on the subject. Achrelius was several times 
reproached with neglecting his duties by the Senate; he for his part 
complained of the lack of students.397 His follower Elias Til-Landz 
seems to have been more active as professor and tried to raise the 
students' interest in his subject. Til-Landz had studied at Uppsala and 
Leiden and was probably aware of the latest developments in medi-
cine; at least he referred to many of the most up-to-date physiologists 
and anatomists in his graduate thesis on malnutrition, which he wrote 
in Leiden.398 He not only practised medicine in addition to his 
teaching, but also prepared drugs in his own small laboratory. This 
was particularly significant, because no regular chemist's store existed 
in Turku (or in the whole of Finland) in those days.'99 He even ar-
ranged a hospital to be opened for lepers. Til-Landz probably based 
his pharmacology and medical treatment on humoral pathology, his 
herbal indicating that he considered the effects of plants to be mainly 
in accordance with the principles of Galenic medicine. In addition to 
this the Paracelsian theory of salt, sulphur and mercury belonged to 
the basic repertoire of medicine. In 1695 Laurentius Braun still trusts 
in both of these in his medical dissertation.400 The last professor of 
medicine before the Great Northern War was Petrus Hjelm. No theses 
were published under his guidance, but he seems to have lectured 
regularly on basic medical subjects.401  
Dissection was a practice which became usual from the beginning 
of the sixteenth century on, and during the following century anatomy 
was still very much a discipline in vogue. In addition to the scientific 
importance of anatomy, it had become a matter of prestige for aca-
demic institutions to have the most up-to-date equipment. One of the 
most fashionable status-symbols of the 17th-century universities was 
397 Klinge 1987, p. 393. Perret 1983, p. 73. 
398 Gronovius-Til-Landz 1670. In Th. IV he mentions the lymphatic system as car-
rying and distributing nutrients; in Th. IX he discusses Malpighi's theory, accor-
ding to which fattenig starts in those parts of the body where the nervous system 
does not reach, and in Th. XI-XX TiI-Landz refers to the British physiologists 
Glisson and Charleton. Gronovius was professor of Greek and history, not a me-
dic. 
399 Leikola 1987, p. 579. Leikola 1993. 
400 Braun-Stecksenius 1695. Braun 1695 is based on traditional medicine as well. 
401 
	
	 Elenchus Praelectionum, Catalogus 1706: Hjelm lectured on principles of medi- 
cine in public and on constitution of the human body in private. 1708: explains 
principles of medicine and Hippocratic Aphorisms in public. 1711: lecturing can-
celled because of war duties. 1712: teaches practical medicine. 
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the anatomy theatre 402 At Uppsala an anatomy theatre was built in 
the 1660's, just opposite the main entrance of the cathedral, but at 
Turku such a building was not needed. It has been claimed that pro-
fessor Til-Landz would have done some anatomical demonstrations at 
his own house, in a room which he had arranged for the purpose403 
However, in my view it is improbable that he would have dissected 
human corpses there (animals might have been possible), because this 
practice was closely regulated in the statutes. Anatomical dissections 
also acquired very rapidly other cultural meanings than strictly scien-
tific and therefore arranging a dissection was a matter to be prepared 
for with tact and diplomacy. 
The statutes of 1626 for the University of Uppsala already decreed 
that anatomical dissections should be arranged every year. (In later 
statutes, however, only one every two years.)404 Obviously dissections 
were thus not even meant to be principal teaching methods. Clearly 
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the function of such events was very much social too, not least because 
of the delicate moral character of dissecting a human body. It was 
usual long into the 19th century to dissect mainly the bodies of cri-
minals or of the extremely poor. Exposing man's intestines to the 
public was thought extremely humiliating and therefore it could in a 
way become a part of the punishment of the criminal.405 
 Indeed, the 
Brahean statutes for instance decreed that the body for dissection 
should be provided by the castellan, which directly indicates that it 
was bodies of criminals which were supposed to be dissected.406 How-
ever, even the criminal body had to be treated with proper respect. 
The statutes tended to regulate more the social code surrounding dis-
section than the benefits which the event might bring to medical lear-
ning (these regulations were originally intended for the University of 
Uppsala, which had two professors in the Faculty of Medicine, whe-
reas Turku had only one.): 
402 Rupp 1990. 
403 Leikola 1987, p. 579. Perret 1977, p. 92. "Tillandz gjorde ofta anatomiska dis-
sektioner i sitt eget hus..." On anatomy in Finland see also Niemi 1990, p. 7-16. 
404 Annerstedt 1877, p. 249-250. Schybergson 1918, p. 233-224. Schybergson 1920, 
p. 168. 
405 Rupp 1990. 
406 Schybergson 1920, p. 168. "Han bör också åtminstone en gång på två år hålla 
en anatomisk sektion, varvid slottsfogden bör anskaffa ett människolik." 
The first of the medical professors should teach the principles of 
medicine together with the methods of healing. The other should 
instruct in physics together with knowledge of herbs and the parts 
of human body. He should also perform a dissection once a year. 
The 'prefect' shall supply the body, and each of the spectators shall 
pay two marks: one for the anatomist, the rest for the funds of the 
faculty. But if both of the physicians lead the dissection in turns, 
they shall divide the money among themselves equally. Professors 
shall be admitted free. When the dissection is finished, the body 
must be buried according to the usual ceremonies, which shall be 
attended by the anatomist and students of medicine,407 
The first public dissection of a human corpse was arranged in the 
greater auditorium of the University of Turku in 1686. This occasion 
became a memorable academic festivity whose main purpose was to 
enhance the prestige of the University and its medical faculty. It was 
to show that "real" anatomy was practised at the Academy. A solemn 
program was printed and an entrance fee of one silver mark was set 
for the event 408 Dissections did not, however, become an established 
practice at Turku, most probably because there was neither need for 
them in medical education nor the capacity to arrange them. The next 
dissection was organised more than twenty years later in 1709. 
Compared with his practical achievements Til-Landz produced re-
latively little written material. In addition to his botanical treatises he 
published only two academic dissertations. The first dissertation in 
medicine ever published at Turku (1673) discussed for the most part 
the nature of the art of medicine. The various meanings and origin of 
the term "medicine" were carefully scrutinized. However, the greater 
part of the thesis discusses the pros and cons of medical schools.4°9 
It was obviously intended as an introduction to medicine, and as such 
407 Annerstedt 1877, p. 249-250. "Medicarum primus institutioner medicinae enar-
rabit cum medendi methodo, alter physicen cum herbarum et partium humanis 
corpori cognitione, sectionem ipse administruet quotannis. Cadavera praefecti sub-
ministrabunt, spectatorum singuli marcas binas solvant, unam anatomico, fisco 
facultatis reliquum. Si per vices uterque medicorum sectioni praesit, pecuniam 
aequaliter inter se dividant. Professores gratis ad inspectionem admittantur. Pe-
racta sectione cadaver ritu consueto sepuliatur, comitante anatomico et medicinae 
studiosis." The organisation of dissections was socially regulated elsewhere also. 
On the situation in the Netherlands see Rupp 1990, p. 265-270. 
408 Perret 1985, p. 71. Leikola 1987, p. 580. 
409 Til-Landz-Aschlinus 1673. See also Pitkäranta 1984. 
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it was well in line with the lively textbook tradition at Turku during 
the 17th century. The another thesis written by Til-Landz, Ostheolo-
gia, was printed in 1692. It gave Latin, Swedish and Finnish names 
to the human bones, and it was illustrated with clumsy copies from 
Vesalius' anatomia.41°  
On the other hand it is notable that both Til-Landz's first thesis 
and the only thesis published under professor Braun in 1695 both deal 
with the basic features of the art of medicine. They try to define what 
medicine is and what it is not; Til-Landz for instance rejects veterinary 
medicine from the proper area of the practice. Both authors also ex-
plain the branches of medicine such as physiology, anatomy, patho-
logy and hygienics 411 Braun also distinguishes between practical me-
dicine, which aims at healing, and theoretical medicine, which had 
more in common with natural philosophy. Both authors also have a 
cursory look at the history of medicine. For Braun especially this has 
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the function of defending and legitimizing the use of Galenic medi- 
cine412 The history of science has frequently been used to legitimate 
the scientific practices of the time. There obviously was a need to 
outline the contents and status of the discipline, which otherwise had 
poor status at the Academy. 
The efforts to raise the status of medicine were slow to succeed. 
However, from the 1690's on the number of dissertations discussing 
physiological matters rises rapidly. Not only did the traditional sub-
jects of sense physiology become popular, but the first theses on spe-
cific physiological themes such as digestion or the brain also appeared. 
One relevant factor in the boom of physiology at Turku undoubtedly 
was Cartesianism. First of all, it propagated new physiological ideas. 
Cartesianism was also very popular in the Faculty of Medicine at the 
University of Uppsala, from where the influences gradually spread to 
Turku. These theses were, however, published under the presidium of 
the professor of physics, Petrus Hahn. 
Thus the human body was not only the subject of medicine, but 
also of natural philosophical inquiry. As I have shown in section "The 
Order of Disciplines" this is in itself nothing peculiar, since the boun-
daries between certain parts of medicine and natural philosophy were 
very flexible indeed throughout the 17th century. The subject of phy- 
410 Niemi 1990, p. 11-13. 
411 	 Pitkäranta 1984, p. 78-82. Braun-Stecksenius 1695, p. 26-31. 
412 Pitkäranta 1984, p. 83-84. Braun-Stecksenius 1695, p. 2-14, 21, et passim. 
sics was the "natural body", and the body of man was, after all, a 
corpus naturalis consisting of matter and form. In dissertations written 
in physics, anatomy and physiology walk hand in hand, so that it is 
almost impossible to separate their spheres. 
When the form, structure, movements and functions of a bodily 
organ were discussed, it had to be done in accordance with the Aris-
totelian scheme. The definition of an organ was not complete without 
knowledge of the good it served, or in other words, its function in 
the organic whole. The descriptions of the internal and external struc-
tures of the human body were usually rather superficial, though. Tra-
ditional categorizations such as the Aristotelian division into partes 
similares - dissimilares were used to portray bodily structures,413 but 
other kinds of approaches to the subject were also employed. Bishop 
Gezelius especially loved to salt his otherwise dry and laconic scho-
lastic text with axioms, in which he claimed e.g. that women were not 
monsters (referring to Aristotle's idea that women were imperfect men), 	 237 
that both men and women had the same number of ribs (although Eve 
had been created from one of Adam's ribs) or that head was the prin-
cipal place of the sensitive faculty because nerves lead to the brain 414 
In natural philosophical dissertations the human body was typically 
described as a microcosm. The theory was simply accepted as a fact 
by which certain phenomena, especially antipathy - sympathy relations 
could be explained. Although generally recognized as true, the mic-
ro-macrocosm theory was nevertheless no rigid guiding principle in 
natural philosophy. 
But, having abandoned these Hermetical dreams, we shall assert 
man to be a microcosm; not in the strict sense so that he would 
contain all natural bodies in reality, but Symbolically and Analo-
gically....Some people also say that man has a peculiar analogy 
with all species in the world. His heart would in a way correspond 
to the Sun, his brain to the Moon, and the rest of his parts to other 
species.415  
413 Gezelius 1672, p. 317-326. Achrelius 1682, p. 360-363. See also Thauvonius-
Warelius 1652, Sect. III, MMembr. III, Art. III. Thauvonius-Anxelius 1655, Th. 
48-52. Similar parts were homogeneous in structure, e.g. bood or muscle, whereas 
dissimilar parts such as a hand consisted of various kinds of materials. Boylan 
1983, p. 181ff., I91-2ff., et passim. Furth 1988, p. 80-83. 
414 Gezelius 1672, p. 317, 321, 325. 
415 Hahn-Chydenius 1697, p. 6, 12. "Sed, missis Hermeticis hisce somniis, mikro- 
Man could be called microcosm because his form included all deg-
rees of being from the vegetative soul to the rational.416 He was also 
the most perfect being, created as the image of God. His bodily struc-
ture was no less perfect and wonderful, consisting of the same four 
elements as everything else in the world.417 But most of all there was 
a symbolic resemblance between certain parts of human body and 
nature. This relationship between a human organ and, say, a plant or 
a planet could be determined by a similarity of the external shape, or 
by the similar functions which they performed. No theory was, how-
ever, put forward on whether these correspondences would be found 
by empirical methods, mystical experience, or by something else. 
In physiology one of the most important innovations in the 17th 
century was the theory of the circulation of blood. The prevalent sys-
tem before Harvey's theory was of course the Galenic one. However, 
it was not an unalterable bulk of theories either, but from the 1530's 
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on especially had been criticised and modified in many respects.418 
We do not know exactly what kind of theory concerning the car-
diovascular system was held at Turku during the first four decades of 
teaching and learning there. The matter was simply not discussed in 
print. The "acceptance" of the theory of the circulation of blood at 
Turku is a good example of the ways in which knowledge is trans-
formed at different stages of the very process of its diffusion. More-
over, this example illustrates the claim that there are different modes 
in which a theory can be "accepted". 
The theory of the circulation of blood first appeared in print with 
professor Achrelius' Contemplationes mundi. It is very likely that Elias 
Til-Landz was at least aware of this theory long before it was first 
published. Achrelius presents a Cartesian version of the circulation of 
blood. There had been some disagreement between Harvey and Des-
cartes concerning certain features of the system; they disagreed par-
ticularly on the proper explanations of the formation of blood and the 
movement of the heart. The main reason why Descartes rejected Har- 
kosmos dici hominem asserimus, non proprie & per realem omnium corporum 
naturalium continentiam; Sed Symbolics, & per Analogiam. ...Quidam etiam di-
cunt hominem cum quävis specie mundi peculiarem fovere analogiam. Quasi cor 
ejus corresponderet soli; cerebrum Lun, & reliquix partes aliis speciebus." See 
also Braun-Stecksenius 1695, p. 19-21. 
416 Thuronius-Kinmundt 1662, Quaest. I. 
417 Hahn-Chydenius 1697, p. 6-13. Achrelius 1682, p. 359-360. 
418 Bylebyl 1969. 
vey's theory was that the cause of the movement of the heart seemed 
to him to require an unconscious mental act. This, of course, was 
against the principles of Descartes' dualistic ontology.419 
According to Descartes the movement of the heart was dilation not 
contraction. As an author at Turku put it, the dilatation of the heart 
was caused by the expansion of blood due to the heat residing in the 
heart: 
It is worth knowing that in the porous tissues of the ventricles of 
the heart there exists a certain kind of a fire without a light. It 
makes heart very warm and burning. At the same time as blood 
enters one of its ventricles, it swells and dilates especially because 
the fire, which I described residing in the heart, serves no other 
end in this machinery, but that... it would cause motion by dilating, 
heating and diluting blood.42°  
In Achrelius' text the role of respiration remains unconnected to 
the circulation of blood. He only says that respiration was to "maintain 
the fire residing in the heart, cool the blood and force it into moti-
on".471 The main purpose of the blood was, according to Achrelius, 
to spread spiritus animales around the body. It was these spirits, which 
caused the movement of the muscles. Contrary to Harvey's theory 
Achrelius supposed, in accordance with the old Galenic dogma, that 
the blood was formed from food in the liver.422 The "concoction" or 
"fermentation" of food into blood was described in still greater detail 
in a dissertation on digestion published in 1708.423  
Achrelius had adopted the Cartesian version of the theory of the 
circulation of blood. This is quite natural, because Descartes was one 
of the most powerful disseminators of the theory, and his influence 
was also strong at the University of Uppsala. It was typical of the 
419 Gorham 1994. p. 212, et passim. 
420 Hahn-Gezelius 1691, p. 8. "Scire quoqve opera pretium est, in poris Parenchy-
matis cordis contineri ignem qvendam sine lumine, qvo istud tam calidum fervi-
dumqve redditur simul ac rangvis alterutrum ejus ventriculum intrat illico intu-
mescat ac dilatetur praeterea ignis, qvem describo in corde, machinae contentus 
nulli alii rei subservit, qvam dilatando calefaciendo & attenuando sangvini... om-
nino sequitur motum." 
421 Achrelius 1682, p. 363-364. "...ignem in corde latentem fovere, sanguinem ref-
rigerare, eumque in motum compellere." Leikola 1983b. 
422 Achrelius 1682, p. 363. See also Hahn-Gezelius 1691, p. 10-11. 
423 Hahn-Dycander 1708, on the formation of blood p. 19-22. 
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developments at Turku that later - in those very few dissertations whe-
re the theory was referred to - it was associated with Cartesianism. 
Laurentius Gezelius for example asserted in his De Sangvine that he 
would follow the road shown by "novi Philosophi", especially Des-
cartes, in matters of the circulation of blood.424 Nevertheless the same 
author turns out not to be so wholeheartedly on the side of the circu-
lation theory, proposing instead an ambiguous statement in which the 
"circulation" of blood seems more likely to be composed of two mo-
tions, of which at least the first is linear. 
The scope of this study does not allow us to examine any more 
closely whether the local motion of fluids is direct or circular, or 
whether it is a third, mixed motion outside of these two alternatives. 
Suffice it to say that the last alternative seems to me most convin-
cing. It is obvious to anyone who looks at the subject with open 
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eyes that all this aims at conserving all the precious parts of the 
entire body, and [the blood flows] in astraight line to all parts of 
the body, however in a way that it must at some point return and 
seek other channels for this.425 
The connection of the theory with Cartesianism is strengthened by 
the fact that non-Cartesian authors remained silent about it. For exam-
ple, there is a dissertation written at the end of the 1690's, in which 
the author takes a critical stance against the theory, according to which 
dead bodies bleed in presence of their murderers. However, the theory 
of the circulation of blood is neither defended nor refuted in this con-
nection.426 
Harvey's theory of the circulation of blood was variously received 
in different European countries. In this battle for acceptance several 
philosophers developed both empirically and rationally-based argu-
ments pro and contra. Although we can safely assume that at least 
some of these arguments might have been known at Turku, no atten- 
424 Hahn-Gezelius 1691, p. 8. 
425 Hahn-Gezelius 1691, p. 8. "Non permittit instituti ratio longius examinare, num 
sit hic fluidorum motus localis, rectus an circularis, an ex his redundans tertius 
mixtus, qvod mihi verosimilium videri, sufficiat dixisse. Cuivis enim, qvi totis 
oculis rem intuetur, obvium est, qvam tendant haec omnia conservationis aman-
tissima, linea recta in universas corporis partes, sic tamen, ut cogantur nonnun-
quam regyrare, aliasque ductus qvaerere." 
426 Hahn-Polviander 1698. 
tion was paid to them. The theory was stated as a fact, confirmed by 
references to foreign authors. No arguments for the theory were nee-
ded, nor was its truth explicitly called into question anywhere. By 
1690 it had already achieved the status of a self-evident proposition, 
i.e. functioning as the premise of another theory, as in Andreas Lun-
dius' thoroughly Cartesian dissertation. He uses the theory of the cir-
culation of blood as a presupposition for his theory of the cause of 
certain mental disorders.427 
Digestion, circulation of blood, sensation and other bodily functions 
occurred in living creatures only. But what was life in itself? Accor-
ding to the Aristotelian form-matter scheme it was naturally the form 
or soul which was responsible for life. On the physical and physio-
logical level, however, other concepts were also introduced to describe 
vitality. 
This vital principle was called calidus innatus. Actualized in gene- 
ration it was coexistent with the composition of matter and soul in 	 241 
all living creatures. Nevertheless, as a substantial part of form it was 
separate from matter.428 The heart was the principal seat of internal 
heat, whence it was propagated throughout the body by blood either 
by circulation or by the Galenic to-and-fro movement.429 It was espe-
cially the extremely penetrative small corpuscles in blood, called Spi-
ritus, which distributed the warmth around the body.430 The physical 
qualities warmth and humidity arising basically from the matter of 
man, the four elements were the essential ingredients of life. Depri-
vation of either of these qualities had lethal consequences: plants 
struck by drought soon withered away and animals removed to ex-
cessively hot or cold enviroments died.431  
External factors strongly affected calidus innatus. First of all, a 
sufficient amount of fresh, non-poisonous and non-infectous air was 
essential for maintaining the vital principle. Appropriate diet, regular 
427 Hahn-Lundius 1690, p. 25. 
428 Hahn-Linstorphius 1688, p. 4-8. Hahn-Frostman 1708, p. 16. 
429 
	 Hahn-Linstorphius 1688, p. 13-14. "Motum cordis arteriarum & musculorum fieri 
å dilatatione sanguinis per cor transeuntis idque å latente igne seu calore in cordis 
thalamo disserit Excellens Achrelius." Hahn-Frostman 1708, p. 17-20. Neither 
author clarifies his stance on whether the blood circulates or not. Hahn-Linsthor-
pius relies more on Galen, Aristotle, Curtius and other classical authors. 
430 	 Hahn-Frostman 1708, p. 17-20. Their idea that the spiritus in blood are material 
particles and not spiritual entities of course resembles the Cartesian reading of 
this Galenic theory. 
431 	 Hahn-Linstorphius 1688, p. 8-9, et passim. 
defecation, sufficient sleep and the absence of emotional upsets were 
further requirements for sustaining it - and thereby health.432 However, 
not even the most extreme external conditions could always disturb 
"internal heat": 
It is to be said that the Finns, when they have been exhausted by 
the heat in a sauna, deliberately plunge into cold. They are not 
afraid to descend to rivers or lakes even in the winter, and they do 
this without any damage. But we cannot say for sure whether this 
really helps to refresh the internal heat.433  
The internal composition of the creature was equally important for 
the duration of life. Fish, which were cold by nature, lived shorter 
lives than "warmer" quadrupeds. Sanguine temperament was best 
equipped for life because of its well-balanced composition. Choleric 
242 
	
	
and plegmatic temperaments, dominated by fire and water respective- 
ly, prognosticated shorter lives, whereas the cold and dry melancholics 
had it worst. The ageing of man or animal was also due to weakening 
or decrease of the calidus innatus.434  
The idea of vital or innate heat is based on Aristotle's texts and is 
therefore to be found in some form or other in medieval and Renais-
sance Aristotelian tradition 435  This is then combined with the Galenic 
doctrines of spirits or pneuma436  (the word pneuma is never used in 
our dissertations) and the theory of temperaments, which of course 
was based on humoral pathology. On the other hand the idea that the 
vital principle lies in (particles of) blood might easily be inspired by 
the Bible, where it says that blood is alive and animated. The con-
nection seems not too far-fetched if one considers how often the Bible 
was used as both a direct and indirect source of information in 17th-
century natural philosophy. 
The essence of life was, quite naturally, an area where metaphysical 
432 	 Hahn-Linstorphius 1688, p. 10-15. These aspects were discussed by that part of 
medicine called hygienics. Braun-Stecksenius 1695, p. 27-28. 
433 	 Hahn-Linstorphius 1688, p. 16. "Fennonum docet, qua; calore balnearico macerata 
frigidam suffundere, in amnes & puteos vel ipsa hyeme descendere non veretur, 
& qvidem sine noxå. Ast an his reficiatur calidum, certi qvid statuere non pos-
sumus." 
434 Hahn-Linstorphius 1688, p. 8-10. Hahn-Frostman 1708, p. 13-16. 
435 Aristotle 1957, Parva Naturalia, 46968-20. 
436 Singer 1962, p. 62-64. 
and physiological ideas crossed and inter-bred. It was by no means 
the only area where these disciplines met each other. One of the most 
important subjects of natural philosophy in which metaphysical and 
theological ideas played a major role, was human generation. 
The Generation of Man and the Development of the Foetus 
The origin of man had fascinated many classical philosophers, who 
presented both mythical folklore stories and their own "scientific" 
theories about this question.437 Although these theories were discussed, 
they were of course found incompatible with the Christian view that 
God created the first man. Nevertheless, classical authors were referred 
to because their stories formed an antithesis to the Christian dogma. 
As ancient theories were labelled ridiculous fiction, the validity of the 
current view was reinforced. 
The human being was generally acknowledged to have two kinds 
of origin: origo extraordinaria and origo ordinaria. The extraordinary 
or supernatural origin of man was entirely accomplished by God. 
...GOD produced man in three ways: 1. He made a man without a 
woman, that is he made Adam. 2. He fabricated a human from man 
without a woman, that is he made Eve. 3. In a peculiar and mira-
culous way Christ was born from a woman without man. This kind 
of generation is above all the powers of nature and thus is not 
subject to physical consideration 438 
The extraordinary origin of man was thus not handled more deeply 
in physics dissertations, because supernatural phenomena were not 
supposed to be subject to natural philosophical inquiry. The other 
means of the generation of man was more in the field of physics. 
Unlike origo extraordinaria, natural or ordinary origin or reproduction 
was achieved by man without direct interference by God. Of course, 
God had given the ability to procreate to all species, including humans, 
in his prime act of creation. His order to multiply and to replenish 
437 Thuronius-Kinmundt 1662, Quaest. III. 
438 Hahn-Ljungdahl 1704, p. 12. "...tribus modis DEUS hominem produxit: Nam I. 
fecit hominem sine foemina & viro, ut Adamum. 2. fabricavit hominem ex homine 
sine foemina, ut Evam. 3. modo singulari & mirabili de foemina sine viro natus 
est Christus, talis generatio est supra cunctas naturae vires & per consequens non 
est Physicae considerationis." See also Miltopaeus-Enebergh 1667, Th. XX. 
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the Earth was seen as the fundamental efficient cause for human proc-
reation. 
The the boundary line between metaphysical and theological spe-
culations and physical processes was very elastic, the transition from 
one area to the other being easy. However, the metaphysical ideas on 
the propagation of form and the theological dogmas involved in the 
generation of man formed only the background or the fundamentals 
which the physical explanations were based on. Physically, the soul 
was propagated by semen, a material but animated substance secreted 
from blood. Both male and female were considered to have semen. 
Nevertheless, ideas on conception itself were quite vague in the 17th 
century: "Conception is a reception, retaining, mixing, fomentation 
and stimulation of male and female semen in the womb."439 Concep-
tion, as well as the growth of the foetus was thought to happen in the 
uterus. The knowledge of the anatomy of female sexual organs seems 
to have been weak, since they were just not described. This may be 
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	 for several reasons. In classical Greek medicine the external female 
genitalia were generally poorly described, because they were not as-
sumed to play a role in health and disease, and only pathological 
conditions were described.44°  
According to the theory favoured at Turku, the process of the for-
mation of foetus starts immediately after the conception. All the "mi-
xings, dispositions, congelations, separations, thickenings, rarefactions 
and condensations" are caused by the "formative faculty" residing in 
the semen. If this facultas formatrix went astray for some reason, or 
the maternal imagination disturbed its function, serious misformations 
could occur.44' The coarser parts of the semen would form a cover 
for the foetus.442  The cover consists of two parts: 
Chorion is a strong fibrous cover, which surrounds the foetus comp-
letely. It is supported by the umbilical cord and is connected through 
it to the wall of the womb. Amnion is a thinner coat. It immediately 
surrounds the foetus and holds all the liquids.443  
439 	 Alanus-Kempe 1647, Th. 48. "Conceptio est seminis maris & foeminae in utero 
receptio. retentio, miltio, folio & excitatio." Cf. Pagel 1976, p. 84-89. 
440 Dean-Jones 1994, p. 78. 
441 
	 Alanus-Kempe 1647, Th. 49, 62-66. "mistiones, dispositiones, concretiones, sec-
retiones, densationes, rarefactiones, contractiones" See also Hahn-Ulholm 1689, 
p. 105-106, 110-112, et passim. 
442 Alanus-Kempe 1647, Th. 49, 54. Hahn-Ulholm 1689, p. 107. 
443 Alanus-Kempe 1647, Th. 56. "Chorion est tunica nervosa, valida, foetum totum 
ambiens vala umbilicalia fulciens, & eorum interventu utero adhaerescens. Am- 
At the same time the finer parts of semen were being formed into 
the foetus. This so-called imperfect formation was completed in seven 
days after conception. In this phase all organs of the foetus were for-
med from pure semen without maternal blood. When the vena umbi-
licali had been formed, the second phase of the process began, the 
so-called perfect formation. This development would take 30 days for 
male foetuses and 42 for female.444 
 The foetus was nurtured by menst-
rual blood, which differed from normal blood only by its greater quan-
tity.445 We are also told certain anatomical details about the nutrition 
of a foetus; the veins would carry nutritional blood to the foetus and 
the arteries "spirituous blood".446 
The ultimate phase of formation was thought to take place two to 
three months after the completion of the second phase of the formation 
process. During the rest of its time in the womb the foetus mainly 
grew in size and began to move. When the foetus was ready, which 
happened after seven to ten (though usually nine) months of pregnan-
cy, it was born. The pain suffered by mother in childbirth was equiva-
lent to the amount of lust she had felt during intercourse. Some theses 
also mention that premature births or miscarriages may occur. A de-
liberately-caused abortion was considered homicide, although not in 
the strict sense of the word, because the human foetus was not yet a 
perfect human.447 Knowledge of the formation of the foetus was based 
mainly on traditional knowledge, though Alanus also valued more mo-
dern knowledge: "...the knowledge of these things has been acquired 
from the teachings of physicians who have studied aborted foetuses 
and dissected women who have died pregnant..."448 
The development of a foetus was sometimes considered to follow 
a phylopeutic pattern. As we remember, the rational soul included all 
nios est tunica tenuior, proxime foetum ambiens ac sudores recipiens." 
444 Alanus-Kempe 1647, Th. 55-57. Hahn-Ulholm 1689, p. 107-109. 
445 Thuronius-Allenius 1661, Th. 19, 21-23. Cf. Dean-Jones 1994, p. 200-209, et 
passim. 
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	 Alanus-Kempe 1647, Th. 59. "Per venam umbilicalem foetus sanguinem venosum 
ad nutritionem & augmentationem accipit. Per arterias sanguinem spirituosum 
ducit. Per urachum urinam expellit." Hahn-Ulholm 1689, p. 113-114. Achrelius 
1682, p. 347-351. 
447 Alanus-Kempe 1647, Th. 61, 67-73. Thuronius-Allenius 1661, Th. 16, 25-32. Cf. 
Dean-Jones 1994, p. 209-215. 
448 Alanus-Lidenius 1643, Th. XXX. "...ex medicorum tarnen traditionibus, qui ex 
inspectis abortibus, & dissectione matrum praegnantium mortuarum, circa illud 
tempus, aliqualem hujus rei cognitionem acquisiverunt..." 
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faculties of the lower souls. In an early phase, when the foetus was 
nurtured by blood, it could be said to live the life of a plant.C9 At 
that phase, only the faculties belonging to the vegetative soul were 
active. Later on so-called animal spirits began to be formed in the 
brain of the foetus. Thus it entered the level of sensitive souls, and 
began to move and feel 45°  In other words, only some parts of the soul 
were active to start with. But the more elaborate the stage the matter 
of the foetus reached, the more complicated the possible functions of 
the soul. We are not told, however, when the final stage, in which 
the rational soul is activated, begins. Although this kind of phase could 
be discerned, it was nevertheless stressed in the dissertations that 
man's soul is one all the time. 
Note. There is only one soul in the foetus, although diverse lives. 
First of all it lives the life of a plant, after that of an animal, and 
246 
	
	
finally life of man. However, this does not happen in respect to the 
form which is one and indivisible, but in relation to the matter or 
organs.451 
The form of man thus governed a fully developed body. From then 
on the form of man was the subject of scrutiny in psychology. 
6.2. Psychology 
The Renaissance tradition of psychology continued uninterrupted into 
the 17th century. No radically new competitive theories emerged as 
had happened in cosmology or anatomy. The Renaissance synthesis 
of Aristotelian, Galenic and other classical theories was by and large 
accepted as such, and most of the questions discussed arose from 
inside the tradition. Psychology457, or the philosophical study of the 
soul and its properties was not considered an independent discipline. 
449 Alanus-Lidenius 1643, Th. XXXIV, "Porisma: Embryo in utero vitam plantae 
quodam modo vivit." 
450 Hahn-Ulholm 1689, p. 113-114. 
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	 Thuronius-Allenius 1661, Th. 20. "Nota. Una est anima in foetu, sed diversa vita, 
primum enim vivit vitam plantae, post animalis, tandem hominis, non quidem 
ratione formae quae una adeoque indivisibilis, ast ratione materiae, hoc est or-
ganorum." 
452 The term was probably introduced by J.T. Freigius in 1575. See Park & Kessler 
1988, p. 455. 
It was in the first place a part of physics or natural philosophy, in 
which the human soul was studied as the formal cause of man. What 
was this subject matter of the study really like? The formal cause or 
soul of the man, rational soul, and the Christian immortal soul were 
all the same; the difference lay only in the viewpoint from which the 
soul was contemplated. 
Since psychology examined soul in connection to the body, ideas 
on the disposition and functions of the soul/mind were to a great extent 
based on physical and physiological study. The study of sense organs 
was especially concentrated upon, because according to Aristotelian 
epistemology all concepts in our mind were ultimately derived through 
the senses. On the other hand, knowledge of the cognitive processes 
of man had further implications for epistemological theories. Of cour-
se, the relationship between the body and the soul was also more 
generally relevant to physical studies. 
The most serious critics of these traditional views came from Car-
tesianism. For Descartes soul/mind was an entity totally separate from 
the body and thus it was no longer equivalent to the principle of life 
in a body. Reactions against Cartesianism feature in much of the 
psychological writing in the latter part of the 17th century. To start 
with I shall discuss the theories of perception and cognition. Physio-
logical aspects of perception will also be taken into account. The prob-
lem of innate ideas and general capacity for knowledge will also be 
discussed in this chapter. 
Perception and the Senses 
The two primary properties of the rational soul were intellect and 
volition. These two faculties distinguished the rational soul from lower 
types of souls. In order to understand how intellect and volition work 
we have to look at the ideas concerning perception and the abstraction 
of thoughts or ideas from sense perception. 
Perception in itself was a faculty of the animal soul. Although ani-
mal perception, or perception on a very general level was dealt with 
in some dissertations,453 it was principally the needs of human psycho-
logy which inspired the study. The senses were divided into external 
(vision, audition, etc.) and internal senses (fantasy and sensus corn- 
453 E.g. Achrelius-Hwal 1683, p. 53-61, et passim. 
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munis).454  Let us first turn our attention to the external senses, because 
they were the first to receive perceptions. 
The study of the external senses occurred in two different phases. 
From the 1640's to the 1660's it was normal to deal with senses on 
a very general level. They were seen primarily as faculties of the 
sensitive soul. The aim was to search for universal prerequisites of 
perception, or those characteristics which were in common to all crea-
tures with a sensitive soul. In the 1670's and 1680's the problems of 
perception seem to have been more out of fashion and they were dealt 
with only incidentally. Then in the 1690's there is a sudden boom in 
theses discussing senses and perception. Compared with the earlier 
phase they concentrate on much more specific topics and on greater 
detail. Some of these theses were inspired by Cartesianism, regardless 
of whether they opposed or defended it. We might ask whether the 
majority of theses, which were strictly traditional in style and content, 
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were also indirectly inspired by the threat posed by Cartesianism. Alt- 
hough opposing ideas were not disputed, the vehemence with which 
traditional dogmas were defended might indicate that there really was 
a need to do so. 
The theses published up to the 1660's typcially considered the ge-
neral requirements for a perception to occur. First of all, a creature 
must have a sensitive soul, which directs the perception processes in 
general. If the sensitive soul perishes, perception ceases too. The se-
cond crucial requirement was a material object of perception. Because 
the senses could receive only qualities which emanated from the ma-
terial objects, immaterial entities would remain beyond sense percep-
tion. It was frequently pointed out that the material objects themselves 
could not enter sense organs: 
...thus when I look at a horse, I do not receive the horse itself into 
my eye, or a colour belonging to it, but only an image of the colour, 
which is called spiritual because it is free from all concrete matter.455 
454 E.g. Thauvonius-Eek 1655, VIII. The scholars at Turku did not differentiate be-
tween imagination and fantasy, as did most Renaissance philosophers. (See Park 
1988.) Fantasy was the mental faculty of perceiving sensory images whereas 
imagination was capable of creating new images. At Turku, however, these two 
functions are performed by fantasy alone, to which I shall in the following refer 
as 'fantasy'. 
455 Thauvonius-Eek 1655, Th. XIV. "...sic dum eqvum intueor, non ipsum eqvum 
oculo, aut colorem ei inhaerentem, sed saltem coloris speciem, quae spiritalis 
The necessary contact between the object and sense organ was the-
refore created by particular species, which were supposed to be some 
kind of image of the perceivable objects. Immateriality was one of 
the most important characteristics of these images. A species was de-
fined as an "image spreading from a sensible object, pure and free 
from matter".456 Thus material objects could emit immaterial images 
or "qualities", which then could be perceived. These species needed 
a substance (usually air or water), called a medium, through which 
to travel to an appropriate sense organ; perception could not take place 
in a vacuum, because all movement presupposed contact. If all these 
five constituent parts of perception were ideal and functioned undis-
turbed, it could not err.457 Special characteristics of these requirements 
in different senses were also studied in the 1690's.45ß Only insignifi-
cant changes had occurred in the accepted dogmas during the succee-
ding few decades. 
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and definitions of the five central factors. An object could, for exam-
ple, be proprium sensibile i.e. perceivable only by one sense such as 
taste or hearing, or communis, which meant that it was possible to 
perceive the object by several senses. Rest and movement, magnitude, 
number and figure were common qualities.459  The medium, on the 
other hand, could be either an external entity between the object and 
the sense, or an internal one. An internal medium was actually a part 
of the sense-organ itself, as is touch in the skin or saliva in taste.460 
Cartesianism took a radically different stance on perception. Ac- 
dicitur, ab omni materiae concretione liberam suscipio." See also Thauvonius-
Warelius 1652, Sect. III, Membr. III, Artic. II, passim. Hahn-Bjurbeck 1697, p. 
13. 
456 	 Alanus-Ketarmannus 1647, Th. X, XII. "...imago ab objecto sensibili sparsa, pura 
& ä materiae concretione libera". Thuronius-Teeth 1664, Sect. I, Th. V, VIII-XIV. 
457 Alanus-Ketarmannus 1647, Th. IV-XXVIII. Thauvonius-Eek 1655, Th. IV-V. 
Thuronius-Teeth 1664, Sect. I, Th. VII, IX, XVI. Petraeus-Ignatius 1673, V-VI. 
458 Halm-Ruda 1695, p. 32 ff. Hahn-Widegreen 1695. Hahn-Junholm 1696. Hahn-
Boda 1699. Hahn-Wickelgreen 1697, p. 5, et passim. Hahn-Löngreen 1709. 
459 A typical question in Renaissance Latin psychology was in what sense these 
common qualities could be said to be objects of perception. See Park 1988, p. 
474. Thauvonius-Eek 1655, Th. VI. "Quantitas non per transmutationem ut Qua-
litates, sed per emanationem agit, sic ä quantitate divisibilitas & localitas pro-
deunt, secundo quoque spiritaliter agit quamvis mediate, & hoc sufficit, ut sit 
objectum commune sensile." Refers to Scheibler's Disputatio de sensu in genere. 
460 Alanus-Ketarmannus 1647, Th. VII-IX, XX-XXIII. Thauvonius-Eek 1655, Th. 
XVI-XVII, et passim. Thuronius-Teeth 1664, Sect. I, Th. VI-XVI. 
cording to the Cartesians perception as a physiological event was not 
based on quality-like species, but on motion and touch. In fact, all 
perception, including vision, was in some way based on the tactile 
sense. The authors at Turku thought this explanation presupposed that 
material particles would have to enter the sense organs and cause the 
perceptions directly.461 The Cartesian attack brought the existence of 
species into discussion, a notion not only defended but also occasional-
ly redefined. 
The concept of perceptible species and the idea that "no body will 
be sensed immediately and as such" (immediate & per se), but only 
through qualities, are reflected in discussions of certain old questions 
of scholastic philosophy. In the Renaissance questions had arisen out 
of disagreements between Averroes and Avicenna over how to inter-
pret particular passages of Aristotle's writings. One of these questions 
was whether odour would travel through a medium as species (Aver- 
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roes) or as a material vapour (Avicenna). Most authors at Turku took 
an Averroistic stance, because it was considered absurd for any body 
to enter the sense organs as such.462 A sort of intermediate theory was 
suggested in 1697 by Johannes Wickelgreen in his thesis on the nature 
of olfaction. 
First of all, a species can not be a quality according to Wickelgreen. 
This is because "...this we usually count among the six absurdities of 
the Peripatetics; that is, Accident without a proper subject"46' It was 
known, however, that 
It is not to be denied that smells really do often spread through the 
air in and with their subject matter which is sulphurous particles - 
sometimes they are subtle and vaporous, sometimes foggy and more 
coarse. They are released by warmth, fire and other causes and 
brought to the sense organs.464 
461 Hahn-Lundius 1690, p. 4, 8 ff. See also Hahn-Lönqwist 1698, p. 14-15. Hahn-
Boda 1699, p. 18-22, 24. Descartes 1973, p. 289-295. See also Hatfield 1992. 
Wilson 1993. 
462 See Park 1988, p. 474-475. Thauvonius-Eek XXXI-XXXVI. Hahn-Ruda 1695, 
p. 40-42. 
463 Hahn-Wickelgreen 1697, p. 21. "...inter sex Peripateticorum absurda recensere 
solet, Accidens scilicet sine suo subjecto proprio." 
asa Hahn-Wickelgreen 1697, p. 21-22. "Negve negandum est odores non raro etiam 
realiter in & cum suo subject° particulis sulphureis, modo subtilibus & vaporosis, 
modo fumosis & crassioribus ä corpore ipso per calorem, ignem, aliasve causas 
resolutis in aerem spargi & ad sensorium deferri." 
Wickelgreen identified this theory as stemming from Heraclitus, 
Galen and the medical tradition (which of course refers to Avicenna). 
He could not accept it, however, because in his opinion it mixed up 
substances and accidents by making an odour a substance. On the 
other hand, he could not accept the Averroistic, or "Peripatetic" ex-
planation either. 
Moreover, we see that many odorous things often gradually dissi-
pate and when the thing itself has disappeared, the smell can often 
be discerned in the air for a long time afterwards. But mere species 
cannot explain this because they do not remain when their subject 
is absent.465 
Wickelgreen had, however, a solution to the problem. According to 
him odoriferous species would often join material particles and be 
carried by them to sense organs, where they would release the species, 
which in turn cause the perception.466 
In addition to the more general problems, some questions related 
to the structure and functions of individual senses were also discussed. 
Anatomical structures of the eye or the ear could be described, alt-
hough often in a rather superficial way. In Cartesian dissertations the 
anatomical and physiological argument played a far more crucial 
role.467 Still most of the problems arose from the Aristotelian tradition 
of psychology itself. One of the most disputed questions since antiq-
uity had been the nature of vision. Time after time the Platonic con-
ception of vision according to which the eye emits some sort of "vi-
sionary rays" was refuted. Seeing was defined as reception of visible 
images, and in this process the eye itself played a rather passive role 468 
If the Platonic theory had been followed, seeing would not have oc-
curred in the eye: 
465 Hahn-Wickelgreen 1697, p. 24. "Videmus insuper res odoratas plurimas paulatim 
imminui, & re ablatå, odorem saepe in aere diu percipi. Qvod species tantum, 
qvae in absentia objecti non remanent, praestare negveunt." 
466 Hahn-Wickelgreen 1697, p. 25-26. 
467 Hahn-Lundius 1690, passim. 
468 Alanus-Ketarmannus 1647, Th. XV-XVI, XXXIX-XL, XLVII. Thauvonius-Eek 
1655, Th. XIII-XIV, XXVIII, et passim. Thauvonius-Schroderus 1659/1661, Th. 
III. Thuronius-Teeth 1664, Sect. II, Th. I, III, VI, VIII-X, et passim. Hahn-Wi-
degreen 1695, Th. V. Hahn-Junholm 1696, p. 20-21. Hahn-Boda 1699, § VII. 
Hahn-Wickelgreen 1697, p. 6-12. 
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But we do more believe in better reasons and experience itself, and 
deny seeing to happen by emission of rays. Whatever it would then 
be which is stated to be emitted - be it a ray, light, spirit or atoms 
- if the vision occured the way the Platonists think, certainly seeing 
would not happen in the eye but in the visible object.469 
On the other hand the Cartesians at Turku accepted neither the idea 
of species nor the Platonic theory. In their opinion, vision was caused 
by the reception of radia.470 
Whenever special issues such as the nature of vision were not 
discussed, the descriptions of the act of perception were often in a 
way very "technical". For example, hearing occurs in the following 
way: 
The form, or the mode of hearing happens as follows: a sound 
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which has been carried through the medium to the ear, hits the 
eardrum. This motion makes it take a form of an audible species, 
which moves through the labyrinth to the innermost cochlea and 
all the way through the auditory nerves. The sensation of hearing 
happens when the image has gone through them.471  
In Aristotelian philosophy the theory of perception was the basis 
on which theories of intellection and knowledge were founded. The 
images produced by sense perception were the foundation for all abst-
ract thinking. Therefore, the certainty of our knowledge was very 
much dependent on the ability of our senses to acquire certain unerring 
perceptions. Indeed, sense perception was accepted with confidence, 
provided that all requirements for perception were unviolated: "The 
senses never make mistakes about their proper objects, if the distance 
469 Thauvonius-Schroderus 1661, Th. III. "Nos rationibus melioribus ipsisque expe-
rientiae majorem fidem habentes, visionem emissione fieri pemegamus, quicquid 
tandem fit quod emitti statuatur, sive radius, sive lumen, sive spiritus, sive atomus, 
nam si visio ex sententia Platonicorum fieret, certe non in oculo sed in objecto 
visibili essent." 
470 	 Hahn-Lundius 1690, p. 14 "Quocirca visio fit receptione radiorum non emissione. 
Satis est quosdam radios, non omnes ex objecto prodeuntes visioni inservire..." 
471 
	 Alanus-Ketarmannus 1647, Th. XLVIII. "Forma vel modus auditionis sic se habet: 
sonus latus per medium ad aurem, pellit tympanum, eoque motu soni speciem 
excipit & per labyrinthum ad intimum cochlae recessum ac basin nervi auditorij 
defert, quo cum species perlata est, fit auditio." Alanus and Ketarmannus refer 
in this to writings of Burgersdijck. 
is just, the medium legitimate and the organ has the right disposi-
tion."472 Although the senses would not err in principle, some failures 
could happen if all prerequisites for perception were not "normal", 
e.g. if the object of perception was too distant. For epistemological 
purposes this interpretation provided sufficient certainty. On the other 
hand, it was flexible enough to account for the well-known fact that 
senses - or our judgement of perceptions - are occasionally mistaken. 
The senses could not by themselves discern and identify percep-
tions. Since this was a job done by the so-called internal senses, which 
were situated in the brain, all perception really occurred in the brain.473  
There was some disagreement about whether there were two or three 
internal senses. At Turku, other writers counted memory among the 
independent internal senses in addition to common sense and fantasy, 
while others regarded it only as a contributory faculty of fantasy. 
Perception was a passive function of the sense organs up to the 
reception of the species. However, the process became active in char-
acter as soon as the facultas cognoscens was activated. Although sen-
sation was a passive process in some respects, perception as a whole 
was an active one. A perception was perfect only if the received spe-
cies was appreciated and classified. Unless the rational soul paid at-
tention to the received species, no perception would occur.474 
A species caught by the external senses was transferred to the in-
ternal ones for further interpretation. This was done by the spiritus 
residing in the nerves.475 
The spirit is as if in a guard post in the organs of the external 
senses. They receive the character or image pressed to the external 
sense-organs by the object, and transmit it to the common sense.476 
472 	 Alanus-Ketarmannus 1647, Sicilimenta 2. "Sensus circa objectum proprium nun- 
quam hallucinatur, si justa sit distantia, medium legitimum & organum recte 
dispositum." See also Thauvonius-Eek 1655, Th. V. 
473 Hahn-Widegreen 1695, p. 5. Hahn-Sidbeckius 1698, Membr. I, § III. 
474 Thuronius-Teeth 1664, Th. XVII. 
475 Hahn-Lönqwist 1698, p. 9. Hahn-Wickelgreen 1697, p. 8-12. Hahn-Boga 1699, 
p. 13. Hahn-Junholm 1696, p. 8-11. 
476 Hahn-Guzelius 1696, p. 12. "Nam spiritus in sensus exterioris organo, velut in 
statione positi, characterem seu speciem ab objecto impressam in organis sensuum 
extemorum excipiunt, eamque ad sensorium transmittunt commune." 
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The nature of the spiritus animales was somewhat unclear at Turku. 
Usually they were thought to be incorporeal entities, which were ge-
nerated in the brain from vital spirits and which moved in the ner-
yes.477 
The first of the internal senses was the sensus communis, which 
collected and combined all the information coming from various sense 
organs. It was helped by the fantasy, which in its tum retained the 
perceptions a little longer. Fantasy also examined the species more 
keenly and created totally new species or auxiliary images to help the 
recognition process whenever needed. Whereas fantasy kept the sen-
sible species processed by the common sense longer than the common 
sense itself could do, memory was the faculty which finally stored the 
images and provided them for later use. It was said to be located "in 
the uppermost part of the brain underneath the forehead" 478 However, 
not all images were transferred from the fantasy to the memory. Whet- 
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her animals had a proper memory or whether this capacity belonged 
to the rational soul only was also somewhat controversial. It seems 
to have been relatively normal at Turku to assume that animals had 
a so-called sensitive memory which enabled them to remember oc-
casions when they had felt pleasure or pain.479 
The Cartesians had a different view on how the perceptions were 
judged and recognized. 
The nerves and animal spirits, which flow in the nerves all the time 
like a stream, are the most proximate and immediate instruments 
of perception. This mass of spirits is moved by the slightest impulse 
by the external objects. They transmit various undulations without 
delay to the middle parts of the brain. In the cavity of brain there 
is a certain very small gland, which is called pinealis... It hangs 
freely and can thus pay attention to all parts of the body equally. 
And this we consider to be the common sense."' 
477 On spiritus see also Leikola 1983a, p. 243-244. 
478 
	 Hahn-Guzelius 1696. "...in ultima cerebri parte sub occipitio". Thauvonius-Eek 
1655, Th. LI-LXI. Thuronius-Teeth 1664, Sect. II, Th. XVIII-XXV. Hahn-Jun-
holm 1696, p. 37. Hahn-Gaslander 1707, p. 10-11. 
479 Thuronius-Teeth 1664. Petraeus-Ignatius 1673. Hahn-Rosendahl 1691. Hahn-
Ruda 1695, p. 23. 
480 	 Hahn-Lundius 1690, p. 6. "Nervi & spiritus animales sunt proximum & immedi-
atum instrumentum sensationis, qui per nervos, continui instar torrentis, semper 
fluunt. Haec autem spirituum massa vel minimo impulsu ab objecto externo com- 
Once in the brain, the movement of corpuscular "spirits" pressed 
images on the brain matter. Perception took place, if the soul-subs-
tance happened to pay attention to the images pressed by the move-
ment. In order for a perception to become recognized and conscious, 
this act of judgement was required 48' It remains unclear, though, how 
Lundius understood the role of sensus communis and the pineal gland 
in this process. 
According to the Aristotelian tradition free movement of the animal 
spirits in the nerves was crucial for the normal function of the human 
body. Sometimes, however, the movement of animal spirits was hin-
dered, which caused the sensus communis to stop functioning and man 
to fall asleep. No consensus was achieved on the question of whether 
it was thick vapours arising from the stomach or something else that 
blocked the way of the animal spirits482 Sleep was thus a disorder of 
the sensitive soul, although it was necessary for maintaining health. 
During sleep fantasy kept on working actively. It created dreams by 
agitating the residues of sensible species which still remained in the 
brain. Because the common sense was "switched off' during sleep, 
even the most weird phantasms would seem real in our dreams. So-
metimes animal spirits were blocked into limbs so that they could not 
communicate with the brain anymore. This would cause somnambu-
lism, a state in which man was not conscious and responsible for his 
movements and deeds48' 
Perception was a faculty of the sensitive soul. Even the processes 
happening in the internal senses were thus subordinate to the actions 
performed by the sensitive soul. For this reason even animals could 
be guaranteed some sort of fantasy and memory. It was well-known, 
mota, undulationes vanas in momento ad medium cerebrum transmittit. In vent-
riculo cerebri est glandula quaedam minima, quae dicitur pinealis... libera pen-
dens, aequaliter omnes corporis partes respicere potest, & haec putatur esse sen-
sorium commune." 
481 Hahn-Lundius 1690, p. 4-5. 
482 Thauvonius-Eek 1655, Th. LIV. Tålpo-Höök 1685, Th. I. Hahn-Wiikholm 1705, 
p. 13-30, 37, et passim. 
483 Hahn-Modeliin 1698, p. 6, 32-33, et passim. Thauvonius-Eek 1655, Th. LVI. 
Hahn-Wiikholm 1705, p. 63, et passim. Achrelius 1682, p. 366. In Achrelius-Pet-
rejus 1681 more detailed causes of sleepwalking are given, as well as their cures. 
Th. XII "Sin vero mall [angeli causa sunt] antidota caelestis verbi precibusque 
discrimen illud praecavendum. Noctisurgium naturale ex cupiditate diurnä, motu 
phantasiae, cibo vel potu nimio cerebrum fumis opplente proveniens non diu 
durabile est, sed momentaneum, nisi forte de novo semper causae accumulentur." 
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for example, that dogs and horses knew their masters, which presup-
posed memory. The existence of fantasy in animals was also proved 
by the fact that dogs clearly had dreams, which could be induced from 
their movements during sleep. The Cartesian theory that animals had 
no soul at all and that animal movements in sleep were purely 
mechanical, had no support among the students at Turku, not even 
from the Cartesians.484 
The Rational Soul 
"The Rational Soul is the form of man, through which it has its es-
sence, special abilities and characteristic operations."485 The rational 
soul was first of all the form of man. In psychology this point of view 
was also essential, as the particular features of human actions caused 
by the rational soul in relation to the body were thought to be subject 
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to psychological scrutiny.486 The rational soul had two characteristic 
faculties, intellect and volition, through which man's soul exercised 
its particular operations - animals could not think. Unlike perception 
and other functions of the sensitive soul, the rational soul was entirely 
inorganic and immaterial.487 Immateriality was an essential quality of 
the rational soul, because it made it possible to explain its immortality. 
The status of the faculties had been a question of philosophical 
dispute since the Middle Ages. Was there a real ontological distinction 
between the soul and its faculties, or did the soul only represent dif-
ferent modalities in different functions? At Turku the question was 
hardly ever passed over in dissertations discussing the rational soul, 
and the answers given are similar without exception. As the question 
was primarily a logical and metaphysical one, the arguments were of 
the same kind: 
484 Thauvonius-Warelius 1652, Sect. III, Membr. III, Artic. II, Ax. 6. Halm-Ruda 
1695. Hahn-Modeliin 1698, p. 7. Halm-Wiikholm 1705, passim. 
485 
	
	 Miltopaeus-Enebergh 1667, Th. III. "Anima Rationalis est forma hominis, qua 
suam habet essentiam, potentias & operationes distinctas." See also Thauvonius-
Anxelius 1655, Th. 6. Thauvonius-Helsingius 1658, Th. 6,8. Thuronius-Stenius 
1664, Th. 2-5. Hahn-Collander 1699, p. 4-5. Hahn-Homaeus 1690, p. 4, 6-7. 
486 Thauvonius-Anxelius 1655, Th. 7-8. Thuronius-Mathesius 1665, Th. 1. Miltopa- 
eus-Enebergh 1667, Th. VII-VIII. Hahn-Collander 1699, p. 2. 
487 Thauvonius-Laurbecchius 1653, Sect. III. Thauvonius-Florinus 1656, Quaest. III, 
V. Thauvonius-Helsingius 1658, Th. 13-16. Thuronius-Stenius 1664, Th. 6, 21. 
Miltopaeus-Enebergh 1667, Th. IX-XI. Hahn-Collander 1699, p. 6, 12. Hahn-
Homaeus 1690, p. 9-10. Hahn-Bruzelius 1697, p. 20. 
Every accident has a real difference from substance. Faculties are 
accidents. Therefore, they have a real difference from the soul. The 
major and minor premises are proved because soul is a substance, 
but the faculties are accidents. It can be added that no created subs-
tance is the immediate principle of its own actions.488 
Not all faculties of the rational soul were not equally important. 
Intellect and volition were the primary faculties, whereas speech and 
laughter were placed second. 
The prime function of the intellect was to recognize truths 489 The 
intellect was either active or passive in its operations. The active in-
tellect would enlighten the species as they were expressed by sensus 
communis and fantasy. It also transmuted the sensible species into 
totally immaterial and spiritual species intelligibiles.490 Because intel-
lection was an inorganic act, it could not use the species produced by 
the fantasy as such, but had to transmute them into a form more sui- 	 257 
table for thinking processes. Intelligible species were received by the 
passive intellect, which made final judgements on them. The division 
between active and passive intellect was only conceptual, and the in-
tellect was considered to be a whole in reality. Differences between 
different "parts" of the intellect could be discerned only by their modes 
of action.491 Intellect could thus be regarded as active, because it pre-
pared its tools (i.e. species intelligibiles) by itself.492 
The other primary faculty of the rational soul was volition, which 
488 	 Hahn-Collander 1699, p. 8. "Omne accidens å subjecto differt realiter; facultates 
sunt accidentia; Ergo ab anima differunt realiter: & major & minor probatur, quia 
anima est substantia, facultates vero sunt accidentia: Addi & potent id, quod nulla 
substantia creata sit immediatum suarum actionem principium." See also Thau-
vonius-Anxelius 1655, Th. 9. Thauvonius-Florinus 1656, Quaest. VI-VII. Thu-
ronius-Mathesius 1665, Th. 5. Hahn-Hornaeus 1690, p. 14. Hahn-Bruzelius 1697, 
p. 7-8. Thuronius 1660, Institutiones Logicae Tractatus Prooemialis, p. 65-69. 
Flachsenius 1678, Collegium Logicum Prooemiale, p. 131-148. 
489 
	 Hahn-Collander 1699, p. 8-9. "Intellectus est facultas animae rationalis ad verum 
cognoscendum ordinata." Thauvonius-Anxelius 1655, Th. 14. Thauvonius-Helsin-
gius 1658, Th. 18. Hahn-Bruzelius 1697, p. 6. 
490 Thauvonius-Anxelius 1655, Th. 15-17, 25, 28-30. Thauvonius-Florinus 1656, 
Quaest. IX. Thuronius-Stenius 1664, Th. 18, 20. Hahn-Gaslander 1707. Hahn-
Hornaeus 1690, p. 15. Hahn-Bruzelius 1697, p. 14, 17-21, 23-28. On the classical 
and medieval ideas on species intelligibiles see Spruit 1994. 
491 	 Thauvonius-Anxelius 1655, Th. 18. Thauvonius-Helsingius 1658, Th. 21-22. Thu-
ronius-Stenius 1664, Th. 14, 19, et passim. Hahn-Collander 1699, p. 9-11. Hahn-
Bruzelius 1697, p. 23-28. Hahn-Frolander 1692, p. 16. 
492 Thauvonius-Anxelius 1655, Th. 24-25. 
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According to Aristotelian theory perception process proceeds as follows: an object spreads 
sensible species around it. A medium carries the species to a suitable sense-organ. Animal 
spirits residing in the nerves move the species to the common sense, which combines 
information coming from various sense-organs. It transfers the species to fantasy, which 
examines them and also creates new images if needed. Fantasy interacts with memory, 
which stores the species. Active intellect accepts the sensible species from the fantasy and 
transmutes them into totally immaterial intelligible species. The passive intellect makes final 
judgements on the perception. It remains unclear whether memory can also act directly with 
the active intellect or must it always negotiate with the fantasy first. 
was destined for "reaching for the good and escaping from the bad" 
(bonum appetendum & malum fugiendum). The intellect would show 
the volition which things were worth reaching for or avoiding. What 
was not known could be an object neither of desire nor aversion. 
Volition then governed other faculties, such as speech and locomotion 
which served the function of achieving the goal set by the volition. 
The very essence and function of the volition presupposed freedom 
of the will according to the authors at Turku.493  The very few Cartesian 
authors at Turku also recognised intellection and volition as the pri-
mary faculties of the res cogitans, although volition was generally 
given a much greater role. Man's volition however would not be de-
termined only by the reason, and dependent only on the information 
provided by the intellect. This was thought to be proved by the fact 
that sometimes the two opposed each other. Moreover it was for the 
most part due to volition that man thought at a11.494 
In addition to these so-called primary faculties the rational soul had 
also secondary faculties. These faculties, speech and laughter, were 
dealt with only seldom, obviously because they were considered less 
important than intellect and volition. Speech was the instrument of 
the rational soul to express the concepts formed in the mind. Thuronius 
described the act of speech physiologically as follows: 
The act of speaking is speech, which is performed as follows. Air 
is inhaled into the lungs. It is bounced back from there through the 
windpipe and the small chinks in the larynx and to the palate. Agi-
tated in this way, the air gives rise to a sound which is collected 
in the palate. It is then controlled and articulated in various ways 
by the vocal cords, tongue, teeth and lips.495 
The ability of speech is limited to humans only, because it presup-
poses rationality. Although the faculty of speech was innate in men, 
493 Thauvonius-Anxelius 1655, Th. 32-38. Thauvonius-Florinus 1656, Quaest. XI- 
XIII. Thauvonius-Helsingius 1658, Th. 29-31. Thuronius-Stenius 1664, Th. 24. 
Hahn-Bruzelius 1700. Hahn-Collander 1699, p. 12-15. Hahn-Homaeus 1690, p. 
16-18. 
494 Tammelin-Hielm 1707, p. 18-27. 
495 Thuronius-Stenius 1664, Th. 28. "Actio sermonis locutio est, quae hoc modo 
peragitur. Aer in pulmonis inspiratur: unde per asperam arteriam in laryngis ri- 
mulam & paiatum resilit: Aer iste sic agitatus sonum dat, qui in palato collectus, 
uvula, lingvå, dentibus & labijs postea vane temperatur & articulatur." 
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no language was natural in the sense of being innate. All languages 
would have to be learned. The first language of all was created by 
Adam, when he gave names to animals 496 Laughter and its opposite, 
weeping, were also dependent on rationality. Whatever the reason for 
laughter was, the faculty was always subordinate to volition.497 Certain 
bodily processes finally initiated laughter: 
Laughter occurs in this way: having been stimulated by some joy-
causing thing, warm blood and vital spirits start moving from the 
heart. The muscles of the heart itself and diaphragm, together with 
those of the thorax dilate, especially the muscles of the cheeks498 
The connection between physiology and "psychology" was once 
again very close. Bodily processes were primarily expressions of the 
various functions of the soul. In this respect psychology at Turku 
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closely follows the tradition which stems from Aristotle's De anima 
and the Parva Naturalia. De anima especially held a central position 
in university curriculums during the Renaissance. The organic con-
ception of soul presupposed combining the physiological aspects with 
the functions of the sou1499 
Emotions and Mental Disorders 
In addition to cognition and volition, emotions had been a central 
subject in Aristotle's De Anima and the medieval and Renaissance 
"psychology" which stemmed from it. In Aristotle's view emotional 
response involved both cognitive and bodily aspects. We have in the 
previous subsection seen that psychology was closely connected with 
the study of the organic body, but on the other hand it was also im-
portant for philosophers as a part of ethics and rhetoric. According to 
Aristotle the thought of the object of emotion (e.g. a frightening or a 
496 Miltopaeus-Enebergh 1667, Th. XXXVI. Hahn-Agrell 1697. Hahn-Hornaeus 
1690, p. 20. 
497 Miltopaeus-Enebergh 1667, Th. XXXIV-XXV. Thuronius-Stenius 1664, p. 29-33. 
Hahn-Hornaeus 1690, p. 18-19. Hahn-Imbergh 1703. 
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	 Thuronius-Stenius 1664, Th. 32. "Fit risio hoc modo: Excitato å re aliquå gaudio, 
magna ex corde fit calidioris sangvinis, spirituumque vitalium effusio; ipsiusque 
cordis, diaphragmatis & musculorum cum thoracis, tum eorum quae ä lateribus 
buccae sunt, dilatatio." 
499 Park & Kessler 1988. Park 1988. 
pleasurable thing, a hateful person) was a prerequisite for the birth of 
an emotion. Because a thought or belief was thus the efficient cause 
of emotion, Aristotle thought that emotional response was in a way 
dependent on the intellect and thus man's behaviour could be affected 
by reasoning and persuasion, which were central to rhetoric, poetics, 
ethics and politics. From a wider point of view soul/form was the 
ultimate source of man's thoughts, emotions and moral actions. In the 
Renaissance psychology was also studied by medics, who sought in 
its doctrines help in understanding mental and physical diseases.50° 
However, emotions were not much dealt with in physical theses at 
Turku. 
In Renaissance Aristotelian biological psychology, which was based 
on De Anima, emotions were placed in the realm of the sensitive soul. 
(This biological distinction between cognitive and perceptional does 
not directly correspond with Aristotle's ethical and political distinc- 
tions between the so-called logical and alogical parts of the soul.)501 	 261 
As we remember, the sensitive soul had three faculties: sensitive, lo-
comotive and appetitive. It was the appetitive faculty which produced 
the emotions, usually further grouped either as concupiscible or iras-
cible ones. Thus, animals were also in a sense able to feel joy or to 
be sad - a view which Cartesians opposed. 
Descartes had aimed to mechanize all of the functions traditionally 
assigned to the vegetative and sensitive souls. Aristotle had regarded 
a thought of the object of emotion as the efficient, and the bodily 
reactions as the material cause of emotions,502 however physiological 
processes were given the role of "efficient causes" in Descartes' phi-
losophy. Thus, one of the main ideas in the Cartesian theory of emo-
tions was that all passions were excited by corporeal processes, alt-
hough they had real meaning only as psychic states of the mind.503 If 
stripped of its dualistic starting-point the Cartesian theory did not ne-
cessarily contradict the traditional view, at least if considered as su-
perficially as the authors at Turku usually did: faculties of the sensitive 
soul were corporeal and hence mortal. According to Miltopaeus, who 
was one of the very few authors of the Aristotelian tradition who paid 
any attention to emotions in physical theses, they resided in the heart. 
500 Park & Kessler 1988, p. 455-457. Fortenbaugh 1975. 
501 Fortenbaugh 1975, p. 26-28. 
502 Fortenbaugh 1975, p. 12-15, 21, et passim. 
503 Alanen 1984. 
All emotions were caused by motions of the blood and spirits, and 
certain physical alterations in some part of the body.5°4 
The most far-reaching description of the origin of emotions was 
given by Daniel Achrelius, who presented a thoroughly Cartesian view 
of the subject in his Contemplationes mundi. Typically the attention 
is aimed at the physiological part of the Cartesian passion-theory. Ach-
relius cites Antonius LeGrand's text extensively explaining how the 
minute corpuscular spirits move from the brain to the heart, dilate the 
blood and cause an emotion. He then discusses variations of this pro-
cess, whereby different kind of emotions are generated. To finish his 
Cartesian episode he aids readers to get more information on the sub-
ject by reading Descartes' De Homine and Passiones animae.5°5  The 
corporeal explanation of emotions was easily combined with the old 
dogma of temperaments. Thus, sanguine people were inclined to be 
joyful, phlegmatics fearful, melancholics sad and cholerics angry, be- 
262 	 cause the spirits tended to move in different ways in their nerves.506 
Many mental disorders also had primarily physical causes. Alt-
hough mental illnesses had been a part of the medical and physical 
repertoire since Hippocrates, it was unusual to discuss the subject at 
Turku. However, Thuronius describes abnormal phantasies in one of 
his dissertations: someone thought his nose had changed to a snout, 
someone else thought he was talking with God, a third lunatic insisted 
on killing himself. All these hallucinations were caused by the fantasy. 
Whatever fantasy represented properly to the intellect would be rightly 
judged by it, but if fantasy did not work in a normal way for some 
reason, the judgements made by the intellect would produce all sorts 
of hallucinations. Following Sennert, Thuronius offered three physical 
causes for the malfunction of the fantasy: 
There are three main causes for this, as Sennert teaches us in an 
accurate manner... 1. When the constitution of brain is defective 
and melancholic. 2. When the heart generates impure vital spirits, 
which are the matter of which the animal spirits are formed. 3. 
When the animal spirits themselves are pure, but some other stran-
ge, impure and noxious matter is mixed up with them.507 
504 Miltopaeus-Pryss 1668, Th. V-VI. 
505 Achrelius 1682, p. 356-359. LeGrand 1679, p. 950-951. 
506 Achrelius 1682, p. 355. Miltopaeus-Pryss 1668, Th. XIV. 
507 	 Thuronius-Kinmundt 1662, Quaest. X. "Hi vero tribus potissimum de causis fiunt, 
In the normal scheme of physical psychology discussions of mental 
illnesses and even of emotions were very rare. Cartesianism was the 
first new psychology which paid attention to emotions on a larger 
scale, but at Turku not even this tradition gained a very strong hold. 
Apart from Achrelius, only Andreas Lundins dealt in passing with 
various illnesses caused by the malfunction of the nervous system and 
the corpuscular vital spirits circulating in them. Mental disorders were 
also caused by diverse derangements of the body. 
INSANITY, MELANCHOLY, DELIRIUM, PHRENESIS, STUPI-
DITY, MANIA, etc. not only corrupt the powers of imagination 
and memory, but also destroy the ability to make judgements. By 
wandering here and there without proper order, by raging and rum-
maging, jumping and shaking, the spirits seize the fibres of the 
brain and imprint there unusual images and impressions. These ima- 
ges the mind, as it is intimately united with the body also, connects 	 263 
without selecting and discriminating. It is impossible that certain 
cogitations in the mind would not respond to certain motions in the 
body and vice versa. If these motions are enormously unusual and 
absurd, the cogitations in mind necessarily become unusual and ab- 
surd also.'" 
Outwardly Lundius' description of the causes of mental illnesses 
resembles that of Thuronius above. However, Lundius arrives at these 
conclusions from a totally different theoretical background. The full 
meaning of this passage might open up only after having got acqu-
ainted with Lundius' other ideas about perception. However, suffice 
it to note that Lundius expects that there be a real distinction between 
ut accurate docet Sennert... 1. Quando cerebri constitutio vitiosa est & melan-
cholica. 2. Cum spiritus vitalis, qui Spiritibus animalibus materia est, in corde 
impurus gignitur. 3. Cum spiritus quidem animales sunt puri, ipsis vero materia 
aliqua allena, impura & tenebricosa miscetur." 
508 Hahn-Lundius 1690, p. 25. "INSANIA, MELANCHOLIA, DELIRIUM, PHRE-
NESIS, STUPIDITAS, MANIA &c. non solum imaginationis & memoriae vim 
corrumpunt, sed etiam judicium, adeo ut Spiritus huc illuc incerto ordine cursi-
tando, tumultuando, sibi invicem occurrendo, insolita trepidatione saltando, cere-
bri fibrillas subeuntes insolitas etiam inibi imagines & vestigia imprimunt, quas 
imagines etiam anima, ut, qui corpori intime unita, sine delectu & discrimine 
connectit. nam non possunt non certae cogitationes in anima respondere certis 
motibus in corpore & vice versa, qui motus si insoliti enormes & absurdi fuerint, 
necessario etiam cogitationes in anima insolitae & absurdae fiunt." 
corporeal processes such as imagination and memory, and mind. The 
former can nevertheless puzzle the mind, which makes the judge-
ments. The solution of this problem of interaction is based on oc-
casionalism. All in all, the main point in Lundius' theory is that the 
disturbed motion of spirits causes these mental states. 
I have here referred to the mind-body problem the Cartesian Lun-
dius had to face. Although Aristotelian philosophy did not face this 
problem as such, certain ideas concerning the relationship of mind 
and matter, or form and matter were formulated in Aristotelian phi-
losophy too. Let us now have a look at this aspect of natural phil-
sophical learning at Turku. 
The Relationship Between Body and Soul 
Despite all their disagreements on the details of the dogma, proponents 
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of the Aristotelian philosophical tradition agreed by and large that the 
rational soul was the form of man. Unlike all other forms, it was 
partly immortal and incorporeal. The relationship between the imma-
terial soul and material body was not seen as very problematic by the 
scholastic authors at Turku. Body and soul were organically one, the 
soul being the active part of the pair. No third part or spirit could 
exist in man: 
We shall say these two things only because of the opinion of those 
who assume a third part or spirit [to exist in man]. If this part 
existed then the soul would be united with the body by the me-
diation of something. But in reality (as Thomas says) form is united 
to matter without mediation. Both the Scriptures and the book of 
Nature remain silent about the third essential part of man.509 
It was also strictly denied that any soul could be located in a body 
in the same sense as material bodies occupied a place. Ontologically, 
being located presupposed quantity. Quantity on the other hand im-
plied mass, extension and divisibility. But no incorporeal substance 
such as the soul had quantity or any of the characteristics which having 
509 Thauvonius-Anxelius 1655, Th. 4."Tantum dicimus hic duo, ut tollatur opinio 
eorum, qui tertiam partem spiritum sc. constituunt. Si pars ille esset, tum anima 
mediate uniretur corpori, verum forma (afferente Thomå) immediate unitur ma-
teriae. De tertia enim hominis parte essentials tacent Scriptura & Naturae libri." 
quantity implied. Therefore the soul could also be claimed to be non-
located.510 There was, however, an intimate relationship between body 
and soul: 
QUESTION III. Is the Rational Soul is inorganic? Affirmed. 
...But neither is it mixed up with the body: (because it is not affected 
by any particular proportion of primary qualities) it does not cease 
understanding and wanting either, if separated from the body. The 
soul thinks in the body, but not through body like using an instru-
ment.511 
There was a settled formula which expressed the generally accepted 
relation between the soul and the body: "Every soul is whole in the 
entire body and whole in each of its parts."512  This saying also assumes 
a position on some principal questions within Aristotelian philosophy. 
One of the problems widely discussed by the medieval and Renais- 
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sance philosophers was whether the entire soul was present in the 
whole body and in each of its parts. Like many other questions, this 
one also stemmed from the texts of Aristotle and his early commen-
tators (especially Avicenna and Averroes). The problem was often 
condensed into discussions on the faculties of the organic soul. Kat-
herine Park has formulated the problem in her article on the organic 
soul as follows: "Does the cause of the differences between the various 
operations of the soul lie on the level of form or matter? In other 
words, do those differences arise in the first place from a distinction 
in the body or from a distinction in the soul?"513 
The position held by Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, which 
510 Thauvonius-Florinus 1656, Quaest. II. "Quicquid non est quantum, illud non est 
in loco. At Anima non est quanta. Ergo. Majoris sequela est firmissima. Quod 
enim quantitate destitutum est, nec extendi, nec dividi potent. Ergo nec partes 
habet, quae partibus spatij insint." Thauvonius-Helsingius 1658, Th. 10. Thu-
ronius-Mathesius 1665, Th. 6. 
511 Thauvonius-Florinus 1656, Quaest. III. "QUAESTIO III. An Anima Rationalis 
sit inorganica ? Affr. ...Haec enim ut corpori commixta non est: (nulla namque 
certä primarum qualitatum temperie affecta est) ita ä corpore separata intelligere 
& velle non desistet. Intellegit quidem anima in corpore, sed non per corpus, 
velut instrumentum." 
512 Thuronius-Mathesius 1665, Th. 3. "Omnis anima est tota in toto corpore & tota 
in cujuslibet ejus parte." Only minor changes in the formulation occurred. Thu-
ronius-Stenius 1664, Th. 7. Miltopaeus-Enebergh 1667, Th. XXIII-XXVI. Hahn-
Rungius 1691, § X, et passim. 
513 Park 1988, p. 477. 
was very influential throughout the Middle Ages, was that a real dis-
tinction existed between the soul (substance) and its faculties (quali-
ties). Therefore, the different functions of the soul were also caused 
by different "parts" of the soul. For example the faculty of sight, re-
siding in the eye, would be different from the soul and from its other 
faculties. On the other hand there was a group of nominalist thinkers, 
who claimed that the soul was located in the whole body and in each 
of its parts. The faculty of sight, for example, was an integral part of 
the soul and present everywhere in the body. The reason why we see 
only with the eye was that the structure and composition of that par-
ticular organ was suitable for sight while other organs were not. The 
latter view started getting more supporters at the beginning of the 16th 
century, when the via moderna partly joined forces with new readings 
of Aristotle.514 
The fact that scholars at Turku recognized a real distinction between 
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the soul and its faculties did not otherwise prevent them accepting the 
nominalist standpoint: 
Although the soul is, in accordance with its essence, present in the 
entire body, it nevertheless could never originate a perception wit-
hout an organ. And although the essence of the soul is the same in 
the foot as it its in the eye and the ear, the foot neither sees nor 
hears. This is because the foot is a proper instrument neither for 
seeing nor for hearing.515 
It was the final cause of all organs to be structured as they were 
in order to perform certain actions of the soul. The soul was totally 
dependent on some bodily organs on certain occasions. For example, 
an injury in the ear could make a man deaf, although the faculty of 
audition would remain unhurt. 
514 	 Park 1988, p. 477-479. Copleston 1985, II, p. 376-378; III, p. 97. 
515 Hahn-Ruda 1695, p. 32-33. "Qvamvis anima secundum suam essentiam in toto 
corpore preesens sit: tarnen nunquam sensus alicujus auctor est, nisi ubi habet 
organum: & licet eadem anima essentia, qva' est in oculo & aure, sit etiam in 
pede: tarnen qvia in pede neque videndi neque audiendi est instrumentum, in pede 
nec videt, nec audit." See also Alanus-Ketarmannus 1647, Th. XXIV. Thuronius-
Teeth 1664, Th. VI. Even the Cartesian Lundius continues on the same line of 
thought, although his idea of the soul-body relationship was totally different from 
these: Hahn-Lundius 1690, p. 7. "Facultatem percipiendi non esse nisi unam, 
licet sensus sint diversi; & sensus ipsos non tam ratione naturae. quam ofciorum, 
& exercitiorum esse diversos ratione non absonum videtur." 
Related to this problem was the question of the relation between 
different grades of souls in man. As we know, it was only man who 
possessed all three types of soul, the vegetative, the sensitive and the 
rational one. It was asked whether there were three different souls in 
man or whether they were united into one single soul? If so, how 
could it be explained that the sensitive soul required the presence of 
bodily organs in order to perform its functions, while the rational soul 
could do without any connection with the body? Although these prob-
lems were commonly discussed in the Renaissance literature, they att-
racted only little interest at Turku. It was asserted that the rational 
soul was one. The sensitive, vegetative and rational faculties of the 
soul formed an integral whole, the parts of which could be separated 
only conceptually because of the different functions they performed. 
The three stages of the soul could be discerned especially during the 
development of human foetus.516 
The rise of Cartesianism threatened the traditional ideas about the 	 267 
organic connection between body and soul. Discussion of the problem 
intensified as new ways to explain psychological phenomena in phy- 
sics were put forward by the Cartesians. We shall come back to these 
problems in chapter "The Breakthrough of Cartesianism". 
6.3. Man, Nature and Supernature 
It has been stated earlier that the borderlines between different disci-
plines were not always very strict in the sense that dissertations dealing 
with natural philosophical themes could be published in other disci-
plines too. On the other hand, some theses, e.g. on ethics and politics 
were published under the guidance of the physics professor, but those 
theses are not dealt with here. The relationship between man and su-
pernatural powers was also discussed occasionally in physical theses, 
although the study of spirits was the proper subject-matter of pneu-
matics. The existing borderlines between sciences mirrored certain 
conceptions of the state of affairs in nature. Therefore studying the 
516 Thuronius-Mathesius 1665, Th. 4. "Una est re anima rationalis, facultatibus & 
vegetativis & sensitivis instructa, quae propter diversas functiones diversa sortitur 
nomina, diversos conceptus." Compare with Thuronius-Allenius 1661. See also 
Thauvonius-Helsingius 1658, Corollaria 1,2. Thuronius-Kinmundt 1662, Quaest. 
VI. On the "evolution" of soul see the previous chapter on "The Generation of 
Man...". 
relationship between man and supernature also helped to define his 
position in the world and the limitations of humanity. For example in 
medieval philosophy it had been usual not to restrict to explaining the 
cognition of the embodied human intellect, but to study cognition in 
disembodied beings also.51  On the other hand, the relationship be-
tween man and nature was not problematised. 
It was a self-evident fact that God had given man a position at the 
top of the hierarchy of living beings. Not only was he created as the 
image of God, but as a microcosm he also symbolically represented 
the entire variety of the cosmos.518 Nature existed in order to provide 
living for man, and it was his right and duty to rule and exploit it. 
Man's control over nature was for first achieved by Adam, when he 
subdued other creatures by naming them.519  It was recognised, how-
ever, that nature also affected humans to some extent. In his study of 
the causes of the variety of habits and customs among different people 
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Petrus Schefer refers to environmental causes. Certain dispositions of 
the bodily fluids, i.e. temperaments, were likely to prevail in particular 
kinds of environments. Each temperament had typical patterns of be-
haviour, which tended to lead gradually to certain kinds of habits and 
morals!'" This view is relatively directly derived from Hippocrates, 
who had proposed that environment (climate, sunshine, winds, geo-
graphical location, etc.) affected temperament and thereby health and 
illness. -1 
Much more common than studying the relationship between man 
and nature was to discuss the essence of spiritual beings, i.e. angels 
and demons, and their intercourse with humans. Whereas men con-
sisted of body and soul, angels were pure spirit (pure form). As spi-
ritual beings they were not restricted by the demands imposed by 
extension and divisibility, for which reason they could act in a way 
which seemed supernatural to men. In comparison with men, angels 
had many advantages because of their incorporeality. For example, 
their acts of intellection were free from sense perception. Angels were 
created beings, and although they were spiritual, they were neverthe-
less finite. 
517 	 Marenbon 1987, p. 117-121. 
518 Hahn-Chydenius 1697. 
519 Achrelius-Hwal 1683, p. 15, § III. 
520 Hahn-Schefer 1687. 
521 	 Hippocrates 1983, p. 148-169. 
On the other hand the incorporeality of angels caused some prob-
lems for scholars. How was it possible that angels could sometimes 
be seen, as if they had a body? How did angels communicate; did 
they, for example, speak to each other? Although angels could tem-
porarily adopt corporeal form and were able to communicate both by 
direct intellection and speech, there were certain limits to their powers. 
God was the supreme ruler over the nature's laws.522  Theories which 
explained natural events such as the regular revolution of planets by 
the action of angels or "intelligences" were systematically refuted at 
Turku. The intervention of supernatural powers in the normal course 
of nature was supposed to be extremely rare. 
The belief in black angels or demons was common even among 
learned men in the 17th century. Accusations of sorcery were regularly 
raised at the University during the century. Usually these accusations 
were of achieving better results by using proscribed arts.523  It is the- 
refore no wonder that some disputations on the subject were also pub- 	 269 
lished. Demonic power over nature was considered to be limited me- 
rely to producing false images. For example, man and demon could 
not procreate: 
Changelings are infants which represent human figure, but are for-
med and produced by the Devil in the womb of witches from blood 
or some other matter. They are then put in the place of real children, 
and which he [devil] himself moves and directs in order to deceive 
people.524 
The workings of both incubus and succuba were fundamentally 
based on deception and conjuring. Not much more successful were 
the people who made a pact with the Satan in order to get some 
advantages. It was, however, a matter of dispute whether the Satan 
would really give witches and sorcerers the power to fly to orgies 
with their body or whether it was all eyewash.525  In 1645 Alanus 
522 Tålpo-Rodde 1684. Hahn-Ring 1689. Flachsenius-Woivalenius 1684, Quaest. III. 
See also Hahn-Wargentin 1697. 
523 Heikkinen 1969. Nenonen 1992. Laasonen 19776, p. 
524 Hahn-Montelius 1690, p. 8. "Infantes supposititii sunt foetus, figuram hominis 
repraesentantes, å Diabolo in sagarum utero ex sanguine vel alia materia efformati 
atque producti, & loco verorum Infantium suppositi, quos ipse praesentia sua 
movet ac dirigit, ad alludendum hominibus." 
525 	 Hahn-Almeqwist 1686, Quaestion: "An in potestate Satanae mancipia sua cor- 
opined that demons could not loosen even the soul of a witch for 
nightly orgies - not to mention the body. Alanus argued that if demons 
could operate with souls in this way, they could also awake the dead, 
which only God could do.526 
Not even Alanus however denied the existence of sorcery and black 
magic. According to him necromancy, incantation and the use of ma-
gical pictures were demonic magic, which was possible only with the 
help of the Devil. Men could manipulate nature also by lawful means. 
This natural magic was based on accurate knowledge of both "mani-
fest" and "occult" causes, both of which had nothing to do with the 
supematura1.527 The difference between men and spiritual beings (both 
angels and demons) thus formed an essentially unbridgeable gap. Man 
was to exploit nature for his needs with tools provided by his own 
skills. 
Seventeenth-century Aristotelianism has, especially in older, whib 
270 
	
	
gish studies, often been presented as the cradle of supersition. On one 
hand there was belief in God's influence on natural processes, and on 
the other hand widespread belief in witchcraft, black magic and sor-
cery. The rise of mechanical philosophy would have abolished these 
beliefs and made thinking more rational. However, it seems that we 
have to abandon this notion. In fact, the mechanists' conception of 
matter as totally barren could also be used to guarantee that superna-
tural activity - both good and evil - could be ever-present in the uni-
verse. Indeed, at Turku we meet the Cartesian professor of physics 
Johan Thorwöste, who during the 1730's showed a firm belief in the 
power of popular magic verses.578 On the other hand, some of the 
most extreme forms of Renaissance Aristotelianism were clearly hos-
tile to the idea of supernatural powers being effective in nature.529 
Ideas on supernatural activity are thus better interpreted from inside 
the philosophical framework of which these theories were in fact part. 
In this chapter I have tried to create an overview of seventeenth-
century learning at Turku. Although the contents of this learning has 
poraliter per aera ad nefaria conventicula sua transportare situm sit? Affir." Hahn- 
Wargentin 1697, p. 17-18, et passim. 
526 Alanus-Munthelius 1645, Th. XLVII. Heikkinen 1969, p. 88-92. 
527 Alanus-Munthelius 1645. 
528 Thorwöste-Maxenius 1733. 
529 Hutchison 1983. 
here been very much emphasized, I have also tried to point out what 
physics was like as science. Our modern categories are seldom effi-
cient in understanding learning e.g. in physics or mathematics, or the 
typically Aristotelian compound of biological and psychological 
knowledge. We have seen that learning at Turku was in many ways 
not purely Aristotelian, but eclectic to some degree of incoherence. 
On the whole learning at Turku was rather stable throughout the se-
venteenth century. The element which for the most part was respon-
sible for new ideas was Cartesianism. In this chapter we have already 
seen some flashes from this "new philosophy", and the next chapter 
is intended to offer a more concentrated look at the subject. 
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Cartesianism and the 
Natural Philosophy at 
Turku 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There is no comprehensive study of Cartesianism at Turku, although 
the subject is dealt with in several smaller articles and touched upon 
in some monographies. Most studies mention the influence of Car-
tesian ideas on their respective fields of study. It is nevertheless dif-
ficult to form a general picture of the rise of Cartesianism at Turku 
from them.' The most profound analyses of the subject until now can 
be found in two articles by Seppo J. Salminen.' His research concent-
rates mainly on the relationship between the orthodox Lutheran theo-
logy and Cartesian philosophy from the theologians' point of view. 
This approach quite understandably puts less emphasis on the fact that 
Cartesianism was not only a problem for theology, but that it played 
an important role in the development of natural philosophy, too. Mo-
reover, Salminen handles "philosophy" as a whole without distinguis-
hing between various disciplines within philosophy: metaphysics, lo-
gic, natural philosophy, moral philosophy, etc. All of these branches 
of philosophy were important for theology, but not all in the same 
way and to an equal degree. Therefore they also had partially different 
approaches to Cartesianism as well. 
In this chapter I intend to offer a general analysis of Cartesianism 
at the University of Turku. The main emphasis will be placed on the 
See e.g. Slotte 1898, passim. Fagerlund & Tigerstedt 1890, passim. Sandblad 
1945, passim. Knuuttila & Niiniluoto 1986, p. 26, et passim. Leikola 1987, p. 
561-563, 572-573. 
2 Salminen 1981 & 1983. 
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influence of Cartesianism on natural philosophy, although theology 
naturally plays an important role as background. In history of science 
situations in which conflicts occur between different traditions are ge-
nerally regarded as very interesting. Because Cartesian philosophy was 
often involved in controversies with Aristotelianism, many studies of 
Cartesian science and philosophy have tended to concentrate on the 
Cartesian disputes. This is especially true for the studies of Car-
tesianism in Sweden! 
In this study we shall also look at the four best known occasions 
at Turku when these two philosophies supposedly clashed. But was 
Cartesianism the main cause of these controversies? If we look more 
closely at these occasions, it becomes evident that other factors were 
involved as well. I shall argue that non-Cartesian factors contributed 
to the birth of the disputes in question. It is also important for us to 
see which particular features of Cartesianism were the most sensitive? 
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Which Cartesian arguments were most strenuously rejected? However, 
concentration on controversies easily creates the false illusion (as in 
my opinion it has done in most Finnish studies on the subject) that 
there was hardly any Cartesianism except the controversial cases. Cer-
tainly many Cartesian ideas were discussed and even accepted at Tur-
ku, which should not be ignored simply because they were tacitly 
accepted. It has been shown recently that in fact many European uni-
versities were ready to open their doors to at least some of the Car-
tesian dogmas.' 
This leads us to my main argument concerning the study of Car-
tesian science. When we talk about the confrontation between Car-
tesian and Aristotelian ideas, we have to take into account in which 
discipline and at which level of importance the ideas discussed are 
found. Obviously fewer divergences of opinion were tolerated in me-
taphysics and theology than in natural philosophy. But even in natural 
philosophy some subjects were more sensitive than others, depending 
on what kind of dogmas the new ideas challenged. In this chapter I 
shall try to answer the question of how these various degrees of sen-
sitiveness were established. What made it possible for Cartesianism 
to develop in peace and quiet as well? One of the most important 
aspects of this chapter is to see what kinds of strategies were used 
3 Lindborg 1965. Salminen 1981, 1983. Klinge 1987, p. 416-428. 
4 Gascoigne 1990, p. 215-220. Ruestow 1973. Heyd 1982. Brockliss 1987, 1981. 
both for dispelling Cartesianism and for introducing Cartesian ideas. 
Interest in Cartesian science and philosophy has been revived re-
cently among historians of science, and it is a much-discussed topic 
in philosophy of science as well. It can therefore be expected that the 
candide lector is not altogether unfamiliar with this philosophy. How-
ever, it might be sensible to begin with by recalling some general 
characteristics of Cartesian natural philosophy. The following survey 
is not intended to be a systematic and comprehensive presentation of 
Cartesianism, but it is only intended to create a background for the 
forthcoming discussion. It will then be appropriate to look at the cor-
responding developments at the main university of the Swedish em-
pire, the University of Uppsala. The course of events at Uppsala differs 
in many important respects from Turku, although we could expect to 
find similarities in reasoning as well. Therefore, in order to see what 
kind of connections and resemblances there might be between these 
two universities, it seems fitting to summarize Cartesianism in 17th-
century Uppsala. 
Cartesianism in a Nutshell 
Both in Descartes' own time and later too Cartesian philosophy has 
been seen as radically breaking with the scholastic tradition which 
preceded it.5 However, Descartes' project for renewing philosophy in-
herited many characteristics from the parent philosophy against which 
it revolted. Although Descartes himself tried to soften the reception 
of his ideas, Cartesianism was nevertheless a radical new philosophy, 
and it was reacted to accordingly.' 
In which matters did Cartesianism differ most from Aristotelianism 
and which were the most usual causes of controversy? Certainly theo-
logians - Catholics, Calvinists and Lutherans - saw Cartesianism as 
threatening some of their most fundamental religious views, although 
the objections raised by these churches differed in details.' However, 
5 	 Although interestingly enough some contemporary critics of Cartesianism accused 
it of unoriginality. Jolley 1992, p. 407-412. 
6 Anew 1992. 
7 Clarke 1989, p. 22-34 has analysed the reasons why e.g. the French Catholic 
church found Cartesianism suspicious, but why, on the other hand, some catholic 
sects such as Jansenism took a more positive view of the philosophy. On the 
Jesuits' attitudes towards Cartesianism see Ariew 1992, p. 93-69. Jolley 1992, p. 
399-403. 
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even the theological opposition was based on divergences in philosop-
hy. There were discrepancies between Aristotelian and Cartesian phi-
losophical theories both in metaphysical and physical ideas. In epis-
temology there were two main reasons why Cartesianism met with 
resistance. First of all the methodical doubt of Descartes awakened 
the mistrust of theologians. Applying any doubt to the Bible or to the 
existence of God was thought to be blasphemous as such, and doubt 
in general was feared to lead to atheism.' 
Descartes was regarded as seriously challenging the fundamental 
concepts of Aristotelian epistemology. Whereas all Aristotelians re-
garded sense perception - at least in principle - as our only source of 
reliable knowledge about the world (nihil est in intellectu quod non 
prius fuerit in sensu), Descartes developed a system based on rigidly 
rationalistic principles. He claims we could never be sure whether 
our sense perceptions really did represent reality. Therefore, reliable 
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knowledge should be based on innate and rationalistic principles 
which were not contaminated by the senses. Hence Descartes claimed 
to have derived his entire physics from metaphysical principles.10 Mo-
reover, the ideal model for all sciences would be mathematics pre-
cisely because it could be independent from sense perceptions.'' 
Although Descartes often emphasized the rationalistic elements of 
his philosophy, we should also see that he was far from negative 
towards experimental science either. Indeed, any one-sided view of 
Cartesianism, which only takes into account its rationalistic side ren-
ders it rather embarrassing to know how for example his allegedly 
metaphysical physics could so often follow a clearly experimental 
programme in practice. At the University of Uppsala Cartesianism 
was defended expressly because of the advance it made in empirical 
and experimental philosophy and medicine.12  
It was at the metaphysical level that probably the most serious of- 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
E.g. Lindborg 1965, p. 38, 144-145, et passim. 
Clarke 1992, p. 259. 
According to Clarke 1979 Descartes in fact does deduce his physics from me-
taphysical principles, but his understanding of "deduction" is so far from ours 
that this causes most of the obscurity in the matter. On the other hand the problem 
of innate ideas or conceptions occupied the minds of many 17th-century Car-
tesians, who generally were reluctant to accept the concept of innate ideas (at 
least in the naive Platonistic sense). Clarke 1989, Ch. 2. 
Descartes 1973, p. 92-94, et passim. 
Lindroth 1975, p. 463. Lindborg 1965, p. 300-306. 
fence against traditional Aristotelianism was encountered. Cartesian 
dualism was in conflict with the Aristotelian understanding of subs-
tance. It was particularly important for Aristotelians to retain "the 
right" interpretation of substance, because some of the most funda-
mental concepts of both theology and natural philosophy were closely 
connected with it. Descartes declared invalid the Aristotelian idea ac-
cording to which a substance consists of form and matter together in 
such a way that their existence is constantly dependent on each other. 
In an Aristotelian world there were as many substances in the world 
as there were independent compound entities. For Descartes a subs-
tance was not the unit of individual entities, but a more universal 
category of being. To be a substance meant to be able to exist by 
oneself. Thus, only two kinds of substances in the world existed (ex-
cept God). They were according to Descartes mind and matter, which 
by definition were totally independent of each other.' The Aristotelian 
way of defining the relationship between the ontological status of 	 277 
substance and accidence fell together with the concept of substance. 
Philosophy operated now with new concepts such as primary and se-
condary qualities such as number, quantity and motion versus sensible 
qualities.14 
 
Naturally Cartesian dualism clashed especially with the traditional 
views of man. One of Descartes' aims was to develop a philosophy 
which would provide a rational and sufficient proof of the immortality 
of man's soul. In Descartes' view mind was so closely bound with 
matter in the Aristotelian hylemorphic system that it would be almost 
impossible to explain how any psychic functions could survive the 
separation from body.15 Descartes' answer to this problem was a hard-
line separation between the mortal body and the immortal soul. Lut-
heran Aristotelians regarded Cartesian dualism as guaranteeing matter 
a far too independent role. How could pure matter - passive as it was 
by nature - perform all the various operations discernible in all living 
beings without the help of the active principle, soul? Descartes had 
denied the existence of any soul-substance in animals, because the 
soul was immortal and could exist in man only. Aristotelians could 
not accept this reduction of animals to machines. There was a fear -
a well-founded and sometimes also a declared one - that if the living 
13 	 Descartes 1973, p. 239-241. 
14 See e.g. Clarke 1989, Ch. 2-3. 
15 Cottingham 1992b, p. 237-241. 
functions of an animal could be reduced to mechanical causes, it 
would be only a matter of time before the same would be done with 
human minds.16 
Not only did Descartes despise the Aristotelian concept of form, 
but he could not accept its definition of matter either. Therefore the 
differences of opinion were no less bitter at the physical level. When 
the metaphysical concept of substance had gone, some of the most 
fundamental questions in Aristotelian physics were no longer relevant 
in the context of Cartesian philosophy. Because Aristotelian physics 
was based on the theory of the four elements, it also presupposed 
qualitative argument as an integral part of the element-theory. Des-
cartes stripped all other qualities except extension away from the ma-
terial substance. The physical world would consist of minute particles 
of three different sizes, small enough to fill every place in the universe 
so that no vacuum would exist. This Cartesian matter was entirely 
278 
	
	
inert, and it could thus be moved only by some external agent. The 
ultimate cause for all motion and its preservation was God, who had 
set these particles in constant motion. However, science should not 
seek to explain the acts of God but to look only for the intimate causes 
of all kinds of physical processes and mutations occurring in nature. 
These causes were the various movements of the particles themsel- 
yes. n 
Cartesian physics strove to explain natural phenomena by 
mechanistic theories, whilst the Aristotelians would accept a wider 
range of efficient and final causes. It was very much exactly these 
"occult" attractive and repulsive forces in nature and qualitative ex-
planations which Descartes sought to get rid of in his physics.18 Mo-
reover, Aristotelian physics distinguished both between linear sublunar 
and circular supralunar motions, and between natural and violent ones. 
As is well known, according to the Aristotelians the natural motion 
of bodies was caused by their striving towards their own "natural" 
place, which was determined by their qualities of heaviness and light-
ness respectively. Descartes however regarded extension as the only 
characteristics or accidence of the material substance: motion was just 
another state of being for them. Although motion was not an inherent 
property of matter for Descartes, the various movements of matter 
16 Clarke 1989, p. 27. 
17 Descartes 1983, p. 40, 49-50, 52, 57-58, 110. Hatfield 1979. 
18 Hatfield 1979, p. 113-115. Clarke 1989, Ch. 4. 
were of crucial importance in explaining all natural processes. The 
whole indefinite-sized universe had evolved when the movements of 
matter had gradually settled into the form of vortices, one of which 
was our solar system. For example, what we feel as light and warmth 
was actually caused by the pressure of particles coming from the Sun. 
This systematically mechanistic physics was something which simply 
could not be fully understood by scholars brought up in the Aristote-
lian "paradigm". 
Both the Aristotelian and Cartesian views as posed above are some 
sort of "standard philosophy". Individual differences did occur be-
tween different religious or geographical schools of Aristotelianism. 
The concept "Cartesianism" is somewhat problematic as well. There 
were differences between Descartes' and his disciples' ideas and be-
tween the disciples' theories as well - not to mention the fact that 
Descartes himself was not always very clear about what he meant. 
Those scholars who became Cartesians often modified Descartes' 
theories instead of accepting them as such.19 Promoting Cartesian ideas 
was seldom easy, because often the Cartesians lacked institutional sup-
port. There were two main strategies which were adopted by Cartesian 
scholars at different European universities. Either one took up a role 
as an extreme Cartesian, or tried to present Cartesian ideas by utilizing 
Aristotelian concepts. The latter strategy was perhaps more commonly 
used. Sometimes it was accompanied by the claim that Cartesianism 
actually was the genuine form of Aristotelianism. In Sweden for exam-
ple Petrus Hoffwenius, who was an eminent figure in the Uppsala 
disputes over Cartesianism, made use of both of these strategies.20 
Cartesian Disputes in Sweden 
René Descartes spent the four last months of his life in Sweden, where 
he died on the 11th of February 1650. He was the jewel in the col-
lection of famous learned men, whom Queen Christina had imported 
to her court. The scholars and artists brought there were supposed to 
teach the Queen and create a cultivated atmosphere. Christina's inte-
rest in philosophy was a part of the new kind of a court culture which 
had spread around Europe from the end of the sixteenth century on, 
19 Brockliss 1987. Heyd 1982, Ch. IV. Clarke 1989. Westman I980b, p. 91, 97-99. 
20 Clarke 1989, Ch. 1. Lindroth 1975, p. 454, 542. Lindborg 1965, p. 116-121, 141 
ff. 
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and Christina also wanted to show off her own learning and the well-
being of scholarship at her feet. For philosophers and scientists this 
system offered new chances. In the protection of their non-clerical 
patrons philosophers, astronomers and other scholars could achieve 
social and intellectual positions which sometimes offered them oppor-
tunities to create different kinds of knowledge than the traditional 
learning system had been willing to allow them.71 It seems that around 
the mid-seventeenth century this kind of a court culture was in Sweden 
very much dependent on the personality of Queen Christina. Its in-
fluence did not so readily affect the Swedish Universities, in any case 
not in the case of Cartesianism. Cartesianism did not really arrive in 
Sweden and at the University of Uppsala through the court. It was 
the medical students' and professors' contacts with Leiden, which 
played a crucial role in dissemination of Cartesian ideas in Sweden. 
As in many other Universities Cartesianism was vehemently op- 
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posed at the University of Uppsala. There were two periods which 
usually are referred to as those of the Cartesian disputes. The first 
covers the years 1662-1668, and the second 1686-1689. It is proble-
matic, however, in what sense the period between 1662 and 1668 can 
be labelled as an epoch of Cartesian dispute. 
In 1662 the recently-appointed professor of medicine, Petrus Hoff-
wenius, started publishing a series of dissertations called Artis medi-
cinalis parvae exercitationes.22  The first part of the dissertation series 
had already made the theological faculty suspect it of heresy. Hoff-
wenius was accused of supporting Socinian views, according to which 
man himself had the ability to turn towards God for grace. Put in 
more medical terms it was stated that corpuscular vital spirits caused 
soul and the whole body to turn to God (spiritus sistit membra Deo), 
whilst the orthodox Lutheran dogma stated that the salvation of man 
was entirely dependent on God's mercy.23 
Only the third part of Hoffwenius' dissertation series, printed in 
1665, included clearly Cartesian ideas. Although the academic world 
was at that time seething with theological disputes, mainly over synch-
retism, Cartesianism had also gradually become involved in the dis-
pute. Because Cartesian philosophy was seen first of all as a threat 
21 	 On court politics and the patronage system see e.g. Biagioli 1993. 
22 	 The work was actually an abridged version of Johannes Antonides van der Lin-
den's Meletemata medicinae hippocraticae. See Lindborg 1965, p. 79 ff. 
23 	 Lindborg 1965, p. 85, et passim. 
to religion (also because of its supposedly Socinian connotations), the 
questions in dispute in Hoffwenius' thesis also concentrated on theo-
logical subtleties. Theologians, eager to keep their dogma pure, were 
suspicious about every philosophical trend divergent from the Aristo-
telian ideas which had been adapted and revised to support theology. 
Fearing the influence of non-Lutheran confessions allegedly implica-
ted in synchretism, the theologians at Uppsala strove to limit the free-
dom of philosophy. At the 1664 Diet the clergy went as far as to 
demand new restrictions on the freedom to travel abroad.24 
Although philosophical questions of substantial forms, mechanistic 
philosophy and Cartesian and Aristotelian epistemologies were to 
some extent at stake at Uppsala, the most burning problems were 
caused by dogmatic aspects. Hoffwenius was, for example, accused 
of discarding the theory of the propagation of soul per traducem, 
which was essential to the Lutheran theory of original sin. On the 
other hand, the Cartesian professor of medicine, Olof Rudbeck Sr. in 	 281 
1665 defended the idea that the mystery of the Christ's presence in 
the Eucharist could be explained by Cartesian philosophy. This ques-
tion had for a long time been disputed in Central European universities 
too.25 Theologians at Uppsala also accused the Cartesians of not ac-
cepting Aristotelian logic and other important parts of traditional phi-
losophy. Cartesians were said to present views which were totally 
contrary to "sane" philosophy. For example, they dismissed the con-
cept of substantial forms. The general principles of logic, metaphysics 
and natural philosophy were important as the basis of learning for all 
disciplines, but especially for theology.26 Hoffwenius' answer to all 
these accusations presented against him was that his meaning was not 
to throw out the old principles but to show that the philosophy of 
Descartes was compatible with them. 27 
The dispute was finally settled in 1668, after the clergy had made 
its last attack on Cartesians at the Diet. No final solution was achieved, 
though. Petrus Hoffwenius had already agreed in 1665 not to lecture 
on Cartesian philosophy any more. It was, however, precisely because 
24 On synchretism see Göransson 1952; on attempts to control foreign travels Gö-
ransson 1951. The attempt to make all students (including the arts' students) study 
certain courses in theology was connected with this controversy. 
25 On the Jesuits' worries on this question see e.g. Jolley 1992, p. 400. 
26 Lindborg 1965, p. 128 ff. 
27 Lindborg 1965, p. 130. 
of Hoffwenius' natural philosophical lectures (begun anew in 1673) 
that Cartesian philosophy really made a breakthrough at Uppsala. In 
1678 Hoffwenius published his famous Synopsis physica, a series of 
theses which presented Cartesian physics in its entirety. In the same 
year, another thesis was published, in which Cartesian dualism was 
thoroughly examined. It is typical of Swedish Cartesianism that Hoff-
wenius did not refer directly to Principia Philosophiae, but to texts 
of other Cartesians such as Johann Clauberg, Johannes de Raei and 
Louis de la Forge.28 
By the end of the 1670's theologians saw that the threat posed by 
synchretism to orthodox Lutheranism had receded. This made them 
more relaxed and less watchful for philosophical purity, which gave 
Cartesianism a chance to strengthen its position. A couple of talented 
young Cartesians trod in Hoffwenius' footsteps. Andreas Drossander 
followed Hoffwenius as the professor of medicine after the latter's 
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death in 1683. An even more enthusiastic Cartesian was Johan Bilberg, 
who was appointed professor of mathematics in 1679. Little by little 
the natural philosophers and even metaphysicians tumed to Car-
tesianism during the first few years of the 1680's. Rolf Lindborg has 
noted that by the mid 1680's it was more difficult for an Aristotelian 
to criticise Cartesian philosophy at Uppsala than vice versa. However, 
important aspects in the relationships between theology and philosop-
hy, such as the relevance of the Bible as an arbiter of truth in natural 
philosophical questions, remained taboos at Uppsala.79 
The clergy's dissatisfaction with the growing influence of Car-
tesianism burst out at the Diet of 1686. Only smaller incidents had 
taken place at the University in 1679, when Nils Celsius defended a 
thesis on Cartesian astronomy, and in 1685, when theologian Petrus 
Ljung attacked the Cartesian idea of the knowledge of God.'' The 
clergy demanded a denial of the entire Cartesian philosophy and of 
every other kind of "new" philosophy. Although the success of Car-
tesian mathematics and of the "experimental" philosophy in medicine 
were conceded, the development of these disciplines should not be 
allowed to disturb the general worldview. Nor should it shake the 
authority of the Bible or deprive logic of its position as the principal 
discipline in sciences. All in all, the clergy's propositions aimed at a 
28 	 Lindborg 1965, p. 135, 141-183. 
29 Lindborg 1965, p. 136, 191-222. 
30 Lindborg 1965, p. 136, 183-191. 
total control and excessive censorship of philosophical thought." 
All faculties of the University of Uppsala were asked to reply to 
the proposition of the clergy. Although the professors of theology by 
and large stood behind the proposition, not even the position of theo-
logians was unanimous. Censorship and radical changes in the schoo-
ling system which had been proposed by the clergy gained little sup-
port. The University wanted to retain its autonomy in respect to the 
church, too. During the 1660's the professors in the Faculty of Phi-
losophy had been as eager to oppose Cartesianism as the theologians. 
Now the situation had changed. According to many philosophers Car-
tesianism was safe for theology. Moreover they claimed that the old-
style theology was no longer valid but should be reformed. This ra-
dical stance was strengthened by the claim that theology and natural 
philosophy should generally be separated from each other. It should 
come as no surprise that the Faculty of Medicine demanded freedom 
for "experimental" philosophy. Even the Faculty of Law ended up 
defending Cartesiansim.32 
After many bureaucratic phases, the dispute was settled by the 
King. On the 17th April 1689 King Carl XI sent a letter to the chan-
cellor of the University, stating that no freedom of philosophy should 
be allowed at the University as would be aimed against the Christian 
religion and dogma. Nor should the Bible be submitted to any phi-
losophical criticism. However, in all other matters except the religion 
and Holy Scriptures, a free use of philosophy should be allowed. The 
King's statement did not specify which philosophies could be studied 
freely, nor did it set any criteria for the question of what was to be 
regarded as criticism of the Bible. In any case neither Cartesianism 
nor Aristotelianism were denied. The resolution did not end all quar-
reling about Cartesianism, because both parties had different readings 
of it. In the interpretation supported by Cartesians the "new philosop-
hy" had won.33 What ever the "right" interpretation may then be, it is 
sure that the Cartesians were very effective in applying theirs. For a 
few decades Cartesianism dominated natural philosophy at the Uni-
versity of Uppsala. 
As we have seen, the Cartesian debates in Sweden were not rest-
ricted to the University of Uppsala only, other institutions like the 
31 Lindborg 1965, p. 226-259. 
32 Lindborg 1965, p. 259-307. 
33 Lindborg 1965, p. 321-338. 
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church and the state (King and the Diet) becoming involved too. Else-
where, for example in the Netherlands, the disputes on Cartesianism 
had largely remained inside the walls of the Universities.34 But there 
were differences even between various parts of the kingdom of Swe-
den. The Cartesian debates never spread to the University of Turku 
as such. It is not that Cartesianism would not have been known at 
Turku. At least the theological circles at Turku were well aware of 
the essence of the new philosophy. For example professor Enevaldus 
Svenonius actively took part in the church political discussions on 
synchretism at Uppsala. He was nominated in 1664 to the clerical 
committee, which was supposed to prepare a circular for the Swedish 
universities against Cartesian philosophy. Another professor of theo-
logy, Petrus Bång, played a crucial role in starting the Cartesian dis-
putes anew in 1686.35 Politics at Turku was to keep battles over Car-
tesianism away from the home ground. However, there may be ten- 
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denies in which developments at Uppsala influenced Turku, too. The- 
se parallels have not been studied before, although claims to have 
done this exist.36 Unfortunately we do not have the opportunity to 
look at the question either, except at a very general level only. Having 
created a wider view of Cartesianism, let us now have a look at the 
discussions on this topic in 17th-century Turku. 
34 Ruestow 1973, p. 34-60, 140-141. 
35 	 Salminen 1978, p. 350. This idea of the clergy was baffled by the chancellor of 
the University of Uppsala, Magnus De la Gardie. On Bång see Salminen 1981, 
p. 100. 
36 	 Salminen 1983, p. 59 claims that in his previous article (Salminen 1981) he has 
"shown how the Finnish discussions depended on the Cartesian Disputes in Upp-
sala". In fact, Salminen has done no other than present some chronological com-
parisons. He has not proved any causal connections between Swedish and Finnish 
discussions. 
2. THE FIRST SOUNDS OF THE NEW 
PHILOSOPHY 
Laurbecchius Against the Revival of 
"Copernico-Cartesianae" 
On the 8th of June 1661 the assistant of the Faculty of Philosophy, 
Petrus Laurbecchius, ascended to the lecturer's desk of the Auditorium 
Major of the University of Turku to defend his thesis, written under 
the direction of the professor of mathematics Simon Kexlerus and 
solemnly named: Dissertatio Tripartita, cumprimis De Circuli Qvad-
ratura et Vero Mundi Systemate, Adversus Copernicum Redivivum.37 
A great part of the contents was mathematical, dealing with the prob-
lem of how to draw a square equal to a circle of a given size. The 
first, geometrical part deals with the use of geometry and the general 
conditions for the validity of a geometrical theorem. 
Just as some previous studies have stated, Laurbecchius' thesis was 
to a great extent polemics both against Copemicanism and Car-
tesianism.38 Its title indicates that it was a response to Daniel Lips-
torp's book Copernicus redivivus sive de vero mundi systemate liber 
singularis. Lipstorp had been born in Lübeck in 1631. He first studied 
astronomy at the University of Rostock, and in 1652 he matriculated 
at the University of Leiden to study mathematics. While at Leiden 
Lipstorp took part in the controversies over Cartesianism, which were 
the hottest issue at the University at that time. In his main work Spe-
cimina philosophiae cartesianae Lipstorp claims the excellence of the 
Cartesian and Copernican philosophies. The superiority of the Car-
tesian system was the reason - as he claimed - why, desperately see-
king for the truth, he had finally converted to Cartesianism. He praises 
the Cartesian mathematical method and mechanics. Specimina, as well 
as his other book, Copernicus redivivus were both published in 1653.39 
In the latter Lipstorp discusses both the biblical and philosophical 
arguments against Copemicanism. According to Lipstorp, all counte- 
37 We do not know whether the work was actually written by Laurbecchius or by 
Kexlerus. Although it seems to me reasonable to suppose that this work was done 
in co-operation, I shall in the following refer to it as Laurbecchius' work. 
38 Salminen 1981, p. 93. Salminen 1983, p. 59-60. Slone 1898, p. 18. 
39 Lindborg 1965, p. 77-78. 
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rarguments could be disproved by Cartesian natural philosophy. 
We do not know what caused the dramatic tum in Lipstorp's life, 
but he seems to have abandoned his main subjects of study (ast-
ronomy, mechanics and mathematics) soon after the publication of 
these books. No sign of Cartesianism can be found in his later works. 
He begun studying law at the University of Leiden, and in 1656 he 
published a book in canon law. In 1662 Lipstorp was finally appointed 
professor of law in the University of Uppsala.40 Rolf Lindborg has 
shown that Lipstorp was appointed professor mainly on the recom-
mendation of the influential Olof Rudbeck Sr, who also was inclined 
to Cartesianism. Lipstorp did not, however, receive a friendly welcome 
from the officials of the University, probably because his actions at 
Leiden during the 1650's were known. Although the Senate did not 
directly try to prevent his nomination, it was certainly delayed from 
the date Rudbeck had planned.41 Lindborg also wonders whether it is 
286 
	
	
a coincidence that the "Cartesian" disputes at Uppsala began in 1662 
when Lipstorp was appointed, and they ceased in 1665 when he left 
the University. 
It would be tempting to connect the strong attack by Laurbecchius 
on Lipstorp to his election as the professor of law at Uppsala. This 
is impossible, however. Laurbecchius' thesis was already published 
in 1661 whereas Lipstorp's predecessor, professor Bringius, died sud-
denly at the end of January 1662 42 What is remarkable, though, is 
that the first attack on Cartesianism was made at Turku before any 
polemic began at Uppsala.43 The fact that Laurbecchius' work was 
the first thesis so clearly directed against Cartesianism alone makes 
the incident worth closer study. Let us now first turn our attention to 
what Laurbecchius actually had against Lipstorp's book. 
To begin with Laurbecchius states the "real state of things" in cos-
mology by asserting that the Earth stands still in the middle of the 
40 Lindborg 1965, p. 78-79. 
41 Lindborg 1965, p. 79. The excuse used to delay Lipstorp's nomination was the 
year of grace of the previous professor Bringius' widow. In itself this does not 
necessarily include any action against Lipstorp, since it was quite usual to gua-
rantee the widow the right to her deceased husband's salary during the "year of 
grace". 
42 Uppsala Universitets Akademiska konsistoriets protokoll VI 1661-1663, p. 101. 
5.2.1662 "Efter nu M. Bringius i hastigheet ähr hädan ryckt worden, skall hwar 
och en af Consistorio för sig hemma betänkia om en duglig kaarl i stället." 
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	 In spite of this Salminen claims that the discussions of Cartesianism at Turku 
were dependent on those at Uppsala. Salminen 1983, p. 59. 
cosmos, and the Sun and the stars revolve around it. He was forced 
to defend the Ptolemaic worldview, because there was a constantly 
spreading movement which claimed otherwise. 
...Ptolemy confirmed that it would be absurd if the Earth was carried 
along the ecliptic in a great yearly orbit, as was claimed long ago 
by Pythagoras of Samos, Philolaus of Croton, Timaeus Locrus, 
Aristarchus of Samos, Cleanthes, Leucippus, Plato the old. In recent 
times no fewer scholars have stated the same: Martianus Capella, 
Guilielmus Gilbertus, Petrus Peregrinus, Maricurtius Gallus, Nico-
laus de Cusa, a Cardinal, and Copernicus with his innumerous fol-
lowers (none of whom regards himself sufficiently learned unless 
he imagines the Earth to move while the Sun stands still), Galileans 
and Cartesians...44 
Many scholars who supported the Copernican system were named. 
This showed that the problem of Copernicanism was serious. More 
"recent" authors were linked to names from antiquity. On one hand 
it mirrors the idea that all wisdom - even the unacceptable - derived 
ultimately from antiquity. On the other hand it is curious to see how 
by putting the matter in this way Copernicus was deprived of the 
status of an innovator. Many other rejected ideas were attacked by 
calling them "novelties", but not Copernicanism. 
Laurbecchius presents many arguments derived from the Bible in 
support of the geocentric system. Salminen has shown that it was 
exactly this thesis of Laurbecchius which really established the Bible 
as the final criterion for philosophical truth and introduced biblical 
arguments into astronomical discussion at Turku.45 It is true that Laur-
becchius argues for the centrality and immobility of the Earth, and 
the motion of the stars, the Sun and the Moon by referring frequently 
to the Bible. It seems, however, that there is also something more 
44 Kexlerus-Laurbecchius 1661, Cap. III, I. "...sancit Ptolemxus, quod absurdum 
sit; tum ut Terra per Eclipticam in orbe annuo & magno fern queat, sicut id 
statuere ohm plurimi, Pyhtagoras Samius, Philolaus Crotoniates, Timmus Locrus, 
Samius Aristarchus, Cleanthes, Leucippus, Plato senex: recentiüs, nec pauciores, 
Martianus Capella, Guilielmus Gilbertus, Petrus Peregrinus, Maricurtius Gallus, 
Nicolaus de Cusa Cardinalis, Copernicus quoque cum asseclis innumeris (quorum 
nemo se satis doctum xstimet, nisi Ten-am, quiescente Sole, fingat mobilem) 
Galilxanis & Cartesianis..." 
45 Salminen 1983, p. 60. 
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important at stake than merely an acceptable interpretation of an ast-
ronomical system. The problem was that the "Copernico-Cartesianae" 
had called the absolute authority of the Bible into question. According 
to Laurbecchius they claim that "...this is to be understood only in 
accordance with our mode of understanding, not because the things 
themselves are really so."46 Thus the question of whether the authority 
of the Bible was valid in the field of natural knowledge and not only 
in matters of faith, is connected with the question of the right way of 
interpreting the Scripture. Laurbecchius uses biblical argument as 
much as he does partly because he wants to show that the Bible does 
give relevant information about nature. Because the two books of re-
velation complement each other, the information in them concerning 
each other cannot be contradictory. 
Immobility of the Earth and the movement of the stars can rightly 
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be construed from the sacred texts. And this is quite appropriate. 
Because God wanted us to know the book of nature, there are many 
things [concerning the book of nature] which are revealed [in the 
Bible], although it principally contributes to greater aims.47 
In Laurbecchius' opinion the blasphemous "Copemico-Cartesianae" 
not only questioned the authority of the Bible in natural philosophy, 
but had also more than once interpreted the Bible falsely.48 For the 
orthodox Lutherans the right way of interpreting the Bible was a literal 
reading - this procedure was of course in practice guided by certain 
preconceived principles. Hence, it was not enough for Laurbecchius 
just to cite the Bible, but the real meaning of its words had also to 
be made clear. In order to argue for the correctness of his interpreta-
tions Laurbecchius uses etymological and other philological methods. 
It is, for example, the "the order and context of words" (verborum 
46 	 Kexlerus-Laurbecchius 1661, Cap. III, 2. "...haec sotöm secundum rationem con- 
cipiendi nostram intelligenda, non quia redpse ita sint, ausu improbo asserere 
occipiat, id studiositis advertendum erit." 
47 Kexlerus-Laurbecchius 1661, Cap. III, 4. "Quies terrae motusque astrorum, e 
sacris, nec minus recte, adstrui debet. quod neque est inconveniens; cum Deus 
ex libro etiam natura cognosci voluerit, atque ideo permulta inde in alterum 
Revelatum, etsi ob finem magis prxcipuum... contulerit." 
48 Kexlerus-Laurbecchius 1661, Cap. III, 3 "Sed Copernicei; praetermisso illo de 
Chizchijå, cum laciniam suo solemni assuere ei nequeant; hoc alterum Iosua 
prodigium, nefandum in modum, detorquent glosris, nec theologice, nec mathe-
matic& veris.", et passim. 
ordo & contextus), which showed him the true meaning of the words 
in the Bible.49 
Resisting the heliocentric system is of course an essential aim in 
Laurbecchius' thesis. The main fault in Cartesian authors' (such as 
Lipstorp's) texts was, according to Laurbecchius, that they claimed a 
physical reality for the Copernican system. 
This would be enough of these, unless, as mentioned, Lipstorp had 
not defended the Copernican opinion as a Physical truth and not as 
an Astronomical hypothesis (which is what Copernicus most likely 
did), and unless he had not considered these two as equal in his 
'Revived Copernicus'. This book is otherwise full of things which 
are pleasant to the intellect. However in the same book he defends 
the Copernico-Cartesian opinion with arguments derived from re-
velation and from reason, and rejects the Ptolemaico-Tychonic sys-
tetn.50 
Although Laurbeccius conceded that Lipstorp's book contained 
many things which were "pleasant for the intellect", the claim for 
physical truth of the Copemicanism was to be refuted. Compared with 
most other theses aimed against Copernicanism Laurbecchius' thesis 
contains relatively little physical arguments` He prefers to attack the 
metaphysical and epistemological premises of the Copernicans. In my 
opinion, this type of argument is not the mere refutation of a new 
physical theory, but constitutes a more severe criticism of the phi-
losophical premises on which the pro-Copernican thought was based. 
Among several arguments against the Copernicans/Cartesians, two are 
especially noteworthy. 
49 Kexlerus-Laurbecchius 1661, Cap. III, passim. 
50 Kexlerus-Laurbecchius 1661, Cap. III, 4. "Poterant hic ista sufficere, nisi, qui 
allegabatur, Lipstorpius, Copemiceam sententiam, non ut Astronomicam hypot-
hesis (quod verisimile est fecisse Copemicum) sed ceu veritatem Physicam de-
fendisset; eöque comparasset Copernicum suum Redivivum, Librum alioqui mul-
tiplici rerum copiä, quae scitu jucundae sunt, refertum: in quo id agit, ut argu-
mentis, tam e revelatione, quäm ratione, sententia, Copemico-Cartesianam stabi-
hat, & Ptolemaico-Tychonicam evertat." 
51 I count here as physical argument only those claims made by Laurbecchius which 
he bases on the ideas concerning the properties of a sphere. Kexlerus-Laurbec-
chius 1661, Cap. III, 5-6. (G2): "neque enim astra, aut primo Mobili, aut vehiculo 
materiae caelestis raptantur, ut qui motus eorum necessariö tum foret violentus; 
sed vi insitä, ab intemöque principio, ipsa sese in alia aliäque loca promovent." 
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First of all, Laurbecchius refutes the Copernican argument that be-
cause the heliocentric system was more simple, it was more likely to 
be true. In the Tychonic system the orbits of the Sun and Mars crossed 
each other, which did not happen in the more simple and elegant 
Copernican system. Moreover, the apparent movements of the planets 
could more easily be "saved" if the Earth was conceded to move on 
the ecliptic. Although Laurbeccius agrees that the Copernican system 
is indeed simpler than the other planetary models, he cannot accept 
simplicity as the criterion for physical truth. By doing this Laurbec-
chius attacks the very core of the metaphysics of the new natural 
philosophical thinking. "But really, natural things are not to be const-
rued from ease of explanation or understanding, but on the contrary 
these things are to be derived from nature."52 There would be neither 
logical nor any other kind of necessity to believe that God would have 
created the world in a way which was most easily understood by 
290 	 human reason. 
Secondly, it was the differences about the idea of legitimate met-
hods for scientific ratiocination which divided the parties. Descartes 
and his disciple Lipstorp are accused of mixing up the methods of 
invention and disposition. Lipstorp is said to demand the use of geo-
metry outside the boundaries of mathematics.53 It was one of the most 
central points in the Cartesian program for renewing sciences that all 
sciences would ideally have to be based on geometrical reasoning. In 
Descartes' opinion this branch of mathematics offered the most secure 
form of ratiocination. Although the Cartesians could only seldom ap-
ply the mathematical method in physical sciences in practice, the ideal 
remained and was loudly promoted as an actual achievement of the 
new philosophy.S4 Laurbecchius was a child of the scholastic age, in 
which the hierarchy of sciences was followed by a hierarchy of ap-
propriate methods. In his opinion the Cartesian method was absurd. 
...a thing is different from its exposition or representation, which 
only seeks to express a thing through the senses (as Hobbes wisely 
52 	 Kexlerus-Laurbecchius 1661, Cap. III, 4, 6. "Verumtamen, non ex facilitate, sive 
delineandi, sive intelligendi, rerum natura effingenda erit, sed illa altera hinc 
potiüs derivanda." 
53 	 Kexlerus-Laurbecchius 1661, Cap. III, 6. "...geometriae vim usumque crepat, non 
in mathesi solöm, sed in disciplinis quoque ceteris". 
54 Clarke 1989, Ch. 5-7. 
deduced in Elem. Phil. sect. I.c.12). In respect to the System of the 
world Geometry can only give the Exposition, i.e. the Figure, not 
say anything about the Thing itself!' 
The Cartesian geometrical method and its scope was dealt with in 
a more detailed manner in the first section of this same dissertation. 
Thus far Finnish historical research has been so keenly concentrated 
on discussing Laurbecchius' refutation of Cartesianism in connection 
with Copernicanism that it has passed over his other attainments in 
silence. It is evident that in his criticism of Cartesian geometrical 
method Laurbecchius also refers to the other book by Lipstorp, the 
Specimina philosophiae. 
Starting from the very basics, Laurbecchius explains what a geo-
metrical problem or a theorem is. Regarding their uses it becomes 
evident that there must be different methods for problem-solving (met-
hodus inveniendo) and teaching (methodus docendi).56 The gravest ac-
cusation he makes against Lipstorp is that he confuses the one with 
the other. Laurbecchius finds nothing to complain about in the Car-
tesian synthetic and analytic methods in themselves, but only opposes 
the misunderstanding of their applicability.S7 Another claim closely 
related to this is that mathematical reasoning could be used only in 
the category of quantity. Thus no operations arising from form, for 
example, fell in the field of mathematics. This principle was of crucial 
importance in the dispute over the "real" world-system too: 
Neither Galileo nor Lansbergius have used the proper form of ar-
gument. They draw conclusions about the radius and dimensions 
of the stellar spheres from the motions of the Fixed stars and the 
Planets. The slowness or velocity of the movement of the stars is 
not dependent on the size of their orbs, but stems from their inherent 
natures.58 
55 Kexlerus-Laurbecchius 1661, Cap. III, 4. "...res est aliud, aliud ejusdem expositio 
seu repraesentatio, quae exprimere rem sensibus queat (ut docte Hobbes Elem. 
Phil. sect. I.c.12. deducit) & in Systemate mundi solam modö Expositionem h.e. 
Figuram Geometria dare potest, Rem non potest." Here the reference to Hobbes 
is quite incidental; Laurbecchius does not otherwise support Hobbes' ideas. 
55 On seventeenth-century conceptions of inventive and teaching methods see Reif 
1962, p. 270-278. 
57 Kexlerus-Laurbecchius 1661, Cap. I, 5-6. 
58 Kexlerus-Laurbecchius 1661, Cap. 1, 7. "Quare, neque Galil~us, aut Lansbergius, 
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Thus, the movement - or the immobility - of planets was dependent 
on their form or "nature", and only the knowledge of that provided 
information on the real physical state of things. Geometry could add 
nothing to this except demonstration (in the sense of being a sort of 
illustration and explication of the theory). Laurbecchius says that the 
Cartesians such as Lipstorp distort the words of Aristotle when they 
claim that according to him mathematical principles were also valid 
in physics. Lipstorp relies on a basic statement in Cartesian me-
taphysics when he claims that mathematics is suitable for studying 
corpora naturalia, because as material entities their only characteristic 
is extension. On the other hand Laurbecchius defends Aristotelian phy-
sics by arguing that a discipline which did not consider colour, hard-
ness, etc., as real properties of a natural body, was more statics than 
physics proper.59 The strongest argument was derived from theology, 
however. Claiming that extension is the only property of a natural 
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body was, according to Laurbecchius, a Calvinistic error.60 Indeed, the 
Cartesian concept of matter as extension was successfully used by 
some Calvinist Cartesians to defeat the Lutheran dogma of the ubi-
quity of Christ.61 Laurbecchius' fear was thus not entirely groundless. 
Aristotelian and Cartesian conceptions of method and substance were 
fundamentally incompatible. Anybody watching through Aristotelian 
lenses was bound not to be able to accept Cartesian views. 
It was noted that Lipstorp was far from the only Cartesian in the 
history of science who supported Copemicanism. From the point of 
view of more traditional scholars this was a monstrous combination. 
Lumping together Copernicans and Cartesians was an efficient rheto-
rical deterrent to any Aristotelians planning to adopt Cartesian or Co-
pernican ideas. Laurbecchius had possibly received the core of his 
counter-arguments from foreign sources, though his exact sources can-
not be traced here. Although his criticism of these two "isms" did 
undoubtedly greatly affect the future fortunes of both at the University 
genuino argumentandi genere sunt usi; cum e Fixarum Planetarumque motu, 
spha'ra; astri cujusque semidiametrum & capacitatem concludunt: quandoquidem 
tarditas velocitasque, motus siderum, non abs capacitate orbium, sed ingenits ast-
rorum natura, cuique sus, proveniunt." 
59 Kexlerus-Laurbecchius 1661, Cap. I, 10. 
60 Kexlerus-Laurbecchius 1661, Cap. I, 10. "...quippe cum inde sit consequens, aut 
Christum non habere verum corpus, siquidem Extensionem aliquando cohibeat, 
aut eum non esse omnipreesentem, cum, ipso remanente, essentia sua tolli é cor-
pore nequeat; eöque nec Extensio, si ipsa Corporis essentia esset." 
61 Heyd 1982, p. 72-75. 
of Turku, it was, however, the criticism of the Cartesian method, 
which was philosophically more important and interesting. The depth 
of Laurbecchius' criticism is remarkable, especially as it has been 
written before the Cartesian disputes at Uppsala began. Laurbecchius 
also pinpointed the spot where the two philosophies clashed funda-
mentally. 
Laurbecchius was a talented young man and his thesis was given 
the respect it deserved, as we see from the fact that he was the primus 
in the master's promotion only three days after the disputation.62 This 
attack on Cartesianism did not, however, lead to any wave of similar 
dissertations, although Cartesian ideas were refuted in occasional the-
ses. Most probably there was no need for intense opposition either 
against Cartesianism or Copernicanism. 
Other Attacks On Cartesianism 
Petrus Laurbecchius' anti-Cartesian thesis in 1661 was the first, but 
not the last attack on the new philosophies during that decade. Laur-
becchius condemned Cartesianism as a proponent of the heliocentric 
philosophy, and discarded the use of mathematical method in physics. 
We are told by some of the reference literature that the next person 
to refute Cartesian views at Turku was the professor of physics as 
well as logic and metaphysics Andreas Thuronius in a thesis published 
in 1665.63 Thuronius is here seen as "formulating the Cartesian prob-
lem" for the academic public at Turku. In my opinion, however, this 
view is somewhat misleading. 
Salminen writes that the three main problems in Cartesianism ac-
cording to Thuronius were methodical doubt, the rejection of the Aris-
totelian theory of substance and heliocentrism.64 Whilst this is true, 
Salminen does not consider the context in which Thuronius advances 
his criticism of Cartesianism. One suspects Salminen of exaggerating 
both Thuronius' talents and the originality of his discussion: "...Thu-
ronius had read Descartes himself. He cites Descartes' ideas in an 
original way and takes only those questions into consideration, which 
were truly relevant for the Finnish practice of theology and philosophy 
especially."65 The same themes were discussed all over Europe and 
62 Lagus 1891, p. 55. 
63 Salminen 1981, p. 93-94. 
64 Salminen 1981, p. 94-94. 
65 Salminen 1981, p. 94. "...Thuronius luki itse Cartesiustaan, referoi hänen ajatuk- 
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there is nothing particularly Finnish in them. In his article published 
two years later Salminen praises Thuronius' account of Cartesianism 
as particularly objective. In Salminen's opinion it is also noteworthy 
that Thuronius rejected Cartesianism on purely philosophical reasons 
(contrary to Laurbecchius' theological argument).66  In the following I 
shall argue that this general interpretation of Thuronius-Sutthoff's the-
sis needs to be corrected. 
The thesis in question considers the nature of physics as a science. 
First of all, the usefulness of the study of physics is argued for, and 
the origins and devotees of the discipline are then surveyed.67 Finally, 
Thuronius gives a profound definition of physics, which according to 
the established practice meant the exposition of the nominal and prac-
tical definitions of "physics", its four causes, etc.68 In the second in-
quisitio Thuronius discusses the origins of physics. Knowledge of na-
ture was innate in Adam when he was created.69 Adam's knowledge 
was perfect, but after the Fall only minor residues of it could be com-
municated to the antediluvian Patriarchs. Through Noah and his sons, 
the Chaldeans, Egyptians and the Greeks physical knowledge finally 
reached Pliny. Since then the knowledge of nature had been subject 
of study for an increasing number of scholars. In addition to these 
ancients there were a good many modern authors in physics. It is in 
dealing with the modern traditions of physical science that Car-
tesianism is called into question.70 
Thuronius classifies "the more recent Physical Authors" (recentiori 
Auctori Physics) into three groups: the disciples of Aristotle, novatori 
and the "surveyors of nature".71 Aristotelians receive severe criticism 
from Thuronius: 
siaan omaleimaisesti ja otti tarkasteltaviksi sellaiset kysymykset, joilla oli nimen-
omaan suomalaisen tieteenhaijoituksen kannalta merkittävä teologis-filosofinen 
relevanssi." 
66 Salminen 1983, p. 60. "Hänen [Thuroniuksen] kartesiolaisuutta koskeva selonte-
konsa oli ajan oloissa harvinaisen objektiivinen ja - mikä merkittävintä - uuden 
filosofian hylkäämisen perustelut olivat yksinomaan filosofiset." 
67 Thuronius-Sutthoff 1665, p. 1-6. By reference to St. Augustine, Seneca, Cicero 
and Ovid it is claimed that man is not set on the Earth only to live there but 
also to admire and study the wonders of nature. Moreover, the study of nature 
leads to acknowledging the majesty of God. 
68 Thuronius-Sutthoff 1665, p. 29-48. 
69 Thuronius-Sutthoff 1665, p. 6-7. "Sapientiam naturalem, eamque exactissimam, 
primo Homini in ipsä creatione ä Deo fuisse inditam, nemo facile negaverit." 
70 Thuronius-Sutthoff 1665, p. 7-29. 
71 Thuronius-Sutthoff 1665, p. 17-18. "Recentiores porro Auctores Physicos triplices 
deprehendimus: Aristotelis sectatores, Novatores & Naturae venatores." 
...they enslaved their minds to Aristotle to the extent that they res-
pected his Physical dogmas as much as they revered the Holy Scrip-
tures in Theology, and they used more time and effort in presenting 
and explaining his texts than investigating the mysteries of nature. 
They put together useless questions, in addition to these long and 
pointless theses, by which the understanding of the students was 
disturbed, and the familiarity with things was in a strange way obs-
cured and hidden.72 
Thus the disciples of Aristotle have considered the authority of 
their master equal to the Bible. They spend their time in pointless 
hair-splitting so that they forget to study the mysteries of nature and 
concentrate on the obscurities of the books instead. Moreover, Thu-
ronius seems to be irritated with the self-confidence of "Aristotle's 
slaves".7 He does not name any of the alleged disciples of Aristotle, 
but claims that "almost all Scholastic Physicists and members of se-
veral other schools" (Physici Scholastici fere omnes, & plerique alij 
sectarij) are such. Thuronius' distrust of Aristotelians is hardly a sign 
of embracing new philosophy of nature, but is probably based on the 
sort of anti-scholastic attitude which had been typical of Lutheranism 
since the Reformation." 
According to Thuronius it is typical of the novatori that they despise 
all true principles of philosophy recognized by the old authors. One 
of the most successful and popular of these innovators was "Renatus 
Des Cartes", whose philosophy had caused quarrels in many places. 
This would not have ha5ppened, Thuronius says, if Descartes had ho-
nestly sought the truth.' Thuronius' refutation of the "monstrous phy-
sical opinions" of Descartes is not so long so that it could not be 
quoted in its entirety here. It shows well how the Aristotelians' reading 
of Descartes' ideas was sometimes rather cursory and occasionally 
removed far from what many Cartesians actually promoted. 
72 Thuronius-Sutthoff 1665, p. 18. "...ita tarnen Aristoteli sua mancipårunt ingenia, 
ut ipsius dogmatibus non minus tribuant in Physica, quam ipsi Scripturw Sacra: 
in Theologia, indeque plus temporis & opera; insumunt, in textibus ejus enarrandis 
& explicandis, quam ipsis naturx mysterijs investigandis. nectuntque qua;stiones 
inutiles, & super ijs prolixas & otiosas disputationes, quibus ingenia discentium 
turbantur, rerumque ipsarum cognitio mirum in modum obscuratur & involvitur." 
73 Thuronius-Sutthoff 1665, p. 19. "...ipsum denique nihil ignorasse & in nullo er- 
rasse clamitant." 
74 On this anti-scholaticism see Kusukawa 1990. 
75 Thuronius-Sutthoff 1665, p. 20-21. 
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Descartes stated that: all things must be doubted at least once, and 
everything which is acquired through the senses is to be held false. 
The prime principle from which the truth of all things can and 
should be deduced is this: I (Descartes) think, therefore I am. There 
are neither substantial forms nor real qualities. The essence of cor-
poreal substances consists of extension into length, width and depth. 
The world has no limits to its extension. The matter of the heavens 
is not different from the matter of which the earth consists: therefore 
only one kind of matter in the entire universe exists. The Earth is 
one of the Planets and the Moon, when it is new, is illuminated by 
the Earth. The Sun is a fixed star. The Sun obtains new matter 
every day for its substance and loses it. There are three visible 
elements in this world (created by Cartesius and lacking names), 
and of these three all bodies are composed. The Sun and the stars 
consist of the first element, the heaven of the second, the Earth, 
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planets and Comets of the third element. The Earth can better be 
said to be light than heavy. Light, colours, odours, savours and 
tactile qualities are nothing else but certain kinds of dispositions, 
consisting of magnitude, figure and motion.76 
Despite some standard misunderstandings of Cartesianism (such as 
the infinite as against indefinite size of the world) Thuronius' desc-
ription is accurate, managing to summarize the main features of Car-
tesianism. However, it is a simplified presentation of the philosophy, 
which hardly can be called altogether objective. The absurdity of these 
ideas is made manifest byits being in the conditional mode. Unless 
the passage really was composed by Thuronius himself, the text could 
76 Thuronius-Sutthoff 1665, p. 21-22. "Statuit autem Cartesius: de omnibus rebus 
semel ad minimum dubitandum, & quaecunque sensibus hauriuntur pro falsis 
habenda esse. Primum principium unde omnium rerum veritas deduci debet & 
potest hoc esse: Ego (Cartesius) cogito, ergo sum. Formas substantiales & qua-
litates reales nullas dari. Extensionem in longum, latum & profundum substantiv 
corporea naturam constituere. Mundum nullos extensionis sux fines habere. Non 
aliam esse materiam coeli quam terra: imö materiam in toto universo unam & 
eandem existere. Terram esse unum e Planetis, Lunam, cum nova est, å terra 
illuminari. Solem esse stellam fixam. Solem quotidie novam materiam substantix 
suze assumere & deperdere. Tria esse hujus mundi aspectabilis elementa (apud 
Cartesium pata & nominibus carentia) & ex his tribus omnia corpora componi: 
nempe solem & stellas fixas ex primo, coelos ex secundo, & terram cum planetis 
& Cometis ex tertio. Terram non gravem, sed potius levern dicendam esse. Lumen, 
colorem, odorem, saporem & tactiles qualitates nihil aliud esse, quam disposi-
tioner quosdam in magnitudine, figura & motu consistentes." 
have been compiled from almost anywhere: from Descartes' followers 
texts, or even from some anti-Cartesian text. We do not know whether 
any of Descartes' books were available at Turku in the middle of the 
1660's. However, in the 1682 library catalogue Meditationes de Prima 
Philosophia is mentioned." Thuronius simply states that Cartesian 
principles are wrong, and he hopes to be able to examine the subject 
more closely in some later thesis.78 
It is by no means only Cartesianism which is rejected by Thuronius. 
A Hungarian scholar, Johannes Bajerus and Francis Bacon are explo-
ded as much as Sperling and Sennert are praised. The list of Bacon's 
sins is a long one: 
He makes physics a practical discipline, or confuses it with manual 
arts which are derived from physics. This is against Sennert and 
Sperling. He [Bacon] presupposes natural bodies to have strange 
principles, this with Comenius and against Sennert and Sperling. 
Against Sennert and Sperling he presumes all natural bodies to be 
living, and against Sennert and Sperling he expresses new notions 
and concepts and new terms never heard of, and mixes up a new 
method and a mode of teaching with all this. He wants the subs-
tantial form to be nothing other than a coordination and disposition 
of corpuscles, as if in other aggregates. This is also against Sennert 
and Sperling.79 
The gravest mistakes made by Bacon seem to have been introducing 
new ideas into philosophy and contradicting Sennert and Sperling, the 
authorities revered at Turku. Of course, these accusations would be 
appropriate to the other "innovators" too, including Descartes. On the 
whole this criticism is, however, directed against Bacon. 
77 BRAA 1682. 
78 Thuronius-Sutthoff 1665, p. 22. "Quas veritates (ut ipse appellat) & plures alias, 
soli cogitationi Cartesianx fictisque hypothesibus & conjecturis superstructas, suo 
tempore, bono cum Deo, pro re natå examinabimus, nec veritates eas, sed vanitates 
& meras imposturas esse sigillatim ostendemus." 
79 Thuronius-Sutthoff 1665, p. 25. "Physicam disciplinam facit practicam, auf illam 
cum artibus ex ea fluentibus confundit, contra Sennertum & Sperlingium: pere-
grina ponit corporum naturalium principia cum Comenio, contra Sehnert. & Sperl: 
vitam omnibus corporibus tribuit, contra Senn.& Sperl: novas & inauditas cudit 
notiones, novos terminos, novam docendi comminiscitur methodum modumque, 
contra Senn. & Sperl. Formam substantialem nihil aliud esse, quam, velut in 
aggregatis alijs, coordinationem & dispositionem partium, contra Senn. & Sper-
lingium..." 
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Having rejected the Aristotelians and the Novatori Thuronius pro-
ceeds to define the right way to study nature. The Naturae Venatori 
do not commit themselves to Aristotle's name, but follow him as a 
guide in natural philosophical inquiry. The opinions of classical aut-
hors are respected, and if they are not harmonious with the Book of 
Nature, they are discreetly passed over.80 The need to find the happy 
mean was also mentioned by the Wittenbergian logician Johannes 
Scharfius, although his classification of the two extremes differed from 
that of Thuronius.81 According to Thuronius a venator naturae pro-
ceeds without "unnecessary" hair-splitting and subtleties. Hence, Thu-
ronius' description of the right way of scrutinizing nature is in line 
with the 1645 edict which prohibited introducing any new ideas into 
philosophy. No matter how badly Bacon is told off by Thuronius, the 
program for the proper use of philosophy he offers is such as it would 
meet Bacon's approval. 
...having abandoned all pointless subtilities of disputations they 
spend all their efforts in turning and opening the pages of the great 
book of nature. And they bring to light many secrets of nature with 
care, they use trustworthy experiments and the truths of things 
which follow are not at all conjectural or hypothetical.82 
In Thuronius' opinion this kind of research has best been done by 
the "leader of the nature's surveyors", Iulius Caesar Scaliger.83 
All in all, Thuronius' criticism of Cartesianism is only a passing 
remark in the thesis, covering only a good two pages of a 48-page 
80 Thuronius-Sutthoff 1665, p. 26-27. "...termins & notions veterum, quatenus 
quidem absque veritatis dispendio usurpari possunt, retinent, sententias quoque 
eorum ad veritatis trutinam appendunt, & cum magno Naturae libro conferunt: 
cui si conformes deprehendantur, eas cum grata Auctorum commemoratione sus-
cipiunt; sin minus, modesto, cum excusatione illorum, praetereunt." 
81 Scharfius 1646, p. 6. "...libere quidem veritati studet, & res ipsas scrutatur, prout 
in se sunt, aliorum tarnen autorum dogmata & dicta simpliciter non rejicit, potius 
omnia probat, &, quae vera bonave sunt, eligit, amplectitur, & constanter retinet." 
Scharfius groups philosophers into libera, sectaria and mediae, whereof the first 
and revolutionary ones were not necessarily modem authors. 
82 
	
	 Thuronius-Sutthoff 1665, p. 27. "...missa disputandi subtilitate inutili, omnem ope- 
ram volvendis ac revolvendis magni naturae libri paginis impendant, multa naturae 
arcana sensim in lucem proferunt, suffultique haud fallacibus experimentis, veri-
tatem circa res adsequuntur minimö conjecturalem aut hypotheticam." 
83 Thuronius-Sutthoff 1665, p. 27. Thuronius has Scaliger's Exotericae exercita-
tiones (1557) in mind. 
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work. Aristotelianism, Cartesianism and Baconianism are all attacked 
to as contradictory to the proper way of studying physics. The atten-
tion paid to Cartesianism in this thesis should therefore be placed in 
its proper context and its importance should be neither exaggerated 
nor undervalued. 
In the 1660's and 1670's the opposition to Cartesianism was for 
the most part provided by the theologians. It was especially methodical 
doubt and some other problems connected with theology which were 
discussed. For example, the claim which was allegedly made by Petrus 
Hoffwenius at Uppsala that the corpuscular "spirits" in blood turn the 
man's mind towards God was refuted.84 However, from the beginning 
of the 1680's on the Faculty of Theology quickly started to close itself 
off from philosophical discussions. It was a normal viewpoint in 17th-
century science that theological problems should not be discussed in 
philosophy - not even in the framework of Aristotelian philosophy. 
Whereas theology was omniscient, philosophy could produce only a 
limited amount of truth. The first professor of theology especially, 
Enevaldus Svenonius, had from the 1660's on encouraged the view 
that the Faculty of Philosophy ought to be some sort of vanguard of 
orthodox theology. Philosophers were supposed to defeat Cartesianism 
on their own ground before it strengthened sufficiently to threaten the 
true religion. Therefore it was considered proper to discuss problems 
related to theology even in philosophical disputations, but only if the 
views expressed supported the orthodox Lutheranism.85 
The fear of Cartesianism the theologians felt was with no doubt 
inspired by the course of events at Uppsala. It is more doubtful, how-
ever, how much the individual events at Uppsala influenced Turku. 
It has been claimed, for example, that Flachsenius' and Grimsteen's 
thesis on the astronomical hypotheses would have been directed 
against Hoffwenius' Synopsis physica, published a year earlier.86 It is 
hard to find support for this interpretation, because Grimsteen's thesis 
shows no special interest in opposing the Cartesian version of the 
heliocentric theory. In one chapter of the thesis Lipstorp is cited fre-
quently87, but I regard this as rather natural because Grimsteen here 
follows Laurbecchius' thesis very closely. Laurbecchius' work against 
84 Salminen 1981, p. 95-97. Gezelius 1672, p. 362-364. 
85 Salminen 1981, p. 98-99. Salminen 1978, p. 268-269, 411. 
86 Salminen 1981, p. 99. 
87 Flachsenius-Grimsteen 1679, Membr. III, Th. 10. 
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Lipstorp was, after all, one of the most profound studies at Turku in 
which Copemicanism was refuted. Referring to the "strange" Cartesian 
principles involved in the heliocentric theory was an effective way to 
refute both of them. Why does Grimsteen not use this powerful ar-
gument as Laurbecchius had done, if the thesis really was inspired by 
Hoffwenius' Synopsis physica? Looking for possible "influences" be-
tween two series of events is always a tricky business, and we should 
be careful when making claims about it. A mere coincidence is not 
enough, and we must also consider the actual contents of each thesis 
and the context in which the arguments belong. 
The theologians' demands for opposition to Cartesianism were un-
doubtedly known in the Faculty of Philosophy. The task set for the 
Faculty by Svenonius was taken seriously especially by those scholars 
who either for personal reasons or because of the nature of their dis-
cipline were close to theology.88 In physics, however, the problem of 
300 	 Cartesianism was tackled only from the 1680's on. 
3. THE 1680'S: SHARPENING 
CRITICS AND THE FIRST 
PROPONENTS 
Juhana Cajanus and His Never-Achieved 
Professorship 
Whereas the 1670's had been a quiet time as regards Cartesianism, 
the new decade began with an incident which more or less had to do 
with the new philosophy. The case of Juhana Cajanus can be seen 
from several different viewpoints. In a way, it probably was a cons-
cious attempt to keep Cartesian influences away from the University, 
but other reasons for the rejection of Cajanus' applications for a pro-
fessorship at Turku can be pointed out. These other reasons may ac-
tually be so forceful that the suspicions of Cajanus' Cartesianism turn 
88 Salminen 1981, p. 99-100. 
out to be more excuses than reasons. 
Juhana Cajanus (1655-1681) was the eldest son of the pastor of 
Paltamo in the North of Finland. Juhana Cajanus Sr. was a particularly 
active pastor considering the very distant location of his congregation. 
He even represented the clergy at the Diet of 1672. It is therefore no 
wonder that he sent his eldest son to study at the University of Upp-
sala. Cajanus Jr. seems to have been a clear-headed and industrious 
student, and he managed to gain the approbation of influential pat-
rons.
89 
In August 1680 Juhana Cajanus applied for a professorship at the 
University of Turku. His application was supported by letters of re-
commendation from His Majesty King Charles XI and the revered old 
Chancellor Per Brahe. Cajanus' application was not aimed at any par-
ticular professorship, but at a so-called expectancy. Whenever a pro-
fessorship became vacant at the philosophical faculty, Cajanus would 
be appointed. Despite his great references Cajanus' career ran into 
difficulties. The professor of poetry, Petrus Laurbecchius, resisted the 
application at the Senate of the University. He claimed to have talked 
with Cajanus, and although he indeed praised him as a hard-working 
man, Cajanus was according to him "addicted to the principles of 
Cartesian philosophy".90 After a lengthy discussion Cajanus' applica-
tion was passed over and the expectancy was given to the secretary 
of the University, Andreas Wanochius. 
What reasons did Laurbecchius have to suspect Cajanus of Car-
tesianism? Laurbecchius claims to have talked with Cajanus, but we 
do not know how well he actually knew a man not resident in Turku. 
It is certain, however, that Laurbecchius was well aware of the main 
features of Cartesian philosophy; nineteen years earlier he had written 
a profound thesis refuting Cartesian astronomical ideas. Cajanus' re-
putation as a Cartesian was based on his wide-ranging two-part thesis 
Meletematum In Mundi Animam, published in 1679. Salminen has 
described Cajanus' sincere intention to sail between the Scylla of the 
Cartesian universe and the Charybdis of Aristotelianism. Cajanus res-
pects Descartes highly, but he takes a scornful stand against the Car-
tesian and Calvinist theologian Christopher Wittich.91 Salminen does 
89 Svensk Biografiskt Lexicon 1927, p. 207-208. The first great biographical lexi-
cons published in Sweden (1837 and 1858-59) do not mention Cajanus. 
90 CAAP V, 30.8.1680, § 5. 
91 Salminen 1983, p. 61-62. 
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not probe further into how closely Cajanus' rhetoric mirrors what he 
actually writes. 
The first thing to separate Cajanus from the Scholastic tradition is 
his method and style of writing. In neither part of De anima mundi 
does the argumentation follow Aristotelian patterns, in which the con-
cepts form and matter, the four causes and the categories of being 
usually played a major role. In the first part of the thesis Cajanus first 
describes different ideas about the world-soul, discussing ancient and 
Scholastic proponents of the idea, and assessing the correctness of 
other authors' interpretations of these views. He classifies the pro-
ponents of the idea of a world-soul into four major groups. Firstly, 
there are those who consider world-soul to be pure mind,9' secondly, 
there are those who think that anima mundi is something between 
mind and matter.93 Thirdly, there are authors who equate world-soul 
with the divine,94 and fourthly there are philosophers who regard the 
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world-soul as consisting of pure fine matter.95 Descartes, whom Ca- 
janus sees as copying Sebastian Basso's ideas, is only one of these. 
He also refers approvingly (!) to Christopher Wittich and seems to 
agree with him that the idea of world-soul can be accepted in the 
sense of subtle, all-pervading matter which is the cause of many na-
tural events.96 The second major chapter of De anima mundi I seeks 
causes by which the variety and particularly the falsity of these ideas 
can be explained.97 Cajanus seems by no means to promote either 
Cartesianism or the existence of world-soul in the first part of the 
thesis. 
The tone in the second part of De anima mundi is strikingly dif-
ferent. Cajanus' argument is now clearly and elegantly Cartesian. He 
proceeds from the claim that God is the only entity which can exist 
with the sole power of its own perfection.98 He is careful not to pro- 
92 Steuchius-Cajanus 1679, Cap. I, § IV-IX. 
93 Steuchius-Cajanus 1679, Cap. I, § X-IXX. These are classified into two sub-
groups; those who regard world-soul as partly mind, partly matter and those who 
do think it to be either of these, but of a third, intermediate nature. 
94 Steuchius-Cajanus 1679, Cap. I, § XX-XXIV. 
95 Steuchius-Cajanus 1679, Cap. I, § XXV-XXXII. 
96 Steuchius-Cajanus 1679, Cap. I, § XXXII. 
97 Steuchius-Cajanus 1679, Cap. II. 
98 Arrhenius-Cajanus 1679, Cap. III, § VI. "Solus Deus existit vi natura & perfec-
tionum suarum, qua tants ac tam plena sunt, ut earum, adeoque & Dei, existentia 
non aliunde sit arcessenda." This follows Descartes' definition of a substance. 
Only God can be a substance in the perfect sense of the definition, since both 
claim dualism aloud, but stresses repeatedly that mind and matter are 
very tightly connected to each other.99 Can we presume that in saying 
this Cajanus also indirectly presupposes the validity of Cartesian dua-
lism? An Aristotelian would certainly refer to the metaphysical rela-
tion between the concepts of form and matter, which Cajanus does 
not do. Now all these created entities (Cajanus does not use the word 
substance) are dependent on God in two ways: He has not only created 
them, but also maintains them continuously in existence. Besides mere 
existence, things are dependent on God in all of their actions: 
The conservative act of God is not enough for moving and agitating 
natural bodies, which remain in their state of being. Another act of 
God is required, without which the bodies could neither move nor 
function in any other way.'°°  
Normally the effective cause of motion would be attributed to form 
in Scandinavian scholastic philosophy. Emphasizing God's role as the 
mover in ordinary physical processes was much more common in Des-
cartes' thought and among the British Protestant physicists.101 Cajanus 
states that God produces motion in the world by his mere will. He 
describes the two theories of how God could be understood as the 
prime mover. According to the "peripatetic" interpretation God gives 
natural bodies some capacity to move by themselves. The Cartesian 
view was that natural bodies were not able to move by themselves, 
but God was the actual cause of all movement. Cajanus humbly denies 
being able to solve such problems as determining the correct view 
and he complains about the difficulty of choosing between two unsa-
tisfactory explanations.102 The problem of whether material bodies had 
a principle of motion in themselves or whether they were moved en-
tirely by an external agent, is very much a theological question for 
Cajanus: 
mind and matter are dependent on God. 
99 Arrhenius-Cajanus 1679, Cap. III, § III, et passim. 
100 Arrhenius-Cajanus 1679, Cap. III, § XIV. "Scilicet ut moveantur & agant res 
naturales, non sufficit actum Dei conservativum, quo in esse suo permanent, sed 
requiritur pra;terea actus Dei alius, sine quo nec moveri, nec vel tantillum operari 
possunt." 
t 01 Garber 1992, p. 303-322. Deason 1986. 
102 Arrhenius-Cajanus 1679, Cap. III, § XXI, XXIV. 
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When Descartes called God an assistant soul (because he addressed 
no motion at all to corporal bodies themselves) ...he meant it as 
appropriate as no other way can be. Now when we say with the 
Peripatetics that natural bodies move themselves with God, the no-
mination of assistant soul is nevertheless equally suitable for Him 
in that case too.'o3 
Without giving a definite answer on the question Caj anus proves, 
however, that God is the primum movens in the sense that all move-
ment ultimately depends on him as the Creator. Cajanus then proceeds 
to prove his main argument that God is anima mundi assistens. Ca-
janus' argument is very complicated and we cannot go into details 
here. In order to prove his point Cajanus draws upon more Aristotelian 
ways of defining concepts. He claims that an assisting form would 
not define the essence of an entity like the substantial form does. The 
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assistant form is, however, present all the time and is a source of 
actions. 104 
An assistant form... does not unite with this or that matter essen-
tially, but only externally or, in other words it confers motion on 
it, or it directs its motion or, as is peculiar to God only, maintains 
its substantial being. If the aforementioned definition is referred to 
God in this sense, everything goes together exactly.105 
Because God is omnipresent, maintaining the cosmos continuously 
and being the primary cause of all motion and other operations in the 
world, the definition of an assistant form suits him. On the other hand 
God can even more appropriately be called anima mundi adsistens, 
because a spiritual God can exist voluntarily without the material 
103 Arrhenius-Cajanus 1679, Cap. III, § XXI. "Equidem Cartesius, dum corporibus 
ipsis in motione sui partes nullas tribuit, Deo animae adsistentis vocabulum ...ita 
appropriat, ut ratione nulla appropriari possit magis: Sed annon, si cum Peripa-
teticis corpora naturalia cum Deo se movere dicamus, in Deus nihilominus ut 
formae ita animae adsistentis appellatio quadrabit?" 
104 Arrhenius-Cajanus 1679, Cap. III, § XXVII. 
105 Arrhenius-Cajanus 1679, Cap. III, § XXVII. "Forma adsistens... ipso ipsiusve 
materia essentialiter non coha'reat, verum solummodo extrinsecus vel motum con-
ferat, vel actionem dirigat, vel, quod solius Dei est, ipsum tö esse potenter sus-
tentet. Quo sensu si ad Deum referatur definitio modo exhibita, conveniunt exacte 
omnia." 
world he has created.106 All in all it is Cajanus' aim to consider in 
which way the material world is dependent on God the creator and 
how this can be expressed in Cartesian and Aristotelian terminology. 
His discussion therefore has a very theological character. 
The scholars at Turku would hardly have accepted Cajanus' ra-
tiocination. First of all the concept forma adsistens was not generally 
in use and it is doubtful whether it would have been approved of. 
Secondly, the main point of Cajanus' thesis was theologically more 
than suspicious. The idea of a world-soul was plainly refuted in some 
dissertations written at Turku.107 Whereas Cajanus tried to prove that 
all action in the world was at some point ultimately dependent on an 
external actor, God, the view favoured at Turku was explicitly the 
opposite. 
...there is no discernible action in the world which would have its 
origin in a soul common to the entire universe. But all operations 
are caused by peculiar and distinct forms. Since every part of the 
universe has a peculiar form of its own, there is no need for a 
common form to connect them, even though the individual forms 
could still exert their actions in it.108 
The existence of any kind of uniting form or soul was usually re-
futed because it was thought to lead to severe metaphysical difficul-
ties. Accepting this view was also thought to be an easy way to pant-
heism, and should therefore be banned. Of course, Cajanus' argument 
for the anima mundi was based on a different notion, and he also 
refuted the classical proponents of the idea.109 Probably no less unac-
ceptable for the scholars at Turku was the way Cajanus combined 
106 Arrhenius-Cajanus 1679, Cap. III, § XXXII-XXXIV'. 
107 Thauvonius-Forsenius 1650, Corollaria 2. "An detur Anima mundi, vel Spiritus 
universi creatus? Neg." Thauvonius-Miltopaeus 1653, Porismata I. "Coelum non 
est animatum, sive coeli forma non est anima." Thauvonius-Lilius 1656, Th. 7-11. 
Cf. also Gezelius 1672, p. 242. "Forma mundi est unicus ille mirabilis & perfec-
tissimus ordo, quo res ille inter se connexae & sapientissime inter se collatae 
sunt & distinctae." 
108 Thauvonius-Lilius 1656, Th. 9. "...nulla conspicua in mundo apparet actio, quae 
proficiscatur ä communi totius universi animä: Sed omnes operationes peculiari-
bus ac distinctis formis debentur. Quare cum omnibus universi partibus peculiaris 
forma insit aliqua communis eas connectens non requiritur, quippe quod in eä 
singulae formae operationes suas exsequi possint." 
109 Arrhenius-Cajanus 1679, Cap. III, § IV. 
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somewhat Cartesian arguments and theories of motion with Copemi-
canism and the idea of world-soul, all based on theological rea- 
soning.  uo 
It seems that from the viewpoint of the professors at Turku Cajanus 
was even more dangerous than they knew or said. It is unlikely that 
Cajanus' theses were known at Turku, because in that case the oppo-
sition to his dogmatic views would probably have been still stronger 
than it was. Mere rumors of the applicant being Cartesian-minded was 
enough to scare the philosophers at Turku. 
But what had the reception of Cajanus' thesis at the University of 
Uppsala been like in the first place? It did indeed cause some stir and 
it seems that the professor of metaphysics, Matthias Steuchius, rather 
disliked it. Steuchius did not himself support Cartesian ideas. Lindborg 
thinks it probable that Steuchius had not had time to read Cajanus' 
thesis beforehand or had not bothered to do so, thus permitting ideas 
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which he did not approve of. When the second part of De anima 
mundi was about to be ventilated, Steuchius opposed the publication. 
It is revealing that the matter was handled in the Council of the Faculty 
of Theology three times from November 1679 to June 1680.1 " In the 
protocols of the University Senate Cajanus was mentioned only once, 
on the 30th April 1679, when he was given an imprimatur."' 
It seems thus that the fuss about Cajanus' thesis remained relatively 
minor and was limited to theological circles. It has been suggested 
that it probably was the Cajanus case which six years later inspired 
the proposition made by the clergy that the maximum length of phi-
losophical dissertations should be four pages. Even the busiest pro-
fessors would then have time to censor the writings thoroughly.113 
no Arrhenius-Cajanus 1679, Cap. III, § VI, XV, XVI, et passim. Cajanus uses theo-
logical argument in several ways and on many levels. It is not, however, within 
the scope of this study to deal with the subject more deeply. Just as Salminen 
1983, p. 61 claims, Cajanus disapproves of the theologian Christopher Wittich. 
This is understandable not only because Wittich was Cartesian, but especially 
because he was a Calvinist. 
111 Lindborg 1965, p. 234. Lindborg calls part one of Cajanus' thesis one of the 
most beautiful Cartesian theses ever published at Uppsala. Lindborg's reasoning 
here is somewhat obscure, because he does not refer to the contents of the thesis 
at all, and seems not to know the really Cartesian part of De mundi anima, 
published in the presidium of Arrhenius. 
112 Selander 1974, p. 312. "30. Aprilis 1679....IV Bewilliades Johanni Cajano att 
disputera de anima mundi." 
113 Lindborg 1965, p. 234. 
It is probable that the main reason for rejecting Cajanus for the 
professorship was not his Cartesianism after all.' 14 Obviously the con-
tents of his Cartesian thesis was not even known at Turku. At the 
meeting of the Senate on the 30th August 1680 Cajanus' application 
for a professorship had been rejected and the secretary of the Faculty 
of Arts had been given an expectancy. At the beginning of 1680 the 
professorship of history and politics became vacant. The meeting of 
the Senate on the 21st of January 1680 considered Abraham Wa-
nochius the best applicant for the professorship. The Constitutions of 
the University decreed, however, that in the election of a professor 
there should be more than one candidate. In this situation, the appli-
cation of Cajanus "was remembered", because the King's references 
"could not totally be ignored".115 
The situation was obviously very painful. Everybody agreed that 
Cajanus should be taken into account in some way, but nobody seems 
to have wanted to appoint him professor. Cajanus' possible Car-
tesianism was not used as an argument against him, although some 
suspicions about his philosophical preferences may have existed. The 
only criticism was expressed by the professor of theology Enevaldus 
Svenonius, who stated that "none of us knows Cajanus and whether 
he is good or bad. And he has not studied enough either."16 There 
were more reasons which spoke for Wanochius. In addition to his 
academic merits (disputations, lecturing) his present office as Secre-
tary made him "automatically" professor according to the constitu-
tional rules which regulated advancement. Besides - it was mentioned 
twice - Wanochius was about to marry the daughter of Svenonius, the 
influential prime professor of theology."" The King actually appointed 
Wanochius, placed at the head of the list of nominees, professor of 
history and politics. Cajanus was given an expectancy for the profes-
sorship of physics, which was to become vacant soon.118 He never 
became professor, however, because he died by 1681. 
It is evident that the professors at Turku preferred to nominate their 
own students to important posts. Dogmatic divergences could be in- 
114 Some older research especially claims the opposite. See e.g. Hultin 1902, p. 113-
114. 
115 CAAP V, p. 129. 
116 CAAP V, p. 131. "ingen af oss känner Cajanum om han är ond eller godh, har 
icke heller studerat." 
117 CAAP V, p. 130-131. 
118 CAAP V, p. 131, 135-136. 
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tertwined with the question, and they usually were good weapons to 
beat opponents with. However, in the case of Cajanus his dogmatic 
deviations were not brought to light in any detailed and emphatic 
manner. Considering the weirdness of Cajanus' views both in religion 
and in physics it is striking that his beliefs were not used against him. 
The most probable explanation is that his views were not known well 
enough at Turku. There may also be a good deal of truth in the prickly 
comment made by professor Laurbecchius in the meeting of the 21st 
January, that it seemed that the Finns wanted to displace all Swedes 
from the University.19 All other professors naturally denied having 
any such intentions; those with a guilty conscience easily take offence. 
Be that as it may, the nepotism of the age played an important role 
in this nomination. 
Criticism of the Cartesian Concept of Substance 
During the 1680's the criticism aimed at Cartesianism by the scholars 
of natural philosophy concentrated mainly on one theme - the concept 
of substance. The new philosophy was seen through very Aristotelian 
spectacles and all judgements made on it were based on the Aristo-
telian metaphysical principles. Of course, the falsity of Cartesian phi-
losophy was evident already by the notion that it was regarded as 
contradicting the Holy Scriptures and "all other recognized authori-
ties".120 
First of all the mere definition of physics in the Aristotelian tradi-
tion made Cartesian philosophy incompatible with it. According to 
the often-repeated formula "Physics is a science of natural bodies, as 
far as they are natural."121 Physics was also knowledge of the universal 
characteristics of individuals of a certain class or group. The proper 
subject of study, corpus naturalis, was any entity consisting of matter 
and form. Only then could substances be considered to be quatenus 
naturale. For Cartesians, who rejected the notions of matter and form 
in the Aristotelian sense, the whole project of physics was something 
different. It was supposed to discover the causes of phenomena by 
constructing a mechanical model which would employ only such con- 
119 CAAP V, p. 129. 
120 Hahn-Håf 1685, p. 3-4. 
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	 See e.g. Thuronius-Sutthoff 1665, p. 29. "Physica est scientia corporis naturalis, 
quatenus naturale est." 
cepts as extension and motion,'22 so that the incommensurability of 
these two philosophical systems started from the very concept of 
science. The question of what natural philosophy or physics ought to 
be like was not taken up explicitly in discussions at Turku. However, 
this question undoubtedly lies in the background of the discrepancies 
between the two philosophies. 
Descartes was accused of rejecting the notion of substantial forms 
and of defending the view that all forms were accidental. In this Des-
cartes was said to have revived the dogmas of classical atomists De-
mocritus and Empedocles. The Aristotelians thought it absurd to gua-
rantee matter an ability to form a substance, because in that case mat-
ter would hold a more noble position than the form.'23 In Aristotelian 
philosophy the ontological categories were placed in a hierarchical 
order. Because a substance was superior to its accidents, no accident 
could be a cause of a substance. Therefore, neither quantity nor ex-
tension could be the cause of a material substance. Of course, Des-
cartes never claimed that extension was the efficient cause of the ma-
terial substance, stating rather that it was its only property. It was also 
evident for Aristotelians that one accident could not dominate a subs-
tance and determine its nature. For this reason it was also claimed to 
be impossible that extension could be the sole property of matter.174 
The Cartesian views of a substance were thus labelled as a confusion 
between the categories of substance and accidence. t75  
Antonius Le Grand's argument that quantity was a property which 
could by no means be separated from the material substance was re-
futed too. The claim was considered blasphemy, because it belittled 
the power of God, who could preserve a body even if its extension 
was abolished.176 Theological arguments were also otherwise widely 
used against Cartesianism. Bolhemius, for example, wanted to main-
tain the real distinction between the substance and the accidence for 
the following reason: if there was no difference between these cate-
gories, then sin would be a part of man's nature and not only one of 
122 Clarke 1992. 
123 Flachsenius-Lund 1681, Art. II Th. VI, Art. IV Th. I-II. Hahn-Håf 1685, p. 2. 
124 Hahn-Bolhemius 1688, p. 2-8. 
125 Hahn-Bolhemius 1688, p. 10. "Dicimus confundere ipsum notionem substantim 
cum notione Accidentis, & statuere: substantiam & Accidens esse unum & idem, 
quod nunquam a novis concessum est, nec potest evinci." 
126 Hahn-Bolhemius 1688, p. 11. "Qvemadmodum sublatå qvantitate, non statim in-
tent corpus, qvia Deus illud absque aliquå Extensione conservare potest." 
309 
his characteristics. If man was sinful by nature, this would mean that 
God had created something depraved, which was against His nature 
and the word of the Bible.127 
Cartesian mechanistic philosophy denied the existence of soul-subs-
tance in animals. All vital functions were explained by purely 
mechanistic principles. In the 1680's, students at Turku interpreted 
this view in a way which Descartes would hardly have agreed with. 
It was claimed that according to Descartes motion was the main cause 
of life. This would lead to animism: "Now if Motion were the cause 
of Life, and I shoot an arrow with a bow, the faster the arrow flies 
the more I should assume it to be alive."128 
Of course it was not Descartes' intention to attribute life to all 
moving things. Nevertheless, his idea was interpreted in this way, and 
the view thus achieved was considered contrary to the Bible. More-
over, it was thought to be the form's task to provide a substance with 
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its typical functions. Mere figure, movement, magnitude and place 
were inadequate properties for differentiating between things. This 
caused certain problems: "in what way, on what criteria do the Car-
tesians think they can distinguish an eagle from a bull and a sparrow 
from a stag."129 The other side of this question was that if all matter 
was homogenous, how was it possible that all motions and processes 
were not identical.130 Other characteristics of matter were also thought 
to be unacceptable in Cartesianism. Bolhemius attacked Le Grand's 
notion that all extended matter could be infinitely divided. In mathe-
matics the notion of infinity was perfectly acceptable. According to 
Bolhemius Le Grand falsely introduced a mathematical concept into 
physics, where there were both the upper and lower limits of size in 
divisibility.131 
127 Hahn-Bolhemius 1688, p. 20. 
128 Flachsenius-Lund 1681, Art. IV Th. II(-III). "Nam si Vitam Motus efficit, emis- 
sam de arcu sagittam, quae citatissimo fertur cursu, etiam maxime vivere assere- 
rem." 
129 	 Hahn-Håf 1685, p. 10, 25. "...qua ratione, quove modo aqvilam a bove, passerem 
ab alce discernere velint Carthesiani." See also Flachsenius-Lund 1681, Art. IV 
Th. IV. 
130 Halm-Hzf 1685, p. 25. "Nam eadem anima seu forma si omnibus inesset anima- 
libus, ut illi volunt, cur non easdem virtutes, motus, inclinationes, vires & ope-
rationes causat, atque univocå plane ratione producit $que in hujus ac illius spe-
ciei individuis?" Flachsenius-Lund 1681, Art. IV Th. IV. 
131 	 Hahn-Bolhemius 1688, p. 11-13. "Dicimus... Ant. Le Grand... introducere etiam 
in Physicam principia sua Mathematica". 
Occasionally other features of the Cartesian philosophy were criti-
cised during the 1680's. For example, Flachsenius and Lund opposed 
the theory of clear and distinct ideas as a guarantee for certain know-
ledge. On the one hand, mere clear and distinct perception of an idea 
would not guarantee that our idea still was right. On the other hand, 
a clear and distinct idea was equated with a simple idea. It could be 
further asked why simplicity would be a better criterion for truth than 
complexity? 132  
Similar arguments to those advanced for the defence of substantial 
forms had been argued at the University of Uppsala from the 1660's 
on. A thesis written by the professor of Greek Martin Brunnerus in 
1664 became a standard model for the arguments favouring substantial 
forms.133  The arguments would thus have had about two decades to 
travel over the Gulf of Bothnia from Uppsala to Turku and so they 
probably did, although no Swedish authors were specially referred to. 
This kind of argument was so to speak common property between 
most Aristotelians and circulated widely in the literature. Now is there 
something in the developments at Uppsala in the 1680's specifically 
which would have launched the defence of substantial forms at Turku? 
It is true that Cartesianism had strengthened its foothold at Uppsala 
at the end of the 1670's and the beginning of the 1680's. Theses 
defending the Cartesian concept of substance were published there. 
We can suppose that this development might have been watched with 
concern at Turku and in this way a need for something like preventive 
criticism against the spreading of these dogmas at Turku might have 
arisen. On the other hand we are now talking about only three theses 
from the 1680's. There is nothing in them which would indicate that 
they were aimed against some specific thesis or a particular incident 
at Uppsala.'34 
All in all, the picture offered of Cartesianism was seldom fair to 
the new philosophy. The scholastics' objections were based on the 
presupposition that Aristotelian metaphysics was the only correct sys-
tem to be relied on. Any explanation which failed to employ the con- 
132 Flachsenius-Lund 1681, Art. IV Th. V. 
133 Lindborg 1965, p. 97-115, et passim. 
134 Once again it has to be said that no Uppsala theses or authors were mentioned. 
On the other hand Hahn-Håf's thesis in 1685 was printed six months before Johan 
Bilberg's thesis promoting dualism was published. Lindborg 1965, p. 192, et 
passim. 
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cepts of matter and form in an adequately acceptable way was doomed 
as absurd. When the Aristotelians rejected Cartesianism, they actually 
opposed Aristotelian-coloured interpretations of the Cartesian theories. 
This kind of discussion would necessarily lead to an irreconcilable 
controversy, because there was no mutually agreed way of reasoning. 
These philosophies spoke two different languages and it was therefore 
easy to categorize the language of the alternative system as absurd 
and incomprehensible. Moreover, it was typical of the dissertations to 
present a very fragmentary picture of the philosophy under attack.135 
The First Proponents of Cartesianism: the Case of 
Physiology 
By now it should be rather clear that although there were no real 
disputes caused directly by the Cartesian philosophy at the University 
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	 of Turku at this time, some Cartesian ideas were nevertheless stre- 
nuously resisted. However, Cartesian ideas were not always discussed 
in a negative tone. The 1680's saw the first theses at Turku in which 
Cartesianism was favoured. In this subsection we shall survey those 
theses published in physics which either supported Cartesian ideas or 
at least adopted a neutral attitude towards them. 
The first conspicuous appearance of Cartesian ideas at Turku was 
in Achrelius' natural philosophical textbook Contemplationes mundi. 
There is a persistent rumour that the incident which followed the pub-
lication of the first parts of the book would have been motivated by 
the Cartesian principles in Achrelius' book.136 Achrelius had begun to 
publish his work in 1678 as a series of disputations. On the 5th of 
December 1678 the professor of Hebrew and Greek Ericus Fallander 
demanded at the Senate that the publication of Achrelius' disputation 
series should be suspended. According to Fallander the reason for this 
was "because a part of it is against the dogmas of other, more sane 
philosophers, and moreover it introduces new principles, and other 
things which seem to be against the Faculty of Philosophy".137 The 
135 	 This is true especially of Hahn-Håf 1685 and partially of Flachsenius-Lund 1681. 
136 This view originated from two articles written by different persons (K.F. Men-
nander and Gjörwell) in 1773. Although this view has already been rectified by 
Rein, the stigma of once having been accused of Cartesianism still dogs Achrelius. 
Rein 1908, p. 132-134. 
137 CAAP IV, p. 476, 5. Decemb. 1678. "...efftersåsom een dehl deruthi repugnerar 
alijs saniorum philosophorum dogmatibus, hand och der iämpte införer nova prin- 
professors of theology, Petrus Bång and Enevaldus Svenonius and the 
professor of medicine Elias Til-Landz favoured the further publication 
of Achrelius' work, because it did not contradict the Holy Scripture 
and it was considered to be useful for young students. 
However, the "nova principia" do not in this case refer to Car-
tesianism. Those parts of Contemplationes mundi which present some 
ideas of Descartes and Le Grand were published nearly four years 
after this incident, in 1682 (in the same year the dissertations were 
printed anew in book form). At the time the accusations were raised, 
only three theses had been published. It was probably Achrelius' in-
formal style, which did not follow the traditional method of presen-
tation very closely, and his claim for the homogeneity of the world 
which caused irritation among the members of the Faculty of Arts. 
Besides, the two best experts on Cartesianism available at Turku, Pet-
rus Bång and Petrus Laurbecchius, were present at the meeting of the 
Senate. If Achrelius' work had been suspected of Cartesianism, they 	 313 
would surely have smelled a rat. Achrelius was allowed to carry on 
with his work, and it was never attacked again.138 
It has already been stated in chapter "The Body of Knowledge" 
that Achrelius was the first scholar at Turku to present the theory of 
the circulation of blood in its Cartesian version. He also adopted the 
Cartesian theory of the origin of emotions. The most crucial differen-
ces between Harvey's theory of the circulation of blood and the ver-
sion of it adopted by Descartes were on the questions concerning the 
origin of blood and the causes of the movement of the heart. Accor-
ding to Descartes blood originated from food through a complicated 
process of digestion - a Galenic view, which Harvey had rejected. On 
the other hand, in Descartes' opinion the heart was dilated (not cont-
racted) by blood, which was warmed up by the fire residing in the 
heart. This view was also faithfully presented by Achrelius.'39 
It is possible that Achrelius had not read Descartes' books at all 
but only one of his disciples, Antonius Le Grand. At least Achrelius' 
account of the emotions is based on extensive citations of Le Grand. 
cipia och mehr sådant som synes facul. philosoph. wara emot..." On the course 
of events see Leikola 1987, p. 562. Hultin 1902, p. 271-273. Salminen 1981, p. 
98. 
138 	 Vallinkoski 1966, p. I. Bång played an important role at the beginning of the 
"Second Cartesian Dispute" in Uppsala in 1686. See Lindborg 1965, p. 227, et 
passim. 
139 Achrelius 1682, p. 363. Leikola 1983, p. 196-198. Hatfield 1992, p. 342-343. 
Achrelius is not quite consistent here, stating on consecutive pages 
that emotions originate first in the brain from various "impressions" 
found there, and then in the heart from where the emotions would 
surge to the brain through nerves.10 In any case Achrelius agrees that 
glandula pinealis was the organ in brain which was the "informati-
on-managing centre" of man.141 At Turku there had been very little 
interest in the study of the emotions of man in traditional psychology 
(in the form in which it was a part of physics). If emotions were 
discussed at all, it was done in connection with the facultas appetens 
of the sensitive sou1.142 But the Scholastic and Cartesian theories of 
emotions - especially as Achrelius' by no means represents a 
mechanical explanation - do not necessarily contradict each other if 
considered from a sufficiently general point of view. As faculties of 
the sensitive soul, emotions were fundamentally based on matter. Be-
cause they were common both to men and animals they could not be 
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a part of the rational soul, which alone was immortal. The physiolo- 
gical if not mechanical explanation of the origin of emotions as pre-
sented by Achrelius is, therefore, in a sense only an extension of the 
old theories.143 
No matter how openly Achrelius presented these Cartesian theories, 
he was by no means a Cartesian. Achrelius did not support dualism, 
nor did the use of these theories presuppose it. On the whole Achre-
lius' thinking rejects the main ideas of Cartesianism, but as a self-
proclaimed eclectic he made use of suitable parts of the philosophy.144 
In fact, some later proponents of the theory of the circulation of blood 
seem to be more devoted adherents of Cartesian philosophy than Ach- 
140 Achrelius 1682, p. 355-356. "Sequentur nunc passiones animae, quae mentem 
humanam commovent & agitant, per ipsos spirituum motus: oriuntur in cerebro 
e variis impressionibus, quae fiunt absque voluntatis concursu." "Observamus, 
passiones in corde perceptas surgere in cerebrum per nervorum scalas, ibi residere, 
illud etiam turbare." 
141 
	
	 Achrelius 1682, p. 356. "...ubi glandula quaedam stabulatur, quae alias spiritus 
animales excipit, & imagines ex corporeis rebus venientes, in se unit: in ista vero, 
animam specialius functiones suas exercere, percipiendo & volendo, existimant 
eruditi." Achrelius (p. 359) also urges reading more of Descartes' Passiones ani-
mae and De Homine. 
142 See e.g. Gezelius 1672, p. 296-297. 
143 Cf. e.g. Miltopaeus-Pryss 1668, passim. Th. VI "Affectus enim cum motione 
sanguinis, spirituum & alicujus partis corporeze alteratione fiunt. Motus vero vo-
luntatis vel mentis nullus cum mutatione corporis primo fit..." On Descartes' 
mechanical physiology and psychology in general see Hatfield 1992. 
144 Achrelius 1682, Cordate et Candide Lector, b3. 
relius could ever have been. In his De sensibus Andreas Lundius pre-
sented perhaps the most thorough-going apology ever for the Cartesian 
physiology at Turku. The contents of Lundius' theses will be dealt 
with in the next section of this study, so that it is enough only to 
mention it here. A year after Lundius' theses another proponent of 
Cartesian physiology emerged. 
Laurentius Gezelius was himself the author of his dissertation on 
blood published under Hahn's direction.145 He readily boasts his pre-
ference for the new philosophies: 
As in the following I shall be studying the movement of blood, I 
can see how wide open is the road to error. Therefore I prefer to 
follow a guide on this expedition than to start off without any di-
rection. I shall listen to the new Philosophers, who say this [circu-
lation of blood] occurs by the virtue of an innate fire. Cartesius 
shall show us the way, and I shall put much stress on his opinions 
or illustrations or exclusions, as stands in his peculiar book De 
Homine. 46  
As I have shown previously in this work, Gezelius' views on the 
circulation of blood are in fact less directly Cartesian. On the question 
of the different colours of arterial and venal blood Gezelius also pro-
claims his reliance on the Cartesian theory of colours. The "man of 
intellectual sharpness, Cartesius" claims that colours are nothing but 
"various modes in which the objects send their images and are re-
ceived by the eyes".147 Achrelius had in his Contemplationes mundi 
given a slightly broader explanation of Cartesian colour-theory, but 
he dismissed it as false in its fundamentals. t48 Gezelius on the other 
145 On Gezelius see also Leikola 1983, p. 203. 
146 Hahn-Gezelius 1691, p. 8. "In successionis ordinem circa sangvinis motum in-
qvisituro, video quam lata pateat errandi via. Quicunque ergo sit, ducem potius 
in hac expeditione sequor, quam ut sine duce ovans incedam, audio novos Phi-
losophos, qui beneficio ignis innati fiere hoc ajunt, edocti viam ab ipso Cartesio, 
cujus verba in majorem opinionis sive illustrationem sive exclusationem adduco, 
prout habentur in peculiari ejus De Horn. p.m.4." 
147 Hahn-Gezelius 1691, p. 13,15."vir ingenio ac acumine inclytus Cartesus" "di-
versos modos, quibus hoc illos [species] recipit & remittit ad oculos". 
148 Achrelius 1682, p. 282-284. The question was about the colours of plants, and 
several colour theories are weighed, among them those of e.g. Willis and Para-
celsus. Sennert's "chemical" theory is accepted, but Cartesius' theory rejected as 
follows: "Ita Chartesiana, accidentia cum substantijs, abstracta cum concretis, cau- 
315 
hand applies the Cartesian theories much less than he claims to do 
and the Cartesianism included in his work is far more vague than one 
could expect. What is notable is that the name of Descartes is invoked 
quite explicitly and positively. 
Other psychological processes such as emotions could also be ex-
plained by referring to physiology. In December 1697 Jacob Hildeen 
disputed on the causes of differing philosophical opinions. One won-
ders if he did not get inducement for this work from the quarrels 
concerning Rudeen's theses earlier in the same year. According to 
Hildeen the causes for diverging opinions were partially in the diffe-
rent function of peoples' intellects. One factor which heavily influen-
ced the constitution of blood, spirits and brain - and thus the function 
of the intellect - was changes in the atmosphere. These changes, says 
Hildeen, had been verified by Cartesius and de la Forge with the help 
of the barometer. t49 In his search for the causes of varying opinions 
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in philosophy Hildeen refers very often both to Descartes and other 
Cartesians, and to Bacon. Although the contents of Hildeen's thesis 
are otherwise not particularly Cartesian, and in some aspects it is also 
very critical of Cartesianism, it is remarkable that Cartesian authors 
were willingly referred to. The same holds true for Petrus Wiikholm's 
thesis on sleep, which he claims is caused by a relative defect of 
animal spirits in the brain. These spirits are material particles, and 
their movements are described in Cartesian terms.'5° 
Medicine and physiology were strong fields of Cartesianism. At 
the University of Uppsala especially it was the Faculty of Medicine 
which from the outset was very active in promoting Cartesian phi-
losophy. By the time Achrelius presented the theories of the circula-
tion of blood and of the origin of emotions it had been established as 
a medical philosophy. At Turku, however, where the Faculty of Me-
dicine was a mere formality without proper content, and only a few 
dissertations on physiology or other medical subjects were published 
in Physics, Cartesianism did naturally not gain such a strong position 
- not even in medicine. 
It is typical of those medical dissertations in which Cartesianism 
played an important role that they do not presuppose engaging in the 
more sensitive tenets of Cartesian philosophy. Lundius, whom we shall 
sam principalem cum instnunentali confundit." 
149 Hahn-Hildeen 1697, p. 14-16. 
15° Hahn-Wiikholm 1705, passim. 
briefly meet, was the only physiologist openly to proclaim dualism. 
Some subjects, such as the question of the role of the pineal gland in 
the transactions between the soul and the body, came closer to the 
boundary line between the acceptable and the refutable. During the 
1690's, the problem of dualism was more widely discussed. 
4. THE BREAKTHROUGH OF 
CARTESIANISM 
In 1689 the king ordained a statute which allowed the free use of 
philosophy at Universities unless religion was harassed. Many Car- 	 317 
tesians seem to have understood this as supporting their own practices. 
It was only after this date that Cartesian tendencies at the University 
of Turku became more and more overt. Cartesianism was not embra-
ced without strong opposition, though. In this chapter we shall have 
a look at the time during the 1690's and after, when Cartesianism 
slowly but steadily made its way through the barricade of Aristote-
lianism. 
Brawly Lundius' Cartesian Enthusiasm 
Only one year after the publication of the king's statute the academic 
peace at Turku was shaken by a young student from Uppsala, Andreas 
Lundius. He got into a fistfight soon after the publication of his stron-
gly Cartesian thesis. The trial following the incident was long discus-
sed in the Senate. It was not formally aimed against Lundius' Car-
tesian views, although they played a role in creating the conflict. Lun-
dius' thesis was strikingly Cartesian, and it is of course tempting to 
see this in a causal relation to the fact that soon after the ventilation 
of his dissertation he got involved in a serious fight. However, I shall 
claim that even here other factors than Cartesianism also played a 
role. The main features of this incident have been discussed recently, 
so we shall only briefly discuss the outward course of events later in 
this subsection.151 
Lundius arrived in Turku from Uppsala in 1688, and he defended 
his thesis (obviously written by himself) on the senses of man on the 
16th May 1690 in physics. Although Lundius praised Descartes vo- 
lubly, he emphasised his own independence from any dogma and de-
nied wishing to break the highly-valued academic peace.152 In his gra-
tulatio professor Daniel Achrelius also mocked the scholastic method 
and declared that when seeking for the Truth a scholar must not de-
pend on any philosophical sects. Achrelius was not a Cartesian, but 
he was perhaps more ready to criticise various forms of scholasticsm 
than many other scholars at Turku were. He had himself been eager 
to adopt ways of thinking which differed from the scholastic traditions. 
Lundius declares Cartesian dualism in explicit terms in the very 
preface of his thesis. This passage is the first at Turku where this 
standpoint was stated positively, and hence worth quoting at length. 
Lundius wants to define man's nature by comparison with angels. 
This [man's nature] is composed of two entirely different essences 
and thus it is not one thing by nature like an Angel is, because an 
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angel does not need anything else to its angelic nature except spi- 
ritual being and negation of extension. It is the unity of the com-
posite of soul and body which together constitutes a man. I trust 
that nobody who has a judical mind denies that these two substances 
really differ from each other, because it belongs to the nature of a 
corporeal body to have three dimensions, that is to be extended in 
length, width and depth. It is divisible into parts, it has magnitude, 
figure, place, motion and so forth. The soul also has in profusion 
those features which constitute its nature, and nothing which per-
tains to the nature of a body can be discerned in soul. Soul is a 
thinking thing, or a thing armed with intellection and volition, and 
I cannot think of the essence of the soul without cogitation for the 
slightest moment. Its attributes are intellection, volition, perception, 
apprehension, immortality, indivisibility, negation of extension into 
length, width and depth, and so forth, and if the diversity of these 
essences is weighed in the balance of free judgement, it cannot be 
anything but clear to everyone that these substances are farther away 
151 	 Klinge 1987, p. 419-421, 426. See also Salminen 1983, p. 66-67. 
152 In Hahn-Lundius 1690, Apologia Ad Lectorem. "Aristotelicae servitutis jugum 
meae cervici non imponetur. Cartesius etiam esto Philosophorum omnium prin- 
ceps, sapientiae in nubibus aquila, literarum Hercules & abstrusioris naturae sum- 
mus imperator; ejus tamen mancipium minime me dico: semper sollicitus fui 
quomodo e sentibus & tricis praejudiciorum pedem expediendo, viam ad sapien- 
tiae ac Aesculapii Templum mihi munirem. Ex communi pleraque hausi fonte; 
vasculo tamen meo." 
from each other than the heaven is from the earth, and that they 
differ from each other more than fire differs from water, and the 
hardest stone from the most tenuous air.153 
Lundius divides man's attributes into three classes: firstly there are 
those which pertain only to the soul, secondly those belonging to the 
body only, and thirdly, a class of properties which are common to 
mind and body. It is this third class of sensations and appetites which 
Lundius wants to turn his attention to.154 
As far as the basic traditional elements demanded for the formation 
of a perception are concerned, Lundius' account agrees with the Aris-
totelian theory. Sensible objects, medium and sense organs all play 
an important role both for the traditional Aristotelians and for Lundius. 
At this stage it is more or less a question of just providing an alter-
native, mechanical explanation to the established theory. Lundius sta-
tes that each sensible object produces an image of itself by emitting 
a subtle effluvium, which reaches our sense organs by local motion 
so that the necessary contact between the object and the sense organ 
is established.155 This idea seems very Democritean, and Lundius in-
deed refers at this point to the ancient atomists Democritus, Epicurus, 
and the 17th-century philosopher Kenelm Digby. Descartes discerned 
three stages in the perception process depending on the extent to which 
153 Hahn-Lundius 1690, Adsertum Prooemiale. "Hic compositus est 6 duabus diver-
sissimis essentiis, & sic non est res una, scilicet unitate naturae, sicut Angelus 
est unum qvid, utpote, qui ad essentiam suam angelicam nihil reqvirit praeter 
spiritualem esse, & negationem extensionis; sed unitate compositionis ex anima 
& corpore organico, quae duo unum constituunt hominem. has autem substantias 
realiter inter se differre, neminem sani judicii inficias iturum confido. nam corpori 
ad sui naturam corpoream nihil deest, ejus a natura est, habere trinam dimen-
sionem, in longum, latum & profundum esse extensum, esse in partes divisibile, 
habere magnitudinem, figuram, situm, motum, &c. Anima etiam omnia, sui na-
turam constituentia, abunde habet, nihilque in ea concipi potest, quod corporis 
naturam redoleat. haec nihil aliud est, quam res cogitans, seu res intellectu & 
voluntate praedita, cujus essentiam ne minimo quidem momento absque cogita-
tione concipere possum. Ejus adtributa sunt: Intellectus, voluntas, perceptio, ad-
prehensio, immortalitas, indivisibilitas, extensionis in longum latum & profundum 
negatio &c. Et sic harem essentiarum diversitate ad stateram liberioris judicii 
adpensa, non potent non cuivis in aprico esse hasce substantias longius inter se, 
quam coelum & terram distare, magisque quam ignem & aquam, lapidem duris-
simum & aerem tenuissimum inter se differre." 
154 Hahn-Lundius 1690, Adsertum Prooemiale. 
155 Hahn-Lundius 1690, p. 3. 
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different substances participated in it.156 Lundius adopts this view, 
which also corresponds to the order in which a sensation proceeds 
physically. 
The first phase in the birth of sensation is entirely physical. To 
begin with, a motion of the sense organs and "animal spirits" in the 
nerves is required. This motion is excited by external sensible objects. 
However, the motion of the material particles in the sense organs is 
usually so slight that we cannot experience it as movement. Here we 
can see a radical difference with the Aristotelian theory. Whereas the 
Aristotelians could accept only immaterial forms or species entering 
the sense organs, here we have a real contact caused by the activity 
of material particles stimulating the organ. The second stage in sen-
sation, perception, involves both substances, mind and matter. It is 
also caused by local motion of the spirits, which run through the ner-
ves to the sensorium commune, situated in the pineal gland. The spirits 
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print certain characters into the brain and thereby offer the mind "an 
occasion" to inspect the information produced by the sense organs. If 
mind "pays attention" to the "occasion", the perceived information 
reaches the final stage, which is purely dependent on the soul-subs-
tance. In reality these stages could not be discerned in the process of 
sensation, although conceptual divisions could be made. Approaching 
again the Aristotelian concepts Lundius also stresses the point that the 
faculty of perception is only one in man, although the senses might 
be different.157 Like the scholastics, Lundius trusts the ultimate ability 
of perception to produce reliable knowledge. It is our mind which is 
susceptible to erraneous judgements.158 
The second stage of the perception process was notoriously difficult 
for Cartesians, because it presupposed interaction of the two radically 
different substances. Descartes himself did not see his dualism causing 
any problems in this respect. According to him the whole problem 
arose from the false supposition that two different substances could 
not interact. In other words we could know that they interacted, but 
156 Hatfield 1992, p. 350-353. 
157 Hahn-Lundius 1690, p. 7-8. It was in accordance with the Aristotelian dogma 
accepted at Turku to claim that there was only one sensitive faculty in man, 
although the organs were different. 
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	 Hahn-Lundius 1690, p. 4-6. "Et sic nunquam error nisi in 3. gradu deprehenditur. 
...Quinimo sine ulla ratione erroris sensus inculantur, nam si objectum, medium 
& organum sint, justo & debito modo disposita, nullus sensus decipitur." 
not how they did it.159 Nevertheless the problem continued to occupy 
many other 17th-century philosophers. Lundius evades the question 
in a way not dissimilar to many other Cartesians. 
The soul and the body work alternately, so that certain movements 
which originate in the body border on the soul. Certain ideas in 
the soul correspond to these movements, but the ideas in mind limit 
themselves to the point where they meet the body. In the same way 
certain movements in the body correspond to these ideas. We cannot 
explain this mutal reaction in any other way except that the Creator 
wanted to connect these two extremely different essences in this 
way, between which there is no other connection and proportion.'6° 
The mind-body problem is briefly dealt with by Lundius from an 
entirely different point of view also, which illustrates the ultimate 
difference between the substances. Lundius remarks that the mind or 
soul has no absolute power over the body. This is evident from various 
illnesses such as epilepsy, which was according to Lundius caused by 
an uncontrollable flux of spirits. Lundius also notes that many basic 
physiological functions were quite independent of our thought.161 
After the general discussion of the nature of perception Lundius 
moves on to study the senses one by one. He first turns to discover 
the physiological properties of the tactile sense, explaining how it 
consists of a net of small glands and nerves spread everywhere on 
the skin. For Cartesians the sense of touch was the most important of 
all senses, because all sensation was based on the motion of particles. 
As Lundius puts it, "There is no sense, which would not presuppose 
the existence of tactile sense."162  Lundius regards sight as the next 
159 Wagner 1993. 
160 Hahn-Lundius 1690, p. 5-6. "Anima & corpus agunt in se invicem, adeo ut certi 
motas in corpore excitati terminentur in anima, quibus motib. certae ideae in 
anima respondent, & animae ideae desinant in corpore, quibus ideis pardi modo 
certi corporis motus respondent. Et hanc mutuam reactionem non aliter explicare 
valemus, quam quod conditor ita voluit adeo diversissimas essentias, inter quas 
connexio & proportio nulla, connectere." Lundius refers here to Le Grand, Hee-
reboord and Clauberg. 
161 Hahn-Lundius 1690, p. 7. "Motum etiam intestinorum peristalticum, cordis sys-
tolen & diastolen, circulationem sangvinis non novit, multo minus impedire potest 
[anima]." 
162 Hahn-Lundius 1690, p. 9. "Nullus namque datur sensus qui non praesupponat 
tactum." 
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most important sense, and he describes the anatomy of the eye in an 
exceptionally detailed manner. Lundius had obviously been present at 
the dissection of a bull's eye, performed by the professor of medicine 
Andreas Drossander at Uppsala.163 Anatomical details of the number 
of nerves and the composition of the eye's humours merge with optical 
speculation in Lundius' text. The Cartesian theory of sight agreed with 
the intromission theory, which had been the mainstream optical theory 
among scholastics.164 The rest of the senses, hearing, taste and smell 
are caused by various movements of tiny material particles as well.'65 
The third part of Lundius' thesis deals with the "internal senses" 
of man. In practice this part consists of a description of the anatomy 
of the brain, which is considered to be the centre of the nervous sys-
tem. Contrary to the Aristotelian tradition, which asserted that memo-
ry, fantasy and common sense were separate entities, Lundius discerns 
only one internal sense in man which expresses itself in three kinds 
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of functions: sensus communis, imagination and memory. All these 
are corporeal in the sense that they are caused by various motions of 
the spirits, which impress images upon the brain matter. But according 
to the definition Lundius gave at the beginning of the thesis, percep-
tion was a process which pertained to both of the substances, mind 
and body. It remains a little unclear from Lundius' text, in which way 
mind is supposed to participate in sense perception. Presumably the 
only connection is implied in the occasionalist theory, according to 
which the faculties "give occasion" for the mind to inspect the various 
images impressed on the brain. Without the inspection of the mind 
we would be unconscious of any perceptions handled by the body.166 
One of the main points of the Cartesian theory of perception was 
that it invalidated the traditional understanding of sensible qualities. 
According to the Cartesian theory a distinction had to be made be- 
Hahn-Lundius 1690, p. 9, 12. 
Hahn-Lundius 1690, p. 11-14. Hatfield 1992, p. 351. 
Hahn-Lundius 1690, p. 14-18. "Fit igitur sonus ex aeris concussione & agitatione, 
ex qua subtillissimae aeris particulae segregantur, quae peculiarem motum tre-
mulum & undulationes varias accipiunt, quae ad auditus organum deferuntur atque 
inibi variis modis praeparatae & temperatae ad sensorium demum per nerium 
auditorium deducuntur." (p. 15-16) "Et sic sapor nihil aliud est quam convenientia 
atomorum rei sapidae cum poris seu papillarum lingvae, salem imbibentius." (p. 
17) "Fit igitur odoratus hoc modo: Effluvia illa subtilissima e corporibus odoriferis 
promanantia membranam percellunt, ubi fibrillae nervae olfactoriae illa excipit 
& per os cribriforme ad sensorium commune deducit." (p. 18) 
Hahn-Lundius 1690, p. 18-23. 
163 
164 
165 
166 
tween the objects which caused our perceptions and the experiences 
we have of them. Sense experience could not give us any information 
about the real properties of physical bodies. All that was really present 
in the external world were variations of motion and figure, but our 
senses nevertheless give us ideas of sound, colour, and so on. Qualities 
like colour, taste and sound were only secondary, i.e. they had certain 
existence only in our experience but not necessarily in the outside 
world.167 In addition to his scepticism on the ontological level Des-
cartes tried to abolish the Aristotelian qualities in his physics too. 
Although no real qualities as such existed, our sense perceptions were 
not merely hallucinations in so far as all sensible "qualities" could be 
reduced to the movements of tiny material particles. This aspect was 
thus essential for the entire Cartesian system. What kind of a stand 
did Lundius adopt on the question of the reality of qualities? He deals 
with the question only in passing when discussing vision. Although 
he agrees with the Cartesians about the cause of perception, the con-
clusion he draws is ostensibly contrary to the Cartesian one. 
Vision does not occur by emission of rays but by reception of them. 
It is enough for vision to receive some rays, namely those which 
cross the pupil, and it does not need all rays which proceed from 
the object. It is here in the vestibule where all the colours have 
their origin. They are caused by various reflexions and refractions, 
which are modifications of light conforming with the object accor-
ding to certain laws. From here it also follows that all colours are 
equally real, and not some real and some others apparent and false, 
as it is generally believed. 168 
It is difficult to say whether Lundius really wants to conclude here 
that all qualities are real in the traditional meaning of "real" which 
supposes them to be certain characteristics of an external body. On 
the other hand Lundius here certainly does what Descartes also did 
167 	 For discussion of Descartes' primary and secondary qualities see Hutchison 1982, 
p. 242-243. Clarke 1989, p. 48-51, 71, et passim. Wilson 1993. 
168 Hahn-Lundius 1690, p. 14. "Quocirca visio fit receptione radiorum non emissione. 
Satis est quosdam radios, non omnes ex objecto prodeuntes visioni inservire, 
nempe illos qui pupillam trajiciunt. Hinc in propatulo est omnes colores originem 
debere variis reflexionum & refractionum legibus, quae iterum modificatio lu-
minis objecti conformationi debetur. unde etiam patet omnes colores esse aeque 
reales, non quosdam apparentes & falsos, ut vidgå creditur." 
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Andreas Lundius' Cartesian dissertation on the senses is also exceptional for its illustration. 
Traditionally a picture was more or less just for ornamentation or simply presented the 
object discussed. Lundius however uses illustration as a part of his argumentation, as can 
be seen e.g. from his discussion on the vision. Capital letters in the text refer to 
corresponding letters in the picture. This practice so to speak geometricises the argument 
and creates an impression of exactitude. 
III 
CAP. II. De Vifu. 
lc c.rtcrtc ut digrirrte vr~/'t, Iit., ctiam ordtre prior ccs;/-rt 
"debet. ,Onoctrc. primrim oculi .:rtifciofgm. m /Iruc7umm 5" 
p.:rtcr , (lux fina : assitt 3, bumortr 3, ncrbi 7. quorum rums c/i 
hf riot, 6. motarii , minull er quorum itidem-4. rcc'i, z. obli-
qui) dcin madam vi/once ocular: an 5.:nimi judicio pads fubjice-
re animus tfl. idcatur sham in bojart rci mcliorcm perception= g.1. 
taut rad;tcr dclint.aak. 
5. II. r. FicuitA oculi eft orbicularis ABC DEF cu-
jus pars antica F AB C a quo is poreft videri, poftica 
pars C D E F priori major, infraos capitis latet. 2.TuNI-
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globum conftiruat. Quuarum prima CORNEA, qua. nihil aliud 
eft quam durxmatris propago, & omnescerebroexeuates 
nervos Legit, roRumc oculum ambir,.cuj9 anterior pars AB 
diaphana inflan evrnu,CoitNEA dicitur; pofteriorpars BCD 
FFA opaca & denfa eft, & vocatur SCLEROTICA. Alia mem-
branula e pericranio oroa, & ad pupills; uscg foramen exten-
fa,ADNATAdic'ta,feu ALBUM OCULI, ob album colorem,Cor-
neamorbita' offibusadligat,nam eft ex mufculorum tendi-
nibus contcxta: H:rc fua opacitate hoc pra:flåt, ut ju{to 
plus lutis per corneam in oculum non penerret.: Cornea 
aliquantulum antrorfum prominer, ur radii refraEtionc 
colleEti pupillam fubeanc; alias fi plana rfret & depreffa, 
folum illa, qua a fronte funt, videremus, non etiarn Illa , 
qua; a lateribus. SECUNDA A;I L B ÜvEA—feu choroides 
dicitur & eft oi« marris propago, in anterior' parce I L 
perforata, quod formen Puru.LA dicirur. In bac nota-
mus LIOAMETA CILIARI A MN MN, CCU filamentaqua-dam 
nig-ra , qua; humorem cryflailinum fufpenfum tenenr. Pu— 
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in assuring all perceptions a similar status. Lundius' remark that some 
colours are not apparent and some real refers in any case to the dis-
tinction which was traditionally made between colours caused by par-
ticles of sulphur (real colours) and the apparent colours caused "only" 
by reflections of light. 
Lundius' thesis was in many respects a forerunner of the new phi-
losophy at Turku. First of all it of course showed relatively profound 
knowledge of the latest anatomy and physiology. Lundius refers ex-
tensively to such authors as Antoine Le Grand, Adriaan Heereboord, 
Johann Clauberg, J.-B. Du Hamel and Jacques Rohault. In anatomy 
his most respected authorities were Marcello Malpighi, Nicholaus Ste-
no, Thomas Willis and Andreas Drossander, to name just a few of 
his most important sources.169 All in all, Lundius was relatively up-
to-date. But his thesis differs from the others in another respect too. 
He does not follow the scholastic order of presentation at all, but 
326 	 builds up a way of presentation of his own. 
One would expect that if something was about to meet resistance 
among more traditional scholars, this kind of exposition of Car-
tesianism certainly would. However, instead of any public opposition 
to his ideas it was Lundius' own pugnacious behaviour which led him 
into difficulties. In the early hours of the 1st of June 1690 Lundius 
was injured. When the combatants were questioned by the Senate of 
the University, the following chain of events was reconstructed. Late 
that night Lundius had started making offensive remarks to his fellow 
students. He had allegedly claimed that the majority of professors at 
the University of Turku were uneducated and therefore the students 
were not much better than grammar school pupils. Lundius had boas-
ted that he would from then on oppose every thesis extraordinarie. 
The angry Lundius had thrown some ashes in a fellow student's face, 
swords were drawn and consequently Lundius got a bad wound on 
his head.10 
The Senate of the University handled the case as a mere disciplinary 
matter. The accusations that Lundius had disparaged professors were 
169 	 Lundius' profound knowledge of anatomy may be partly credited to his acquain- 
tance with professor Til-Landz. Lundius thanks Til-Landz in the preface of his 
thesis, and in the row he also mentioned him as the only professor at Turku who 
understands his ideas. 
170 CAAP VI, p. 590-597, 2. Junii 1690. Lundius seems to have entertained the 
slightly paranoid idea that other students had conspired against him. p. 593, 597. 
considered unsubstantiated."' Although the incident itself was only 
indirectly linked with Cartesianism, Lundius' person still represents a 
violent outburst of the new philosophy at Turku. Being an adherent 
of Cartesianism he was scornful of the forms of thought he regarded 
as outdated. Professor Matti Klinge has in his History of the University 
brought up the interesting idea that the row which Lundius caused 
was considered particularly dangerous, because there were actions 
afoot against some religious dissidents at the same time. A small group 
of radical pietists had caused severe disturbance at Turku during the 
same summer Lundius came from Uppsala to Turku.172 It was not so 
much Lundius' Cartesian ideas which were regarded as dangerous. 
Even more serious was his obvious rebellion against the established 
academic order and authorities. Just as Ulstadius had questioned the 
spiritual status of the clergy, Lundius now questioned the learning of 
the professors. 
All in all, the blissful ignorance of the University of Turku of the 	 327 
changing world of learning had started to be sullied. The Chancellor 
of the University, G.A. de la Gardie was at that time consciously 
trying to modernise it; it is very characteristic of Turku that the pres-
sure for change came from above. In the 1690's two of the professors 
nominated were Cartesian. One of them was the professor of medicine, 
Laurentius Braun (Braunerskiöld having been knighted), who had stu-
died in the Cartesian Faculty of Medicine at Uppsala. The other one 
was Torsten Rudeen, appointed professor of poetry in 1692.13 As a 
third person the professor of eloquence, Christiem Alander, could be 
mentioned as a Cartesian arriving from Uppsala. But it was Rudeen's 
theses that caused one of the real disputes about Cartesianism at the 
University of Turku. Let us however have a look at the anti-Cartesian 
discussion of this period first. 
171 	 CAAP VII, p. 6-8, 10. Julii 1690. 
172 Klinge 1987, p. 426. For example, Laurentius Ulstadius had in 1688 appeared 
naked in the Cathedral, cursed the Lutheran religion and claimed that the Lutheran 
clergy lacked touch with the Holy Spirit. Two students, both of whom had studied 
at Uppsala, shared Ulstadius' views. 
173 	 Klinge 1987, p. 421. Klinge mentions that Braun was active in spreading Cartesian 
ideas at Turku. While this may be true from his other activities, in his only 
published dissertation he retained old Galenic views. This does not necessarily 
invalidate his alleged Cartesianism, however, because Descartes adopted quite a 
lot of Galenic views on physiology. Hatfield 1992, p. 341. 
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Cartesian Theories Refuted 
In the 1690's the emphasis in the criticism of Cartesianism shifted 
from the notion of substance to the mechanistic explanations of nature. 
Cartesian epistemology, rationalism and methodical doubt also ac-
quired its first critics in natural philosophy. Let us first turn our at-
tention to Descartes' mechanization of nature. The concept of a 
mechanistically functioning nature was, of course, based on Descartes' 
dualistic theory of substance. For Descartes the mechanistic model 
was the the best way of explaining the phenomena produced by matter. 
Notoriously Descartes applied this model of explanation to living or-
ganisms as well. We cannot here go into details, but obviously Des-
cartes had both theological, metaphysical and physical reasons for re-
jecting animal souls.14 The fact that Cartesian philosophy denied ani-
mals any kind of a soul was found utterly unacceptable by the Aris-
totelian scholars at Turku. 
During the previous decade Cartesian mechanistic philosophy had 
been supposed to lead to animism. In the 1690's, the theory began to 
be understood the other way round: it would make animals machines 
by leaving no space for a soul.15 The first theses asserting this had 
been published by the very end of the 1680's. Descartes was not the 
only one to have a mistaken view of the nature of animal soul: 
I shall only say that the forms of animals are not rational souls as 
Pythagoras [claimed], and they are not, as Cartesius claims, blood 
warmed in the heart and thinned out as spirit. The movements of 
animals would then arise from the various movements of this spirit. 
And it is not a kind of small flame, or a more tenuous species of 
fire, as Gassedi suggests. I strongly refute that they would be created 
directly by God, be induced from the heavens or arise from matter. 
These forms are rather of a mediate nature between matter and 
spirit.' 76 
174 Garber 1992, p. 302-303. Clarke 1992, 1989, p. 174-181. 
175 This objection to Cartesian mechanistic philosophy was of course much more 
common. See e.g. Clarke 1989, p. 27. 
176 Halm-Ulholm 1689, p. 54. "Hoc solum dicimus, brutorum formas nec esse ani-
mam rationalem, ut pythagoras... nec sanguinem in corde calefactum, & in spi-
ritum attenuatum, a cujus motu varii illorum moms proficiscantur, ut Cartesius, 
nec flammulam quandam, seu tenuissimi ignis speciem, ut Gassendus, nec a Deo 
immediate nunc creari, a coelo induci e materia educi, pemego, sed illas formas 
It was stated that according to Cartesians the material form of ani-
mals was made of elementary fire, the material of organic body or 
subtle blood.' /7 Whatever type of corporeal substance the Cartesian 
"animal soul" might consist of, it was considered unacceptable, be-
cause matter was by nature a passive principle and could not organise 
and inform itself.178 The argument runs thus on a similar track as the 
criticism of Cartesian substance had done in the previous decade. The 
existence of animal soul was also thought to be proved by the great 
number of different functions performed by the animals, which had 
emotions and moved voluntarily. Moreover, the Cartesian idea that 
the material "soul" was located in the pineal gland was considered 
absurd.19 Physiological functions could not be the efficient cause of 
all the actions perceived. 
At least two interrelated things were at stake here. The existence 
of animal souls was of course an ontological question. For the Aris- 
totelians the animal souls were something essentially belonging to the 	 329 
order of nature, and the elimination of their existence meant a radical 
change in the way the world looked to them. But the existence of 
animal souls - or substantial forms in general - was also in another 
way an important question. According to the Aristotelians a form was 
a central explanatory principle, because all the qualities and functions 
of, say an animal, were produced by the form. Descartes, who saw 
the form as attributing "thinking" even to such non-living bodies as 
stones, strove to expunge substantial forms from all relevance to scien-
tific explanation.180 Thus we approach the question of what "science" 
should be like and what kind of explanations would be acceptable. In 
the scholastic natural philosophy this explanatory model was so deeply 
rooted that it was indeed impossible to think about proper explanations 
without the substantial forms. Moreover, much of the theological dog-
ma was dependent on substantial forms in its presentation and expli-
cation. The rejection of the animal souls thus threatened a large num-
ber of concepts vital to the Aristotelian philosophy and world-view. 
esse mediae naturae inter spiritum & materiam." 
177 Halm-Ruda 1695, p. 6-7. "ex qvo hujus mundi elemento sit composita forma 
brutorum." 
178 Hahn-Ruda 1695, p. 9. 
179 	 Hahn-Linstorphius 1688, p. 6-7. Hahn-Rungius 1691, §III, et passim. Halm-Ruda 
1695, p. 18-39. Hahn-Hacks 1700, p. 26, et passim. Hahn-Nidelström 1704, p. 
10-18, et passim. See also Miltopaeus-Pryss 1668, Th. XIII. 
180 Clarke 1989. 
Opinions like those presented by the scholars at Turku reveal how 
difficult it was to view things in a conceptually new way. Of course, 
we might suspect that in most cases there was not even willingness 
to do it. Both mechanistic philosophy and heliocentrism were opposed 
when the Cartesian vortex model was refuted. We meet the vortex 
theory for the first time in Jonas Ekedahl's thesis On Comets in 1695. 
Descartes is integrated into the discussion as one of the the scholars 
who support some form of the theory that comets are actually planets. 
Ekedahl has a simplified vision of Descartes' theory, but he quite 
rightly sees it explaining comets as suns/planets moving from one 
vortex to another. Ekedahl, who considers comets to be extraordinary 
stars lit by God in order to scare and warn people, does not approve 
of this view. In Ekedahl's text, the description of Descartes' vortex 
theory seems to argue for its own impossibility. 
330 	 He knowingly tries to draw his conclusions from mere suppositions 
and Mathematical hypotheses. He then tries to affirm that GOD has 
impressed motion onto this certain and peculiar Chaos, which as 
such is immobile. The three elements which he has assumed to 
exist would then have been formed by this motion, and not only 
that, the celestial bodies have developed from those very elements, 
particularly from the first element, which would constitute peculiar 
orbs or vortices, carrying along and rotating the planets. This most 
praisewothy Author says, that it is due to this gyration that Comets 
move from one vortex to another, and that comets are as old as the 
entire creation, not in respect to their essence but to their matter.t81  
Once again we witness a clash between the two different ideas 
about science proper and scientific explanation. Cartesian theories 
were implausible because they were based on "mere mathematical 
hypotheses". Whatever proofs were not based on demonstration, i.e. 
181 Hahn-Ekedahl 1695, p. 14. "...ex meris suppositionibus & hypothesibus Mathe-
maticis suas educere conclusiones sedulo conetur, idoqve adfirmat DEUM certum 
atqve peculiarem Chaoti, ex se alias immobili, impressisse motum, ut non solum 
tria illa, qvae statuit, generata sint Elementa, sed etiam ex illis Elementis, & 
qvidem praesertim ex primo, corpora coelestia provenerint, qvae peculiares nacta 
sunt orbes seu vortices, qvibus circumferrentur atqve rotarentur; in qva gyration, 
dicit laudatissimus Auctor, qvod transeant Cometae ex uno vortice in alium, sint- 
gve tempori creationis, si non qvoad totam suam essentiam, tamen qvoad ipsam 
materiam coaevi." 
syllogistic reasoning based on indemonstrable premises, were scant 
opinions or "hypotheses" in the Aristotelian understanding of ideal 
science. Descartes, on the other hand, tried to give a different kind 
of status to hypothetical explanation. In his opinion certain knowledge 
in the sense of Aristotelian demonstratio was not attainable from na-
ture. All we could arrive at were hypotheses whose status would ne-
vertheless be more probable than simple guesswork. Part of Descartes' 
problem of explaining his stance was that in the earlier part of the 
seventeenth century the concept of probability itself was just emer- 
ging.
182 
 
On the physical level of his argument Ekedahl seems to grasp the 
elements in their Aristotelian sense and therefore finds a theory, which 
assumes elements to exist in the supralunar region absurd. His refu-
tation and ridicule do not, however, prevent him from referring posi-
tively to Descartes when arguing for the location of comets in the 
heavens.1ß3 Whereas Ekedahl bases his arguments on natural philosop-
hy, Johannes Tålpo prefers to show the incompatibility of the vortex 
theory with the Bible. His Qvies coeli, printed in 1699, saw the Car-
tesians as the main proponents of the adverse heliocentric system. 
Nothing in the Bible would support the vortex theory, nor was there 
any necessity of nature for it. Teleological arguments were not as 
common in Aristotelian discourse as one might expect, but Tålpo pre-
sents one: "Whose benefit would these vortices then serve?"184 The 
Bible also produced the best arguments in Tammelin's and Nidel-
ström's thesis where the Cartesian form of heliocentrism was refuted. 
Neither of these authors accepted Descartes' definition of motion, ac-
cording to which the Earth would be at rest, because it did not change 
its position in respect to other particles around it.'85 
All in all, no coherent picture of Cartesian astronomy and physics 
can be formed on the basis of the theses at Turku. Criticism was 
mainly directed against heliocentrism and the theory of elements in 
Cartesian natural philosophy. For example, the different concept of 
motion (not caused by the form) or the plenum theory were discussed 
only incidentally.186 There were also themes which were dealt with 
182 Clarke 1989, Ch. 5, 7. Shapiro 1983, Ch. II. Hacking 1978, p. 18-30. 
183 Hahn-Ekedahl 1695, p. 35-36. 
184 Hahn-Tålpo 1699, p. 15, et passim. "Cui deniqve usui inservirent hi vortices?" 
185 Tammelin-Nidelström 1706, p. 15-17. Hahn-Tålpo 1699, p. 22-29. 
186 Hahn-Tålpo 1699, p. 28. Tammelin-Frostman 1710, p. 27. 
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even more sporadically. 
Although theologians had regarded dualism and methodical doubt 
as the main problems in Cartesianism for decades, it was only at the 
very end of the 1680's that these problems were tackled in physics 
dissertations. In December 1689 Petrus Ring opposed certain views 
held by some Cartesian theologians about the cognition of angels. Con-
sidering the criteria of truth Ring accuses Le Grand and other Car-
tesians of asserting man's own cognition as the highest criterion. Truth, 
according to Ring, was not dependent on the cognizing subject, but on 
the object of cognition. Having a clear and distinct idea would not 
guarantee certainty.187 Ring cannot accept the Cartesian view that our 
mental states (perceptions, judgements) do not necessarily correspond 
to the entities outside the mind-substance. 
Methodical doubt was thus also refuted by Ring. He did, however, 
make a difference between methodical and hyperbolic doubt: 
Descartes however differs from the Sceptics in that whereas they 
remain in their doubt, he tries to use doubt for achieving a better 
understanding. Wheres doubt is the aim for the Sceptics, for Des-
cartes it is a means for Philosophising. Nevertheless this kind of 
doubt does not find a place among the legitimate methods, because 
nothing which is contrary to conscience, such as doubt, cannot de-
cently be used for acquiring scientific knowledge.'88 
The threat of atheism was latent in every doubt. Dualism was also 
criticised sometimes, mainly in connection with questions related to 
sense perception processes. In addition to this, the location of soul in 
the pineal gland was still seen as a problem.189 Although Descartes 
187 Hahn-Ring 1689, p. 40-41. "Hint errat nobis quam maxime Ant. le.Grand cum 
suo Antesignano Cartesio Institutionibus Phil.Reg.4.p.11. dum asserit omnis ve-
ritatis regulam ac normam esse propriam cogitationem, adeo, ut id demum pro 
vero habendum, quod dare & distincte percipitur. ...Idcirco rectissime statusmus, 
quod pendeat veritas non a subjecto, quod cognoscit, sed ab objecto, quod cog-
noscitur, quia nullus homo potest esse alicujus scientiae, aut sententiae norma..." 
188 Hahn-Ring 1689, p. 43-44. "Cartesium quidem in hoc a Scepticis differre, quod 
hi in dubitatione acquiescant, ille intendat ea uti ad meliorem cognitionem, adeo 
ut dubitatio Scepticis sit finis, Cartesio autem medium Philosophandi: nihilominus 
autem hujusmodi dubitatio inter legitima media locum non invenit, nihil enim 
quod est contra conscientiam, sicut dubitatio, potest de jure adhiberi ad scientiam 
acquirendam." 
189 Halm-Ruda 1695, p. 26-27, et passim. 
332 
did not strictly speaking locate soul in the pineal gland, this naive 
reading of his theory became common during the 17th century. Lo-
cating some particular function of the soul, such as sensus communis, 
to the pineal gland was nevertheless in no way repugnant to the Aris-
totelians. The opinion expressed by the student Guzelius was typical 
of solutions of this dilemma: it was the common sense which was the 
route of sense perceptions into intellection proper, which was located 
in the pineal gland. The soul itself could remain unlocated.190 
Outright opposition to Cartesianism was by no means an overw-
helmingly dominant attitude at Turku. The majority of theses did not 
comment on Cartesianism in any way. 
Cartesian Meteorology 
During the 1690's there was a considerable increase in references to 
Cartesian authors, which did not, however, cause any reactions from 
the more conservative scholars at the University. This situation raises 
several questions for the historian of science. First of all, how widely 
did Cartesian influence spread at Turku and to what extent did it affect 
learning? How deeply had those authors who frequently refer to Car-
tesian writings, really adopted the new philosophy? In this subsection 
we shall bear these questions in mind while at the same time taking 
a look at Cartesianism in theses on meteorology. Meteorological theses 
are interesting in respect to Cartesianism, because it was here that the 
new philosophy gained perhaps most ground at the theoretical level. 
In this subject Cartesian citations almost overwhelmed some theses. 
I have discussed Cartesianism in meteorological dissertations at 
Turku in a previous article,'91 which shows that positive or neutral 
reference to Cartesian authors does not automatically mean adopting 
Cartesian ideas. What I find interesting, however, are the several "stra-
tegies" which were used in respect to Cartesian theories. At one ext-
reme we have the cases in which Cartesian authors are cited inciden-
tally, with no necessary connection whatsoever to Cartesian philosop-
hy.192 A more complicated strategy was used e.g. by Magnus Wide-
beck, who combined pieces of Cartesian and traditional philosophies 
190 Hahn-Guzelius 1696, p. 18-19. 
191 Kallinen 1993. 
192 See e.g. Hahn-Heurlin 1702, p. 15, where Le Grand is cited as an authority against 
the view that a laurel crown could protect man from being hit by lightning. 
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without ever really committing himself to either view. It was typical 
of Widebeck to argue against a Cartesian view using a citation from 
another Cartesian author, and to mix Aristotelian and Cartesian ref-
erences in a way that they seem to agree where in reality they cont-
radict each other. Cartesian, Aristotelian and Paracelsian theories 
could be expressed without ever saying, which theory was the right 
one. One sign of Widebeck's vagueness is also the fact that he very 
seldom makes any negative judgements either.193 
What does Widebeck's woolliness reveal? We may ask how much 
he really understands about the main ideas of Cartesian natural phi-
losophy. Or can we expect his vagueness to be a (semi-)conscious 
strategy for introducing at least some mechanical explanations? An 
example shows Widebeck discussing the problem of how the vapour 
which causes meteorological phenomena rises. 
334 	 ...and these vapours are (b) not light by their nature, because a 
propriety of one thing does not become a characteristic of another 
thing. But this evaporated water rises into the heights because of 
the fire which it contains, and which really is light. So also Car-
tesius (c) calls vapour water mixed with fire... [(b)= Sperling Ins-
titutiones 1.5.c.8., (c)= c.4. Meteora.]194 
Sperling's view of the question was actually the one which was 
generally embraced at Turku: the watery vapour rises, because natu-
rally light particles of fire are conjoined to it. On the other hand, 
Descartes also seems to think that evaporation is caused by minute 
particles which penetrate the pores in water.195 The difference between 
Descartes' and Sperling's views, which Widebeck is either unable to 
see or does not want to see, is as follows. Sperling's theory is based 
on the qualitative conception of matter: fiery particles rise because 
they are light by nature. On the other hand, Descartes' particles of 
homogeneous matter just move around in the filled-up universe ac-
cording to the mechanical laws and without any natural goal what- 
193 	 Hahn-Widebeck 1702, p. 6, 8-11, 13, 22, 31, 40, et passim. 
194 Hahn-Widebeck 1702, p. 13. "...sunt hi vapores (b) leves non tarnen sua natura, 
propria enim unius non fiunt propria alterius; sed propter ignem qvem continent 
qvi vere levis est, hic resolutam aqvam in sublime vehit, ideo etiam Cartesius 
(c) vaporem aqvam igni commistam adpellat... [(b)= Sperl. Inst. I.5.c.8., (c)= c.4. 
Meteor.]" 
195 	 Sperling 1663, p. 508. Descartes 1644, p. 215, et passim. 
soever. However, the second law of motion in the Principles shows 
that particles tend to preserve their motion in straight lines. Thus, 
there is a tendency for a body in curvilinear motion to recede from 
the center of rotation; a phenomenon which was later to be called 
centrifugal force.196 It is in this sense that the particles from the surface 
of the rotating Earth "tend" to rise upwards. 
If Widebeck's views were in the most cases close to the traditional 
theories (at least as far as it can be judged from his text), there were 
other authors who were more eager to adopt Cartesian theories. Still 
it is true that despite the frequent citations of Cartesian authors the 
Cartesian ideas do not strike the eye. It is only in small details of the 
theories that one can pick up the scent of Cartesianism. However, 
very fundamental questions concerning the nature of motion and na-
ture's laws lie disguised in these cursory questions. In Sveno Melan-
der's197 thesis on lightning Cartesianism was once again involved in 
the question about the nature of the power which draws the vapours 
and exhalations upwards. Melander writes: 
...it can be judged that exhalations, which blow from the subter-
ranean caverns into the heights, conjoin there [under earth] with a 
most subtle matter, which Descartes calls matter of the prime ele-
ment. And it is natural for this element to move very rapidly...198 
It seems that Melander has now replaced the traditional fiery par-
ticle with a Cartesian, rapidly moving "first element". According to 
Melander it was an inherent property of fine matter to move upwards. 
Once again Descartes' theory of quickly moving "first elements" has 
been wrongly understood to be inherently movable. The attractive for-
ce of the Sun had so often been favoured as an explanation for the 
rising of vapours by the more traditional commentators. Relying on 
Du Hamel's text Melander claims that this was mere fiction, because 
196 Garber 1992, p. 312-316. 
197 
	
	 Of the three students discussed in this subsection only Melander had studied for 
a while at Uppsala. Lagus 1890, p. 241 mentions that Melander had gone through 
deposition ceremonies there. The same roll by no means implies that Widebeck 
and Pryss would have studied there. See Lagus 1890, p. 230, 302. 
198 Hahn-Melander 1693, p. 15-16. "...existimandum est, exhalationes, qvae ex ca-
vemis subterraneis in altum transpirant, ibi conjungi cum materia subtillissima, 
qvam Cartesius materiam primi elementi appellat, eique innatare, qvae celerrimae 
est agilitatis..." 
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attraction could not be explained physically. It was more probable 
that the Sun's rays extract vapours mechanically, by some kind of 
percussive force.199 Melander thus does not have an unambiguous ex-
planation, but proposes several theories. It remains unclear whether 
they were alternative or mutually complementary. Although Melander 
preserves the Sennertian understanding of matter, the attractive forces 
do not appeal to him any more. 
Melander prefers mechanical explanations in other theories also. 
According to the traditional view, thunderstorms were generated by 
the fraction and inflammation of certain "chemical" substances ("nitre" 
and "sulphur") in the air. Melander's view of the question is a simp-
lified Cartesian one: there are clouds at different heights from the 
surface of the earth. The upper clouds are surrounded by a warm mass 
of air, which condenses the cloud. (It is said that this happens in the 
same way that snow condenses before it smelts away.) The thicker 
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cloud gets heavier, and it falls onto the clouds below it. This - accor- 
ding to Melander - causes lightning and often also a downpour. The 
varieties in the sound of thunder would be caused by the different 
densities of the colliding clouds and their different speeds. This cm-
dely mechanistic collision theory and the idea of the condensing effect 
of warmth have both been derived from Descartes. Melander's text 
even partially follows Descartes' (or some of his disciples') text.20o 
A third example of the mechanistic explanations adopted by Me-
lander characterises the attitude of Cartesian natural philosophy to-
wards older theories. Since antiquity there had been a theory according 
to which very hard stones could be generated by a thunderstorm and 
then fall down to earth. In 17th-century science the existence of these 
lapis fulminaris was still generally acknowledged, although there were 
differences of opinion about the way the generation was presumed to 
take place. Descartes did not dispute the existence of these stones, 
but explained them on his own premises. In fact, the theory of thun-
derstones was an excellent paradigmatic case for the Cartesians: if 
stones could be generated mechanically in the air, why would it not 
be possible that over a much longer time the whole universe could 
have emerged from moving particles. Melander accepts the Cartesian 
theory and he even summarises the experiment described by Descartes 
199 Hahn-Melander 1693, p. 13-14. 
200 Hahn-Melander 1693, p. 23-25, 31-32. Descartes 1644, p. 260, 282-283. 
in which a thunderstone is generated by burning clay and some ex-
plosive materials.201  
Although Melander adopted some mechanistic explanations from 
Descartes, he was by no means a pure Cartesian. For example Me-
lander's understanding of matter is still based on the traditional theory 
of elements. Like Widebeck, he also proposed several contradictory 
theories as explanations of certain phenomena. One reason why both 
Melander and Widebeck stay relatively close to the old ideas may be 
their sources. Most authors cited by them, e.g. Clauberg, Du Hamel 
and Le Grand were not orthodox Cartesians themselves, but they were 
proponents of the so-called Cartesian scholasticism, a philosophical 
movement which tried to reconcile Aristotelian and Cartesian phi-
losophies or at least to make Cartesian ideas more palatable to Aris-
totelians by presenting them in Aristotelian terminology. In fact, some 
Cartesians claimed that their eclectic method represented an unadul-
terated and a more original form of Aristotelianism than scholasticism 
did.202 By no means all exponents of the Cartesian system adopted it 
in its entirety, but modified and developed it in order to meet their 
various philosophical expectations.203 
It is, however, a trivial explanation for Widebeck's and Melander's 
behaviour to refer to the eclectic character of their sources. We may 
ask how deeply Widebeck and Melander were actually versed in Car-
tesian philosophy, and whether they really did understand in what 
respect Cartesian natural philosophical principles differed from the 
Aristotelian ones. If Melander and Widebeck really read those Car-
tesian books they refer to, they at least had a chance to learn the main 
features of Cartesian physics. Information was of course spread also 
by those theses in which Cartesianism was opposed, albeit that Car-
tesian theories were not always presented correctly in them. Granting 
this, we are still left facing two equally plausible, if possibly intert-
wining ways of interpreting this situation. On one hand I would be 
tempted to read Widebeck's hesitation to mean that he did not have 
a very profound understanding of Cartesian physics. This would then 
have contributed to his difficulty in deciding between the old and new 
explanations. Not being entirely content with the Aristotelian-Senner- 
201 Hahn-Melander 1693, p. 36-37. Descartes 1644, p. 285-286. 
202 Bohatec 1912, p. 22, et passim. 
203 Brockliss 1981, 1987. Clarke 1989, p. 17-18, et passim. 
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tian theories either, Widebeck adopted this strategy of balancing be-
tween the two. 
On the other hand it is possible that our authors have sometimes 
quite consicously selected and adopted only certain kinds of informa-
tion from their sources. Only such knowledge would be openly pre-
sented as Cartesian as could be interpreted through the Aristotelian-
Sennertian framework. Whether this procedure did full justice to either 
of the philosophies may well be doubted. All in all, it is relatively 
harmless ideas which have been advanced - there is no talk e.g. about 
dualism or methodical doubt. Mechanistic explanations had been cri-
ticised before, but these mechanistic theories in no way threatened the 
Aristotelian concept of substance or the status of the four elements as 
e.g. the vortex theory had done. 
Why then did Melander and Widebeck cite Cartesian authors so 
frequently, if they were not ready to accept all the most fundamental 
338 	 principles of the philosophy? Did they want to follow the example of 
their sources and reconcile the two philosophies? At least Widebeck 
did not believe this was possible for him, although it might have been 
possible for a magis ingenii vir.704 It seems more probable that the 
old philosophical system had simply lost much of its vigour, but a 
new system had not made a complete breakthrough either. Breaking 
away from the conceptual system of the Aristotelian philosophy hardly 
was an achievement for which an ordinary student's intellectual ca-
pacity and courage were sufficient. Probably there was also a lot of 
genuine uncertainty about which of the philosophies gave better ans-
wers in physics. A general trend seems to have been to recast Cartesian 
ideas in terms of the Aristotelian system and not vice versa. The ec-
lectic natural philosophy of the time allowed many kinds of theories 
to be suggested as long as the fundamental principles of the Aristo-
telian philosophy were left untouched. 
In meteorology there is still one dissertation which surely is worth 
noticing. Although Andreas Pryss refers to Cartesian authors only twi-
zos 
ce 	 in his thesis on the rainbow, it is the work which most radically 
differs from the Aristotelian tradition.206 Pryss studies the causes for 
204 Hahn-Widebeck 1702, p. 9. 
205 	 This means that only 7.6% of all citations were Cartesian. Pryss mentions Des-
cartes and Le Grand. 
206 
	
Slotte 1898, p. 54-55 mentions this thesis and praises it as one of the best pub-
lished under the direction of professor Hahn. However, Slotte only refers to the 
the genesis of a rainbow. He also examines the places and times when 
these phenomena usually occur. An important question for Pryss is, 
what causes the the colours and the peculiar figure of a rainbow. Pryss 
follows Cartesian physics most directly in his description of the co-
lours of the rainbow. He describes Descartes' experiment in which a 
single drop of water is imitated by a ball of glass which is set against 
the sunlight. Referring to his optical laws Descartes tries to show by 
geometrical reasoning, how different reflections of light give rise to 
different colours. Pryss has not only adopted these ideas from Des-
cartes, but he has also copied a drawing from Descartes Dioptrics, 
which illustrates the experiment.207 Pryss differs from Descartes in one 
crucial point, however. Whereas one aim in Descartes' discussion on 
the rainbow was to show that all colours and qualities were in a sense 
apparent, Pryss retained the traditional conception of the existence of 
both apparent and real colours. 
Pryss does not confine himself to adopting some theory-level ideas 
from Descartes, however. It is remarkable that Pryss also applies Car-
tesian method in his thesis. Externally his thesis looks very traditional, 
and its disposition is an absolutely exemplary presentation of the tra-
ditional method with all its nominal and real definitions, four causes 
and other categories. However, e.g. in the chapter on the form of the 
rainbow Pryss totally dismisses scholastic terminology. Instead of 
mentioning the accidentality or substantiality of the phenomenon Pryss 
describes how straight, refracted and reflected rays of light behave in 
making a rainbow.208 Even more striking is the fact that Pryss tries to 
handle all problems which are amenable to such procedures geomet-
rically. 
Pryss seems to have chosen his methodological and theoretical gui-
delines fully knowing where they would lead him. He was a talented 
student, who soon after his graduation (1694) became an assistant of 
the Faculty of Philosophy (1698), and was finally appointed professor 
of eloquence in 1706.209 Pryss' thesis was actually the first at Turku 
in which mathematical method was used in solving a physical prob-
lem. Despite its pioneering contents it seems to be relatively certain 
work perfunctorily and without paying any attention at all to the Cartesian con-
tents and its unusual method. 
207 Hahn-Pryss 1691, p. 11-13. Descartes 1644, p. 291-295. 
208 Hahn-Pryss 1691, p. 6-7. 
209 Lagus 1890, p. 230. 
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5. IV, 
Illustrations in the theses published at Turku were often copied from Central-European 
sources. Hahn and Pryss have copied Descartes' illustration in their thesis On the Rainbow 
(1691). A tiny glass ball represents a raindrop and the reflections of light from this are 
studied geometrically. Just like Lundius, Pryss also uses the illustration as an integral part 
of the argument, which is almost directly cited from Descartes. 
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that it did not provoke any opposition either in the Faculty of Arts or 
in the Senate of the University.2t0 
It has been stated several times in this study that in Aristotelian-
Scholastic scholarship there was a strict hierarchy of the disciplines 
and the methods appropriate to each discipline. According to the pre-
valent philosophy, mathematical reasoning could not provide sound 
arguments in the field of physics. How is it possible then that Pryss 
was not attacked for category mistakes similar to those Laurbecchius 
had accused Lipstorp of? First of all, Pryss confined himself to dis-
cussion of reflections and refractions of light, and he did not touch 
upon any of the more sensitive matters such as dualism or heliocent-
rism. Had Pryss tried to apply geometrical method to the burning 
210 	 There are no signs in the protocols of the Senate that the subject had been dealt 
with. CAAP VII, p. 45-94. (The spring term 1691.) 
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questions of astronomy, the reception might have been very different. 
On the other hand, Pryss' thesis was in a sort of gray area between 
physics, optics and mathematics. Optics was traditionally a discipline 
in which mathematical argument was legitimate - not to mention Aris-
totle's geometrical treatment of the subject.211  
On the whole the impact of Cartesianism on physical theories at 
Turku in the 1690's is limited to some details. In 1697, for example, 
Cartesian views on tides and the movements of sea were thoroughly 
described by the professor of eloquence, Christiern Alander. He finds 
the Cartesian hypothesis extremely good. However, the theory was 
problematic according to him because it presupposed the movement 
of the Earth. Therefore Alander is careful not to commit himself to 
Descartes' own ideas, but to "revised Cartesian" theories.212  Strong 
Cartesian influence at the theoretical level can also be found in Mag-
nus Steen's astronomical dissertations, in which he described the vor- 
342 	 tex theory. Steen's presentation of the theory is very positive and he 
is constantly on the verge of accepting it explicitly as we11.213 
Trail-blazing attempts to use the new methodology were more rare. 
Besides the few meteorological dissertations analysed above refer-
ences to Cartesianism are only sporadic. Although theoretically Car-
tesian ideas could be merged into the Aristotelian system, most ideas 
with some consequences for metaphysics were irreconcilable with the 
old theory. However, the 1690's was the decade when Cartesian dua-
lism and epistemology were defended for the first time at Turku. 
The Emergence of Cartesian Dualism: the Case of 
Torsten Rudeen 
The first person at Turku to defend Cartesian dualism in a public 
dissertation was Andreas Lundius. Compared with the theses in me-
teorology, Lundius' thesis is much more consistent in its Cartesianism. 
Instead of adopting some single theories and applying them to a Aris-
totelian scheme Lundius presented a rather consistent Cartesian view 
of his subject. As we have seen above, Lundius' thesis did not provoke 
opposition despite its undoubtedly controversial contents. After Lun-
dius, dualism was not propounded in physics dissertations before the 
211 	 Aristotle 1978, III ch. iv-v. 
212 Alander-Wasbohm 1697, p. 16-25. 
213 	 See chapter "The Structure of the Cosmos". 
Russian occupation (1714-21). It was, however, adopted in some dis-
sertations which deal with subjects belonging to the field of natural 
philosophy published under the guidance of another professor. 
A "real" Cartesian dispute did not arise until 1697 at the University 
of Turku. It was caused by two theses published under the guidance 
of Torsten Rudeen. The course of events in this incident has been 
studied in detail, first in the biography of Rudeen by Arvid Hultin in 
1902 and then by Klinge in his Helsingin Yliopisto 1640-1990. My 
account of the dispute owes much to these studies. Research into this 
subject is made rather difficult by the fact that the protocols of the 
University Senate for 1695-99 are lost. A major part of our knowledge 
is based on the information in J.J. Tengström's biography of bishop 
Gezelius.214  It is sensible to deal with it in this study as well, because 
it was the first institutional clash between the old and new academic 
traditions, in which openly Cartesian arguments were ranged against 
Aristotelian. 
Torsten Rudeen had studied at the University of Uppsala, where 
he received his master's degree in 1691. He became acquainted very 
early with Cartesian philosophy and undoubtedly was one of its pro-
ponents. He defended a Cartesian thesis in 1688 on the separation of 
the soul and body, which dealt with the primary characteristics of 
those two substances.215  Soon after finishing his studies Rudeen was 
nominated professor of poetry at the University of Turku. There had 
been some stir at Turku about the best candidate for the professorsip. 
Ignoring the proposal of the Senate, the King nominated Rudeen, who 
undeniably had the best qualifications for the job. The professors at 
Turku were, of course, dissatisfied, because their proposals had been 
ignored and because a man unknown to them had been nominated. 
However, Rudeen soon met with the other professors' approval and 
by all we can judge he seems to have been very popular with his 
collegues and students.216 
From the beginning it was Rudeen who was on the defensive. In 
January 1697 bishop Gezelius Jr. (thus the Vice-Chancellor at the 
University) prohibited the publication of Rudeen's and his respondent 
Anders Chydenius' thesis De mente humana. In the Senate one of the 
214 Tengström 1833, p. 96-106. 
215 Hultin 1902, p. 27-28. The thesis was Lagerlöf-Rudeen 1688, De dissolutione 
mentis et corporis. On Rudeen's master degree see Hultin 1902, p. 28-32. 
216 Hultin 1902, p. 56-60, et passim. 
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professors of theology, Andreas Wanochius supported the prohibition, 
and the professor of physics, Petrus Hahn, also opposed some argu-
ments in the thesis. According to Hahn, the statement "Anything which 
is, is either spirit or body, or can be reduced to either of these." was 
not true, because there was radius solaris, which was body as well 
as sou1.217 Rudeen defended the publication of his thesis with an old 
tactic used by Cartesians: he said he could show that Cartesian prin-
ciples actually agreed with the old and pure Aristotelian theories. 
Vice-Chancellor Gezelius answered that in that case he should also 
speak as the old philosophers had done. Gezelius also referred to two 
royal edicts of 1691 and 1693, which barred any "useless novelties" 
in academic dissertations. But as soon as Gezelius had left from Turku, 
the thesis was ventilated.218 
The thesis itself was very short - only four pages long. This was 
mainly due to the poverty of the respondent Andreas Chydenius, who 
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had to pay for the printing of the thesis. It claimed that mind was a 
res cogitans, the only property of which was thinking (cogitatio). Alt-
hough Rudeen's thesis dealt mainly with the mind-substance, there 
remained no doubt about him accepting dualism as well. The soul 
was said to differ realiter from the body, and to be maintained by 
God. The Aristotelian dogma that sense perception was the basis for 
all intellection was also refuted.219 
Rudeen's thesis is extremely compact and he does not qualify or 
explain this last statement in any way. What the Cartesians actually 
objected to in the Aristotelian maxim "nihil est in intellectu quod non 
prius fuerit in sensu" was the first word of the sentence, nihil. Matter 
had only limited powers in Cartesian philosophy and all it could pro-
duce was material images in the brain. However, our ideas proper 
were the product of the immaterial mind, although often stimulated 
by the material images. Although most of our ideas had their origin 
in the sense perception, some of them were nevertheless irreducible 
to certain brain-states. In this respect there were also "innate ideas" 
or principles which on a very fundamental level contributed to our 
217 	 Hultin 1902, p. 119. "Qvidqvid est, Spiritum esse vel corpus; vel posse ad alte-
rutrum horum referri." 
218 	 Hultin 1902, p. 119-120. These two edicts were originally aimed against certain 
novelties in political thought, which the king regarded as too favourable to the 
nobility. 
219 Rudeen-Chydenius 1697. 
knowledge about the world.22° 
The third thesis in Rudeen's dissertation claims that there is a real 
distinction between the mind and the body.22' Just like Lundius Ru-
deen understands the real distinction in a Cartesian way. Rudeen main-
tains that there is no real difference between an ens or substance and 
its properties. Thus, mind and cogitation were the same. 
Cogitation is an attribute and at the same time the substance of 
mind. It is not necessary that in every relation of attribution there 
should be a difference between what attributes and what is being 
attributed. As I have shown, there is a way of speech, in which 
something is understood with two or more words although the thing 
is the one and the same.222 
Although Lundius apparently also favoured the Cartesian under- 
standing of the distinctio realis, he did not analyse the concept as 	 345 
Rudeen does.273 It may even be that it was just the analysis of the 
real difference which contributed to the theologians' opposition to 
Rudeen's thesis. What Rudeen is suggesting here involves a radical 
change in the way the distinctions between different metaphysical ca-
tegories were conceived. According to Rudeen the only difference 
between a substance and its attributes was in the way of speaking, 
whereas the Aristotelian tradition stressed that there was a real onto-
logical distinction between them. The radicality of Rudeen's view lies 
precisely in its rejection of the ontological basis of Aristotelianism. 
In his excuse to Gezelius Rudeen later pleaded that he had not de-
fended these dogmas in the thesis, but only described and explained 
them. 
It was no less than two months later in March when another thesis 
of Rudeen was picked on by Gezelius. This time the thesis was written 
220 	 On Descartes' understanding of the innate ideas see Clarke 1982, p. 48-54. Clarke 
1989, Ch. 2. 
221 	 Rudeen-Chydenius 1697, Th. III. "Mentem å corpore realiter differre, nec ullum 
corpus posse cogitare." 
222 Rudeen-Chydenius 1697, Th. IV. "Cogitationem esse attributum & simul subs-
tantiam mentis. Non enim reqviritur in omni attributione, ut inter id quod tribuitur, 
& id cui attribuitur, diversitas intercedat; cum detur qvoqve talis modus loqvendi, 
qvo ostendimus, id qvod duobus pluribusve verbis intelligitur, esse rem unam et 
eandem." 
223 Hahn-Lundius 1690, Adsertum Prooemiale. "Has autem substantias realiter inter 
se differee, neminem sani judicii inficias iturum confido." 
by the respondent Clemens Thelaus and was called Cognatio artis 
atque naturae. Depending on the texts of J. Chr. Sturm, Thelaus stu-
died the correspondences between nature and the internal structure of 
artificial objects in his thesis. Instead of Gezelius himself it was the 
professor of metaphysics Simon Tålpo (Gezelius' son-in-law) who rai-
sed an accusation against the thesis before its ventilation. It was said 
to contain "principles which were contradictory to those which have 
always been accepted in this academy". Despite this the Senate of the 
University allowed the disputation to take place. Because Vice-Chan-
cellor Gezelius had earlier refused the public examination of the thesis, 
he turned the matter over to the Chancellor, Count Wallenstedt. Theo-
logians at the University supported Gezelius' move.224 
Rudeen's letter of response was very thorough. Although he 
emphasised his dogmatic purity in matters of the Lutheran religion, 
he did not deny being an adherent of the new philosophy. During his 
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studies at Uppsala it had been common to favour recentiorum prin- 
cipia, he stated. Why would it be wrong to support ideas, which com-
mon sense and experience had shown to be true? Rudeen maintained, 
however, that he was a slave neither of the Cartesian nor of any other 
philosophy, nor did he force his students to believe in this or that 
philosophy. With clear insight Rudeen expressed his wonder over the 
fact that his De mente humana had been attacked, although similar 
ideas had previously been proposed by Lundius seven years earlier 
without any trouble. All in all, if he was said to oppose true philosop-
hical principles, his accusers should define which principles should 
be called the right ones.225 The Faculty of Arts took Rudeen's side, 
and it seems that the conflict was over before the Chancellor's advice 
to let the matter drop arrived. 
Rudeen hits the mark in his response. It was first of all a question 
of the limits of freedom in philosophy, both in respect of the rela-
tionships between theology and philosophy and within philosophy it-
self. Because the theologians (and also most philosophers) saw phi-
losophy as subordinated to theology, they wanted to keep control over 
it as long as possible. Because theological dogmas were expressed in 
philosophical concepts the purity of the philosophy was very impor-
tant. At Turku there had been very little effort among philosophers 
224 Hultin 1902, p. 121-123. 
225 Hultin 1902, p. 123-125. 
to separate philosophical thought from theological, whereas at Uppsala 
this process had been going on since the 1660's. Rudeen's case was 
to be the first occasion when these boundaries were questioned in 
public at Turku. Although I have here emphasized the restrictive role 
of theology, the purity of dogmas was equally crucial for the survival 
of the scholastic philosophy. 
New definitions of the legitimate realm of philosophy were also 
demanded by Christiernus Alander.226 
 In spring 1697 several theses 
were published under his direction, which discussed the nature of aca-
demic learning and wisdom. However, Alander is very careful not to 
claim freedom of philosophy directly. In his De custodibus scientiarum 
he discusses the fact that there are different disciplines in the world 
of learning. On the other hand his Liber studiosus dissertatione aca-
demica limitatus considers mainly the external forms of students' li-
berty, for example their legal position.227 However, he defends "liber- 
ty" because of its usefulness, as long as it is based on the right kind 	 347 
of moral principles. 
Discussions on Dualism and the Mind-Body Problem 
It seems that problems concerning Cartesian philosophy were discus-
sed at the Academy more often than is apparent from written treatises. 
For example, Petrus Hahn announced that he would lecture upon va-
rious controversial ideas on cognition in 1704, and five years later he 
lectured upon "the principles of corporeal bodies" and claimed to solve 
the controversies which have occurred between old and more recent 
authors on this matter.228  Unfortunately the contents of his lectures 
are unknown. After Rudeen we actually meet a defender of Cartesian 
dualism only once more before the closure of the University in 1713. 
In 1707 a thesis which dealt with the actions of men, was published 
226 	 Alander was the professor of eloquence 1692-1704. 
227 Alander-Tolliin 1697. Alander-Werander 1697. Klinge 1987, p. 424-425. 
228 Elenchus Praelectionum, Catalogus 1704. "PETRUS HAHN Professor Physices 
ordinarius absolutis Principiis Cognitionis humanae, partem Physicae specialem 
suis Auditoribus, per praecepta methodica & perspicua, Deo vitam sufficiente 
explicabit, plenaque earum controversiarum, quas veteres & recentiores Philosop-
hi agitarunt, tractatione & decisione illustrabit." Catalogus 1709 "HAHN: Princi-
pia rerum Corporearum, earumque Affectiones proponet publice, singularesque 
de iisdem tam a veteribus quam recentiorubus Physicis agitatas controversias de-
cidet." 
under the presidium of the professor of mathematics, Laurentius Tam-
melin. As a student Tammelin had studied for a while at Leiden. A 
rumour exists that Tammelin would have written from there to Johan-
nes Gezelius Jr. In this letter he would have described the success of 
the new philosophy by saying that "all philosophers are Cartesians 
here".229  The collection of Gezelius' letters, which is kept at the State 
Archives of Finland in Helsinki does not unfortunately include this 
document. Our knowledge of the contents of this lost letter is therefore 
very fragmentary. In any case it seems probable that Tammelin knew 
something about Cartesian philosophy. It has been rightly noticed that 
Tammelin did not accept Cartesian cosmology.230 He did, however, 
allow a thoroughly Cartesian physical thesis to be published under his 
guidance. It is even possible that Tammelin was the co-author of this 
thesis.23' 
Tammelin and Hielm also proclaim dualism. Their reasoning is ty- 
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pical of Cartesian expositions of the subject. That cogitatio is the 
prime characteristic of the mind, and extension of the matter is argued 
for with the following well-known formula: 
...thus all things without which the soul can be understood to exist 
are different from it. When we have removed everything else, only 
cogitation remains inseparable from soul unless the concept itself 
is allowed to collapse. It follows that thinking is essential for 
mind. 232 
Matter could also be conceived in the same way without all other 
qualities except figure, magnitude and place. While some qualities 
such as extension were dependent on matter, the existence of colour, 
taste, smell, etc. was irrelevant to it. In physics applying this principle 
naturally meant giving up the Aristotelian mode of explaining natural 
229 Klinge 1987, p. 424. The story does not say whether this was a good or a bad 
thing in Tammelin's opinion and in which context he would have made this 
statement. 
230 Ibid. 
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	 The real author is, once again, an open question. The respondent Andreas Hielm 
does not announce himself as the author; but on the other hand, it was a graduate 
thesis, which were often written by the respondent. 
232 Tammelin-Hielm 1707, p. 3. "...ita ab anima differunt omnia ea, sine quibus illa 
intelligi possit: quoniam vero remotis omnibus, cogitatio sola ab anima sit inse-
parabilis nisi ejus conceptus evanescat; omnino sequitur, quod anima ea sit es-
sentialis." 
phenomena by having recourse to its qualitative characteristics. Hielm 
also claims a real distinction between the substances 233  According to 
him it was the clear and distinct perception of the concepts which 
guaranteed the reality of the distinction. 
Moreover, each of these substances, that which thinks and that 
which is extended offer us distinct concepts so that we can clearly 
and distinctly think of the one without the another. From this it can 
be concluded that there is a real distinction between them.234 
The mind-body problem inevitably followed the acceptance of Car-
tesian dualism. If there was no contact between the two substances, 
then how could the immaterial substance affect the material one and 
vice versa? Cartesian philosophy brutally cut the intimate connection 
between the body and the soul, and maintained that there was a phy-
sically and metaphysically real distinction between the substances 
mind and matter. This idea was defended in public for the first time 
by Lundius in 1690. Before 1713 he got only a handful of like-minded 
followers.235  The mind-body problem was also recognised at Turku 
and the problem was formulated as follows: 
I have said here that the soul is the cause of bodily movements. 
Because all motion happens through some mutual contact, I wonder 
in what way would an immaterial entity move a material?236 
233 Aristotelian and Cartesian philosophy had different meanings for the terms "real 
difference" and "substance". Whereas in Aristotelian tradition a real difference 
existed between two ontological categories like substance and accidence, for Des-
cartes it was a line between two equal substances of totally different natures. For 
Aristotelians a substance was any entity consisting of form and matter. According 
to Descartes a substance was an entity which could exist by itself, without getting 
any physical or logical help from other substances. Beside God there were only 
two entities, which fulfilled these conditions, i.e. mind and matter. On Descartes' 
meaning of the real distinction see Alanen 1982, p. 66-85. 
234 Tammelin-Hielm 1707, p. 4. "Porro, cum utraque haec substantia, cogitans nimi-
rum & extensa diversum sui nobis sistat conceptum, ita ut unam sine alters seor-
sim dare distincteque intelligere possimus, inferre id ipsum, patet, realem utrius-
que distinctionum." 
235 Hahn-Lundius 1690, Adsertum Prooemiale. Rudeen-Chydenius 1697, Th. I-V, 
XII. Tammelin-Hielm 1707, p. 2-3. 
236 Tammelin-Hielm 1707, p. 10. "Dixi gratis fingi animam motuum corporis esse 
caussam; cum enim omnis fiat motus per mutuum contactum, quomodo, amabo, 
immateriale materiale moveat?" 
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In the Cartesian dissertations written at Turku we find this question 
being answered only twice. Both authors discuss the subject only brief-
ly, and therefore it may be less appropriate to draw very thorough-
going conclusions from them. First of all, Lundius has accepted some 
form of psychophysical parallelism. Mind and body do not touch each 
other, but perform parallel movements. 
The soul and the body work alternately, so that certain movements 
which originate in the body border the soul. Certain ideas in the 
soul correspond to these movements, but the ideas in mind limit 
themselves to the point where they meet the body. In the same way 
certain movements in the body correspond to these ideas. We cannot 
explain this mutal reaction in any other way except that the Creator 
wanted in this way to connect these two extremely different essen-
ces, between which there is no other connection and proportion.237 
Lundius refers in this passage to the writings of the famous Car-
tesians Antonius Le Grand, Adriaan Heereboord and Johann Clauberg. 
Lundius' ideas seem to fulfil two of the demands which Winfried 
Weier has defined to construct proper occasionalism. Occasionalism 
should 1. expect soul and body to be two totally distinct substances, 
2. deny the possibility of any natural cause for their interaction, and 
3. attribute all interaction of the substances to the perpetual interfe-
rence of God. According to Weier these three requirements are essen-
tial for the various forms of occasionalism and thereby it is of no 
importance, whether the word "occasio" is present or not.238 Only in 
one aspect, not expecting God to direct perpetually the interaction 
between the substances, does Lundius not fulfil the criteria, but the 
formulation of his text rather seems to suggest that God has ordained 
this particular order at the beginning of time. As Weier concludes, 
not even Clauberg (whose works Lundius also refers to) fulfils this 
prerequisite of occasionalism completely.239 Despite this metaphysical- 
237 Hahn-Lundius 1690, p. 5-6. "Anima & corpus agunt in se invicem, adeo ut certi 
motus in corpore excitati terminentur in anima, quibus motib. certaz idece in anima 
respondent, & anima idece desinant in corpore, quibus ideis parili modo certi 
corporis motus respondent. Et hanc mutuam reactionem non aliter explicare va- 
lemus, quam quod conditor ita voluit adeo diversissimas essentia, inter quas con- 
nexio & proportio nulla, connectere." 
238 Weier 1981, p. 43. 
239 Weier 1981, p. 52-53. 
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ly important difference I shall refer to this explanation model as oc-
casionalism in the following discussion. 
Another standpoint which approaches occasionalism as well comes 
up in a thesis written by Tammelin and Hielm, according to whom 
soul and body had no mutual contact, but affected each other nevert-
heless. The question of how this happens still remains open: 
This action is performed... not as a consequence of a mutual contact 
...but... because certain movements in the body correspond to certain 
thoughts in the mind and conversely, so that the soul which moves 
by itself... stimulates certain movements in the body. But the body, 
moved in various ways, gives soul an occasion to bring forth divers 
ideas. There are manifold movements in the soul which depend on 
the body in that they could never exist in a soul not stimulated by 
the body. Indeed, even after they have started to exist, they exist 
necessarily as long as there is motion in the body. In the same way 	 351 
there are various operations in the body, which not only could not 
be exerted unless the soul was thinking, but also given this act of 
cogitation, they will be brought about necessarily.240 
Certain bodily movements would excite movements of mind and 
vice versa, but the mechanism for this remains obscure. In any case 
this schema involves more impulses or contact-like occasions between 
the two substances than Lundius' theory does. The same point of view 
was expressed by Hielm when he investigated the existence of diffe-
rent kinds of ideas in man. 
These kinds of mental concepts are usually called innate ideas. Not 
that the soul would always be conscious of them, but if the soul is 
left by itself it can find and choose them. Other ideas, which are 
formed in negotiations with the body, are called acquired ideas. Not 
240 Tammelin-Hielm 1707, p. 12. "Absolvitur haec actio... non secundum mutuum 
contactum, ...sed... quod scilicet certis animae cogitationibus, certi respondeant 
motus in corpore, & sic reciproce, ita nimirum, ut anima ex se mota, ...in corpore 
quasdam excitet operationes; corpus autem varie motum, animae occasionem 
praebeat varias ideas elicendi. Plurimi namque sunt motus animae, qui a corpore 
ita dependent, ut in anima corpore non agente nunquam existerent, immo etiam 
postquam existere caeperunt, ad durationem motus in corpore necessari existant. 
Sic quoque variae sunt corporis operationes, quae anima non cogitante, non modo 
non exererentur, sed etiam posita hac cogitatione, necessario eliciantur." 
because they are impressed on the soul by some images derived 
from external objects, but because the soul pays attention to these 
previously innate ideas only when the external objects offer them 
an occasion to think about them." 
One of the most famous ideas in the Cartesian psychology is that 
the soul might be located in the pineal gland. At least this is how 
some contemporary scholars understood Descartes.242  At Turku this 
idea was not accepted in such a crude form. According to Lundius 
the pineal gland was the seat of sensus communis, and a similar idea 
had been expressed somewhat earlier by Achrelius. Lundius 
emphasized, though, that the soul "is diffused through the whole 
body", although it showed some of its powers especially in the heart 
and brain.243  The theory of the pineal gland as a sort of "information 
managing centre" in the brain could as such be incorporated into the 
352 	 Aristotelian scheme too. 
The Question of Innate Ideas and Their Relation to 
the New Epistemology 
Descartes' philosophy gave rise to the old Platonic question about 
innate ideas. Both some of his arguments for the existence of God 
and geometrical proofs presupposed the existence of some sort of in-
nate idea.44  The epistemological slogan of the Aristotelian philosophy 
was largely incompatible with this, there being nothing in the intellect, 
which has not come through the senses. Although the basic Aristote-
lian epistemology stated that there could be scientific knowledge of 
the universals only, this knowledge was ultimately abstracted from 
particulars. Because of the idea that all the contents of our mind have 
241 	 Hahn-Hielm 1707, p. 14. "Cujusmodi conceptus mentis, innatorum nomine insig-
niri solent, non quod animze semper obversentur [=observentur, mk], sed quod 
possit anima Bibi relicta fillos elicere. Czeteri autem, qui non sine commercio cum 
corpore exeruntur, adventitii audiunt, non quod per species quasdam ab externis 
objectis animas; imprimantur, sed quod antea innatos anima tunc demum exerat, 
cum objecta externa occasionem prxbent de illis cogitandi." My italics. 
242 	 Hahn-Rungius 1691, § III. On Descartes' ideas about the seat of the soul see e.g. 
Voss 1993, p. 134-140. 
243 	 Achrelius 1682, p. 355-356. "sit diffusa in universum corpus" Hahn-Lundius 1690, 
p. 6. The idea of the pineal gland as the seat of common sense is present at least 
in the texts of Le Grand. Le Grand 1679, p. 875, 948 ff, et passim. 
244 Beyssade 1992, 1993. Doney 1978, p. 5-6. 
their origins in sense perceptions, perception played an important role 
in theories concerning cognition and thought. It had considerable sig-
nificance in epistemology. This Aristotelian "empiricism" was then 
fundamentally opposed to both Platonic and Cartesian theories of in-
nate ideas.245 
The philosophy at Turku shared this Aristotelian "nihil est in in-
tellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu" notion. It was claimed that all 
universal ideas in our minds were formed by the intellect, which abst-
racted them from singular notions derived from the senses:246 "We 
claim universals are obvious for understanding, for they are... per-
ceived by comparing particulars between each other, and by abstrac-
ting from the particulars."247 Contrary to this rather straightforward 
empiricism, Cartesianism notoriously doubted the reliability of the 
senses and thereby the validity of experiential knowledge. There is a 
feature in Cartesianism however which emphasises rationalism ins- 
tead. The most secure basis for philosophical knowledge for Descartes 	 353 
were certain innate notions or ideas, the most important of which was 
God, whose existence was for him the ultimate guarantee of stopping 
methodical doubt.248 What attitude did the authors at Turku take up 
towards innate ideas? It seems that the problem was discussed to any 
considerable extent only in the 1690's. Although Cartesian authors 
are not always mentioned, it is probable that these discussions were 
at least distantly inspired by Cartesianism. 
Descartes classified our ideas into three types: innate, adventitious 
and fictitious.749 This scheme was outlined for the first time at Turku 
by Achrelius. In his understanding of the theory, "ideas" played the 
same role as species intelligibiles in traditional Aristotelian psychology. 
We understand their habitus without organs with the help of ideas, 
which are things thought of, to the extent that they have objective 
being in the intellect. These Ideas such as the notions of the sun 
and the stars, are either acquired, or received from the things 
through the senses, or they are fictional, created by the intellect at 
245 
	 For a short but useful discussion of the topic see Marenbon 1987, p. 94-102. 
246 Miltopaeus-Enebergh 1667, Th. XXIX. 
247 Hahn-Bruzelius 1697, p. 12. "Universalia autem intellectioni obvia dicimus, per 
comparationem nempe singularium inter se, & per abstractionem ä singularibus... 
percipiantur." 
248 Descartes 1973, Vol. I, p. 157-171. 
249 Descartes 1973, Vol. I, p. 160. 
its own discretion. Such are the concepts of Chimera and Cerberus. 
Or they are innate, which follow the ability to think and the norms 
we have for forming concepts.25° 
This interpretation was typical of those authors who applied Car-
tesian philosophy only to a very limited extent.25' On the other hand, 
Andreas Hielm, who was a more convinced supporter of Cartesianism, 
stresses more the importance of innate ideas. Led by his occasionalistic 
philosophy he claims that adventitious ideas are "not impressed on 
the soul by some kind of image received from external objects, but 
are something which previously was innate, but which the soul con-
siders only then when external objects give it an occasion to think 
about them."252  In fact even adventitious ideas were thus to some ex-
tent innate. 
The most problematic of these three ideas for the Aristotelians was 
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the notion of innate ideas. Achrelius gave it the meaning of an ability 
to think and the power of forming concepts (cogitandi potentiam for-
mandique conceptus normam). Related to this view is the idea that 
the desire for knowledge is innate in all human beings. It was consi-
dered to be a relic of the Light kindled by God in man in his original 
state. This facultas cognoscendi was left in human beings after the 
Fall, but in a deteriorated state. Ignorance of the causes of things 
produces astonishment in man, who cannot stand the sadness caused 
by his ignorance and starts to investigate the causes of things. This 
constitutes philosophy and repels ignorance.253 
250 	 Achrelius 1682, p. 354. "Intelligimus eorum habitunem sine organis ope idearum, 
quae nihil aliud sunt quam res cogitatae in quantum habent objectivum esse in 
intellectu, suntque Ideae istae vel adventitiae, quae ex rebus per sensus trajectis 
recipiuntur, ut notitia de sole & sidenbus: vel fictitiae, quae pro arbitrio ab in-
tellectu configuntur, ut Chimera & cerberi conceptus: Vel innatae, quae cogitandi 
potentiam formandique conceptus norrram, comitantur." The passage is an almost 
direct quotation from Antonius Le Grand. Achrelius manages to fully integrate 
this passage into the Aristotelian theoretical framework. See Kallinen 1991a, p. 
122. Cf. also Descartes 1973, p. 163. 
251 	 See e.g. Hahn-Gaslander 1707, p. 15-16. Tammelin-Brumerus 1695, p. 2. 
252 Tammelin-Hielm 1707, p. 14. "...non quod per species quasdam ab externis ob-
jectis animae imprimantur, sed quod antea innatos anima tunt demum exerat, 
cum objecta externa occasionem praebent de illis cogitandi." 
253 	 Tålpo-Sidbeck 1700, p. 3, 11, et passim. Tålpo-Askbohm 1697, p. 29-35, et pas-
sim does not approve of admiration as such as the cause of inquiry, but diffe-
rentiates between vulgar and learned admiration. Tammelin-Brumerus 1695, p. 
2. Hahn-Frolander 1692, p. 7-8. 
This was not, of course, what the question of innate ideas funda-
mentally was about. The most thorough study of the problem of innate 
ideas was published as a dissertation by Hahn and Askebohm in 1695. 
The author of the theses, Askebohm, is clearly sympathetic to Car-
tesian philosophy, although he is not over-zealous. First of all he pre-
sents the Platonic model, in which our soul has in some previous state 
or life included all ideas. The conjunction with the body has then 
corrupted our innate knowledge, but we can become aware of those 
notions by recollecting them. Knowing is remembering. Totally op-
posite to this is the Aristotelian model as presented by Askebohm. 
According to him the human mind is like a tabula nuda, in which 
there are no notions at the time of birth. Only the faculty of acquiring 
knowledge through the senses was given to man.254 
Unlike most scholastic dissertations Askebohm's does not refute 
these standpoints in detail. He only asserts that "according to many 
of the most accurate Philosophers of our age, and the opinions of 	 355 
Orthodox Theologians" it was not right to claim that all our ideas are 
innate or that we receive all notions through the senses, but it was 
justifiable to assume that there also were innate ideas in man's mind.255 
In every man there was an innate idea of God, although only by thin-
king could this idea be made "clear and distinct" i.e. would man be-
come conscious of its presence.256  However, Askebohm's definition 
of ideas is broad and rather inaccurate. In his view ideas are all "per-
ceptions of the intellect, whenever we we understand something in 
some way."757 The idea of God is thus the only innate idea we have, 
although we are not always conscious of its presence in our minds. 
We have instead a faculty of recognizing it without any help from 
the senses.258 
254 Hahn-Askebohm 1695, p. 1-6. 
255 	 Hahn-Askebohm 1695, p. 7. "secundum plerorumque, nostrae aetatis adcuratis-
simorum Philosophorum, nec non Orthodoxorum Theologorum sententiam" See 
also Juslenius-Petrejus 1703, p. 9. 
256 	 Hahn-Askebohm 1695, p. 12, 24-25. Askebohm refers to St. Augustine, Du Hamel 
and Clauberg on this question. 
257 	 Hahn-Askebohm 1695, p. 11. "...intellectus perceptio, qvando rem aliqvam qvo-
cunqve modo concipimus." 
258 Hahn-Askebohm 1695, p.I1-13. "Hinc ideam seu notfonem Dei non ideo nobis 
innatam voluit Cartesius, qvasi semper nobis observentur, & non distinctum qvid 
ab ipsa facultate cogitandi sit; Sed qvod facultatem habeamus illam ex propriis 
ingenii viribus, absqve ullo sensuum experimento, aut incitamento nobis repra-
esentare." 
Despite his obvious sympathy for Cartesianism, Askebohm's opini-
on is by and large adaptable to the general view on the question ex-
pressed at Turku. His "innate idea" is in fact knowledge of God and/or 
an ability to realise certain notions which refer to God.259  The question 
of innate ideas was not purely a philosophical and epistemological 
one, but also had many implications in theological dogma. To claim 
innate ideas in the Platonic sense would have presupposed some kind 
of prenatal (and pre-conception) existence of the human soul - or even 
transmigration. Although this view was naturally rejected by the Lut-
heran dogma, the orthodox opinion nevertheless agreed that men had 
some accurately defined sort of innate knowledge of God.260 All the 
other contents of our mind were derived by abstraction from sense 
experience. 
The question of the existence of innate ideas is related to episte-
mology, which included one of the most striking differences between 
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the Aristotelian and Cartesian philosophies. It is my purpose in this 
subsection to determine, whether the Cartesian kind of epistemology 
got any foothold at Turku during this period. 
Although the Aristotelian tradition prevalent at Turku presupposed 
that all universal notions were abstracted from individual sense-per-
ceptions and that senses were thus the primary source of all know-
ledge, this empirical principle did not affect natural philosophy very 
much. In practice the study of nature was based on reverence for 
certain authorities. Even here we can see a discrepancy between the 
official policy and academic routine. Even though it was the "old 
authors" (i.e. authors of antiquity) which were considered the primary 
source of knowledge, in practice certain "new authors" were referred 
to at least equally eagerly. In Cartesianism there was also tension 
between certain epistemological claims and the practical search for 
scientific knowledge. The rationalistic side of Cartesianism 
emphasised that mathematics should be applied to physics. But more 
importantly it stressed the point that the first principles of philosophy 
were derived from man's own thought without any recourse to sen-
se-perception. 
Descartes notoriously claimed repeatedly to have founded his phy-
sics on metaphysical, rational principles and - most of all - on mat- 
259 Hahn-Littorinus 1685, § Il-III, et passim. 
260 See Lindborg 1965, p. 70-72. 
hematical ratiocination. Most contemporaries of Descartes - and lat-
ter-day historians of philosophy as well - have taken Descartes' words 
at face value. However, this was an ideal which, while it could perhaps 
be approached, was as hopeless of fulfilment in most of the natural 
science as the Aristotelian study of nature was of reaching its ideal 
of strictly syllogistic science based on indemonstrable principles. In 
fact, Cartesian philosophy was far from hostile to empiricism, if we 
only take into account what role he gives to experience. Despite his 
distrust of what we would call scientific experiments, Descartes did 
not deny the importance of "ordinary experience" in acquiring know-
ledge about the physical world. Adequately controlled, even experi-
mentalism might have a place in Descartes' science.76t 
Empirism in the early modern sense of the word, and experimen-
talism as its more technical form did not arrive at the University of 
Turku until late in the 18th century. At Uppsala this empirical attitude 
had increasingly gained ground during the 17th century, especially in 	 357 
the Faculty of Medicine. Indeed, the free teaching of Cartesianism 
was argued for because of its benefits for experimental philosophy.262 
At Turku philosophical justification of new knowledge had just begun 
during the period concerned. The role of experience in gaining new 
knowledge was argued for in two theses published during the first 
decade of the 18th century. The thesis of Juslenius and Brunnius es-
pecially, at least as much inspired by Cartesian as Baconian ideas 
about experience, takes a positive stance towards gaining new know-
ledge through experience; using new and uncommon methods was not 
indefensible if the results gained matched the requirements of right 
reason, experience and the Bible.263 
Brunnius and Petrejus treat experience from the psychological and 
cognitive point of view. What about experiments and other new met- 
261 Clarke 1982, 1989, 1992. 
262 Lindborg 1965, p. 301 ff. 
263 Juslenius-Brunnius 1709, p. 27-28. "Non itaque quod Philosophia indies incre-
mentum capiat, ceu videmus ex scriptis recentioribus, quippe multas res multi 
per experientiam observarunt antea ignotas, unde & disciplinas insigniter auxe-
runt, multasque res solutu difficiles explicuerunt. Procedunt quidam eorum met-
hodo nova & insolita, non tamen ideo plane rejiciendi, si saltem dogmata eorum 
conveniant rectae rationi & experientiae, quibus tertium quoque requisitum nos 
Christiani addere debemus, nimirum ut nostra Philosophia non deroget Sacrae 
Scripturae, siquidem ei subordinata esse debet, non vero vi propriae indolis eidem 
contraria." See also Juslenius-Petrejus 1703. Knuuttila & Niiniluoto 1986, p. 30-
32 analyse the Baconian influences in these two theses. 
hodologies as scientific practice at Turku? Pryss' description of the 
glass ball experiment explaining the origin of the colours of a rainbow 
is merely a faint echo of the empiricist program so central to Cartesian 
science. The geometrical exposition of the subject aimed primarily at 
conceptualization of an experiment, whether just a thought experiment 
or one actually performed. It is striking that the first dissertations at 
Turku, where much of the argument and description was based on the 
general sort of observation, were written by a man who stood for 
Cartesianism. Although Rudeen's theses on the swansong and on seals 
do include a lot of first-hand observations, they do not express any 
vows on epistemology.264 
The rationalistic reading of Cartesian epistemology gained only litt-
le ground at the University, from the 1690's on. The certainty of geo-
metrical proofs was not discussed, and more generally the discussion 
of innate ideas concentrated exclusively on the idea of God. Olaus 
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Askebohm was the first author at Turku who proposed a Cartesian- 
influenced theory of the epistemology of man. We have also noted 
that Torsten Rudeen briefly questioned the validity of Aristotelian 
epistemology. However, Rudeen's statement is painfully laconic: "It 
is false to say: There is nothing in the intellect which has not come 
through the senses."765 Ten years later Andreas Hielm gave a fuller 
analysis of the innate and "adventitious" ideas, although Askebohm 
had already followed the same line of thought. Both Hielm and As-
kebohm accepted only one innate idea: the idea of God. This was 
central to the Cartesian dogma also, and was supported by the ortho-
dox Lutherans.266  The arising of the Cartesian rationalism at Turku 
was thus very restrained and did not give rise to further polemics. 
Moreover, the understanding of the role of "innate ideas" in Cartesian 
philosophy is here restricted to the way innate ideas were traditionally 
conceived of in the form of the Aristotelian philosophy which was 
approved at Turku. A slightly different kind of theme, which nevert-
heless was very much related to Cartesian epistemology was more 
positively dealt with only in one dissertation concerned with the corn- 
264 Rudeen-Granroot 1703. Rudeen-Wijkar 1707. The "empiricism" in these theses 
was so general that it was perfectly compatible with the Aristotelian view of 
empiricism too. 
265 Rudeen-Chydenius 1697, Th. XI. "Falsum esse: Nihil esse in intellectu, qvod 
prius non fuit in sensu." 
266 See e.g. Lindborg 1965, p. 71. 
patibility of Aristotelian and Cartesian ideas. 
It had been a much-used strategy among Central European Car-
tesians to claim that their "new" philosophy was actually a pure and 
orthodox presentation of "the old" philosophy.267 At Turku only Ru-
deen had used the argument in his quarrel with Bishop Gezelius. Aris-
totelian-Scholastic and Cartesian philosophies were considered cont-
rary to each other until the eve of the Russian invasion, especially by 
the proponents of the old philosophy. In 1712 a physics dissertation 
was published, in which the relation between the old and new phi-
losophies was considered from a different point of view. 
To begin with Asplund regards the fact that when some people call 
Cartesianism a "new" philosophy, they actually mean it is false, in 
any case only one could be right. However, as not everything in clas-
sical philosophy was true, not everything could be wrong in Car-
tesianism.268 First of all, there was Cartesian doubt. Was it "new" and 
impious? The fact was, claimed Asplund, that even the greatest of 	 359 
ancient authorities, Plato and Aristotle, would have regarded doubt as 
the mother of all inquiry. For Asplund Cartesian doubt meant primarily 
amazement and uncertainty about the causes of natural things, which 
preceded the search for knowledge. In this sense Asplund comes very 
near to the traditional understanding of admiratio as the ultimate ins-
piration of philosophy. On the other hand methodical doubt for As-
plund also meant suspensium judicii before the truth was revealed.269 
Asplund also tackled the problem involved in the crucial point in 
Cartesian metaphysics which led man to doubt the existence of God 
and the real contents of his own mind. Although Asplund saw the 
sensitivity and centrality of these aspects in the Cartesian theory of 
doubt, he considered himself able to achieve a consensus between the 
rival views.270 Doubt would by no means be unlimited, but it confined 
itself to the notion of a thinking subject: "Whoever doubts, is in any 
case thinking, and from this it follows that he exists."271 Thus, Asplund 
reached the secure ground of non-dubitation on the same shore as 
Descartes had done. However, being a new idea was in itself some- 
267 	 E.g. Clarke 1989, p. 36-37. 
268 Hahn-Asplund 1712, p. 4-6. 
269 Halm-Asplund 1712, p. 7-15. 
270 Halm-Asplund 1712, p. 16. 
271 
	 Halm-Asplund 1712, p. 20. "Qui enim dubitat, cogitat utique, atque ex hoc ipso 
sequitur eum esse." 
thing very questionable at Turku, and Asplund had to dispel the sha-
dow which the alleged innovation cast upon methodical doubt, so he 
reminded his readers that the certainty about one's own existence had 
been guaranteed for the first time in the same way by St. Augustine. 
Not even this was first and foremost a new idea. Ultimately all our 
knowledge was established by the existence of God. 
It follows that the natural Light or the faculty of knowing which 
GOD has given to us, can never deal with any object which would 
not be true, as far as it is understood in itself, i.e. it is perceived 
clearly and distinctly.2n 
Whatever was perceived clearly and distinctly, could not be wrong, 
because God loved the truth. Doubt only liberated mind from the pre-
judices acquired in childhood. Asplund's strategy was to show the 
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acceptability of certain Cartesian notions by showing their compati- 
bility with ancient theories; thus he reduced the Cartesian idea that 
mind consists of pure thought to Platonic and Epicurean theories, and 
the theory of innate ideas to Plato.273 However, one had to be careful 
because not all the ideas of the classical philosophers could be em-
braced either. All in all, the new philosophy was regarded as very 
useful especially in experimental sciences like medicine and chemist-
ry, and in mathematics. The important thing was that no philosophy, 
old or new, should plunge the light of revelation into darkness. The 
Bible should remain the final judge in matters of physics, too.274 
It is an interesting notion that many of Descartes' Central European 
critics had also tried to show his unoriginality. During the 17th century 
for example Libertus Fromondus, and Pierre-Daniel Huet especially 
attacked Descartes as a reviver of old heresies and a plagiarist. By 
the 18th century this view of Descartes vanished and although many 
of his theories were still rejected, he was nevertheless in this respect 
granted a position of something like "the founder of modem philosop-
hy".275 Askebohm possibly knew the work of Huet and at least he 
272 Hahn-Asplund 1712, p. 24. "Unde sequitur, Lumen naturae sive cognoscendi fa-
cultatem, a DEO nobis datam, nullum unquam objectum posse attingere, quod 
non sit verum, quatenus ab ipso attingitur, h.e. quatenus Clare & distinct& perci-
pitur." 
273 Hahn-Asplund 1712, p. 36-43. 
274 Halm-Asplund 1712, p. 45-48. 
275 Jolley 1992, p. 409-410, 416-419. 
referred to it.276 But he turned the accusations of Descartes' unori-
ginality into his good. In a context where proposing novelties was 
officially forbidden this is an easily understandable strategy. Although 
Ascbohm strove to strip Cartesianism of its original features, he de-
finitely took the side of the new philosophy. Cartesianism was disp-
layed in a good light. 
I have in this chapter described the fate of Cartesianism at the 
Academy of Turku. This course of events was independent at Turku 
in the sense that it was not launched by the heated controversies which 
took place at Uppsala. Arguments for and against Cartesianism did 
obviously circulate much more easily, although this work has not con-
centrated upon tracing their origins in European literature. There were 
no "real" Cartesian disputes at Turku as there were in Uppsala, ex-
cluding perhaps the one in which Rudeen was involved. The contro-
versies which touched on persons having something to do with Car-
tesiansim were motivated by many other, often personal causes as 
well. Cartesianism was first discussed by Laurbecchius in 1661, who 
connected Cartesianism with Copernicanism. It was only in the 1680's 
that refutations of the Cartesian concepts of substance began to appear 
in physical theses, and in the following decade discussion widened to 
embrace dualism and the mechanistic philosophy more generally. It 
was common to all these discussions to see Cartesianism breaking the 
accepted methodological rules or ontological categorizations. It is re-
vealing that most of the proponents of certain Cartesian physical ideas 
from the 1680's on concentrated on minor details of the philosohy 
and retained its traditional Aristotelian framework. Although Car-
tesianism was discussed at Turku, we cannot talk about "Cartesianiza-
tion" of the University during the period concerned. Cartesian dualism 
gained only some three proponents in physical dissertations, whereas 
various physical ideas were somewhat more popular. In the next chap-
ter of this work some remarks will be made concerning this obvious 
reluctance to accept new ideas. 
276 Hahn-Asplund 1712, p. 9. 
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Stability and Change: 
Concluding Remarks 
1. THE INTERPLAY OF CHANGE 
AND STABILITY 
History of science is primarily interested in describing and explaining 
scientific change. However, in practice much discussion is also devo-
ted to questions concerning special features of the "normal science" 
of a time - to use the well-known Kuhnian term in a deliberately 
vague sense. We have in the foregoing discussion seen how both the 
contents and method of natural philosophy remained to a great extent 
unchanged during the period concerned. Of course, this is not to say 
that minor changes in learning and emphasis on particular topics 
would not have occurred within the Aristotelian framework, too. The 
first task in this chapter is to achieve an overview of the question 
which this kind of situation naturally raises: what changed and what 
remained unchanged in natural philosophical learning at Turku? What 
is even more important is to try to find explanations for this. Most of 
this chapter concentrates therefore on pondering probable causes and 
other background factors for this relatively great stability. 
I would regard it as useful to bring up certain concepts and dis-
tinctions concerning our subject matter before I examine the interplay 
of change and stability. In the chapters "The Academic Context of 
Natural Philosophy" and "The Body of Knowledge" especially I have 
discussed topics which could by and large be called as "images of 
knowledge" and the "body of knowledge" respectively. These concepts 
are a part of the scheme introduced by Yehuda Elkana for considering 
science as a cultural system. In this scheme Elkana tries to capture 
some universally applicable components in science, which we could 
use to analyse not only modern science but also previous systems 
which we usually classify as "sciences". According to Elkana 
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Knowledge grows by the interaction of three factors which can be 
distinguished only if time is stopped and a socio-cultural situation 
is, so to speak, photographed. I am idealizing for the sake of clarity. 
Three factors will be: (a) the body of knowledge; (b) the socially 
determined images of knowledge; (c) values and norms included in 
ideologies which do not directly depend on the images of know-
ledge.' 
I have several reservations concerning Elkana's scheme. First of 
all we should be careful about the sense in which we can say that 
scientific knowledge grows or progresses; in scientific change certain 
elements are usually rejected, some aspects re-interpreted and only a 
part of the material is new in the sense of adding something to the 
growth. Elkana seems to refer here to growth in a situation which 
Kuhn would call "normal science". On the other hand I am not con- 
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vinced that all "photographs" of science would produce a picture di- 
vided in this way. By distinguishing between factors (b) and (c) Elkana 
actually revives the old distinction between "internal" and "external" 
in science. There are the images of knowledge, which although so-
cially determined are nevertheless somehow inherent in science. On 
the other hand there are values and norms "external" to science proper, 
i.e. the images plus the body of knowledge. 
However, the internal-external dichotomy is more or less an imp-
ression produced by certain kinds of lighting techniques and the speed 
of the film than by the firmly verifiable characteristics of the object 
of the photograph. As many of the recent studies in sociology of scien-
tific knowledge (hereafter SSK) have shown, this kind of distinction 
is hardly tenable.' Elkana's theory is very schematic which gives rise 
to certain defects. It does not, for example, illustrate how these images 
of knowledge are formed. Neither does it shed much light on the 
problem of how these three factors contribute to scientific change - 
let alone explaining why these changes occur. In fact, all it does is to 
offer us one way to outline a situation where a scientific controversy 
is caused when two or more images and/or bodies of knowledge clash.' 
Elkana 1981, p. 14. For a German version of Elkana's paper see Elkana 1986. 
2 The literature arguing for this point is vast and increasing. For some classical 
representations see Barnes 1977. Knorr-Cetina 1981. Latour 1987, 1988. 
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	 This is actually what Elkana himself does in his paper. Elkana 1981, p. 21-27. 
Shapin 1979, 1992. The latter provides a useful overview on the whole internal- 
In spite of all my criticism I have found the concepts "images of 
knowledge" and "body of knowledge" convenient for descriptive pur-
poses. I shall use it here only as a heuristic model for outlining my 
presentation without wanting to commit myself more deeply to the 
views Elkana's theory involves. Let us first consider what kind of 
changes we can discern in the "body of knowledge" i.e. ideas and 
theories held as true knowledge by at least some members of the 
academic community.4 If not specified otherwise, the group of scholars 
referred to here are the authors writing on natural philosophy, ast-
ronomy or medicine. 
We can talk about theoretical change in several respects when it 
comes to the Academy of Turku. It is not my intention here to recite 
all the changes which occurred in each branch of natural philosophical 
knowledge. This can be best done by going back to the relevant sub-
sections of the chapters above. I am trying instead to typify the chan- 
ges in a way which reflects the depth to which each change touches 	 365 
the doctrinal basis of Aristotelian natural philosophy. Most of the 
changes occurred within this system and implied only modifications 
of the existing body of knowledge. For example, apart from the very 
first theses on the structure of the world, the idea of clearly definable 
elementary spheres - and especially the existence of the fiery sphere 
just below the moon - was largely rejected from the 1650's on. The 
idea of elementary spheres was an essential part of the Aristotelian 
world-view. However, rejecting this notion did not lead to the rejection 
of the entire Aristotelian theory of elements or the dichotomy between 
sublunar and supralunar areas. 
Not only could a part of an old theory or theoretical system be 
dismissed, but ideas alien to Aristotelian physics could also be intro-
duced. We have seen how some Cartesian ideas could be merged, e.g. 
in meteorology, without inflicting major change on the fundamental 
concepts of physical theory. Eclecticism, a typical feature of the 17th-
century learning at Turku, functioned very much in this way, limiting 
itself to the Aristotelian framework. It is very typical of all changes 
of this kind that they mostly concern only minor details of the theo-
retical structure, and leave the fundamental assumptions untouched. It 
is not always easy to determine how widely accepted these changes 
external controversy. 
4 Elkana 1981, p. 14. 
in theoretical details were, because some issues were discussed only 
by a few authors anyway. On the other hand it was not unusual that 
contradictory views were put forward by several authors at about the 
same time, but without any controversy between them (especially in 
some theses published by Halm) - or that opposing ideas were pro-
moted even by a single author.' 
It was very unusual at Turku that a new theory was embraced "as 
a whole". Actually the only possible instance of this kind of develop-
ment is the acceptance of the theory of the circulation of blood. Even 
here I prefer to put the expression "as a whole" in parentheses. It is 
true that the main idea that the blood circulates in human and animal 
bodies along arteries and veins with movement caused by the heart, 
is embraced by the few authors who in the first place refer to the 
matter.6 However, this theory which was originally promoted by Wil-
liam Harvey had lived through several modifications before it was 
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"accepted" at Turku. It was first cited at Turku in its Cartesian form, 
and later commentators tended to simplify its presentation even more. 
At the same time there was also a tendency to turn back towards the 
Galenic understanding of the subject, as is obvious from the treatment 
Gezelius gives it. 
There are a lot more examples available from the third type of 
change which took place in the body of natural philosophical know-
ledge at Turku. Let me start with an example which at the same time 
illustrates the still valid hierarchy of knowledge in the Aristotelian 
philosophical system. Although mathematical astronomy was ranked 
lower in the epistemological hierarchy than physics, in physics the 
knowledge of heavenly bodies was regarded as more noble than that 
of the elementary world. Hence, whereas the homogeneity of the sub-
lunary world was accepted by practically all scholars at Turku (as far 
as can be judged by the sources), the homogeneity of the world was 
a view embraced only by a meagre handful of authors.' Erasing the 
dichotomy between heavenly and elementary worlds would at the 
same time have presupposed rearrangements in the order of knowledge 
too. Not surprisingly the kind of theory which contradicted some of 
5 	 E.g. Kallinen 1993, p. 75-82. 
6 This is said with the reservation that in Hahn-Gezelius the doctrine is unclear 
enough to allow other readings. See chapter "Anatomy and Physiology". 
7 	 The first proponent of the idea at Turku was, of course, Daniel Achrelius. The 
view seems to be involved also in the Cartesian heliocentrism of Magnus Steen. 
the more central doctrines in the dominant philosophical system were 
favoured by fewer scholars. Often they were also actively criticised, 
not only by authors in the same discipline but by other scholars too. 
Copernicanism is a theory the spread and acceptance of which in 
different European countries is possibly the most widely-studied topic 
of its kind relating to the 17th century.' The acceptance of Copemi-
canism has often been seen as one of the main indicators of a suc-
cessful breakthrough of the Scientific Revolution. Although accepting 
Copemicanism is of course an immense change in science and the 
entire world view, I prefer not to measure the success of revolution 
by it, since many other factors contributed to the rise of modem scien-
ce as well. With such a mathematically complicated theory as Coper-
nicanism, we must be even more careful when talking about the chan-
ge its acceptance produces in the body of knowledge. First of all we 
have to notice the difference it makes to embrace it as a mathematical 
hypothesis and "instrument" for calculation on one hand and as a phy-
sical truth on the other. Moreover, a difficult theoretical construct was 
probably not understood equally fully by all scholars. There must have 
been differences between the understanding physicists with little or 
no mathematical training had of it and how mathematicians - who 
also were bright to various degrees - saw the theory. At Turku all 
scholars, including theologians, were ready to accept Copernicanism 
as a hypothesis, whereas only Magnus Steen seems to have been ready 
to consider the theory also physically true. His astronomy also merges 
Copemicanism with the Cartesian theory of planetary vortices. Coper-
nicanism as well as some other physical and metaphysical ideas such 
as Cartesian dualism or mechanical explanations in physics were very 
controversial because they challenged certain theological and me-
taphysical ideas. They could also presuppose changes in the images 
of knowledge. 
According to Elkana the images of knowledge are factors deter-
mining what counts as knowledge in a given (scientific) culture at a 
certain time. Each culture has several sources of knowledge, such as 
sense-experience, tradition, authority, ratiocination, analogy, beauty 
and many others. All these sources must be legitimized and they usu-
ally have a mutual order or different degrees of importance. In Elka-
na's view the location of an image of knowledge on a sacred-secular 
8 See e.g. Dobrzycki (ed.) 1972. 
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continuum is also a central component of the images in general, but 
in my opinion we can see this as a special case of legitimization of 
knowledge.' Elkana also counts the audience or public which shares 
the images of knowledge, the time-scale continuum and degree of 
consciousness of the existence of a special image as contributing to 
the formation of images of knowledge. However, in my view these 
factors are relevant in respect of the body of knowledge as well. At 
this point it might also be emphasized that the images and body of 
knowledge are in many ways interdependent.10 The other side of this 
interplay is clearly remarked by Elkana when he writes: "Very often 
images of knowledge determine the acceptance of a new theory or of 
a new fact (i.e., they determine that a 'fact' is indeed a fact), even 
before the body of knowledge supplies all the necessary tools."" El-
kana does not in fact explain in his paper what kind of role he thinks 
the body of knowledge plays in forming an image of knowledge and 
368 	 yet he stresses their interaction. "- 
As I have shown in chapter "The Academical Context of Natural 
Philosophy", the disciplinary structure at the Academy of Turku mir-
rored the epistemological boundaries between the disciplines. Each 
branch of study had its proper subject matter, legitimate methodologies 
and distinct aims, which together framed the scope of study for each 
discipline. It is typical of the learning at Turku that both these "partial" 
images of knowledge in each discipline, and the "meta-image of know-
ledge" by which the structure of the whole system of knowledge was 
justified, were shared and recognized as valid by the entire academic 
community. A special feature in almost all knowledge, but especially 
in natural philosophical knowledge, was that it was directed at the 
very community which produced it. There was no attempt to engage 
the lay public in the use and acceptance of these images, as is the 
case in modern science to some extent. But the closedness of natural 
philosophical knowledge is evident also in comparison with other dis- 
9 Elkana 1981, p. 16-17. In 17th century scholastic Aristotelianism at Turku we 
cannot distinguish between "a theological framework and a scientific conceptual 
structure" at least according to modem criteria. In fact the "location on the sac-
red-secular continuum" played an important role in legitimizing the hierarchy of 
the various sources of knowledge, with religiously legitimizable knowledge oc-
cupying the top place. 
'° 	 Elkana 1981, p. 15-21. 
11 	 Elkana 1981, p. 56. 
12 	 Elkana 1981, p. 13-14. 
ciplines. The function of theological knowledge was to save the souls 
of the people and the aim of medicine was to cure their bodies. Com-
putation of planetary movements was an essential tool for compiling 
almanacs and in this way it became "useful" for the non-academic 
public, but natural philosophical knowledge mainly had only self-re-
ferential motivations. Knowing the causes of things was important in 
itself and at most it served as a key to wisdom. It also formed the 
basis on which medical knowledge was built. Finally it contributed 
to our knowledge of the Creator as well and thus it gave support to 
theology. These essential features in learning remained basically the 
same during the whole period concerned. 
Although the general picture remains stable, minor changes occur-
red in the images of knowledge. There are some stylistic and metho-
dological peculiarities, and changes in the emphasis of trends in re-
search, which to some extent represent change in the images of know- 
ledge. We shall next have a brief look at these three topics. I have 	 369 
argued in subsection "The Order of Disciplines" that the order of pre-
sentation in physical dissertations was closely bound to the proper 
method of enquiry in natural philosophy. Therefore, seemingly harm-
less stylistic changes can in fact imply more profound changes in the 
field of images of knowledge. The author whose peculiar style came 
under discussion at the end of the 1670's was Daniel Achrelius. He 
gives us to understand in the preface to his Contemplationes mundi 
that he had been criticised for his unusual style, among other things. 
This is somewhat odd, because in the controversy which arose in the 
Senate of the Academy, one of the main factors which spoke for the 
continued publication of Achrelius' theses was its style. 
It is true, however, that Achrelius for the most part omitted certain 
central features in the dissertation tradition. He only seldom paid at-
tention to the nominal definitions of things. His style of expression 
is, of course, unusually ornate and eloquent in other respects too. Ig-
noring nominal definitions certainly involves a re-evaluation of the 
purpose and valid methods of natural philosophy. According to Ach-
relius pondering etymologies, synonymies and homonymies would not 
bring out much essential knowledge of a thing and therefore the value 
of the entire procedure decreased in his eyes. This kind of thinking 
was naturally against the philosophical tradition, and diverging from 
tradition was an insult against the established hierarchy of legitimate 
sources of knowledge. In spite of this, not even Achrelius called the 
grand aim of philosophy into question: he also strove to know the 
causes of things, even though his idea of what contributes to this 
knowledge was slightly different from the others. 
Similar and more far-reaching stylistic changes can be found in 
Cartesian dissertations. Interestingly enough the very same Achrelius 
praises Andreas Lundius in a gratulation for the latter's Cartesian phy-
siological thesis for not immersing himself in scholastic terminology, 
which he regards as obscure. Observation and dissection instead are 
much more clear and reliable sources of knowledge according to Ach-
relius. Although Achrelius' presentation of the "old method" is over-
done, a caricature, its main point is the attack on the dominant position 
of tradition as a judge of what counts as real knowledge.13 
The "genuinely" Cartesian authors, Lundius and Torsten Rudeen of 
course had clearly different kinds of images of knowledge to the more 
traditional authors. They rejected the Aristotelian four causes and con-
centrated their examination on "efficient" causes only as they could 
be explained in mechanistic terms. The dualistic conception of subs-
tance also rendered the typical Aristotelian questions of matter and 
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form irrelevant from the Cartesian point of view. Not only was the 
proper scope of inquiry different in Cartesianism, but they also had 
different views on what counts as an explanation and which sources 
of knowledge were the best for finding them. However, even if their 
images of knowledge were different from the Aristotelian ones, the 
Cartesians did not entiely reject all theories and conceptions which 
could be placed on the body of knowledge side. It was more usual 
for them to modify and transform a physical theory or a concept than 
to reject it altogether. Moreover, the body of knowledge can consist 
of several strata, so that even the borderline with images of knowledge 
may become blurred. Let me offer just one example which illustrates 
these two points. The existence of thunderstones (lapis fulminaris) 
was accepted both by Aristotelians and Cartesians as well. However, 
Cartesians explained their origin by mechanistic causes, and Descartes 
also tried to demonstrate this by arranging an experiment. Causal ex-
planations are of course a part of the theory (body of knowledge), but 
at the same time the plausibility of certain kinds of explanations de-
pends on further assumptions concerning the nature of knowledge in 
general (images of knowledge). 
The third type of change in the images of knowledge, namely chan-
ges of emphasis in the orientation of research, is in external appearan-
ce very much related to the stylistic changes discussed above. We 
13 Hahn-Lundius 1690, "Pereximie Dn. Respondens, ... Tuus D. Achrelius". 
have seen how the concept of form, and especially ideas on the pro-
pagation of form were argued in detail until the 1660's. That the prob-
lem was less discussed in the 1670's may be mere chance, as the 
main interest areas lay elsewhere. In the 1680's and 1690's the same 
fundamental ideas about the propagation of form were obviously ac-
cepted as before, but now the doctrine is usually briefly stated as a 
matter of fact. The theory is not always even explicitly argued for, 
but is simply presupposed as a prerequisite for the explanation of 
related problems and thus left unarticulated. This change of emphasis 
is caused by the change in the status of the doctrine in question. Ob-
viously the degree of certainty of the idea of the propagation of form 
was less stable in the early decades f the Academy of Turku. Although 
no clear antagonist to this theory can be pointed out, the detailed 
argumentation also served as establishing the preferred view among 
the local academics as well. This Sennertian interpretation of the pro- 
pagation of form was of course rather new in the 1640's, which might 	 371 
explain the thorough way it was taught at the Academy. When the 
status of this idea stabilised in the course of years, the need to argue 
for it so explicitly diminished. This change then becomes visible in 
the choice of dissertation themes and other stylistic features. 
A somewhat similar change of emphasis can be discerned in ast-
ronomical discussions. Now in the first two or three decades of the 
existence of the Academy physical theses on cosmology tended to be 
very general. Alanus and Thauvonius especially present summary 
overviews of the general structure of the universe. Things are stated 
as matters of fact, and certain ancient conceptions or Copemicanism 
are only perfunctorily argued against. One gets the impression that 
this was done because a good thesis had to argue against something 
simply for dialectical practice. However, during the last quarter of the 
century much more specific topics such as comets or the Sun are 
discussed. This change expresses itself as a change of literary genre 
from systematic compilation of theses (factual statements) to the type 
of dissertation which consists of nominal and pragmatic definitions. 
Thus the scope of questions to be asked is differently structured, or 
at least emphasised in a different way in these theses. On the other 
hand, mathematical astronomy first started to attack Copemicanism in 
earnest. Not that it would have been embraced by physicists either, 
but the mathematicians were the first who built some parts of their 
argumentation around opposing one and defending another theory. 
Although the discussion of Copemicanism was not as dominant a the-
me in astronomical discussions at Turku as might be imagined, it 
probably shaped the approach of most physicists too. If nothing else, 
the emergence of a potential enemy made the scholars more conscious 
of the legitimate body and images of knowledge in both physical and 
mathematical astronomy. Aspects which were accepted but might have 
stayed unarticulated were now brought into discussion with a new 
intensity. 
It might be pointed out here that these kinds of changes of emphasis 
occur within the dominant philosophical system and they do not in-
volve a change from one tradition or conceptual framework to another. 
Not even new theories are integrated into the old body of knowledge. 
The changes of emphasis can therefore be called changes in the images 
of knowledge only as far as the degree of certainty of some parts of 
the conceptual and theoretical apparatus involves changes. Moreover, 
all the three types of the change listed here as mutations in the images 
of knowledge are trifling when seen from the viewpoint of the totality. 
The more fundamental assumptions about the nature and aims of 
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knowledge remain the same. Only Cartesianism presents clearly dif- 
ferent images of knowledge at Turku, but at this time they do not 
attract very wide support at the Academy. If we follow the model 
presented by Elkana, the relative stability of the images of knowledge 
should account for the strikingly small amount and limited depth of 
changes in the body of knowledge." I am very much inclined to accept 
this view. However, I would like to look for explanations for this 
stability from a slightly different point of view, and in this job Elka-
na's concepts are of much less use. I shall come back to the problem 
of stability somewhat later below. Before plunging into that problem, 
however, I shall deal with a matter which has much to do with the 
way the body of knowledge - and even the images of knowledge - 
are formed. 
I have in this subsection tried to create a picture of the nature of 
change in natural philosophy. One of the most typical ways in which 
change occurs in the history of science is the dissemination of know-
ledge. This concerns practically all aspects of science: theories, met-
hodologies, instruments, types of institutional organization, and so 
forth. I have pointed out earlier in this work that dissemination always 
involves many kinds of modifications and transformations of know-
ledge and this may happen in several ways among different groups 
of people. A special example of how such dissemination of knowledge 
14 Elkana 1981, passim. 
works is eclecticism, a process in which several kinds of ideas are 
combined, modified and accepted. Eclecticism is thus also a force 
which for its part generates scientific change in this particular histo-
rical context. 
2. THE ROLE OF ECLECTICISM 
The 17th century was a period in European learning when several 
traditions of natural philosophical learning - or images of knowledge 
- competed for their place in the sun of acceptance. Traditional Aris-
totelianism struggled to hold its dominant position in the learning at 
the universities. Baconian empiricism offered a new model of science 
especially in England, whereas on the Continent the Cartesian phi-
losophy also achieved some success. On the other hand occult and 
cabbalistic traditions still offered a serious alternative for the acquisiti-
on of knowledge. One approach to science and philosophy which was 
developed in this shambles of methodologies was eclecticism. On one 
hand it was not unusual at 17th century universities to read both "old" 
and "new" authors, but on the other hand eclecticism also became a 
defined position.15 
Eclecticism (in the sense I shall give it in the following) was per-
haps not a wide-spread viewpoint in its own time and in our days it 
certainly is not a very well known philosophy. Indeed, excluding some 
quite recent studies in history of science, eclecticism is nowadays very 
much a forgotten approach. One reason for this general neglect may 
be the disparaging view of eclecticism which developed especially 
during the 19th century in connection with Hegelianism. According 
to this view eclecticism is despicable because it is inherently arbitrary, 
lacking criteria and inexact.16 Even some relatively recent accounts in 
philosophy accuse eclecticism of lapsing into the sin of unoriginality. 
Thus eclecticism is regarded as a product of minds not capable of 
anything better. 
15 Gascoigne 1985, p. 395 mentions that it was quite usual e.g. at the University 
of Cambridge to read both old and new authors. Thus, for example, Newton 
started with Magirus and later proceeded to reading Descartes' works. 
16 Lalande 1932, p. 186 compiles several negative statements about eclecticism. 
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Eclecticism is the name given to the position of those philosophers 
whose thinking is limited to examining the results of the intellectual 
labor of others. They then pick out what seems true and valuable 
without making a serious philosophical effort to combine these 
truths into a unified whole." 
However, since in the 17th century unoriginality was not a vice 
but a normal practice, eclecticism was viewed in a different light.18 
This attitude originated most of all as a counterreaction to all phi-
losophy bound up with the schools. This emphasis was still central to 
eclecticism when it became an ideal philosophy at the University of 
Uppsala during the first three decades of the 18th century. There ec-
lecticism was seen characteristically as a rationalistic philosophy, as 
did the philosophers of French Enlightenment later. Uppsala eclecti-
cism was based on the ideas of two German philosophers, Johann 
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Christopher Sturm and Johann Franz Buddeus, who was of a younger 
generation than Sturm. Whereas Sturm was still ready to count as 
eclectics those philosophers who aimed at reconciling Cartesian and 
Aristotelian philosophies, Buddeus' generation dismissed this view as 
synchretism.19 The philosophical attitude which thus became dominant 
at Uppsala in the 18th century already had proponents during the pre-
vious century, at least at Turku. The eclectic ideology there is reminis-
cent of Sturm's, and it is perfectly possible that his writings were 
known at Turku, although this assumption is difficult to verify.20 What 
then was eclecticism at Turku like? 
It is problematical that not even the more neutral definitions of 
eclecticism take account of the various senses in which a philosophy 
can be called eclectic?' Combining ideas in a somewhat random way 
was not strange for Aristotelianism either. In fact many ideas from 
other ancient traditions had found their way into the generally-accep-
ted corpus of Medieval and Renaissance natural philosophy, and na-
tural history in particular. On the other hand quite a lot of new know-
ledge, e.g. on geography, botany and zoology, had been merged into 
12 Brugger & Baker 1972, p. 106. 
18 	 On the history of the meanings attached to eclecticism see Donini 1988, p. 15-33. 
19 Lindberg 1975. 
20 	 Elenchus Praelectionum, Catalogus 1712, 1713. Tammelin announces that he will 
lecture on Sturm's mathematics, but we cannot know for sure whether these lec-
tures were really held because of the war. 
21 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica 1991, p. 352. 
the traditional body of knowledge by the 17th century. In fact, Charles 
B. Schmitt has based his classification of two types of eclecticism in 
Renaissance Aristotelianism on these grounds in one of his numerous 
articles. 
Eclecticism in Aristotelian philosophy can be viewed from at least 
two different approaches. First it may be taken as a general impulse 
of some Aristotelians to draw material from non-Aristotelian sour-
ces simply because they thought that the insights found among the 
texts from other traditions could usefully be applied to strengthening 
their own philosophy. A second path lay in the tendency to accept 
new developments, particularly in science and the formalistic dis-
ciplines, which clearly offered superior doctrine to that derivable 
from normal Aristotelian sources!' 
Partly due to this eclecticism, partly to theological and other inte- 	 375 
rests, different schools and authors had a great diversity in their views 
both about the fundamental concepts of natural philosophy and details 
of physical theories. Therefore there never was such a thing as - strict-
ly speaking - the Aristotelian natural philosophy. In this sense all 
European universities were "eclectic" in their learning. We cannot talk 
about a pure form of Aristotelianism at Turku either, because ideas 
from many other philosophical traditions were also united to it there. 
Both types of eclecticism as classified by Schmitt existed at Turku 
too. For example, the three Paracelsian principles salt, sulphur and 
mercury, which were the cause of all sensible qualities like taste, co-
lour and smell, were thought to be combinations of the four Aristo-
telian elements. A certain notion of the existence of atoms was ac-
cepted, and the transmutation of elements into each other was refuted. 
All these ideas were in disagreement with the mainstream of Aristo-
telian philosophy. 
However, such combining of ideas is not really what I mean by 
eclecticism, which is characteristically a conscious approach in natural 
philosophy. At Turku this kind of approach is met from the 1670's - 
1680's on. The word "eclecticism" itself was not always employed, 
but even then the attitude was expressed in other ways. Jacob Flach-
senius puts the concept "Sectae Electicae" into print at Turku in the 
22 	 Schmitt 1983, p. 91-92. 
"history of philosophy" which he includes in his logic-book. He refers 
here to the ancient tradition which was associated mainly with Potamo 
of Alexandria. Flachsenius does not recommend eclecticism as a met-
hod, but he recognizes it as one of the most praiseworthy, if also 
difficult philosophies.2' 
In his Contemplationes mundi also Achrelius mentiones the "Sectae 
Electicae", which chose the necessary and rejected the trivial matters, 
and Asplund in 1712 mentions "eclectic philosophy".74 Although the 
specific term was generally lacking, eclecticism was nevertheless a 
clearly detined attitude, according to which theories from different 
philosophical traditions could and should be brought together, guided 
by some "proper" or "sane principles" - which they actually were is 
then a much more complicated matter. In a thesis of 1672 the professor 
of Latin language Martin Miltopaeus wrote about the nature and pro-
per uses of philosophy as follows: 
[We understand by philosophy] neither the Stoic philosophy, nor 
the Platonic, nor Epicurean, and not Aristotelian philosophy either, 
but whatever is rightly said by these sects, this selected totality is 
to be called Philosophy, and it has to be stored up for our use, as 
Augustinus exhorts us.25 
And in 1690 Andreas Lundius who promoted Cartesian ideas in 
his thesis on sense physiology, denied being a slave of either Car-
tesianism or Aristotelianism: "I have drawn on several sources, but 
with my own vessel"26, he says. I would also count as eclectics those 
authors on meteorology, who were mostly preoccupied with com-
bining Cartesian and Aristotelian meteorological ideas together. Alt-
hough for example Sveno Melander never abandoned the fundamental 
ideas of Aristotelian physics, what is significant is that he explicitly 
23 Flachsenius 1678, Appendix, p. 149-150. 
24 Achrelius 1682, Cordate et Candide Lector, b3. "Est insuper hic Character SEC-
TAE ELECTICAE, quod seligat ex omnibus necessaria, rejectis supervacuis." 
Hahn-Asplund 1712, p. 45. "...verae sanaeque eclecticae Philosophiae..." 
25 Miltopaeus-Lithomannus 1672, Th. 1. "...non intelligitur Philosophia Stoica, nec 
Platonica, nec Epicura;a, aut Aristotelica, sed qua'cunque ab his sectis recte dicta 
sunt, hoc totum selectum, Philosophia dicendum est, atque in usus nostros, mo-
nente Augustino, seponendum." 
26 Hahn-Lundius 1690, Apologia Ad Lectorem Candidum & Nigrum. "Ex pleraque 
hausi fonte; vasculo ramen meo." 
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confronts the old philosophy with the new and more critical one.27 
On the other hand Magnus Widebeck commented in passing on the 
possibility of combining the diversity of ideas into a coherent theory. 
He also seems to think that even contrasting ideas can be accepted if 
they can be "reduced" or modified into a form which fulfils the criteria 
of the "right" philosophy. 
We shall reject the opinions of the above-mentioned authors [i.e. 
Achrelius, Rohault, Descartes, Clauberg], because they tend towards 
principles which we disagree upon. These [opinions] could perhaps 
be retained if time allowed us to properly explain their meanings. 
(Clauberg p. 48) It would be ideal and beautifully done, if the 
thoughts of great men could be reconciled with each other, so that 
each would keep his position. But doing this is prevented both by 
the weakness of our reason and the shortness of time.28 
In other words the borderline between eclectic and synchretic pro-
cedures was sometimes a vague one. It seems that the elusive character 
of eclectism and synchretism was typical of the 17th-century eclecti-
cism in general, whereas the meaning of these two attitudes became 
more distinct from the end of the century on especially in the so called 
Halle school.29 The aforementioned J.F. Buddeus was one of the main 
proponents of this new kind of eclecticism, which already clearly 
stood on the side of the new philosophy. At Turku Ericus Asplund 
referred twice to Buddeus in his thesis of 1712. However, these ref-
erences are very superficial and do not include anything specific to 
Buddeus' thinking on eclecticism.30 Although Asplund clearly is dis-
posed to Cartesianism, he is reserved about some "universal" (=me- 
27 Hahn-Melander 1693, p. 15. "Sic placuit veteribus, Philosophia autem hodie ocu-
lata apparet, credit qvod videt, aut immotis argumentis deprehendit, verum esse..." 
See also Kallinen 1993, p. 76. 
28 Hahn-Widebeck 1702, p. 9. "Sententiam autem Clariss. auctorum antea allegato-
rum [i.e. Achrelius, Rohault, Descartes, Clauberg] [non] rejicimus, nititur enim 
principiis å nostris dissentientibus, & si ad mentem eorum illam explicare tempus 
permitteret, posset forsan retineri; (Claub.p.48) Optimum enim & pulchre factum 
est si magnorum virorum sententiae possint conceliari, ut utraque locum obtineat, 
qvod jam facere tenuitas ingenii & angustia temporis prohibet." 
29 Lindberg 1975, p. 225-229. 
30 Halm-Asplund 1712, p. 8, 45. On the latter page Asplund also mentiones Gerhard 
Vossius' book De philosophia et philosophorum sectis (1658) as a source for 
further study about the subject of what kind of ideas can generally be reconciled. 
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taphysical) features in that philosophy. This is because they are "less 
congruent with the true and real eclectic philosophy".31 Asplund's phi-
losophy also has this synchretistic character, which of course is cont-
rary to Buddeus' view. What Asplund actually tries to do in his thesis 
is to reconcile the two philosophies as far as is possible and his space 
allows. Asplund has no unrealistic phantasies about how far this pro-
gram can be taken: the old and the new are never entirely compatible 
with each other.32 
Most of the eclecticism at Turku was about theories, but we might 
also ask whether there was not eclecticism about methods, too. This 
was not very common. However, possibly the most striking example 
of methodological eclecticism was Andreas Pryss' thesis on the rain-
bow in 1692. Pryss follows very closely the traditional order of pre-
sentation, which mirrored the proper method of inquiry in physics. 
However, the contents of Pryss' arguments are based on the Cartesian 
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geometrical method. Usually authors who drew physical conclusions 
from mathematical reasoning were accused of making serious category 
errors, but nothing of that kind came up in Pryss' case, since his work 
could be seen optical as well as physical. Mathematical argument was 
traditionally legitimate in the field of optics. All in all, quite a lot of 
new ideas on theoretical details could be embraced without any prob-
lems at all. In methodology only a limited amount flexibility was 
possible. 
What is more important to notice, though, is that eclecticism was 
actually seen as a method in itself, and as a new kind of a method. 
The author at Turku who was most outspoken in support of this ap-
proach was Achrelius, and I shall in the following summarise his 
views. Perhaps the most dominant aspect of eclecticism at Turku was 
the emphasis on the notion that one should be free of all sects. This 
demand was very much "in the air" during the 17th century, and it 
received its most famous expression in the motto of the Royal Society: 
nullius in verba. According to eclectic philosophy the wise man would 
not be a slavish follower of a ready-made system, but would carefully 
31 	 Hahn-Asplund 1712, p. 45-46. "Cartesium utut in nonnullis & quidem praecipue 
universalibus, quae verae sanaeque eclecticae Philosophiae minus congruere vi-
deantur, erroneum, vel novum... suspectum." 
32 	 Halm-Asplund 1712, p. 5, 16, 19, et passim. p. 5: "Quamvis neque virium mearum 
neque instituti sit, omnia veterum ac Cartesii dogmata inter se conciliare, vel quid 
probabilius in utrisque reperiatur, eruere." 
select the best views by himself. This idea was expressed by Achrelius, 
Lundius and Torsten Rudeen as we11.33  This assertion was principally 
directed against the dominant position of Aristotelianism, but it held 
good in respect to other philosophies too.34 Of course, the fact that 
the two Cartesian authors claimed not to be enslaved by the new 
philosophy may also have been due to a certain caution. It was not, 
after all, a very wise strategy to pronounce oneself a proponent of 
such a suspicious philosophy as Cartesianism. Achrelius on the other 
hand seems to associate the intellectual independence from sects with 
a better capability to achieve truth. Conversely, this implies that sec-
tarians love their dogma more than the truth. 
Finally, to understand is not to belong to this or that Sect, or to 
venerate one author's name and precepts, despising thereby the in-
ternal properties of things, but to be wise is to defend the truth by 
reading much, being rich in experiences and happy in one's ac- 	 379 
tions.35 
A man free of all sects would be able to choose the best and most 
useful theories. This process essentially involved careful consideration. 
Theories were not to be picked out at random. It was necessary to 
proceed cum judicio, because "monstrous errors" were made by earlier, 
especially pagan philosophers (Ethnici). At this point a question arises 
quite naturally about the criteria which were to be used for choosing 
suitable doctrines. In this aspect J. Chr. Sturm and the 18th-century 
tradition at Uppsala emphasized man's reason and his own experience 
as the proper criteria for recognizing the truth. Compared with them 
33 Achrelius 1682, Cordate et Candide Lector. "Tunc ea quae quondam ex diversis 
magistris excerpebam, non ut mancipium ab alieno flutit pendens, sed retinens 
modestae libertatis, placuit colligere, disponere, & in gratiam illorum publicare, 
quibus propter egestatem non datur facultas, Excellentium virorum monumneta 
adire." Hahn-Lundius 1690, Apologia. "...Du Hamel (ut qui conciliator utriusque 
Philosophiae salutatur) paulö pressius fui secutus, ita tarnen ut å Nemine compe-
des mihi injici patiar: ...Aristotelicae servitutis jugum rneae cervici non im-
ponetur." On Rudeen see Hultin 1902, p. 123-125. Klinge 1987, p. 428. 
34 	 Cartesianism was sometimes criticised for its attempt to replace one kind of dog-
matism (Aristotelian) with another kind (Cartesian). Clarke 1989, p. 17-18. 
35 	 Achrelius in Hahn-Lundius 1690, Pereximie Dn. Respondens, b. "Hoc demum est 
sapere, non alligare se huic vel illi Sectae, vel unius nomen ac praecepta venerari, 
contempta rerum indole. Sed lectione copiosus, experientia dives, actu felix, elo-
quio promptus, veritatem defendere." 
Achrelius appears much more traditional and cautious in his views. 
Certainly no ideas which implied or led to theological errors could 
be accepted. But Achrelius also named authority, sense-experience, 
reason and the "guidance of the nature itself' (ipsius naturae manu-
ductio) as selective criteria?' 
The selection of optimum theories out of a multitude of alternatives 
was made possible by philosophical or academic freedom. Because 
according to eclecticism no predetermined and ready-made set of 
truths existed (it was considered characteristic of the sects to claim 
that there were), new truths could be found. In this sense knowledge 
could also thus grow. However, this idea of progress was not a modern 
one, Achrelius referring here to the antique authorities. 
This Queen [=truth] is revered by the honest Academic freedom 
together with the privileges which the most wise of the Romans 
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gives us with his very brief words, which nevertheless are well worth 
thinking about: they who lived before us did a lot but they did not 
accomplish everything. There still is much left for our age to do, 
and the possibility of still adding something is not excluded even 
from someone born after a thousand centuries.37 
A central implication in the concept "philosophical freedom" was 
that it gave the philosopher licence to deal with doctrines which were 
perhaps very tempting, but suspicious and unacceptable from some 
more important point of view. Usually it was theology which set this 
limit for acceptability. When Achrelius excused himself in the preface 
of his Contemplationes mundi for discussing the homogeneity of the 
cosmos, he did this expressly by pleading his philosophical freedom.38 
Perhaps more explicitly than any other author at Turku Achrelius de- 
36 	 Achrelius 1682, Cordate et Candide Lector, b3. According to Lindberg eclecticism 
at Uppsala also served the function of mediating between theology and natural 
philosophical ideas potentially in disagreement with it. Lindberg 1975, p. 218-220, 
230-232. 
37 Achrelius in Hahn-Lundius 1690, Pereximie Dn. Respondens, b. "Hanc Reginam 
[=veritatem] adorat sincera libertas Academica juxta privilegia quae nobis dat 
sapientiss. Romanorum brevissimis verbis sed prolixae meditationis: multum ege-
runt, qui ante nos fuerunt, sed non peregerunt; multum adhuc temporis restat, nec 
ulli nato post 1000. secula praecluditur occasio aliquid addendi." Achrelius refers 
here to Seneca's 64. letter to Lucilius. This particular citation was much used in 
the 17th century. Eriksson 1969b, p. 164. 
38 Achrelius 1682, Cordate et Candide Lector, b3. 
rives a certain kind of scepticism from his eclecticism. The multitude 
of probable-looking theories and the obvious inability of men to reach 
unanimity e.g. in respect to astronomical theories was for Achrelius 
a sign of the feebleness of man's reason. On the other hand this in-
security also provided a useful screen. Whether we end up promoting 
this or that theory, we can never attain absolute certainty: man must 
be humble before God's creation. You accuse me of embracing false 
theories - do you thus regard yourself as more competent than all 
other men to judge these things? This was fine and convincing rhe-
toric. As I shall argue later in this conclusion, setting oneself above 
others was a serious offence according to the 17th-century mentality. 
Thus, on the whole the use of philosophical freedom presupposed 
mature consideration. A freedom which had been misused (i.e. unac-
ceptable theories had been embraced) was not libertas but licentia, 
arbitrariness.39 This view of the limited freedom of philosophy re-
ceived official expression in 1689, when the king handed down his 
decision on the Cartesian disputes at Uppsala, permitting the free use 
of philosophy provided the monarchy was not offended and Holy Writ 
was not criticised. Thus not even the Bible's sayings about the cons-
titution of the natural world could in principle be repudiated. It is 
clear that this kind of resolution could not settle the matter. Indeed, 
both parties to the Cartesian controversy interpreted it as victory.ao  
The settlement was gradually achieved by socially negotiating the ni-
les of mutual conduct.4' For example, the Bible was not explicitly 
criticised, but it was the result of social agreement to judge what 
would count as criticism. The rules for the right selection of theories 
in Achrelian eclecticism worked ultimately in very much the same 
way. 
I have suggested the German philosophers such as Sturm and Bud-
deus, and even the Dutch humanist Gerhard Vossius and his son Isaac 
as the possible models for the eclecticism at Turku. However, there 
is also another source of inspiration here, which cannot be left unno-
ticed. The demand for philosophical freedom, scepticism about sects, 
anti-Aristotelianism and the emphasis on clarity of expression are all 
39 Lindberg 1975, p. 230. 
40 Lindberg 1975, p. 218-219, 232. 
41 For social negotiation in modern science or the so-called closure mechanisms of 
otherwise potentially unending controversies see e.g. Collins 1992, p. 127-130, 
et passim. 
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features found e.g. in Achrelius' Apologia, but they also played a 
central role in Ramism.42 Ramus' philosophy had been directed mainly 
against the dominance of Aristotelianism in school philosophy, and 
revolt against Aristotelianism was a central motive behind eclecticism 
as well. Unlike most of Europe, Ramism had maintained a favoured 
position in Sweden well into the 1650's. The tradition was thus not 
far removed and Achrelius' eclecticism especially may very well par-
tially echo the Ramistic program as well. 
During the 17th century eclecticism surely was a symptom of dis-
satisfaction with the explanatory models which Aristotelian philosop-
hy could offer. It also obviously helped to bring up new ideas, and 
broke the methodological dominance of scholasticism. What is more, 
it stressed the importance of the scholar's own judgement as against 
predigested and systematised information. As a force for change it 
was nevertheless rather inefficient, mostly because its criteria for the 
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selection of the "best theories" were still closely bound up with old 
values - or if you wish - the old images of knowledge. 
Achrelius' conceptions of eclecticism and the freedom to philosop-
hize are organically related to his need to defend himself against ac-
cusations of introducing novelties. I shall in the following introduce 
these novelties; what were they and what do the attitudes towards 
them tell us about 17th-century philosophy in general? 
3. FACING THE NOVELTIES 
As Yehuda Elkana has stated in his analysis of the images of know-
ledge, the pursuit of originality is a driving force in present-day scien-
ce. Although the metaphysical implications of this standpoint are not 
42 Sellberg 1979, p. 103-108, et passim. Achrelius 1682 expresses his demand for 
clarity in "Cordate et Candide Lector", b3. Although he states it as a rhetorical 
principle, clarity is realized by avoiding typically scholastic terminology and such 
definitions as were central to dissertation writing at Turku. "Fabius Perspicuitatem 
primam eloquentiae virtutem appellavit, Inde effugere volui horridam spinosita-
tem & terminorum jejuna, placideque ad communem sensum candide & intrepide 
sensa animi mei efferre." 
usually discussed, the scientists often treat innovation or technological 
advance as a criterion for knowledge, and, for instance, strive to use 
the latest machinery for their experiments. Indeed, original discoveries 
are essential stepping-stones in a scientist's career.43 In the 17th cen-
tury the general attitude towards innovation was very much the op-
posite. To be a new idea was in itself something bad. Whereas the 
"traditionalists" saw "novelties" as inherently bad or at least suspi-
cious, the proponents of modem science often railed against this at-
titude.44 For instance, the way in which the two contemporary authors 
John Donne and Francis Bacon in England expressed these views has 
become a classic of the history of literature. 
And New Philosophy calls all in doubt, 
The Element of fire is quite put out; 
The Sun is lost, and th'Earth, and no man's wit 
Can well direct him where to look for it.45 
John Donne has become famous for expressing the feeling of in-
security ("all coherence was gone") - but also for a sort of titillating 
excitement in facing the novelties of the new science. On the other 
hand we can hear Francis Bacon in his Novum Organum bewail the 
conservative attitude at the Universities: 
Again in the customs and institutions of schools, academies, colle-
ges and similar bodies, destined for the abode of learned men and 
the cultivation of learning, everything is found adverse to the prog-
ress of science. ...For the studies of men in these places are confined 
and as it were, imprisoned in the writings of certain authors, from 
whom if any man dissent he is straightaway arraigned as a turbulent 
person or innovator.46 
43 Elkana 1981, p. 20. Knorr-Cetina 1981 goes deeper to explain the social motives 
behind this respect for innovation. On the rhetoric of constructing an innovation 
see Blakeslee 1994. 
44 A basic study which discusses the polemics about the terminology and attitudes 
towards old and new forms of scholarly work is Jones 1961. 
45 
	
	 The relevant passage from Donne's An anatomy of the world from 1611 is fre- 
quently quoted in histories of science. See e.g. Brooke 1991, p. 56. 
46 Bacon 1988, Book I, Aph. XC. 
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The avoidance of innovation was a wide-spread and established 
attitude in Europe in the 17th century. It is not surprising then to find 
it well alive at Turku either. But what was this "anti-noveltism" like 
at Turku, then? It is notable that in Sweden just as in some other 
countries and organizations this attitude was an official policy.47 There 
is a famous remark by the Rector of the University in 1642, that: 
"every professor must be careful not to present new ideas, since he 
would seem to be doing more and better things than the others, and 
thereby would undoubtedly awaken suspicions and disagreement."48 
Three years later the matter was put even more plainly in a state-
ment, made in the Senate of the Academy: 
It was also remarked here in the Senate that none of the professors 
may, without the consent of His Royal Majesty or the Chancellor 
of the University, publicly lecture on any other author but those 
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especially mentioned in the constitutions of the University. The lec- 
tures must also be hurried on so that an author's text will be dealt 
with in the prescribed time. And nobody must oppose the good 
opinions of the old authors, and defend one's own or some new 
opinions in public. But if there is some mistake or error in the old 
authors, the best should be made of it, and a well-grounded opinion 
should be explained to the students in addition, so that they can 
choose the better alternative opinion.49 
47 	 Jesuits for example prohibited teaching and holding new doctrines or opinions in 
1586 in order to secure the position of faith. Ariew 1992, p. 66-67. 
48 	 CAAP I, 14.5.1642, p. 54. "...absoluto ita feliciter examine publico, bleeff Con-
sistorium hållit, då gratuleradhe Rector Magnificus, at examina publica nu äre 
tillbörligen ändade. Ther hooss ratione officij admonerade wenligen, at hwar och 
en professor achtar sigh for all tingh therföre, at han icke något nytt proponerar 
till then ändan, at han skulle synas något mehra eller bättre kunna gära ähn the 
andra, ther af twifwels uthan, förargelsse och osämia kan sedhan förorsakas." 
49 	 CAAP I, 22.1.1645, p. 149. "Bleff och omalt här in Consist., at ingen af profess. 
må vthan H.K.M:tz eller Acad. Cancell. special befalning publ. läsa någon annan 
authorem, vthan then, som in constit. vthtryckeligen nämpnes; och ändtligen medh 
praelectionibus så foort sättiandes, at author innan den tijdh, som foreskrifuit är, 
berömligen absolveras. Eij skall heller någon lasta gamble authorum godhe me-
ningar och sin egen eller någon nye authoris meening eller opinion eenwissligen 
publice defendera. Vthan the så hende, at någor feel funnes i thee gamble aut-
horibus, sådant må man i besta måtto vtthyda, och ther jämpte sin grundade 
meening discipulis kungöra, at thee sedhan måge eligera, then som better synes 
om saken, döma." 
These quotations show quite a strong vein of official traditionalism. 
This policy was valid throughout the period concerned in this study. 
It should be noted, however, that these bans were not directed exclu-
sively against new ideas in natural philosophy or astronomy. The 
church and the state were much more interested in potenital deviations 
from the right religion or the right course of political thinking. Of 
course, even general bans against novelties could be turned against 
natural philosophy as well. Most of the ideas which were labelled as 
such at Turku were of Cartesian origin, but authors such as Achrelius 
and some theologians also had to face the accusation of being inno-
vators. 
The next question we have to ask is what a "novelty" was, in fact. 
It seems that for some it was any idea deviating from the established 
way of thinking. Indeed, in 1712 an author begins his thesis by re-
marking that when some people call Cartesianism a "new" philosophy, 
they actually mean it is a false one: "But this [Cartesian philosophy] 	 385 
is called new not only because it has arisen closer to our times, but 
the word unfairly also equates to unknown, unfamiliar or sometimes 
even false."50 The use of the concept "novelty" actually does bring 
very strong connotations of falsehood, although it might be too daring 
to equate its meaning with it. As my discussion in the next subsection 
of this chapter will show, the category of novelty had a distinctly 
negative meaning of its own. 
But there are other characteristics of innovation which should be 
taken into account. The concept itself indicates that the idea in ques-
tion should preferably also be a new one. However, this is not strictly 
speaking always the case. For example, heliocentrism had all the qua-
lifications for being called a novelty. It was a relatively new idea, and 
it was an idea which was certainly not accepted at Turku for most of 
the 17th century. Nevertheless Copernicanism was not labelled as a 
novelty at Turku, but was belittled by associating it with an ancient 
tradition which had only recently been revived. On the other hand it 
was possible to label an old concept a novelty. There was a well-
known controversy in theology in 1666 about Petrus Bång's doctoral 
thesis, one of the controversial aspects of which was that he had called 
God the instrumental cause of the Christian church. Because of this 
50 Hahn-Asplund 1712, p. 4. "Sed cum illud [Philosophia Cartesiana] non tantum 
dicatur novum, quod tempore nobis est propius; verum etiam incognito, inaudito, 
imo falso quandoque, quanquam abusive aequivalet." 
and some other expressions other theologians accused him of intro-
ducing a novelty. However, the concept supposed to be a novelty here, 
causa instrumentalis, was an old scholastic concept. In this case it 
had only been used in a new context and therefore presented certain 
dogmas in a slightly different manner and, as its opponents suspected, 
also changed the meaning of the dogma.51 I mention only two exam-
ples here, but we must in general be careful when talking about no-
velties, because there seems to be different ways in which an idea 
could be called so. 
In fact, it seems that most of all "novelty" was a very efficient 
rhetorical category. This does not mean, of course, that it was some-
how without any further content. On the contrary, only ideas which 
posed a threat to some fundamental part of the traditional philosop-
hical system were called novelties. But it obviously was used as a 
rhetorical device both for inhibiting the spreading of new ideas and 
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for shaping the self-image of the new science. The latter use is clear 
for example in the quotation from Bacon which I cited above. There 
were several strategies for dealing with the innovations which were 
employed at the Univerisity of Turku too. A brief summary of the 
strategies both pro and con innovation will further illustrate my point. 
Cartesianism was considered to be one of the most serious threats 
to right philosophy at Turku, and therefore it might best offer us an 
overview of the matter to look at the reactions and responses this 
philosophy provoked. The main strategy of protection at Turku was 
to keep Cartesianism away as long as possible, and judging by the 
historical evidence this strategy was very successful for a considerable 
period. Several tactics were used for achieving this goal. First of all 
Cartesian ideas were labelled as contrary to theology, and often equ-
ated with religious heresies (or opinions characteristic of non-Lutheran 
confessions). This was done for the first time by Petrus Laurbecchius 
in 1661, who in his strongly polemical work equated Cartesian views 
on substance and especially extension with Calvinistic thought. Laur-
becchius was also the first to bind Cartesianism together with another 
unwelcome theory, Copernicanism. For the proponents of these phi-
losophies it made things more difficult, because each of their claims 
tended to involve a growing number of very difficult implications. 
Therefore it became more laborious for them to make positive state- 
51 	 Laasonen 1977b, p. 303. 
ments concerning either Cartesian or Copernican ideas. However, it 
was most of all Cartesian metaphysics which was generally found 
unacceptable. All in all, Cartesian theories were in the 1660's and 
1680's especially interpreted from the Aristotelian point of view and 
therefore it was easy to accuse them of category mistakes in metho-
dology. The picture offered of Cartesianism was often very fragmen-
tary: only individual propositions were treated and there was no at-
tempt to see them in the larger context of the Cartesian philosophy. 
It was also typical that the knowledge of the system was usually based 
on secondary sources. 
Despite all this, Cartesian ideas could be introduced without diffi-
culty, if the theories embraced concentrated on details of, say, phy-
siological or meteorological theories, and the validity of Cartesian dua-
lism or epistemological principles was not defended. It is very prob-
able that most authors would not even have accepted these ideas them-
selves. On the contrary, there was an eclectic tendency to select and 
embrace some Cartesian ideas, and a "synchretistic" tendency to adjust 
them to the traditional philosophical framework as much as possible. 
Indeed, we can say that the main strategy for introducing new ideas 
was to adjust them to the existing body of knowledge. Those authors, 
especially Torsten Rudeen, who introduced some exceptionally radical 
new ideas at Turku, had to employ different kinds of strategies. In 
responding to the accusation of proposing new ideas which had been 
brought against him, Rudeen claimed, for instance, that he was not 
presenting anything new. Rudeen claimed that Cartesianism was only 
a purified and original form of the old Aristotelian theories. In the 
course of the controversy he at one point denied being an adherent 
and proponent of the new philosophy, and stated that he was only 
explaining it. Rudeen also appealed to the general practice of the day, 
saying that the ideas he stood for had been accepted elsewhere. Finally 
Rudeen emphasized that his teachings were in no way against religion.52 
The argument Rudeen employed had many characteristics which 
were common in the European Cartesian disputes in general. However, 
it is notable here that many of his arguments show that also he took 
the accusation of introducing novelties seriously. There is one more 
very exceptional excuse that was made with regard to innovation 
which might be worth having a look at. This example takes us fifteen 
52 On Rudeen see subsection "The Emergence of Cartesian Dualism". 
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years back from the time of Rudeen's controversy. I have in the fo-
regoing repeatedly referred to the various kinds of excuses Daniel 
Achrelius made in the preface to readers of his book Contemplationes 
mundi. Achrelius also draws upon the argument that the alleged no-
velties are in fact old. The peculiarity of his argument lies in the 
assumption that ideas return cyclically in the course of times. 
Moreover, if they [= A.'s critics] smell novelty in the things which 
I present [then I shall tell them] that all ancient dogmas return to 
daylight in circular course. Indeed, I do not present here a single 
line which I could not if necessary prove either by authority, senses, 
reason or by the guidance of nature itself.53 
Novelty was an important concept in the 17th-century learning in 
general. The word had a notorious reputation and even those authors 
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who presented new ideas attempted to dissociate themselves from al- 
legations that they had favored novelties. Opposing them was also an 
official policy, and efficient rhetorical strategies (and sometimes plain 
censorship) were employed to dispel these unwanted ideas. This policy 
was well in line with the ideology which stood behind the foundation 
and function of the university. As one of the main aims of the Uni-
versity was to guard the right religion, any ideas which would poten-
tially erode the structures on which the dominant status of orthodox 
Lutheran religion was built would therefore have to be eliminated. 
Stability was after all perhaps a more characteristic feature of the 
learning at the Academy of Turku than change in the period concer-
ned. In the next subsection I shall try to show what might have caused 
this stability. 
53 	 Achrelius 1682, Cordate et Candide Lector, b3. "Porro si novitatem sapiunt quae 
adfero, per gyrum redeunt in lucem universae vetustatis dogmata, sane, vero nul-
lam lineam adduco, quam non auctoriatate, sensu, ratione, & ipsius naturae ma-
nuductione, possum ubi opus fuerit probare." 
4. EXPLAINING STABILITY 
The question about stability in science can be put in many different 
ways, some of which are less satisfactory from the historiographical 
point of view than others. We must be careful when asking why scien-
tific change was delayed or did not occur in this or that country or 
discipline. The way in which this question has been put in some stu-
dies smacks of asking "Why did the inevitable not happen?" or "What 
inhibited the people from accepting these clearly more advanced and 
correct claims about nature?"54 This kind of approach not only implies 
an idealised and untrue picture of science,55 but it also drives us alar-
mingly near to the sin of presentism, i.e. appreciating historical events 
on the basis of our own evaluations of what the "proper" scientific 
practice should be. Evaluative anachronism cannot avoided either, if 
stability is contrasted with progress. This view was in fact taken as 
the starting point in a fairly recent study, in which the causes of the 
"stagnation" of astronomical learning at the Academy of Turku were 
considered.56 The concept of progress is almost inevitably bound up 
with our own evaluations, and is therefore not suitable for the kind 
of historiography of science I want to promote in this study. I would 
like to put the question mentioned above in another sense. 
My search for the causes of stability, or tardiness of change should 
be taken as as a part of the general description and analysis of a 
certain historical context. Stability is a historical phenomenon as well 
as change. Instead of evaluating the past, my analysis of stability en-
deavours to explain historical processes on their own premises. The 
"changes" we are after are naturally those reorganizations both in the 
54 Good examples are to be found in Lehti 1979, p. 63-97. 
55 
	
	 This so-called "sociology of error" has been criticised in numerous articles from 
the 1970's on. See e.g. Bloor 1976, p. 10-11. Knorr-Cetina 1981. 
56 Lehti 1979, p. 63, et passim. "...at the beginning of the eighteenth century the 
view of the location of the Earth among other planets (which Copernicus had put 
forth over 150 years earlier and which many of the greatest scientists in history 
had proved indisputably true during the seventeenth century) was still dogmati-
cally rejected without making oneself familiar with the theory. Thus it has to be 
said that here is a paradigm of the lack of progress or stagnation. In this chapter 
I intend to shed light on the question about the causes and manifestations of 
stagnation." (translation mine) 
389 
body and images of knowledge which are so well-known in the 17th-
century history of science. The Aristotelian natural philosophy and 
concept of science were abandoned, and the new models for scientific 
enquiry came from various traditions, usually Baconian or Cartesian. 
One of the main indicators of this "scientific revolution" has also been 
the acceptance of the heliocentric system. I am not asking why none 
of the trail-blazing inventions of the new science or contributions to 
them were made at Turku, because I find this kind of speculation 
pointless. But I am going to ask which factors in the organization of 
learning at the Academy of Turku were responsible for the fact that 
some of these typical features of new science were not accepted - or 
even discussed - more quickly at Turku. Talking about slowness or 
rapidity is of course always relative to something else. Thus we can 
ask further, whether this process of change was slower at Turku than 
elsewhere in Sweden and Europe. I shall deal with the topic of the 
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University of Turku in an all-European context somewhat later below. 
Here it suffices to mention that change, or giving up Aristotelian na-
tural philosophy did not necessarily happen much later at Turku than 
in many other European universities. In a way the whole question of 
the pace of change is due to an illusion caused by comparison with 
the very pinnacle of 17th-century new science. 
The causes by which we can try to explain stability are very similar 
to those by which change can be explained. In whatever kind of ins-
titutions or organizations science is pursued, it is never entirely sepa-
rated from the culture and society around it. Depending on the point 
of view we can say that science is always a part of culture, or that 
science is a culture. Just like all other "cultures" (such as art, religion, 
politics etc.) science interacts in many ways with surrounding political, 
economic and social forces. It is shaped by them and conditions them 
in turn. It is then the task of an historian to consider how science is 
involved in these processes in different historical contexts. It has been 
typical of earlier historiography of science to see the production of 
scientific knowledge as separate from social and economical proces-
ses. However, modern SSK studies have taken quite a different view, 
claiming that social processes are involved in the production of all 
kinds of scientific knowledge. Although it is not my intention here to 
apply any of the sociological approaches in full, it should become 
clear from the following that much of the structure of learning consists 
of specific kinds of social relations. 
The SSK approach disputes the existence of the traditional division 
into "internal" and "external" factors in respect to the production of 
scientific knowledge.57 More generally, however, it is very difficult 
to discuss these factors without committing oneself to some sort of 
division, at least linguistically. One of the typically "external" forces 
in this respect is economics. We can ask, whether the stability of 
learning at the Academy of Turku could be explained at least partially 
by the economic situation of the country. Of course, it would be naive 
to expect any direct causal dependence to exist between certain natural 
philosophical ideas and economic factors. Neither does it lead us any 
further to claim that the economic structure of Sweden, and especially 
its province Finland was entirely agrarian and therefore there was 
nothing in its economy to stimulate scientific change. Either economic 
life does not produce scientific change in a way characteristic of simp-
listic Hessenian views, or the connection between science and 
economies is only very rarely as direct as this.58 
Of course economic factors did play a significant role in creating 
the general conditions for the function of the University. We know, 	 391 
for example, that the professors at Turku were paid less than their 
collegues at Uppsala, and that the payments were often late.59 It could 
therefore be supposed that Turku was not an attractive place for the 
more gifted scholars, who preferred to stay at the wealthier Uppsala 
instead. The university also had only a limited amount of money to 
invest in books or scientific instruments. However, these are very tri-
vial explanations and do not in themselves explain such things as by 
which criteria it was determined which books were to be acquired for 
the Academy. 
On the other hand economic motives could direct the course of 
scientific activities. During the 18th century mercantilistic and utili-
tarian thinking achieved a great vogue in Sweden. It was then gene-
rally thought that universities should also participate in enriching the 
nation by producing knowledge which could be economically valuab-
le.60 Charting the mineral and botanical resources of the country be-
came a major area of emphasis in natural history, and meteorology 
was met with new interest in "physics" because the climatic conditions 
57 From the large amount on literature see e.g. Knorr-Cetina 1981. Latour 1987, 
1988. Shapin 1992. 
58 	 For a critique of this approach on its "home ground" see e.g. Henry 1992, p. 
178-181. 
59 Klinge 1987, p. 146-167. 
60 Liedman 1986. 
of agriculture were to be studied. Economic interests became involved 
in many ways in the production of knowledge. As the main expression 
of this new attitude the chair of poetry at Turku was changed to a 
chair of economics in 1747.61 In the 17th century, however, university 
learning in general and natural philosophy in particular were not sup-
posed to produce such economically straightforwardly utilizable re-
sults. I would claim that this had not so much to do with the predo-
minantly agricultural structure of the country (that aspect remained 
much the same even in the 18th century) as with the pre-established 
ideals of what knowledge was all about. The task of natural philosophy 
was to find the causes of natural things and this activity as scientia 
was sharply separated from manual arts. This was not merely a ques-
tion of appreciation but was based on an epistemological division be-
tween arts and sciences. 
This leads us to ask whether there were any stabilizing factors in- 
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herent in the Aristotelian system itself. Indeed, it was a central feature 
of the Aristotelian philosophical system that it was considered to be 
essentially ready-made. But Aristotle's and his commentators' texts 
were full of ambiguities and gaps. Much of the medieval scholars' 
time had gone into making sense of all this. Thus, although the system 
could be organised in a better way and could be supplemented by 
adding some details, on the whole of the enterprise of natural phi-
losophy was already complete.62 Therefore it also lacked a concept of 
progress, which sees progress consisting in the rejection of old and 
acceptance of new and "better" ideas. As Edward Grant has pointed 
out in one of his articles, the corpus of Aristotelian knowledge was 
"atomized" into single quaestios which inhibited the formation of any 
coherent whole which would then have drawn attention to possible 
inconsistencies. By the 17th century this inconsistency simply grew 
because new knowledge was merged into the framework of the old 
system. In a way then, as Grant suggests, the problem of Aristote-
lianism was not inflexibility but too much flexibility.63 Although there 
certainly is some truth in Grant's view, it does not reflect the situation 
at Turku. The body of knowledge there might have included incon-
sistencies, but we hardly can say it was necessarily "atomized" to any 
considerable extent. There was, for example, a relatively coherent 
61 	 Lindroth 1978, p. 40, 91-145. 
62 See e.g. van Berkel 1981. 
63 Grant 1978b. 
view on what kinds of explanations would count as efficient causes. 
The same views also set limits to the flexibility of the system. 
In other words it is evident that we must give up the attempt to 
employ the "external" (especially economic) factors on such a coarse 
level as described above. We should rather approach the matter from 
a different angle and consider how the economic and political factors 
formed part of the social structures which tended to favour the pro-
duction of certain kinds of knowledge. On the other hand we have 
seen that merely "internal" explanations prove to be insufficient as 
well. What seems to be inherent to the intellectual structure of the 
system is in fact produced by various kinds of social processes and 
negotiation. 
I have claimed in this work that the socio-professional roles in the 
academic world were based on epistemological boundaries and vice 
versa. Every discipline had a specified subject matter and the metho- 
dologies to be used in each of them were also closely defined. Mo- 	 393 
reover, each discipline had a proper end or finis, which the enquiry 
was supposed to fulfil. These disciplinary boundaries then served as 
a basis for the formation of professional roles. More crudely the dif-
ferences between professional statuses were of course visible in rates 
of pay: according to the statutes the yearly income of the professors 
of theology was considerably higher than that of the professors in the 
Faculty of Arts.64 But even more importantly the various disciplines 
were respected to a different extent. (Of course even the grading of 
salaries was ultimately based on differing appreciation of the disci-
plines.) Furthermore, the evaluation of different disciplines had its 
source in the more general cultural values of the time, thus theology 
as the science of God and salvation of souls was of an extreme im-
portance. These appreciations created a hierarchy which determined 
the views on competence; it conditioned who was qualified to produce 
and judge certain kinds of knowledge. In this sense the disciplinary 
boundaries also had an important social dimension. 
This picture is however more complicated in reality. It has been 
stated several times in this work that it was not unusual for professors 
to publish theses on subjects other than what their own profession 
actually prescribed. In other words it seems that in daily practice the 
64 	 Schybergson 1918. However, the professors of law were the worst paid, because 
they were expected to receive extra income from other sources. 
professional roles were not as profoundly differentiated as might be 
expected. However, the flexibility of the professional roles was limited 
by the epistemological boundaries: whatever the status and profession 
of the author, the methodological rules of the discipline in which the 
subject matter belonged had to be followed.65 Because the whole hie-
rarchy of knowledge and the social roles intertwined with it were 
based on the epistemological boundaries, they had to be respected, 
too. It seems that this criss-crossing of professional boundaries pro-
voked argument between the professors only when these boundaries 
were broken in some respect and/or some personal grudge was invol-
ved. 
The immediate reasons why a professor wrote about a subject not 
in his proper field ranged from personal interest to an increased de-
mand of certain kinds for thesis caused by special conditions at the 
Academy. However, what ultimately made this flexibility possible is 
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a special property of knowledge which was inherent in the Aristotelian 
system. I call this factor the "impersonality of knowledge". Aristote-
lian philosophy was characteristically a system of learning as opposed 
to those of inventing and discovering. There were neither groups nor 
particular kinds of individuals specialized in the production of new 
knowledge. As long as you were a member of the academic com-
munity and respected the boundaries implied by the definitions of 
knowledge you got access to the entire body of philosophical know-
ledge in the sense that there was no expertise. Some scholars might 
have been better-versed in certain branches of knowledge than others, 
but the knowledge itself was potentially attributable to any scholar. It 
is also due to this impersonality of knowledge that the students were 
trained so that they could at least in principle either defend or oppose 
any thesis. 
Obviously then some of the epistemological and/or social borders 
were more rigid than the others. For example, the transition from phi-
losophical geography to the description of the mores and history of 
the people living in the area in question could be effortless, while the 
borderlines e.g. between physical and mathematical astronomy or be-
tween theology and philosophy in general were much sharper. The 
65 This feature was not peculiar to Turku, but it was in fact rather usual for the 
early modern academics to shuttle between different disciplines whilst never chal-
lenging the lines separating them. Westman 1980, p. 105. Westman 1980b, p. 
90-91. 
renegotiation of disciplinary boundaries and the social roles involved 
in the production of knowledge in the 16th and 17th centuries have 
recently been examined especially in respect to the borderline between 
physics and mathematics, but interesting surveys on the relationships 
between physics and medicine have also been made.66 These studies 
show very clearly that there is a connection between the social order 
and epistemology or the "images of knowledge". The status of mat-
hematical knowledge and thus mathematicians was the subject of 
much discussion during the latter half of the 16th century and at the 
beginning of the 17th. For example, both Copernicus and Galileo had 
either to employ certain kinds of argumentative strategies or, in the 
case of Galileo, to create for himself a new social role in order to be 
able to make credible mathematical claims about physical nature. At 
the same time the institutional status of mathematicians changed and 
often came to involve non-academic patrons and organizations.67 
Similar kinds of tensions between disciplines probably evolved at 	 395 
Turku too, especially with the advent of Copernican and Cartesian 
ideas. However, there were no such channels at Turku into which this 
tension could have been directed, in which it would have had soil to 
grow and space finally to burst out, producing new solutions, and 
thereby changing science. For example, for Galileo the evolving ab-
solutist court culture and royal patronage offered an opportunity to 
institute a new position as a royal astronomer, separate from the tra-
ditional university structures bound to Aristotelian conceptions of the 
status of mathematics. During the 17th century many European royal 
courts did indeed become considerable centres of scientific and scho-
larly activity as the philosophers were supposed to attain glory of their 
patrons by their own fame. At the same time the connections between 
courts and universities often became more frequent. In Sweden Queen 
Christina fostered this kind of court culture, importing several scholars 
to the country to build up a reputation as a cultivated monarch. How-
ever, after Christina's abdiction this kind of court culture quickly eva-
porated and came to play no greater role in the development of scien-
ces in Sweden. The situation was somewhat different in respect to 
historical and antiquarian research, which became important vehicles 
66 	 On the boundary-work between physics and mathematics see e.g. Westman 1980. 
Dear 1987. Biagioli 1993. On the changing relations between natural philosophy 
and medicine see Cook 1991. 
67 	 Westman 1980, p. 111, 115-117. Biagioli 1993, p. 1-6, et passim. 
for state ideology.68 All in all, the lack of competing organizations 
and institutions strengthened the monopoly of knowledge and learning 
which the universities had in Sweden. This also may serve as a partial 
explanation for the stability which characterized 17th-century learning 
at Turku. 
Thus the epistemological and disciplinary boundaries were not 
simply a means for organizing the function of the university institu-
tion, but more importantly they also formed a considerable power-
structure. This power was usually of a very abstract kind, the power 
over knowledge, and only through that did it become power usable 
in the social realm of life. The academicans had the power to deter-
mine what counts as real philosophical knowledge and they were un-
derstandably reluctant to resign it to those proponents of new science 
who indeed already claimed it themselves. I would like to illustrate 
my point from two different ways in which this power-struggle sur- 
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The second Cartesian dispute at Uppsala (1686-89) began, when 
the Clergy demanded a full prohibition of Cartesian philosophy in 
Sweden at the Diet of 1686. Only the teaching of "experimental phi-
losophy" in physics was to be permitted. The Clergy's proposals for 
realizing this prohibition included far-reaching measures against the 
then existing practices in which non-theological faculties were relati-
vely independent. For example, an extensive right to censor theses in 
all faculties was proposed, and the right to control all nominations to 
academic posts. The clergy also demanded that physics teaching which 
then was located in the Faculty of Medicine at Uppsala, should be 
returned to the Faculty of Arts. Behind this proposal was the idea to 
bring natural philosophy back onto ground more easily controllable 
by theologians. Cartesianism had a strong foothold in the Faculty of 
Medicine, whereas the Faculty of Arts had until then remained more 
faithful to Aristotelian philosophy. From the clergy's point of view, 
these demands were legitimized by the idea that philosophy should 
be theology's servant. Discharge of an insubordinate servant was the-
refore fully justified.69 
Such extensive demands quite naturally evoked a strong response. 
The clergy's demands for increased control were, in fact, very straight- 
68 Lindroth 1975, p. 197-204, 235-348. 
69 	 For the details of the clergy's claims see Lindborg 1965, p. 226-244, et passim. 
forward. On the practical level the controversy was urged by deman-
ding that all faculties give a written response to the clergy's proposals, 
and the king would then settle the matter on the basis of these answers. 
The controversy was quite explicitly over the question who should 
have the right to control the contents of teaching. In other words, 
should the teaching of physics be transferred to the Faculty of Arts 
or not? The issue of philosophical liberty became central. Although 
Cartesian philosophy hardly was introduced into Uppsala in order to 
create a gulf between philosophy and theology, in the course of the 
controversy Cartesian philosophy became a symbol for the reorganiza-
tion of the spheres of natural philosophy and theology. In this histo-
rical situation the Faculty of Philosophy - previously rather traditional 
in its actions - was also ready to join the medics in attacking Aristo-
telian philosophy, and stand up for the "freedom of philosophy".70 
Developments at Turku took a totally different route. No movement 
for more freedom in philosophy arose at Turku, thinking and social 
relations being much more homogeneous in this respect. The Faculty 
of Theology was even more dominant at Turku than at Uppsala, where 
for example the Faculty of Medicine had a considerably more power-
ful position in relation to other faculties. The relatively powerful po-
sition of the Medical Faculty on the other hand was due to the good 
relations which it had with certain powerful noblemen (especially to 
the De la Gardies' through Olaf Rudbeck Sr.). Turku, however, was 
much more outside the interest of nobility. The homogeneity of 
thought at Turku may have had other contributing factors as well, 
since the town was small and the social circles of the learned class 
were small indeed. The academic community was bound together by 
several marriages, and also this kind of communality may have 
strengthened the us-against-the-newcomers feeling.71 It is no wonder 
that those scholars who had studied at Uppsala, such as Rudeen, and 
had been used to the confrontational relations between theology and 
philosophy and to the somewhat more liberated position of philosophy, 
got into trouble when they tried to continue in the same way at Turku. 
My other example is more directly connected to Turku, although 
it also involves more abstract conceptions of power. The question is 
about Copernicanism and the burning issue iof its incompatibility with 
70 Lindborg 1965, p. 277-307. 
71 Klinge 1987, p. 221-231. 
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the Bible. It is not my intention here to show that the only causes for 
rejecting Copernicanism for so long were theological, although dog-
matic arguments obviously played an important part in the process. 
Motion of the Earth was interpreted as against the word of the Bible. 
However, another way of interpreting it was also available. This so-
called principle of accommodation was expressed as early as 1584 by 
an Augustinian hermit Diego de Zuniga in his Commentary on Job, 
but it really became famous only when Kepler and Galileo especially 
started to employ it in their arguments for the heliocentric world sys-
tem.72  According to this view the Bible talks about most natural phe-
nomena in accordance with people's vague and simple understanding. 
Thus when the Bible says that the Sun and the Moon stood still it 
could be interpreted as meaning only how this phenomenon would 
seem to us. This interpretation was banned by the Catholic church in 
1616 after having been used by such a skilled propagandist as Galileo. 
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This interpretation could no more be embraced by the orthodox Lut- 
heranism than be tolerated by the Roman Catholic Church. 
When the 17th-century theologians argued against this interpretati-
on, they said that it denigrated the nobility of the Holy Book. God 
would not lie, not even about the physical facts. In my opinion the 
matter can also be seen from a different point of view. The reason 
why the principle of acommodation was regarded as so dangerous was 
that it implied a threat to the dominant position of the clergy. We can 
first of all ask what constituted the "nobility" of the Bible. The argu-
ment against the principle of accommodation used by theologians im-
plies that nobility of the text was constituted by the expertise needed 
for its interpretation. It was stated that if the Bible had been written 
in accordance with the understanding of the common man, this would 
produce "vulgarity". In other words, it would indicate that "ordinary 
people" were supposed to be capable of interpreting it. Whatever the 
intentions of Luther's reformation in translating the Bible and bringing 
it closer to the people, the orthodox tradition certainly did not grant 
the right to interpret the Scripture to just anyone. The authority to 
make judgements concerning the words of the Bible was bound to 
theological expertise, and the expression of legitimate expertise was 
the priesthood. According to the orthodox Lutheran dogma the Holy 
Ghost was included in the text itself, which made literal reading of 
72 Moss 1993, p. 129-147. 
the Bible possible. However, in practice the ability to interprete rightly 
was bound up with a certain professional status.73 For example Mil-
topaeus was made to feel this in being officially reproached for ma-
king statements concerning theological matters when he had opposed 
the use of some concepts in Petrus Bång's thesis.74 
Although the Galilean controversies were well-known in Europe, 
this did not defer an author at Turku from promoting the principle of 
accommodation. This was of course Kexlerus, who in his astronomical 
manuscript took a positive stance towards this interpretation. Was 
Kexlerus then a religious dissident demanding more democratic rights 
for interpreting the Scripture? Hardly so, but in his case we might 
think of two possible reasons for adopting this exceptional view. First 
of all he probably relied heavily on the ability of mathematical ast-
ronomy to produce knowledge that really had relevance for physics. 
By the 1660's it was no longer unusual for astronomers elsewhere to 
defend the validity of some form of this principle.75 This was then 	 399 
combined with a less rigid view of religion, Kexlerus belonging to 
the generation which was still much inspired by the older sort of ort-
hodox Lutheran tradition which was less aggressive in many respects, 
although not directly accepting the principle of accommodation. 
All in all it seems that the social and disciplinary relations at the 
University formed a power-structure which had a strong tendency to 
maintain itself. More radical changes which would have shaken these 
power-structures were difficult to achieve without strong impetus from 
outside. Indeed, there was a tendency at Turku to see most influences 
coming from outside as bad and disturbing. But it also seems that the 
maintainance of the established disciplinary structures and thereby the 
old forms of knowledge had support in a larger context too. I have 
highlighted the reluctance of the church and theologians to accept 
changes; however, the old order was much preferred by the king too. 
Of course both the church and the state needed well-educated but 
docile servants who would do their duties without wasting their time 
on new ideas which might even lead them to questioning the premises 
of the established system. This aspect was especially important for an 
73 Hägglund 1971, p. 281-284. Klinge 1987, p. 606. 
74 On the Miltopaeus case see section "Theology and Philosophy - Subordination 
or Submission?" 
75 Brooke 1991, p. 57, 100, et passim. Westman 1986, p. 89-93. Shea 1986, p. 
118-133. Westfall 1986. 
absolute monarch whose authority presupposed to a great extent the 
internal stability of the country's institutions. For example in France 
- the absolutist state par excellence - the main motive force of change 
in learning, Cartesianism, was regarded also as politically suspicious. 
This was because Cartesianism was thought to be connected with Jan-
senism, a religious heresy which emphasized the intellectual and spi-
ritual freedom of man. Indeed, as D.M. Clarke has remarked, the Car-
tesians "were correctly identified as sharing the Jansenist belief in the 
authority of human reason". This was of course a force competing 
with the absolute authority of the king.76 
On the whole the role of the king in directing academic life was 
highlighted during absolutism. Whereas in the earlier parts of the 17th 
century Swedish universities had been relatively independent from 
each other, from the 1680's on a new centralization policy became 
aparent in the universities. We have seen that the king served as the 
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highest authority in resolving doctrinal disputes. In addition to this 
resolution on Cartesianism in 1689 the king normally also sent other 
circulars to all academies. Their contents varied from forbidding the 
espousal of "useless novelties" to urging more control of students' 
pub-crawling. The role of Uppsala as the main university of the count-
ry was emphasized. On the other hand the Chancellor, a nobleman, 
provided another kind of tendency in the state's educational policies. 
An expression of this new policy at Turku was that in the 1690's 
several new professors from Uppsala were nominated to various 
chairs, some of them against the will of the Senate of the Academy. 
It was common to these men, Magnus Steen, Torsten Rudeen and 
Christiern Alander, that they had adopted ideas still very controversial 
at Turku, such as Copernicanism and Cartesianism. In this way state 
policy did not one-sidedly aim at a status quo, but it also indirectly 
changed the course of learning at Turku.77 
Both the absolutist monarchy and the university institution itself 
were based on a common feature, the need for subordinates to trust 
their authority. The rationalistic principles of Cartesianism placed a 
much greater role on the independent reason of the individual: "Car- 
76 Clarke 1989, p. 28-33. 
77 Klinge 1987, p. 125-128. Whereas the idea that more Uppsala men should be 
appointed to posts at other universities was in accordance with the centralization 
politics driven by the King, it was the Chancellor of the Academy of Turku, 
Count Wallenstedt, who pushed these particular men into office at Turku. 
tesians were accurately perceived, therefore, as challenging the as-
sumption that scientific issues could be resolved by reference to any-
one's authority, Aristotle's, the church's, or the king's."78 Independent 
thought in natural philosophy was not only dangerous because it could 
spread from there to disrespect of other authorities, but also because 
it destroyed one central characteristic of Aristotelian knowledge, its 
impersonality. However, Cartesianism was not the only threat to the 
impersonality of knowledge; eclecticism also emphasized the active 
role of an individual in judging the validity of various claims to know-
ledge. It is probably no coincidence that eclecticism was promoted at 
Turku expressly by Cartesians, and Daniel Achrelius. Although Ach-
relius was by no means an anti-monarchist, his political sympathies 
were clearly on the side of the aristocracy.79 As a political counter-
balance to the absolute monarch's power the aristocracy was also more 
liable to adopt those ideals which emphasized individuality against 
absolute authority. In this respect the somewhat more independent 
thinking of eclecticism could well suit their world-view. 
Another point of view the importance of which should be conside-
red is that the Academy of Turku was very new in the 17th century. 
It has been suggested that the need to procure basic academic educa-
tion partially caused the slowness of change at Turku.80 When teachers 
had to concentrate on teaching the basics to the students they did not 
have the time and possibly not the capacity to adopt new ideas. How-
ever, in my opinion this explanation is not fully plausible. The fresh-
ness of the institution does not in itself explain dogmatism. Higher 
education did not have much older roots in Sweden either, where the 
University of Uppsala started functioning effectively only during the 
1620's. Nevertheless, this institution was more prone to adopt new 
ideas than the Academy of Turku. On the other hand, in the Nether-
lands the dynamic character of the universities such as Leiden was 
partly due to the fact that they were new and thus not stuck to any 
old traditions. I do not think that it was so much the need to give 
basic instruction as other factors which made this new university so 
conservative. The professors in a small community without their own 
long traditions may have felt insecurity and inferiority in their position, 
and by sticking to the old forms they may have tried to convince 
78 Clarke 1989, p. 35-36. 
79 Klinge 1987, p. 596. 
80 Lehti 1979, p. 64-65. 
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themselves and the others of their competence. New ideas got the 
status of deviant science and/or heresy. They functioned as a contrast, 
by which one's own practices could be compared. In this way the 
proponents of new and yet unsettled academic traditions at Turku de-
fined their own internal coherence. Thereby they also outlined and 
strengthened their own position.81 Together with strong religious dog-
matism this would lead to the situation described in this work. 
The factors which contribute to the stability of learning at the Aca-
demy of Turku are often subtle and it is not always easy to substantiate 
these claims very strongly, even less so with the final feature which 
I would like to advance. I would like to spend some time speculating 
on an idea which I think might help us understand the "anti-noveltism" 
which was, of course, a central factor contributing to the slowness of 
change. It seems to me that the causes behind this conservatism were 
not simply dogmatic, but stem from the more general features of the 
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social ethics of Lutheran culture and even penetrate to the deeper level 
of community mentality. The reluctance to accept change arises at 
least partially from the communality which in the 17th century per-
vaded all spheres of life. To start with, I would like to briefly portray 
an analogical case from religion and explain how communality ori-
ginated in the religious sphere of life. 
Lutheran social ethics emphasized the priority of the interests of 
the whole community in relation to individuals. All members of the 
community had to adapt their actions and behaviour so that they would 
promote the need of society to secure its own existence. Selfishness 
was dangerous, and according to a parable used by Luther it was 
sometimes better to amputate a limb so that the rest of the body would 
survive. However, the Lutheran ideal of society was very hierarchical. 
It was up to the authorities to decide what would serve the good of 
the entire community; moreover, it was stressed that even the secular 
authority had its ultimate source in God.82 Another train of thought 
which is relevant to communality stems from the Augustinian tradi-
tion, which had a strong influence in Lutheran thought in general. 
What interests us here is St. Augustine's attitude towards sin and the 
relations between sin and community. In his De Civitate Dei St. Au-
gustine talks about family and how peace is maintained in a family. 
ß1 	 On the role of deviant science as a determinant of "official science" see Dolby 
1979. Kurtz 1983. 
ß2 	 Laulaja 1981, p. 95-120, 178-179, et passim. 
Now as St. Augustine explicitly says, families are the elements of 
which the entire society consists. Therefore his ideas about family are 
applicable to the entire "City of God".83 St. Augustine's own words 
will put the matter most clearly: 
And if any member of the family interrupts the domestic peace by 
disobedience, he is corrected either by word or blow, or some kind 
of just and legitimate punishment, such as society permits, that he 
may himself be the better for it, and be readjusted to the family 
harmony from which he had dislocated himself. For as it is not 
benevolent to give a man help at the expense of some greater benefit 
he might receive, so it is not innocent to spare a man at the risk 
of his falling into graver sin. To be innocent, we must not only do 
harm to no man, but also restrain him from sin and punish his sin, 
so that either the man himself who is punished may profit by his 
experience, or others be warned by his example.84 
We have here the source of the idea that a community must not 
put up with an individual committing sin. The sinner must be punished 
and his or her behaviour rectified by the community - the damaged 
limb must be amputated. Indeed it is not "innocent" for a community 
to allow sin to flourish in some of its individuals. A community doing 
so will be considered as committing sin itself and consequently will 
be punished by God. Several seventeenth-century dissertations written 
at Turku stress that wars, failures of crops and other disasters were 
punishments sent by God to rectify sinful behaviour.85 Punishment 
for an individual's sin could befall the whole village or parish or the 
nation. Religion was therefore by no means a personal matter, but 
very much a communal matter. This kind of an attitude naturally cau-
sed very tight internal control and caution inside the community. Any 
deviant behaviour became a potential sin. 
Another strain of communality stems from the general living con-
ditions of the majority of people. To put it simply and briefly: the 
prevalent agrarian system in southern and western Finland, the so-cal- 
83 St. Augustine 1990, Book XIX, Ch. 16. On St. Augustine's social views see 
Markus 1988, p. 95-100, 140-144, et passim. 
84 St. Augustine 1990, Book XIX, Ch. 16. 
85 Achrelius 1682, p. 148, 154, 163. Hahn-Melliin 1686, p. 10, 14, 27, 41. Hahn-
Iflander 1961, p. 9-10. Hahn-Ekedahl 1695, p. 15. 
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led "open-field system", forced people to work together in their fields. 
The land was so scattered around that it was impossible to cultivate 
one's own piece of land only. Therefore, everyone's work was de-
manded for the survival of the community. Moreover, the communali-
ty of life including religion was strengthened by the fact that the vil-
lages were closely built. The pressure for uniform behaviour was 
strongly felt in all areas of peasant and small-town cultural life.S6 
All this is of course very roughly put and has to be taken as a very 
generalised description. The main point I am putting forward here is, 
however, that 17th-century life in general and religion in particular 
were very communal so that every individual's behaviour and beliefs 
were considered to influence the future of the larger community. 
The academic world was also a community, for which coherence 
was also important. The bans on novelties cited above explicitly show 
concern for averting disagreements. An individual's exceptional be- 
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haviour or his unusual ideas could easily be seen as a threat to the 
coherence of the community. When somebody presented new ideas 
in philosophy he not only violated the accepted dogmas, but he also 
stepped out of line, making himself different from others. Often he 
was also seen to set himself above others. Doing this he obviously 
broke the hierarchical order. In religion every kind of deviant beha-
viour was a potential sin. In philosophy, every new idea was also a 
potential heresy, either theological or philosophical, and often in both 
senses. In other words the mere act of differing from the (academic) 
community was threatening in itself. Dissent, revolting against the set 
rules and hierarchical structure of the community became a "sin" in 
itself, and should be punished accordingly. 
What has to be emphasised here is that I am not suggesting a causal 
connection between religious beliefs and practices on one hand, and 
the conservatism in philosophy on the other. I am nevertheless sug-
gesting that there is a parallel or an analogy between them, and a 
pattern of thinking can easily be transferred from one sphere of life 
to another. Religion and learning were not so very separate spheres 
of life anyway, especially because the general rules of Lutheran ethics 
applied to the both. There were of course differences as well. In the 
secular sphere of society what counted as a crime or an offence was 
defined by the law. In religion the nature of sin was a stated dogma 
86 Anttila 1986, p. 354-355. 
as well. In philosophy there was, of course, the official policy of 
anti-innovationism, but nevertheless the definition of what was novel 
was blurred. In my opinion this parallel between religious conformity 
and hostility to new ideas in philosophy, does indeed make the 17th-
century mentality more understandable to us, although it may not offer 
any causal explanations of this attitude. The fact that the hostility 
towards the new was not peculiar to Lutheran Finland only is of course 
somewhat problematic, but in my opinion it does not necessarily di-
minish the explanatory power of this analogy. There is no reason why 
wide-spread phenomena could not have also local factors contributing 
to their existence in a certain area. 
To sum up, we can hardly discern any single major cause of the 
stability of learning at the Academy of Turku. Various intellectual, 
institutional, social, political and economic factors, even those per-
taining to the 17th-century mentality intertwine and interact, thereby 
constituting instead a context in which hostility is a natural response 	 405 
to most types of change. According to Martha Ornstein's famous study 
this is the attitude all European universities adopted during the 17th 
century. In the next, and at the same time the last subsection of this 
chapter I shall consider the question of whether Turku thus genuinely 
represents an all-European trend, or was there something more typi-
cally peripheral in the attitudes adopted there? Where should we place 
Turku on the academic map of Sweden and Europe? 
5. PART OF SWEDEN, PART OF 
EUROPE 
The purpose of this subsection is to consider what role the Academy 
of Turku played in the educational system of Sweden, and what kind 
of demands and conditions this role made on learning in natural phi-
losophy at Turku. A further question is whether there was something 
in this role which would explain the special characteristics of natural 
philosophical learning at Turku. Conversely we could also ask whether 
there was something in the learning itself which might partly explain 
the institution's role in general. 
What were the other Universities in Sweden like during the 17th 
century? The University of Tartu was founded in 1632 on the model 
of the University of Uppsala. It was founded in a recently-occupied 
part of the country, and its explicit aim was to educate local youth 
and thereby root Swedish law and clerical culture in the country. Des-
pite these well-meaning intentions, the University had little effect on 
the Balts themselves. Most of the approximately ten professors were 
German, and the majority of students came from Sweden and Finland. 
Otherwise the strong cultural influence of the German-Baltic nobility 
was felt in the life of the Academy too. Located in a restive area near 
the Russian border, the University of Tartu soon fell under Russian 
control. It stopped in 1665 (having functioned in Tallinn from 1656 
to 1665), and it was not refounded until 1690. Even then the proximity 
of the border brought a great degree of unrest to the life of the Uni-
versity. In 1699 it had to be moved to a safer location to Pernau, and 
in 1710 it closed down again. Although the German influence was 
strong in the University even at the later stage of its existence, most 
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professors were now Swedish. The University was rather lively, mo- 
dern ideas such as natural right and pietism being openly taught there. 
The number of students remained relatively small, however, and on 
the whole the University did not meet the expectations which had 
been set for it.87 
The University of Greifswald was also located on land occupied in 
the 1630's. However, it was of older German origin and not founded 
by the Swedes. It functioned according to its old German statutes and 
was never joined to the tradition Uppsala and Turku shared. During 
the Thirty Years' War until 1648 the University hardly functioned at 
all. Although this University with its ten ordinary and eight extraor-
dinary professors was rather well-off especially towards the end of 
the century, it caused all other kinds of trouble throughout the century. 
There was a conspicuous lack of discipline and the status of the deg-
rees became notoriously low. It is a special feature of Greifswald that 
due to its geographical location it constantly had to compete for stu-
dents with several other universities on German ground. Greifswald 
was nevertheless popular among Swedish-Finnish students as well - 
Lars Nihlen assumes that poorer students especially found Greifswald 
attractive.88 Whatever importance it may have had in its time, some 
historians regard its influence on the Swedish culture in general as 
87 	 Lindroth 1975, p. 48-50. Klinge 1987, p. 119-122. Piirimäe 1985, p. 29-53, 56-65. 
88 Nihlen 1983, p. 98. 
very slight indeed.89 
Life at the University of Lund was not much more peaceful than 
in the other two Universities. Just like Tartu and Greifswald, Lund 
was located on recently acquired land. This also caused much of its 
difficulty. Warfare between Sweden and Denmark went on during the 
17th century, and the Academy founded in 1666 was soon trampled 
under soldiers' feet. To start with it was supposed to be a big insti-
tution, and it even had its own statutes (although modified from those 
of Uppsala). However, lack of money and a certain degree of incon-
sistency in its planning shrank it to only a medium size. Most of the 
students were Danish, German or Swedish. Although not as successful 
as expected in this early phase the University of Lund became a quite 
respectable institution. This is true especially of the time after the 
break (1676-1682) which the war caused in its operation. In this latter 
period it got statutes from Uppsala, the professors nominated there 
were exclusively Swedish and the foreign students had left during the 	 407 
war. Lund became characteristically a provincial university for Skåne 
and Blekinge, which then undoubtedly could effectively fulfil its main 
function in "swedifying" previously Danish provinces. Lund Univer-
sity's provincial character was strengthened by the fact that it re-
mained relatively small. With its roughly 200 students it was clearly 
smaller than Uppsala and Turku.90 
Thus, compared with the other provincial universities in Sweden 
Turku seemed a peaceful and reliable university indeed. The focus of 
the state policy was directed towards Central Europe and Poland for 
most of the century. This made Turku politically a safe haven far 
from the centres of crisis. The internal discipline at the University 
was relatively good too. Of course, there always was some squabble 
caused by the young, noisy and all-too-often drunken students, but 
the reputation of Turku in this respect was no worse than of most 
other university towns. Moreover, Turku was located in an old pro-
vince which was an established part of the country. There was thus 
no need for such an ideological campaign at Turku as there was in 
Tartu and especially in Lund. All in all Turku must have appeared a 
relatively good and secure choice for getting a degree in Sweden. It 
89 	 Lindroth 1975, p. 47-48. "Men det lilla Greifswaldsuniversitetet behöll sin tyska 
prägel och blev tills vidare inte av någon betydelse för vår nationella kultur." 
Klinge 1987, p. 122-123. 
90 Lindroth 1975, p. 53-56. Klinge 1987, p. 124-125. Weibull 1868, p. 1-148. 
was located far enough from Stockholm and Uppsala not to be directly 
under the eyes of the nation's rulers all the time, and this increased 
its autonomy in certain matters, but it certainly was not in any distant 
periphery either; the merchants at least sailed frequently between the 
two staple towns Turku and Stockholm. So what was the relationship 
between the Academy of Turku and the University of Uppsala, then? 
The main university of the country was founded in 1593 by the 
famous Uppsala meeting, in which the confessional Swedish state-
bound church was also born. Swedish nationality was set there against 
the old Union-period Danish direction and the more recent Polish and 
catholic connections. The university therefore had to be national and 
Lutheran - the two themes were closely bound together in the politics 
of the 1590's. It was, after all, only about seventy years previously 
that the country had been forced into reformation by king Gustaf Vasa 
in the 1520's. The clerical connection of the new university was es- 
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tablished by the fact that the new university was located at Uppsala, 
which was traditionally the town of the arch-bishop. It was officially 
founded in 1595, but the beginnings were modest and torn with in-
ternal controversies. From 1613 on the circumstances gradually imp-
roved and in the 1620's the university was profoundly modified and 
strengthened. Although the education of vicars remained its main func-
tion, the emphasis in its learning shifted from clerical needs towards 
fulfilling the needs of the state. Ramistic philosophy and the ideals 
of Renaissance humanism were new leading motives, and gradually 
the University of Uppsala made itself attractive for the education of 
the nobility. With its 20 professors and around 1000 students by the 
1630's it was not only a big university, but was also crucial for the 
state because of its location near Stockholm. In the aristocratic world 
of the 17th century it was not unimportant that Uppsala had several 
highly-ranked noblemen such as Skytte, Oxenstierna and De la Gardie 
as its patrons (chancellors).91  
Although the University of Uppsala thus was clearly the most im-
portant university of the country, and its constitution was copied in 
both Tartu and Turku, and later in Lund, it nevertheless remained 
relatively separate from its younger sister-institutions. It is also curious 
how little of the doctrinal developments at the University of Uppsala 
became known and were discussed at Turku. This was not necessarily 
91 Lindroth 1975, p. 16-47. Klinge 1987, p. 24-32, 39-48. 
due to lack of contact, because many students studied at both univer-
sities. Moreover, the ratio between Finnish-born and Swedish profes-
sors at Turku shows only a slight advantage to the Finns: altogether 
21 professors of 46 during the years 1640-1713 came from Sweden 
and 25 from the province of Finland.97 During the Cartesian disputes 
in the 1680's, for instance, some professors from Turku took an active 
part in the disputes at Uppsala. Nevertheless the natural philosophical 
learning at the University of Turku followed its own characteristic 
trends in relation to its mother university despite the fact that the 
tradition was originally brought ready-made from Uppsala. It was not 
until the absolutist king adopted a new kind of centralization policy 
that the two universities became more tightly bound together. Both 
universities produced mostly clergymen, although Uppsala was spe-
cially characterised by the education of nobility. The statistics com-
paring the background of the students and their profession after fi- 
nishing their studies reveals quite a lot about the direction in which 	 409 
the main function of the University of Turku lies. 
Clearly the largest proportion of students at Turku came from the 
homes of priests or professors. From 1640 to 1709, 15-26% of all 
students were clergymens' sons. The local townsmen were also rela-
tively eager to send their sons to get higher education, since 5-11% 
of students came from tradesmen's or craftsmen's families. About the 
same number of students, 3-8%, and in the period 1700-1709 as much 
as 14% came from the lower clergy's and teachers' rank. Only 3-6% 
of students were of noble descent - the proportion declining sharply 
after the beginning of the war in 1700. Peasants' sons formed 3-5% 
of the students, whereas all other major groups of people such as 
officials give rise only to one or two percent each. These statistics 
are only indicative, because 61-40% of the social status of the stu-
dents' fathers remains unknown. The students choice of a clerical ca-
reer is more clear; as many as 40-50% of students became priests of 
some rank. The production of bureaucrats was surprisingly small re-
latively, as only 3-6% of students ended up as officials or local judges. 
Here one has to remember that the need for civil servants was still 
relatively limited after all. University education was obviously not a 
very efficient way of rising to the ranks of nobility, because only 
92 Lindroth 1975, p. 52. Of course, these numbers also prove that the Academy 
became an important educational channel for the people in this province. On 
students visiting both Turku and Uppsala see Strömberg (forthcoming). 
3-7% of students were granted these privileges - about the same per-
centage of students belonged to the nobility even while studying. Once 
again the marginal for error is considerable, because the latter phases 
of the lives of 32-49% of students remains obscure.93 
Obviously then the main role of the University of Turku was to 
produce orthodox Lutheran clergymen. However, this was not exclu-
sively for the needs of the province. (About half of the students came 
from the bishopric of Turku. One half to one third of the students 
came from other parts of Sweden.94) This context explains the status 
of natural philosophy. For intending vicars natural philosophy was 
important only as far as the knowledge of natural phenomena was 
necessary for their all-round education, and of course as preparatory 
studies before taking courses in the higher disciplines. From this point 
of view it should not be surprising that the reluctance for change was 
especially strong for theological reasons at Turku. There is nothing 
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new in these remarks and they only remind us of the fact that the 
institutional setting created a context which set the limits to the scope 
of possible actions this particular discipline could take. On the other 
hand nothing seems to indicate that the reverse situation would have 
had any importance. The seemingly conservative character of the Uni-
versity of Turku and the slow rate of doctrinal change there did not 
diminish its importance on a national scale. On the contrary, some 
parents may have preferred to send their sons to Turku than to Upp-
sala, which was torn by Cartesian disputes and was therefore a less 
"safe" place for clergymen-to-be. 
What it comes to the all-European scale, the University of Turku 
did naturally not have such a meaningful function as it had within the 
Swedish state. All it had to offer European learning were the inscrip-
tion payments by the peregrinating students who came to complete 
their studies at some, predominantly German and Dutch universities. 
But was the rate of change at the Academy of Turku then much slower 
than in other European universities? It is not my intention to give a 
thorough picture of learning in Europe, but just to sketch the situation 
in order to be able to relate Turku to these developments. 
England was of course one of the leading nations in promoting the 
new science, and the situation there is one of the most studied in 
93 	 The percentages are based on the statistics compiled by Strömberg 1987, p. 322- 
323. 
94 Strömberg 1987, p. 307-309. 
history of science. The "new Baconian science" especially succeeded 
in making a breakthrough there and the Royal Society quickly became 
its authoritative proponent. Universities, on the other hand, were for 
a long time hostile to the new scientific institutions. The foundation 
of new kinds of institutes threatened the educational monopoly of the 
universities, which meant danger not only for their intellectual status, 
but also a toughened competition for patrons and finances. Opposition 
to the new natural philosophy itself was much less, and indeed a re-
markable amount of "new" material was included in university curri-
culums during the 17th century.95 Empiricism and experimentalism 
became the prevalent attitude in England, which to some extent dis-
couraged the acceptance of mechanistic philosophies such as Car-
tesianism. 
Although France played little part in giving birth to the new science, 
it came to hold an eminent position in this field later in the century. 
In France we meet a considerable variety of educational institutions. 
In addition to traditional Universities there were the so called colleges 
de plein exercice, which gave courses in philosophy and humanities. 
Many of these colleges were run by religious organizations such as 
the Jesuits. Aristotelianism remained a particularly vivid tradition in 
French universities, and there was for a long time no consensus about 
the proper philosophical basis of the emerging new science or natural 
philosophy. For certain religious and political reasons mechanistic phi-
losophy made its breakthrough only from the 1690's on. By the 1660's 
empirical philosophy was already in vogue and there was an abun-
dance of astronomers, chemists and anatomists especially. Instead of 
flourishing much in the universities, the new science grew especially 
in the scientific salons in Paris established around the 1650's and 
1660's. This new philosophy was embraced especially by court aris-
tocracy and the urban elite. As a sign of the official recognition of 
experimental philosophy, the Academie royale des Sciences was es-
tablished in 1666, which at the same time brought the new science 
under state control. As the popularity of experimental science grew 
in the latter part of the seventeenth century, mostly due to successful 
popularization, the creative activity became more centralized in Paris. 
In France too the Universities were mainly to educate priests, and the 
reluctance to change was obvious even there. Only the fear of loosing 
95 Feingold 1991. Gascoigne 1985. Henry 1992. 
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respect in the eyes of the Parisian establishment and consequently a 
considerable number of students made the Universities to adopt new 
material into their curriculums.96 
A general feature of the many new philosophies of this age was 
that most of them placed importance on the role of mathematics as 
the language of (experimental) philosophy, although each in a different 
respect and to a various extent. In Italy this approach was naturally 
promoted first and foremost by Galileo. The new science was favoured 
for the most part by regional princes. Botany and medicine especially 
kept on flourishing in Italy, but the general tendency is that after the 
1670's Italian science became more and more marginalized from Eu-
ropean developments - Spain and Portugal remained scientifically 
backward for most of the century.97 The vivid scientific practice in 
the Low Countries during the seventeenth century had been based on 
a considerable amount of activity during the previous century. At the 
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turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Low Countries 
underwent a boom in founding new universities. Mathematics, natural 
history and medicine prospered, and often the traditions of empirical 
investigation and mathematical accuracy were combined in the acti-
vities of the same persons. The Dutch were no great system-builders 
but they did a great job in getting straight many of the details in the 
natural world. On the other hand the Netherlands was blessed with 
skilled craftsmen who for their part contributed to the birth of new 
science by manufacturing scientific instruments of outstanding quali-
ty.98 
Some parts of the German-speaking area of Europe had suffered 
severely during the Thirty Years' War. It also seems that German 
universities lost much of their eminence during the war. The whole 
of German-speaking area was split up into principalities, and the state 
of learning varied greatly in different universities. In the small prin-
cipalities, universities were more to guard the "right" religion and 
show the power of the ruler than to promote new and often rebellious 
ways of thinking. It was no wonder, then, that so-called Neo-Scho-
lasticism still flourished also in the University of Wittenberg, which 
the scholars of Turku held in high esteem.99 On the other hand, some 
96 Brockliss 1981, 1987, 1992. Clarke 1989. 
97 Biagioli 1992. Goodman 1992. 
98 Cook 1992. Ruestow 1973. 
99 Evans 1981. Lindroth 1975, p. 56-65. 
Germans were deeply interested in instrumental experimentation, and 
after 1670 many universities got their physics classes structured 
around experiments. It was typical of German learning however, that 
it still mostly relied on the Aristotelian framework although Paracel-
sian, atomistic and Cartesian elements were gradually fused into it.10° 
It seems then that there is no single pattern of development in se-
venteenth century natural philosophical learning. Indeed, in compa-
rison with the developments in other European universities learning 
at Turku did not change at a very different pace. If we illustrate this 
development for example by comparing the arrival and at least partial 
acceptance of Copemicanism and Cartesianism in various countries, 
we get the following picture. In Oxford and Cambridge Cartesian phi-
losophy had been discussed since the 1640's, and such conspicuous 
figures as Newton studied Cartesian physics.101 In Paris Cartesianism 
became triumphant only in the 1690's, and in Protestant Geneve 
Chouet introduced the new natural philosophy during the 1680's.102 	 413 
In the Netherlands Cartesianism had been discussed from the 1640's 
on. Although most German States despised or even prohibited this 
philosophy, some elements of it nevertheless managed to infiltrate into 
their universities.103 Copernicanism, on the other hand, was accepted 
as the superior cosmological theory in most Protestant universities in 
the period 1650-1700. Catholic Europe tended to embrace heliocent-
rism considerably later. Only in Louvain in the Low Countries did 
most professors "convert to heliocentricity" between 1650-1670, whe-
reas in France the more secular scholars adopted the theory in the 
1690's. But the Jesuit colleges in France as well as the other predo-
minantly Catholic countries such as Hungary, Poland and Spain yiel-
ded themselves to Copernicanism only during the period 1750-1770.104 
The picture thus achieved is of course defective in many respects. 
It does not, for instance, tell us what parts of Cartesianism were ac-
cepted and in which form. However, it becomes quite clear that the 
10o Clark I992b. 
t 01 	 Gascoigne 1985, p. 405-406. 
102 Brockliss 1981, p. 52-60. Heyd 1982, passim. 
103 Cook 1992, p. 129-131. Ruestow 1973, p. 36-72. Clark 1992, p. 107. 
104 Brockliss 1990, p. 201-203. Brockliss writes about the Protestant universities: 
"Heliocentricity captured Leiden and Oxford in the 1650s, Cambridge, Geneva, 
Copenhagen and the Scottish universities in the 1660s and 1670s, and Basel and 
the Swedish universities in the 1680s and 1690s." See also articles in Dobrzycki 
(ed.) 1973. 
slowness of change at Turku is more or less an illusion caused by 
comparison not with other universities but with other factors which 
contributed to or followed from the rise of new science. Most univer-
sities in Europe had broadly speaking similar aims, i.e. they taught 
priests and lawyers. Therefore they were also less eager to make ra-
dical changes to curriculums which suited their purposes. New kinds 
of scientific institutions and the rise of other non-academic learned 
groups such as court-scholars, almanac-makers and surgeons put Uni-
versities in a competitive position in the 17th century historical con-
text. In Sweden, and especially in Finland there were either no such 
competitive institutions or groups, or they were too weak to pose a 
challenge to academic learning. The Academy of Turku had a mono-
poly on learning, and this position was about to turn it monolithic. 
But the eighteenth century brought in its train many social and 
political changes. After the Great Northern War Sweden had lost its 
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powerful political position. Absolutist monarchy was gone and the 
new Constitution of the country gave much power to the Parliament. 
Even the orthodoxy of the Lutheran church had to adapt itself to new 
conditions when pietism strengthened its hold. Outwardly the Univer-
sity of Turku did not change much, its basic disciplinary structure, 
constitutions and even its main function remaining the same. However, 
in this new cultural and social context not even the University could 
avoid change and it gradually started to respond to the demands of 
new utilitarian thinking. Old forms and practices were imbued with 
new values and aims. It did not immediately adopt all the niceties of 
new science, become creative, dynamic and international, but the new 
generation of professors which came to be nominated after the break 
from 1713 to 1722 certainly belonged to a different scientific culture. 
The time of scholasticism was inevitably over. 
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